# RUSSIA (USSR)

## Abaza

Activity: 1992-2020

**General notes**

* The Abazas are concentrated in the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic of the Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 1). However, the Abaza do not appear to have significant influence over the regional government. After 1991, there has been an ethnic power-sharing system in place in Karachai-Cherkessia (Ormrod 1997: 112; Minahan 2002: 911; Comins-Richmond 2002: 76); however, it involved mainly the republic’s two titular nationalities (the Karachais and the Cherkess) and the local Russians. In particular, after the very contentious 1999 presidential election, a deal was struck that the republic’s two top executive positions would go to a Karachai (presidency) and a Cherkess (prime ministry), while the parliament speaker would be a Russian (Fuller 2008). Since the Abaza appear to lack influence over the regional government, we do not code any concession/restriction related to Karachai-Cherkessia.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Abazas are concentrated in the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic of the Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 1).
* Roeder (2007: 134) contends that by March 1992, the Abazas in Karachai-Cherkessia had begun to agitate for a separate Abazian republic within the Russian Federation.
* In the context of the heavily contested 1999 republican presidential elections (from which, under dubious circumstances, a Karachai turned victorious), Cherkess leaders declared a separate Cherkess state (Orttung et al. 2000: 198, 200; AFP 1999). The proposed republic would have included Abazian lands (Minahan 2002: 5). Abazian leaders supported the move, but demanded their own autonomous homeland within the proposed Cherkess-Abaza state (Minahan 2002: 5). In 2000 Abaza and Cherkess parliamentarians refused to take part in sessions of the local parliament, arguing that participation would be invalid since they would soon separate from Karachai-Cherkessia (Minahan 2002: 5).
* According to Minahan (2016), continued agitation resulted in the establishment of a small autonomous district and the Abazas have continued to make claims for a larger territory stretching into Stavropol Krai. In 2018, several thousand ethnic Abazas and Cherkess signed a petition to secede from the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic (Stolicas.su 2018). [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Roeder (2007: 134) reports that by March 1992, the Abazas in Karachai-Cherkessia have begun to agitate for a separate Abazian republic within the Russian Federation. In the context of the heavily contested 1999 republican presidential elections (from which, under dubious circumstances, a Karachai turned victorious), Cherkess leaders declared a separate Cherkess state (Orttung et al. 2000: 198, 200). The proposed republic would have included Abazian lands (Minahan 2002: 5). Abazian leaders supported the move, but demanded their own autonomous homeland within the proposed Cherkess-Abaza state (Minahan 2002: 5). In 2000 Abaza and Cherkess parliamentarians refused to take part in sessions of the local parliament, arguing that participation would be invalid since they would soon separate from Karachai-Cherkessia (Minahan 2002: 5). In the 2010s, Abazas’ continued their demands for secession from Karachay-Cherkessia and creation of the Cherkess-Abaza autonomy (Roth 2015, Stolicas.su 2018, Regnum 2018). Based on this, we code a sub-state secession claim throughout. [1992-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* According to Roeder (2007: 134), the Abazins initially made claims for a separate Abazian republic within the Russian Federation. According to Minahan (2016), the claimed territory includes the current Abazin district but stretches into Stavropol Krai. Because we cannot find any specific information on the location of the Abazins in Stavropol Krai, we code only the Abazin district using geoBoundaries 2017, and code it as ambiguous.
* In 1999, Abazin leaders publicly supported the creation of a joint republic with Cherkess (Minahan 2002: 5). According to Roth (2015: 184), this became the Abazins’ main claim. We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 174). Notably, the claimed territory includes Cherkess areas but, according to Roth, no territories in Stavropol Krai.
* According to Minahan (2016), the Abazas also make claims for the inclusion of additional territories currently in Stavropol Krai into the Abaza autonomous district that was established in 2006. We here follow Roth, who suggests that the claim for the establishment of a joint republic with the Cherkess is dominant.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1999 Cherkess leaders declared a Cherkess state separate from Karachai-Cherkessia (AFP 1999). The proposed republic would have included Abazian lands (Minahan 2002: 5). While Abazian leaders supported the move (Minahan 2002: 5), it appears that the initiative came from Cherkess leaders, hence we do not code the declaration in the case of the Abaza (but we do code it for the Cherkess).

**Separatist armed conflict**

* 26 injuries were found from the 1999 agitation but no casualties were reported, and thus the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Abaza were subjected to strong Russification policies. Stalin had plans to deport the Abaza, but the plan was not realized (Minahan 2002: 4).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Minahan (2016), a small autonomous district was established in 2009. However, according to the Abaza district’s official website, the district was created on 1 June 2006 (Abaza municipal district n.d.). [2006: autonomy concession]
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017 cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The Abazas are concentrated in the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic of the Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 1). However, the Abaza do not appear to have significant influence over the regional government. After 1991, there has been an ethnic power-sharing system in place in Karachai-Cherkessia (Ormrod 1997: 112; Minahan 2002: 911; Comins-Richmond 2002: 76); however, it involved mainly the republic’s two titular nationalities (the Karachais and the Cherkess) and the local Russians. In particular, after the contentious 1999 presidential election, a deal was struck that the republic’s two top executive positions would go to a Karachai (presidency) and a Cherkess (prime ministry), while the parliament speaker would be a Russian (Fuller 2008). Since the Abaza appear to lack influence over the regional government, we do not code them as autonomous.
* In 2006, the Abaza were granted an autonomous district, but this is insufficient for us to code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Abaza |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence for representation in the central government. [1992-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* For the population estimate, we draw on the 2010 census, according to which the Abazas made up 0.03% Russia’s population. [0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Abazas are located in the Karachai-Cherkess republic, where they make up around 7 percent of the local population according to the 1989 census (this share has increased slightly due to Russian outmigration). According to Minahan (2002: 1), a majority of the Abazas lives in 13 towns and villages in Karachai Cherkessia. We browsed district level data from Russia’s 2010 census. According to the 2010 census, there were 43,000 Abazas in Russia. 15,000 reside in the Abazin district in northern Karachai-Cherkessia, where they make up >85% of the local population. Another 5,000 reside in the adjacent Adyge-Khablsky district, where they make up 30% of the population. And another 10,000 reside in the nearby capital of Karachai-Cherkessia, where they make up 8% of the population. In sum, this suggests that the Abazas form a majority in one district, but less than 50% of all Abazas live there. We could not find more fine-grained data. On the basis of district level data, we code the Abazas as not concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 443) suggests that there are Circassians, including Abazas, in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel. Other sources (e.g. the UNPO) also mention that there are people of Circassian descent in particular in Turkey (estimated at up to several million). While many Circassians have assimilated, there appears to be a certain level of ethnic identification among at least some of the Circassians in Turkey (Ayhan 2005). Furthermore, the Abaza are closely related to Georgia’s Abkhaz (Minahan 2002: 1), who number >100,000 (Minahan 2002: 7). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Abkhaz

Activity: 1977-1978; 1988-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In December 1977, 130 Abkazh intellectuals sent a petition to Moscow, demanding the separation from the Georgian SSR and association with the Russian Federation. In 1978 there were demonstrations and further petitions (Jones 1997: 510). Moscow, together with Tbilisi, made minimal concessions in an attempt to calm the situation, ranging from increased investment in the region to minimal language concessions. This appears to have appeased the Abkhaz and ended self-determination activity. We code an end to this first (non-violent) phase in 1978. [start date 1: 1977; end date 1: 1978]
* The movement re-emerged in the late 1980s. A separatist popular front organization called Aiglara (Unity) was formed in 1988. In 1989, 30,000 signatures were gathered to demand full Union Republic status. In August 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic declared independence from the Georgian Republic, claiming that the territory had been illegally annexed by the latter. In addition, the Abkhaz legislature called for the granting of full Union Republic status to the region, which it had briefly enjoyed between 1921 and 1930 (Gurr 2000; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; International Crisi Group 2007, 2013; Jones 1997; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002; MAR).
* The movement remained active when Georgia became independent from the USSR in 1991 (see Abkhaz under Georgia). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 255-256) note that Abkhazians in North Ossetia, Russian Federation, wish to be united with the Abkhaz in Georgia. Probably they mean that some Abkhaz in North Ossetia want Georgian Abkhazia to merge with Russia (which would not constitute a self-determination claim as we define it). We found no Abkhaz self-determination claims in Russia beyond 1991. Thus we code an end to the movement in 1991 and continue to code it under the header of Georgia. [start date 2: 1988; end date 2: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* The initial claim was for separation from the Georgian SSR and incorporation into the Russian Federation (Jones 1997: 510). In the second phase, the demand shifted to separation from Georgia and attainment of full Union Republic status (MAR). In 1989, 30,000 signatures were gathered to demand full Union Republic status. In August 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic declared independence from the Georgian Republic, claiming that the territory had been illegally annexed by the latter. In addition, the Abkhaz legislature called for the granting of full Union Republic status to the region, which it had briefly enjoyed between 1921 and 1930 (Jones 1997: 513; Jones 2013: 32). In light of this evidence, we code a claim for sub-state secession throughout. [1977-1978, 1988-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Abkhaz claimed the Abkhaz Union Republic that existed between 1921 and 1930, which also corresponds to the current Abkhaz autonomous republic within the Republic of Georgia (Minahan 1996: 3). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In August 1990, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared sovereignty and separation from Georgia (Jones 1997: 513; Jones 2013: 44; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Several died in the protests in 1978 (see above), but death estimates are below the 25 marker.
* There was severe violence in July 1989 between Abkhaz and Georgians, but these were intergroup clashes and not directed against the Georgian authorities, or at least not mainly. A total of 18 people died in the 1989 Sukhumi riots (Shesterinina 2021: 6f; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989\_Sukhumi\_riots). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* When the Red Army invaded Georgia in 1921 Abkhazia was awarded with the status of a Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR). In 1931 its status was downgraded, and Abkhazia became an ASSR under Georgian administration (Jones 1997: 509). From the 1930s, there was a policy of Georgianization vis-à-vis the ethnic minorities. Most minority rights were restored after Stalin’s death in 1953, and there was a policy of affirmative action since the 1970s (no exact date was given in the sources), which led to much increased influence of the Abkhaz over their regional government (Jones 2013: 44; Minority Rights Group International). [1970: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1977, 130 Abkazh intellectuals sent a petition to Moscow, demanding the separation from the Georgian SSR and association with the Russian Federation. In 1978 there were demonstrations and further petitions (Jones 1997: 510). Moscow, together with Tbilisi, made concessions in an attempt to calm the situation, ranging from increased investment in the region to an increase in the number of leading positions allocated to the Abkhaz, and increased autonomy for the Abkhaz ASSR in the fields of science, education and the media (Coppieters 2004). The demand for separation from Georgia, however, was rejected (MAR). [1978: autonomy concession]
* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections to party secretaryships and legislatures at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites were effectively hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism was more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (ASSRs) – such as Abkhazia. Notably, certain Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk Oblast were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. [1989: autonomy concession]
* While it led to decentralization at the Union level, in Georgia, perestroika initiated a phase of Georgianization, with several policies that explicitly discriminated against minorities. In particular, in August 1989, Georgia publishes measures designed to increase the use of the Georgian language in all spheres of life (MAR). Georgia was one of only three Republics where the language of the titular language had had official status already prior to perestroika, but still this law constitutes a restriction since it made Georgian the only official language throughout Georgia (Encyclopedia Princetoniensis). According to George (2009: 110), the law made the use of Georgian mandatory for all administrative, party, and policy organs. According to Jones (2013: 35, 45, 48-49), the program was designed to increase the status of Georgian throughout the region, and implied a requirement of proficiency of Georgian for state employment also in autonomous entities. April 14 was made the Georgian language day. Thus, the 1989 language law restricted the language rights of ethnic minorities within Georgia, and we code a cultural rights restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
  + There were other measures in the direction of Georgianization, including programs for the promotion of Georgian history and the defense of historical monuments. A republican army was created, comprised by Georgians only. There was a policy of resettling Georgians to minority areas. An electoral law that was adopted in 1989 effectively prohibited ethnic, regionally-based parties from running in the elections (Jones 1997: 511-512). However, these measures do not change the self-determination status as defined in the codebook.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). The law appears not to have had immediate effects in the Georgian SSR due to its contrary language law and is thus not coded.
* In 1990 there was an additional measure which we do not code (see the ‘Tajiks’ entry).
* In June 1991, the first democratically elected president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, negotiated a power-sharing agreement with the Abkhaz. This agreement guaranteed disproportionate Abkhaz representation in the regional government by way of ethnic quotas (at the time the Abkhaz made up only 17.9 per cent of Abkhazia). Furthermore, the agreement set out consent of both Georgian and Abkhazian factions within the regional parliament for major constitutional and legislative changes (Coppieters 2004; Jones 2013: 95, 223). The consociational agreement implied increased autonomy for the Abkhaz, even if it was very short-lived, and is coded as an autonomy concession. [1991: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Abkhazia had the status of an ASSR in the USSR, the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Thus, we code the Abkhaz as regionally autonomous in the Soviet Union. [1977-1978, 1988-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1991, Abkhazia became part of Georgia, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Abkhaz |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Abkhaz |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36546000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Abkhaz resided in the Abkhaz ASSR, though during the Soviet period they were clearly outnumbered by ethnic Georgians (18% vs 46% according to 1989 census). The Abkhaz made up the majority in one of Abkhazia’s districts according to the 1989 census (Gudauti), but the Gudauti district harbored only approx. a third of Georgia’s total Abkhaz population (30,000/90,000). This matches with information from MAR. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR notes no kin, though MAR does. Minahan (2002: 7) reports that there are approximately 35,000 Abkhaz in Turkey, which does not count as numerically significant. We found no other kin groups. [no kin]

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## Adyghe

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Adyghe are concentrated in the North Caucasus in today’s Adyghe Republic. Adygea was awarded with Autonomous Oblast status in 1922. The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Adyghe Autonomous Oblast/Republic. The Adyghe make up only a minority (around a quarter) of their homeland, but as the titular nationality they have considerable influence over the regional government (see Ormrod 1997: 101-103). Moreover, the movement’s claims relate to the Adyghe homeland.

**Movement start and end dates**

* July 2, 1991, Adygea issued a sovereignty declaration, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to republican level, implying separation from Krasnodar Krai, to which it had been sub-ordinated since 1937. Since this is the first evidence of organized self-determination activity we found, we peg the start date of the movement at 1991.
* Shortly thereafter, the status increase was granted, with the upgrade fully implemented by March 1992. Subsequently a movement emerged that demanded the reunification of the Circassian lands (Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug are commonly referred to as Circassians) and redress for part injustices. There are also demands for an independent Circassia. We associate pan-Circassian mobilization with the individual groups to avoid repetition of the same/similar claims.
* In addition, Adyghe nationalists continued to demand increased autonomy for the Adyghe Republic. The Russian Press Digest reports that 2,000 people demonstrated in March 2000 for greater Circassian autonomy. In the mid-2000s, there was a plan to unify Adygea with Krasnodar Krai, implying the abolishment of the Adyghe’s autonomous status. Fiercely resisted by the Adyghe, the plan was eventually abolished, but nonetheless it stirred Adyghe nationalism and led to renewed calls for increased autonomy in the re-centralized Russia of Vladimir Putin (Financial Times 2014; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002; Ormrod 1997; Smirnov 2006; UNPO 2008, 2010).
* The Circassian Congress and Adyge Khase continued their work in the 2010s (Kavkazskyi Uzel 2014; Jamestown Foundation 2015; Maratova and Gritsevich 2020; Markedonov 2014). In 2008, Circassian Congress and Adyge Khase joined efforts with peer Circassian organisations in the Caucasus and demanded the reunification of the Circassian (Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug) lands and the creation of a united Circassian autonomous region within Russia (Kabard 2019, Shazzo 2008). In 2010 and 2020, Adyghe activists conducted information campaigns and made calls to identify themselves as Circassians during the upcoming population census. The effort is linked to the initiative on reunification of the Circassian lands (Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug are commonly referred to as Circassians) in a new region within Russia (Cherkes 2020, Shazzo 2008; Roth 2015: 184). In 2018, Adyge Khase also protested against the amendments to the federal law on education that would restrict Adygea’s autonomy to teach their own language as a compulsory subject in schools (Maratova 2018). In light of this evidence, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1991; end date ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The 1991 sovereignty declaration demanded separation from Krasnodar Krai, which was granted in 1991 and fully implemented in 1992 (Treisman 1997: 226; Orttung et al. 2000: 6). After the separation, demands in the North Caucasus (except for Chechnya, which demanded outright independence) generally focused on increased economic and legislative autonomy (Ormrod 1997: 100). Although there have been calls for an independent Circassia, contention for increased autonomy appears to be more common; for instance, organisations like the Circassian Congress and Adyghe Khase have become strong defenders of Adygea’s autonomy (Smirnov 2006). Following the first of January rule, we code a claim for sub-state secession in 1991-1992, and an autonomy claim for 1993 onwards. Since 2008, Circassian Congress and Adyge Khase have focused on reunification of the Circassian (Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug) lands and stronger autonomy of the united region within Russia (Cherkes 2020, Shazzo 2008). [1991-1992: sub-state secession claim; 1993-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* While some Circassian activists have implied secessionist aspirations, we could not find clear evidence for an organized independence movement (see UNPO 2023: Roth 2015: 185). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* In the initial phase, the main territory claimed by the Adyghe was the current Adyghe Republic in the North Caucasus region in southern Russia (Minahan 2002: 36). We code this claim based on GADM.
* Since 2008 (2009 with Jan 1 rule), the area of the claimed territory includes a broader set of Circassian lands, which includes the lands of Adyghe, Abazin, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug (Roth 2015: 184). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 174).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* July 2, 1991, Adygea issued a sovereignty declaration, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to republican level. This would have implied the separation from Krasnodar Krai, to which it had been sub-ordinated since 1937 (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). Note: the declaration overlaps temporally with Adygea’s transformation into a republic. Thus the extent to which this declaration can be considered unilateral is somewhat ambiguous. We code it nonetheless since both Kahn and Treisman make mention of it. [1991: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Adyghe are concentrated in the North Caucasus in today’s Adyghe Republic. The region has come under Russian control in the late 18th century (Minahan 2002: 38). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification policies (Russian was made the sole official language of Adyghea in 1938, see Minahan 2002: 39)/Cyrillication of national languges in the 1930s and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. In 1937, Adygea was sub-ordinated to the newly established Krasnodar Krai. A crucial event in the North Caucasus was the abolishment of the autonomous entities and the deportation of the Karachai, Balkars, Ingush, and Chechens in 1944. Only in 1956 were the deported peoples allowed to return and the autonomies restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99). In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). At the time Adygea had the status of an autonomous oblast, and hence was unaffected by the reform.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). The evidence we have found suggests that autonomous oblasts and okrugs (like Adygea at the time) were not granted this right. However, note that the Adyghe achieved republican status in 1991 (see below). Thus, Adyghe soon attained official language status in Adygea. [1991: cultural rights concession]
* In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of constituent republics of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21; Orttung et al. 2000: 6). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Adygea became independent of Krasnodar Krai, to which it had been sub-ordinated since 1937. Moreover, In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Aslan Dzharimov was elected governor of Adygea in January 1992 (Orttung et al. 1992: 6). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since these measures imply a reduction of the center's control of the regions. Note: the movement emerged in early July, so this is not coded as a prior concession. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and somewhat weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with a more or less equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). We have not, however, found evidence suggesting that Adygea signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty.
* According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 14): “In 1995, following pressure from Adygean nationalists, the Russian Federation approved a new constitution for the Adygean Republic. In addition to redrawing electoral districts in favor of Adygeans, the constitution also stipulates that the president of the republic must speak Adygean as well as Russian. This provision effectively eliminates Russian citizens from candidacy because few Russians speak Adygean. Aslan Djanov, an Adygean, has been president since 1991.” The language requirement could be seen as an autonomy concession, but we consider this too ambiguous to be coded.
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Adygea never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In the name of administrative simplification, Putin initiated amalgation plans in a couple of regions. In the mid-2000s, there was a plan to unify Adygea with Krasnodar Krai, implying the abolishment of the Adyghe’s autonomous status. Fiercely resisted by the Adyghe, the plan was eventually abolished – unlike similar projects in Siberia and the Volga region (Smirnov 2006). Hence, we do not code a restriction.
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). In 2016, the Adyghe Republic’s assembly abolished direct elections of the governor. According to new rules, the parties propose their candidacies to the president of Russia, who determines three candidates. The regional deputies then choose among these three through secret ballot (Kommersant 2016). Given the central initiation of this change (Muradov 2013), we code an autonomy restriction. [2016: autonomy restriction]
* In 2013, Russian lawmakers adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, which prohibit calls for separatism. According to the amendments, which entered into force in May 2014, "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation" are punishable for up to five years in prison (Harding 2014; Meduza 2016). This is not a restriction as defined here, though.
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017 cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Adygea had the status of an Autonomous Oblast (under the administration of Krasnodar Krai) until 1991, when it was upgraded to republican status. According to Minority Rights Group International, Ormrod (1997: 101-103), and Smirnov (2006), the Adyghes have substantial influence over the regional government, despite their minority status within Adygea. All governors have been of Adyghe ethnicity thus far (Kommersant 2017). [1991-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Full republic status was granted in 1991 and fully implemented in 1992 (see above). [1992: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Adyghe |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Adyghe |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36540000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1991: 0.0004; 1992-2013: 0.001; 2014-2020: 0.0009]

**Regional concentration**

* The Adyghe’s homeland is the Adyghe republic in the north Caucasus, where the vast majority of the Adyghes resides. The Adyghes make up but a minority in the Adyghe republic, around 25% (Minahan 2002: 36; Ormrod 1997). According to the 2010 census, the Adyghes make up 25.8% of the republic’s population, and there is a concentration of Adyghes in the republic’s north. According to the 2010 census, the Adyghes make up an absolute majority in four of the Adyghe republic’s nine administrative units, but less than 50% of all Adyghes live there (see the figures below). Based on district level data, we concluded that the Adyghe are not spatially concentrated. [not concentrated]
  + 125,000 Adyghe in Russia.
  + Teuchezhsky district: 13,000 Adyghes (66% of local population)
  + City of Adygea: 12,000 (80%)
  + Shovgenovsky district: 11,000 (63%)
  + Koshekhablsky district: 16,000 (52%)

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 36), there is a large Adyghe community in Turkey, estimated at 130,000. More broadly, the Adyghe form part of the larger group of Circassian peoples. According to the UNPO, there are people of Circassian descent in particular in Turkey (estimated at up to several million). While many Circassians have assimilated, there appears to be a certain level of ethnic identification among at least some of the Circassians in Turkey (Ayhan 2005). [1991: kin in neighboring country; 1992-2020: kin in non-adjoining country]

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## Ajars

Activity: 1988-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Ajar separatists first lobbied Moscow for removal from Georgian jurisdiction in 1988, thus the start date. In 1989, the first openly nationalist organization was formed. The movement remained active when Georgia became independent in 1991 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002; MAR). [start date: 1988; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002: 66), the Ajars began to lobby for removal from Georgian jurisdiction in 1988 (also see MAR). [1988-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ajars is the current Autonomous Republic of Adjara (also Ajara) in southwestern Georgia (Roth 2015: 188). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 14) report that “Adjaria, fearing the loss of its administrative freedom, declared itself sovereign.” However, we found no corroborating evidence of a formal declaration of autonomy or sovereignty (cf. e.g. Kahn 2000).

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of separatist violence under the header of the Soviet Union, thus the NVIOLSD code. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Supported by Turkish troops, the Ajars declared the independent republic of Ajaristan in 1918. Georgian forces took part of Ajaristan in 1920, while Armenian forces annexed Kars and the south of Ajaristan into then-independent Armenia. Bolshevik Russia retook Ajaristan in early 1921. Ajaristan became an autonomous republic under Georgian control in 1922 (Minahan 2002: 65-66; Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 14). In 1926 the Ajars mounted an insurgency against the Soviets. After the rebellion was crushed, Stalin deported large numbers of Ajars to Central Asia. As another punitive measure, the Ajars were reclassified as ethnic Georgians in 1930. Most minority rights were restored after Stalin’s death in 1953 (MAR); however, Minahan (2002: 66) and Minorities at Risk suggest that the Communist Party of Georgia pursued a long-term strategy in the 1970s of assimilating the Ajar to Georgian culture, and that there were (unsuccessful) attempts at disestablishing Ajar autonomy.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections to party secretaryships and legislatures at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (ASSRs), such as Ajarstan. [1989: autonomy concession]
* While it led to decentralization at the Union level, in Georgia, perestroika initiated a phase of Georgianization, with several policies that explicitly discriminated against ethnic minorities (making Georgian the sole official language throughout Georgia, for instance). We do not code the language law since the Ajars speak a dialect of Georgian (Minahan 2002: 64).
  + However, in 1991 Gamsakhurdia launched some attempts to Christianize the Muslim Ajars (Minahan 1998: 121). Among the more oft-cited measures was the organization of mass baptisms in Muslim areas (Jones 1997: 513). Another is the appointment of an Orthodox priest as head of Akhalcikhe, a heavily Muslim area (Jones 1997: 521). [1991: cultural rights restriction]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, this cannot be seen as a concession since Georgian had already been the official language of the Georgian SSR (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia were the only three republics where the titular nation’s language had official status). The Ajars speak a dialect of Georgian (Minahan 2002: 64).
* In 1990, a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* In 1991, Gamsakhurdia stated intentions to remove Ajaria’s autonomy (George 2009: 122), but did not act on it. We do not code a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* Ajaria had the status of an ASSR in the USSR, the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Thus, we code the Ajars as regionally autonomous in the Soviet Union. [1988-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1991, Ajaria became part of Georgia, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ajars |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Georgians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36510000 |

**Power access**

* The Ajars are essentially Muslim ethnic Georgians. They form a regional branch of EPR’s Georgians. The Georgians are powerless from 1988-1991 (and so are the Ajars). [1988-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 63), there are approximately 260,000 Ajars in Georgia. With an estimate of around 300,000, the Minorities at Risk Project’s estimate for 1995 is similar (we use Minahan’s estimate). According to the 1989 census the USSR had about 287 million inhabitants [0.0009]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 63), the vast majority of the Ajars resides in Ajaristan, where they make up 65% of the local population. Data from MAR provides further evidence in this direction (see gc6b, gc7, groupcon in different MAR releases). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to MAR, though according to Minahan (2002: 63), there are Ajars (called Laz) in Turkey numbering 105,000. Note: the number of Laz in Turkey is unclear; estimates run from 45,000 to more than a million; we rely on the Joshua project, and according to them the number of Laz is < 100,000. [no kin]

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## Altaians

Activity: 1989-2000

**General notes**

* The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast/the Altai Republic Republic, despite the fact that Altaians make up only about a third of Altai's population, (Fondahl 1997: 208). The Altaians’ influence over the regional government is not fully clear. Titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Roeder (2007: 133) suggests that the Altaian’s influence has diminished in the last years of the movement’s activity, but was substantial at least in the initial years. Hence, they seem affected by changes in Gorno-Altai’s sovereignty.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1989, the Siberian Cultural Center was established, an organization formed by ethnic Khakass, Shor, and Altaians advocating increased autonomy for the South Siberian peoples (Khakass, Altai, and Shors) and/or the unification of the three territories to a single autonomous entity (Fondahl 1997: 207). Hence, we code 1989 as the start date of the movement.
* In October 1990 the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast (then under the administration of the Altai Krai) unilaterally declared republic status (Ross 2002: 21). The Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast was upgraded to the status of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation in July 1991 (Ross 2002: 21), and thereby separated from the Altai Krai. We were unable to find clear evidence of movement activity beyond 1990, and hence code an end to the movement in 2000, following the ten-year rule. [start date: 1989; end date 2000]

**Dominant claim**

* The Siberian Cultural Center that was established in 1989, among other things, advocated increased autonomy for the Altaians, and the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast unilaterally proclaimed republican status in 1990, implying separation from the Altai Krai (Fondahl 1997: 207; Ross 2002: 21; Minahan 2002: 95). In light of this evidence, we code an autonomy claim in 1989-1990, and a sub-state secession claim for 1991-1992 (following the first of January rule). In 1992, the Gorno-Altai AO was upgraded to republic status, the highest status within Russia’s matrioshka federal system. Thus, a claim for sub-state secession is no longer possible. For the movement's remaining years of activity we code an autonomy claim. [1989-1990: autonomy claim; 1991-1992: sub-state secession claim; 1993-2000: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Siberian Cultural Center for the Altaians is today’s Altai Republic, formerly known as the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast declared sovereignty on October 25, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised itself to republican status, implying separation from the Altai Krai (Ross 2002: 21; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence the movement’s NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks created an autonomous homeland for the Altai, the Oirot Autonomous Oblast (Fondahl 1997: 206). It became the Gorno Altai Autonomous Oblast in 1948 (Fondahl 1997: 206-207; Minority Rights Group International). Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. The post-World War II period saw significant industrialization. Slavic in-migration reduced the Altai to a minority within their own ethnic homeland. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). At the same time, however, Russification continued (Fondahl 1997: 201). There was a significant concession in the late 1980s, when Gorbachev initiated perestroika. In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, it appears that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Gorno-Altai at the time had the status of an autonomous oblast, and hence appears unaffected by the reform. Hence, we do not code a concession.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous oblasts and okrugs (like Gorno-Altai) were not granted this right. However, note that the Altaians achieved republican status in 1991 (see below), and the Altai language thereby attained official status. [1991: cultural rights concession]
* In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21; Minority Rights Group International). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Gorno-Altai became independent of the Altai Krai. Moreover, in August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). However, the Altai Republic did not sign a bilateral treaty with Moscow (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Altai never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.

**Regional autonomy**

* Gorno-Altai had the status of an Autonomous Oblast (under the administration of Altai Krai) until 1991, when it was upgraded to republican status. At least after Stalin, the autonomous entities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117), though it was limited, especially for the Siberian entities (Fondahl 1997: 200-203). The Altai Republic has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. Note, however, that the Altaians make up only about a third of Altai’s population (Fondahl 1997: 208). The Altaians' actual influence over the regional government could not be determined, though it has to be noted that titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). In contrast, Fondahl (1997: 203) suggests that the influence of the Siberian peoples on their regional governments is limited. Roeder (2007: 133) suggests that the Altaian’s influence has diminished in the last years of the movement’s activity, but was substantial at least in the initial years. Noting the ambiguity, we still code the Altaians as regionally autonomous throughout (EPR does so, too). [1989-2000: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Full republic status was granted in 1991 and fully implemented in 1992 (see above). [1992: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Altaians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Altai |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36547000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.0002; 1992-2000: 0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* Most of the Altaians are located in the Altai republic (Minahan 2002: 91), yet they make up only about a third of Altai's population (Fondahl 1997: 208). From Minahan (2002: 91) it appears that the Altai live scattered throughout Altai. This suggests that the criterion that the group must make up an absolute majority of the local population is most likely not fulfilled. To confirm that there is no alternatively defined territory that would fulfil the threshold for spatial concentration, we consulted census data. We found only limited information, but what we found was sufficient to establish that the Altaians make up a majority in three adjacent districts (out of 10 plus the city of Gorno-Altaysk): Ongudai, Ust-Kan, and Ulagansky. The data we found did not give exact estimates of the number of Altais there, but it appears unlikely that the threshold for spatial concentration is met (the three districts have a population of approx. 40,000, and there are > 70,000 Altais). This case would profit from further research. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there are no kin groups. Minahan (2002: 91) mentions “smaller communities” in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan but these are not substantial enough to be coded here. We found no other groups that would qualify as numerically significant ethnic kin. [no kin]

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## Armenians

Activity: 1966-1991

**General notes**

* This movement combines Armenians in the Georgian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR, and the Armenian SSR. We code changes in all of the group’s self-determination status as concessions or restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The National Unification Party (NUP) was formed in Yerevan in 1966. The NUP called for an independent Armenia which would include Western Armenia, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. We peg the start date to 1966.
* In the late 1980s several organizations were formed in Armenian-inhabitated territories, which all advocated the unity of Armenian lands. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh began to make irredentist demands in 1987 when dissidents known as the Karabakh Committee organized a petition drive to voice that demand.
* On February 28, 1988, the Karabakh Soviet of People’s Deputies passed a resolution supporting the transfer of Karabakh to Armenian control. A million Armenians marched in Yerevan in support of the transfer of territorial control and Gorbachev promised action on the issue.
* In 1989 the Armenian National Movement was formed, demanding first sovereignty and then independence of the Soviet Republic of Armenia.
* Finally, in 1988 in what then used to be the Georgian Soviet Republic the national-popular movement Javakhk (the Armenian for Javakheti) was created whose influence rapidly grew among the local Armenians. The official goals of the organization were the preservation of Armenian cultural heritage, science and history of Armenia in local schools, protection of national institutions and also the development of the region. From the very beginning, however, the goal of Armenians in Javakheti was at least to obtain autonomy, if not to unite with the region with Armenia (Banks et al. 1997; Dudwick 1997; Guretski 1998; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; International Crisis Group 2011; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR; MRGI 1997).
* The Armenian movements in Armenia itself, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are coded under the same header during the Soviet period. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union we code the Armenians in Georgia and Azerbaijan separately, see Armenians in Georgia and Armenians in Azerbaijan. [start date: 1966; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* In its first phase, the Armenian movement was small and repressed, but radical, mostly advocating the independence of (all) Armenian lands. (Dudwick 1997: 481-482). [1966-1987: independence claim]
* In 1987 the Karabakh movement emerged, aiming for the unification of Karabakh with the Armenian SSR. The Karabakh question soon became the focus of the Armenian nationalist movement, now much broadened compared to its initial phase and more moderate in its claims (see Dudwick 1997: 482-486, especially 486; Rutland 1994: 845). [1988-1990: sub-state secession claim]
* Armenia was comparatively slow to demand independence. Many Armenian elites remained favorable towards the Soviet Union, partly because of the belief that the absence of Soviet protection would make Armenia vulnerable to Turkish expansionism. However, after the elections in May 1990, fervent nationalists gained ground. At the time they remained a minority, though, and sovereignty (rather than outright independence) was declared in 1990 (Dudwick 1987: 489). In 1991 independence became the dominant claim: Armenia boycotted the all-union referendum in March and embarked on the road to secession as prescribed in Gorbachev’s 1990 secession law (Armenia was the only republic to follow the procedure set out in the secession law). This would have implied a transition period of several years within which Armenia would remain with the Soviet Union. However, the August coup made immediate independence unavoidable. Note: we code an independence claim in 1991, though it has to be noted that there is some ambiguity whether independence can indeed be considered the dominant claim by January 1. But in any case, independence was the dominant claim soon after January 1. [1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. Between 1987 and 1990, the dominant claim shifted away from secession, but we could not find clear evidence that all independence claims were ended; therefore, we code an independence movement throughout. [start date: 1966; end date: host change (1991)]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Armenians in the USSR consists of all Armenian lands, which includes the former Armenian SSR as well as the Karabakh, Nakhchivan, and Javakheti regions in present-day Azerbaijan and Georgia. We code these regions based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On February 20, 1988, the Supreme Soviet of the [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_Autonomous_Oblast) voted to unify with Armenia. [1988: sub-state secession declaration]
* December 1, 1990, the Armenian Supreme Soviet issued a decree proclaiming the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (Rutland 1994: 850). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]
* The Armenian Soviet Republic adopted a declaration on its sovereignty in August 1990 (Dudwick 1997: 502; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* The Parliament of the Armenian Soviet Republic issued a declaration of independence in September 1991 (Dudwick 1997: 502). This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and thus, the declaration was not really unilateral.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO codes a low-intensity armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1990-1991. Violence continued, and escalated markedly, after Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991.
  + Note: Marshall and Gurr (2003: 57) indicate that separatist violence over Nagorno-Karabakh had started already in 1988. In agreement with this, MAR’s rebellion score is 3 in 1988 and 1989 (suggesting a “local rebellion”). We investigated this using qualitative sources. We found evidence for large-scale demonstrations in 1988 and several episodes of inter-ethnic violence and pogroms in 1988-1990 (e.g., Minahan 2002: 904); the latter are included as non-state violence in UCDP/PRIO. We could not find evidence for separatist armed conflict, which requires substantial violence between rebels and the state, however. [1966-1989: NVIOLSD; 1990-host change (1991): LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the 19th century, the Armenian homeland was divided between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Between 1915 and 1917 the Young Turk government committed genocide against the Armenians, causing the loss of about one million Armenian lives. Armenia enjoyed a short-lived period of independence between 1918 and 1920 before it was integrated into the Soviet Union. Armenia became a Soviet Republic (Dudwick 1997: 471-476). Note, however, that there were significant Armenian populations in the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Georgia, too. The Soviets awarded both Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh to the Azerbaijan SSR (Rutland 1994: 841). In 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was created. Initially, the Soviets granted the Armenian Republic relatively broad autonomy; this changed under Stalin’s reign, when the Soviet Union became increasingly centralized (Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952; Dudwick 1997: 478). Even under Stalin, however, the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death (1953), and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Dudwick (1997: 478) argues that the Armenian Republic was able increase its independence from Moscow somewhat during the 1960s. Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). Moreover, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were the only three Republics where the language of the titular nation had official status.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had official status. In 1977/1978, there was an attempt to downgrade the status of the titular nations’ languages. This sparked major protests in Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Armenia, prompting Moscow to back down and not implement the downgrade (Minahan 1998: 120). Hence, we do not code a restriction.
* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections to party secretaryships and legislatures at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In the context of the transfer of Karabakh to Armenia, on July 18, 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet resolved in the favor of Azerbaijan the question whether the constitutional right to self-determination should override the requirement that a republic had to agree to border changes (which was cited by Azerbaijan; see Dudwick 1997: 486-7). We consider this too ambiguous to code as an autonomy restriction (that is, the autonomy status as we define it appears not directly affected).
* In response to a general strike in Armenia, on December 5, 1988, the Soviet Army imposed military rule across the Armenian SSR. According to Rutland (1994: 844): “Troops broke up 27 road blocks and arrested 5000 curfew violators. Just two days later a devastating earthquake struck northern Armenia, killing 17 000, destroying 17% of the housing stock and leaving 530 000 homeless. Moscow took advantage of the chaos following the earthquake to crack down. The leaders of the Karabakh Committee were arrested, on the absurd grounds that they were interfering with earthquake relief. After a crowd tried to free them from jail they were spirited away to Moscow. Three district prosecutors were dismissed, 13 leaders of the CPA were expelled from the party and 104 disciplined for having collaborated with the Karabakh Committee.” The imposition of a state of emergency is not coded as a restriction in accordance with the codebook.
* Shortly thereafter, Nagorno-Karabakh, an Autonomous Oblast under the administration of the Azerbaijan SSR, was placed under direct rule by Moscow in January 1989 and Karabakh’s elite was replaced by outsiders (Suny 1993: 134; Dudwick 1997: 488). Note though that this also meant that Azerbaijan’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh was suspended, a core demand of the movement.
  + A second reason to code an autonomy restriction in 1989 is Azerbaijan’s angry reaction to the loss of control over Karabakh: In response to the imposition of direct rule in Karabakh, the newly-founded Azerbaijan Popular Front organized a general strike with the twin aim of dislodging the Republic’s Communist leadership and returning Karabakh to Azerbaijani rule (Rutland 1994: 849). Azerbaijan began a rail blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in 1989, which effectively put Armenia and Karabakh under siege (Dudwick 1997: 488). The economic blockade can be considered another autonomy restriction. [1989: autonomy restriction]
* In November Gorbachev stroke a deal with Azerbaijan. November 28, 1989, the power of the local Soviet in Karabakh was restored, thus restoring Azerbaijan’s administrative control over Nagorno-Karabakh (Suny 1993: 137; Dudwick 1997: 488). In return Azerbaijan should end its rail blockade (Rutland 1994: 850).
  + In line with the codebook, the end of direct rule and the blockade are not code as a concession. We still code an autonomy concession in 1989 due to Gorbachev’s decentralization reforms. According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics. Notably, certain Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk Oblast were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this should be seen as an (another) autonomy concession in 1989 given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. [1989: autonomy concession]
* While it led to decentralization at the Union level, in Georgia, perestroika initiated a phase of Georgianization, with several policies that explicitly discriminated against minorities. In particular, in August 1989, Georgia publishes measures designed to increase the use of the Georgian language in all spheres of life (MAR). Georgia was one of only three Republics where the language of the titular language had had official status already prior to perestroika, but still this law constitutes a restriction since it made Georgian the only official language throughout Georgia (Wolff n.d.). According to George (2009: 110), the law made the use of Georgian mandatory for all administrative, party, and policy organs. According to Jones (2013: 35, 45, 48-49), the program was designed to increase the status of Georgian throughout the region, and implied a requirement of proficiency of Georgian for state employment also in autonomous entities. April 14 was made the Georgian language day. Thus, the 1989 language law restricted the language rights of ethnic minorities within Georgia, including Armenians, and we code a cultural rights restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1990 Moscow declared a state of emergency and ordered a military intervention in Karabakh and (a bit later) in Baku (Suny 1993: 137; Rutland 1994: 850). In Baku the intervention led to the death of dozens of protesters. In accordance with the codebook, this is not coded as a restriction (autonomy was not affected as such, no direct rule).
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication, but de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. This cannot be seen as a concession to the Armenians, given that the Armenian, the Azerbaijan and the Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation enjoyed official status.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Compared to the Baltics and Georgia, Armenia’s leadership was far less confrontational. In late 1991, for a short while it even looked as if it were to give up its claim on Nagorno-Karabakh: “In September 1991 Presidents El'tsin and Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan brokered a peace deal under which the Azerbaijani blockade was to be lifted and all hostages returned, in return for Armenia relinquishing its claim on NKAO. This represented a major concession by Armenia, but the pace of events in Moscow and backtracking by Azerbaijan meant that the deal collapsed. This was a major blow for Ter-Petrosyan's moderate approach. In January 1992 the Dashnaks, who had gained control of the regional parliament in NKAO, declared the province an independent republic and started to pursue a more aggressive military strategy without approval from Erevan (Rutland 1994: 856).” On the other hand, also Armenia’s road to independence reflected the relatively moderate stance. While boycotting the all-union referendum in March 1991, Armenia was the only republic to follow the route to secession prescribed in Gorbachev’s secession law. This implied several referendums, and the first was announced for September 21. But after the August coup, the Soviet Union entered its final phase of rapid break-up, and the Armenian parliament chose a short-cut and declared independence on August 23. Still, the referendum was held. It can be argued that Armenia’s secession was accepted almost immediately by Moscow, where Gorbachev was now ‘sharing’ power with Yeltsin; in any case, the Union formally dissolved on December 25. Thus, we code an independence concession in 1991. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The regional autonomy variable is somewhat difficult to code in the case of the Armenians because the Armenian homeland was divided between several Union Republics. The biggest share of Armenians resided in the Armenian SSR, and a substantial number resided in Nagorno-Karabakh, an Autonomous Oblast (i.e., an ethnic homeland that, however, was under Azeri control). And while Soviet federalism was highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign, even under Stalin the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117; Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). In 1989 direct rule was imposed in Nagorno-Karabakh, but not in Armenia itself. Hence, we code the Armenians as regionally autonomous throughout. [1966-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The short period of direct rule in the Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is not coded as a major territorial change.
* Armenia became independent in 1991. [1991: independence]
* Furthermore, Azerbaijan and Georgia became independent, implying a host change for Armenians in the two respective countries. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Armenians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Armenians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36508000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* The Armenians in the USSR can be considered spatially concentrated according to data from the Soviet 1989 census: out of the approx. 4.6 million Armenians in the USSR, approx. 3.1 million, or 67%, resided in the Armenian SSR, where the Armenians made up 93.3% of the local population. Outside of the Armenian SSR, larger concentrations of Armenians could be found in the Georgian SSR (primarily in the Javakheti region) and the Azerbaijan SSR (primarily Nagorno-Karabakh). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Numerically significant kin (Armenians) in Iran (EPR). There is also a large Armenian diaspora in the US. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Avars

Activity: 1990-2000

**General notes**

* The Avars are located mainly in the Caucasian republic of Dagestan (Ormrod 1997: 117; Minority Rights Group International). Dagestan comprises more than 30 ethnic groups. The largest include the Avars, the Dargins, the Kumyks, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans – and the Russians (Ormrod 1997: 117).
* There has been a movement demanding increased self-determination for Dagestan as a whole, but at the same time several of Datestan’s ethnic groups have agitated for increased self-determination themselves. These are listed separately from the Dagestan movement.
* Unlike other ethnic regions in Russia, Dagestan does not have a titular nationality. There is an ethnic power-sharing system in place in Dagestan, with the Republic’s chief executive body (at least in the 1990s and the early 2000s), the State Council, composed of representatives of different ethnic groups. No group is allowed more than one representative in the State Council (Ware & Kisriev 2001: 111). Yemelianova (2005: 613), Holland & O’Loughlin (2010: 299), and Cornell (2001: 270) note that – notwithstanding the consociational constitutional set-up in Dagestan – effective power has been confined to only two groups – the Dargins and the Avars – ever since 1991. The Kumyks appear to have had some influence on regional politics as well (Roeder 2007: 105; Minority Rights Group International). Since the Avars are directly affected by the status of Dagestan, the concessions/restrictions coding includes concessions/restrictions to the Dagestan republic. Concessions/restrictions related to the Wahhabbi sect is not coded, however, since they concern the Wahhabbi movement coded under Dagestan only.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, the Avars formed a national movement as the Soviet Union began to collapse. The movement was named after a local, famous 19th century leader, Imam Shamil. According to Gammer (1999), the Shamil Foundation was formed in 1990, hence the start date of the movement.
* Minahan (2002: 221) suggests that the Shamil Foundation was active throughout the 1990s, pushing for greater sovereignty for the Avars either within Dagestan or even as a separate republic of the Russian Federation. Both Minority Rights Group International and Minorities at Risk note that the Avar’s Shamil national movement was disbanded in 2000. Hence, we code an end to the movement in 2000.
* In 2011, an organisation called Avar National-Cultural Autonomy was created. The organization aims to develop Avar culture within Dagestan and beyond and protect the interests of all Dagestan peoples (Akhmednabiev 2011; Chernovik 2013; MRGI). The organisation contributed to launching internet and television services such as the Dagestan’s Avar TV channel in their native language (MRGI). In 2018, the organisation protested Russia’s reform that would restrict the national regions’ ability to teach non-Russian languages in schools (MK Dagestan 2018). However, we found no evidence to suggest that Avar National-Cultural Autonomy demanded increased territorial self-rule. [start date: 1990; end date 2000]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002: 221) the Avar national movement – called the Shamil Foundation – was pushing for greater sovereignty for the Avars either within Dagestan or even as a separate republic of the Russian Federation throughout the 1990s. We were unable to establish which of the two demands was dominant. Following the codebook, we code the more radical claim, sub-state secession. [1990-2000: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Roth (2015: 180) suggests there is at least one group which has made claims for outright independence: the People’s Front Imam Shamil. Yet, according to Roth, advocates of outright independence are marginal. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Shamil Foundation’s claims concern a territory called Avaristan. This area lies in west-central Dagestan, the autonomous republic in southeastern Russia, with the valleys of the Avar-Koisu and the Andi-Koisu Rivers being the main areas where the Avars live (Minahan 2002: 216; Roth 2015: 174). We code this claim using GIS data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas database (L2)

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Dagestan’s 1991 sovereignty declaration is not coded since it called for sovereignty for Dagestan as a whole (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Ormrod 1997: 116).

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Ethnic Avars including Aliaskhab Kebekov and Magomed Suleymanov (both rebel commanders) participated in the Caucasus Emirate rebellion (Fuller 2017); however, the Avars’ involvement in this insurgency was overall limited. In the SDM dataset, this rebellion is associated with the three groups that were most heavily involved (Chechens, Dagestanis, Ingush). We found no other evidence for separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Dagestan has come under Russian control in the 19th century (Minahan 2002: 512). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* And in 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), by which union republics and autonomous republics (like Dagestan) gained autonomy (Gorbachev 1999: 99). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Dagestan), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently Aghul, Avar, Azerbaijani, Chechen, Dargwa, Kumyk, Lezgian, Lak, Nogai, Rutul, Tabasaran, and Tsakhur (as well as Russian) attained official language status. Note: it is not clear whether the concession was made before or after the movement’s formation in 1990, but since the law was adopted in April, it is likely that the concession was made before the movement’s start. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t[he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action did not imply tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
  + Also, in 1990 travel restrictions to Mecca were lifted (Minahan 2002: 513), which is not, however, a concession as defined in the codebook.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The Avars are Dagestan’s most numerous minority (see Ormrod 1997: 117), making it at least not unlikely that the presidency would go to an Avar. However, fearing the introduction of a presidential system would cause ethnic unrest, Dagestan instead opted for a parliamentary system, as confirmed thrice in referendums throughout the 1990s (Orttung et al. 2000: 111). We nonetheless code an autonomy concession because i) it was Dagestan who refused to implement the institution of the president, and not Yeltsin, ii) Moscow, at least initially, accepted Dagestan’s choice, and iii) the institution of the centrally-appointed regional Communist party secretary, who de-facto was the most powerful institution, was abolished anyway. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Dagestan did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Dagestan never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.

**Regional autonomy**

* Dagestan had the status of an ASSR under the Soviets and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Russian republics have retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. Note that Dagestan comprises more than 30 ethnic groups. The largest include the Avars, the Dargins, the Kumyks, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans – and Russians (Ormrod 1997: 117). Unlike other ethnic regions in Russia, Dagestan does not have a titular nationality. There is an ethnic power-sharing system in place in Dagestan, with the Republic’s chief executive body (at least in the 1990s and the early 2000s), the State Council, composed of representatives of different ethnic groups. No group is allowed more than one representative in the State Council (Ware & Kisriev 2001: 111). Notably, Dagestan clinged on to its parliamentary system (confirmed three times in referendums) until 2006, arguing that a presidential system would be detrimental to stability, despite federal pressure (Orttung et al. 2000: 111). According to Yemelianova (2005: 613), Holland & O’Loughlin (2010: 299), and Cornell (2001: 270), notwithstanding the consociational constitutional set-up in Dagestan, effective power has been confined to only two groups – the Dargins and the Avars – ever since 1991. However, the Kumyks appear to have had significant influence on regional politics, too (Roeder 2007: 105; Minority Rights Group International). Based on this, we code the Avars as regionally autonomous throughout. [1990-2000: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Avars |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Avars |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36523000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.001; 1992-2000: 0.006]

**Regional concentration**

* The Avars’ homeland lies in southwestern Dagestan (MAR). According to MAR, more than 75% of all Avars reside there (see gc7). According to censuses conducted in 1989, 2002, and 2010, the Avars are the largest of Dagestan’s ethnic groups and make up 27-29% of Dagestan’s population. We browsed the 2010 census, concluding that the Avars can be spatially concentrated in line with our definition. According to the 2010 census, there were 912,000 Avars in Russia. Dagestan has 51 administrative units. The Avars form an absolute majority in a total of 16 spatially contiguous units in Dagestan’s southwest. A total of 432,000 Avars reside there, or 47%. This is marginally below the threshold, yet the Avars form relative majorities or very significant minorities in a number of adjacent units, and if these are added the threshold is easily passed (see the list below). [concentrated]
  + Absolute majority:
    - Akhvakhsky district: 22,000 Avars (99% of local population)
    - Bezhta district: 10,000 (100%)
    - Botlikh district: 52,000 (95%)
    - Charoda district: 11,000 (97%)
    - Gergebil district: 20,000 (99%)
    - Gumbet district: 22,000 (99%)
    - Gunib district: 24,000 (96%)
    - Kazbek district: 37,000 (86%)
    - Khunzakhsky district: 31,000 (98%)
    - Kizilyurt city: 31,000 (71%)
    - Kizilyurtovsky district: 52,000 (83%)
    - Shamil district: 28,000 (99%)
    - Tlyaratinsky district: 22,000 (98%)
    - Tsumadinsky district: 23,000 (99%)
    - Tsuntinsky district: 18,000 (99%)
    - Untsukul district: 29,000 (98%)
  + Relative majority
    - Buynaksk city: 29,000 (46%)
    - Khasavyurt city: 40,000 (31%)
    - Khasavyurt district: 44,000 (31%)
    - Kizlyar district: 31,000 (47%)
  + Minority
    - Buynaksk district: 17,000 (24%)
    - Novolak district: 6,000 (22%)
    - Babayurtovsky district: 9,000 (20%)
  + Other areas with significant populations
    - Makhachkala city: 187,000 (27%)

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 216) mentions Avar communities in Turkey and Azerbaijan (also see MAR), but these are below the numeric threshold. No other kin found. [no kin]

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## Azerbaijanis

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Compared to other Soviet republics, nationally oriented groups were slow to emerge in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Popular Front was formed in 1988. Initially, the Front’s goals were limited to achieve Perestroika’s goals. However, in 1989 the Front’s goals expanded, now including greater independence for Azerbaijan, hence the start date of the movement. Azerbaijan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement (Banks et al. 1991; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hunter 1997). [start date: 1989; end date 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially the main organization linked to the Azeri self-determination movement, the Azerbaijan Popular Front, aimed at autonomy (Hunter 1997: 442-443). By late 1989, this began to change. Pro-independence protests in Baku in 1990 led to a bloody crack-down and armed conflict, which further contributed to the dominance of the independence claim (Minahan 1998: 26-27). In light of this evidence, we code an autonomy claim in 1989 and an independence claim in 1990/1991. [1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Azerbaijanis matches the present-day boundaries of Azerbaijan (previously the Azerbaijan SSR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Azerbaijan declared sovereignty on September 23, 1989 (Kahn 2000: 60). [1989: autonomy declaration]
* August 30, 1991, Azerbaijan declares independence, but not before checking with Moscow to ensure that Soviet troops would not pull out of the troubled areas before Azerbaijan could form a national guard (MAR). This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and the declaration thus not unilateral in the sense employed here.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The LVIOLSD coding for 1990 follows UCDP/PRIO. MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is 3 in 1985-1989 (“local rebellion”); however, we found no evidence for substantial violence before January 1990 in other sources, when more than 200 people were killed after emergency rule was declared and Soviet soldiers fired into crowds of protesters in Baku (Radio Free Europe 2020). [1989: NVIOLSD; 1990: LVIOLSD; 1991: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Azerbaijan enjoyed a short period of independence in 1918-1920, after which it was reconquered by the Bolsheviks. The Azerbaijan SSR was established in 1920. Nakhichevan and Karabakh were subsequently merged with the Azerbaijan SSR, both as an Autonomous Oblast under Azeri administration. Initially, the Soviets granted the union republics relatively broad autonomy; this changed under Stalin’s reign, when the Soviet Union became increasingly centralized (Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952; Dudwick 1997: 478). Even under Stalin, however, the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were the only three Republics where the language of the titular nation had official status. In 1977/1978, there was an attempt to downgrade the status of the titular nations’ languages. This sparked major protests in Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Armenia, prompting Moscow to back down and not implement the downgrade (Minahan 1998: 120). Hence, we there was no restriction. Then, in 1988 the Supreme Soviet introduced multi-candidate, contested elections at all levels of the Union, which can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are de facto appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In July 1988 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet resolved in the favor of Azerbaijan the question whether the constitutional right to self-determination should override the requirement that a republic had to agree to border changes (which was cited by Azerbaijan; see Dudwick 1997: 486-7). In light of the rising tensions, however, in January 1989 Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under direct rule by Moscow (Suny 1993: 134; Dudwick 1997: 488; Hunter 1997: 445). We interpret this as an autonomy restriction since this implies that Azerbaijan’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh was suspended, though noting that this is a somewhat ambiguous coding decision. We code this as a prior restriction since the SDM only emerged in 1989 (see above). [1989: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In response to the imposition of direct rule in Karabakh, the newly-founded Azerbaijan Popular Front organized a general strike with the twin aim of dislodging the Republic’s Communist leadership and returning Karabakh to Azerbaijani rule (Rutland 1994: 849). Azerbaijan began a rail blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in 1989, which effectively put Armenia and Karabakh under siege (Dudwick 1997: 488). In November Gorbachev stroke a deal with Azerbaijan. November 28, 1989, the power of the local Soviet in Karabakh was restored, thus restoring Azerbaijan’s administrative control over Nagorno-Karabakh (Suny 1993: 137; Dudwick 1997: 488; Hunter 1997: 443). In return Azerbaijan should end its rail blockade (Rutland 1994: 850). The end of a short-term period of direct rule is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. Note: it is not clear whether this concession was made before or after the movement’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. This cannot be seen as a concession to the Azeris, given that the Armenian, the Azerbaijan and the Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation enjoyed official status already prior to this.
* In 1990 Moscow declared a state of emergency and ordered a military intervention in Karabakh and (a bit later) in Baku (Suny 1993: 137; Rutland 1994: 850). In Baku the intervention led to the death of dozens of protesters. In accordance with the codebook this is not coded.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Azerbaijan declared independence at the end of August 1991, which appears to have had the tacit approval of Moscow (MAR). The definite approval from Moscow came with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the Azeris as regionally autonomous throughout. [1989-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Azerbaijanis |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Azeri |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36509000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* The majority of Azerbaijanis resided in Azerbaijan, with a minority in other republics, in particular Georgia and Armenia. According to the 1989 census, more than 80% of Azerbaijan’s population were Azerbaijanis (Hunter 1997: 439). This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Azeris in Iran (EPR, MAR), and Turks in Turkey (MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Balkars

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

* Kabardino-Balkaria is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Kabards (making up about half of the local population) and the Balkars (making up about ten per cent of the republic’s population). Unsurprisingly, given the numerics, the Kabards have significant influence over the regional government (Ormrod 1997: 109-111; Roeder 2007: 130), and the Balkars often complain about too limited representation in the regional institutions (Minority Rights Group International).
* There is a degree of ethnic power-sharing with the Balkars at the republican level (Hahn 2007: 143; Ormrod 1997: 111). However, overall, the Balkars’ influence appears limited. According to the EPR coding notes: “In Kabardino-Balkaria, the Kabards control the subunit-level government and thus, have regional autonomy. In the Kabardino-Balkar Republic the government is made up mainly of ethnic Kabards and ethnic tensions between the groups exist (Dzutsati 2013b). Since 1956 only one ethnic Balkar (Boris Zumakulov from 1990 to 1991) was governor of this republic. The Balkars have numerous grievances (mostly originating from the mass deportation in 1944), which express themselves in desires of an individual republic in Russia. In 1992 the Balkars unsuccessfully voted for the secession from the Kabards. Additionally, the Balkars only make up around 10% of the people within this territory (4371, 4372). The Balkars thus, have no regional autonomy.” Following EPR, we do not code the Balkars as autonomous; and we also do not code changes in Kabardino-Balkaria’s status as concessions or restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1989 Tere was formed, an organization dedicated to the re-establishment of Balkar sovereignty, the preservation of the Balkar language and the development of effective education (Richmond 2008: 143). 1989 is thus coded as start date.
* In November 1990 a commission was formed in Kabardino-Balkaria to examine the question of restoring Balkar autonomy (Ormrod 1997: 132). An unofficial Balkar National Congress was formed in March 1991 in order to promote demands for a Balkar autonomous region within the Russian Federation. When the demand was ignored, the Balkar Congress unilaterally proclaimed a separate Balkar republic on November 17, 1991, and initiated an unofficial referendum on the question of national sovereignty (Radio Free Europe 2005; Roeder 2007: 130; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 147-148).
* According to Minahan (2002: 253), “[t]he Balkars have long felt disadvantaged in Kabardino-Balkaria […] In a referendum in December 1991, they voted to create a separate Balkar republic within the Russian Federation”.
* Agitation towards self-determination continued, though there is conflicting information regarding the exact nature of the claim raised in 1994. Minahan (2002: 253), on the one hand, notes that Balkar leaders in 1994 once again called for a separate Balkar republic by formally requesting the permission from the Russian Federation to sign a federal treaty, but that the request was rejected. Ormrod (1997: 110), on the other hand, argues that the Balkar leaders in 1994 modified their demand to autonomy within Kabardino-Balkaria, and that they explicitly renounced claims for separation from Kabardino-Balkaria. In any case, in 1994 the Kabardino-Balkarian government initiated a referendum on the question of separation, according to which 96 per cent of the Balkars supported a unified Kabardino-Balkaria (Roeder 2007: 130). And in March 1994 Yeltsin signed a decree, rehabilitating the Balkars, reviving their cultural heritage, repatriating those still living abroad, and providing special pensions to deportees. Valerii Kokov, Kabardino-Balkaria’s governor, proceeded to reinstate the the region’s territorial divisions as they had existed prior to the Balkars’ deportation in 1944 (Orttung et al. 2000: 161; Minahan 2002: 254).
* November 17, 1996, the Congress of Balkars once again unilaterally proclaimed a separate republic, suspending the laws of Kabardino-Balkaria on its territory, and declaring itself as the governing authority (Roeder 2007: 130-131; Orttung et al. 2000: 162; Hahn 2007: 144). The demand was repeated in 1997 (Hahn 2007: 145).
* Agitation towards self-determination carried over into the next millennium (Hahn 2007: 146). Protests over separation from Kabardino-Balkaria took place in 2005 and 2010. Moreover, in 2005 Balkars protested a local territorial-administrative revision (Minority Rights Group International). Land rights for the Balkars have been a primary issue as well, with protests taking place in 2009 and in 2013 over contested grazing areas.
* In the 2010s, the main Balkar SDM, the Balkar Council of Elders has continued its demands for the dismantlement of the Karbadino-Balkar Republic to create an autonomous Balkar republic (MRGI). In 2018, there were clashes between Balkar activists and state authorities. About 45 people were insured and 120 were arrested. The Balkar Council of Elders covered the event in its newspaper, the Bulletin of the Balkar people. In response, the republic’s court recognized the publication as extremist. In the same year, Russia’s higher court overruled this decision (Kommersant 2020; Maratova 2019). In 2020, the Council organized a congress that gathered 150 participants from various parts of the Karbadino-Balkar Republic. The congress was disrupted by more radical Balkars that were dissatisfied with the Council’s activities (Maratova 2020). [start date: 1989; end date ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The aim of Tere, the organization that was formed in 1989, was the re-establishment of sovereignty for the Balkars (Richmond 2008: 143). It is not clear whether this implied complete separation from Kabardino-Balkaria (following the codebook, the more radical claim should be coded, which is sub-state secession), but in 1991 the Balkar Congress indeed proceeded to proclaim a separate Balkar republic (Roeder 2007: 130).
* According to Ormrod (1997: 110), the Balkar leaders modified their demand to autonomy within Kabardino-Balkaria in 1994, thereby explicitly renouncing claims for separation from Kabardino-Balkaria. Minahan (2002: 253), on the other hand, argues that Balkar leaders continued to agitate for a separate republic. Since Ormrod (1997) is generally more reliable, we rely on her. In November 1996, the Balkar congress once again proclaimed a separate Balkar republic (Roeder 2007: 130-131; Orttung et al. 2000: 162; Hahn 2007: 144). There were repeated calls for separation from Kabardino-Balkaria in subsequent years (Hahn 2007: 145; Minority Rights Group International); no other claim was found beyond 1996. In the 2010s, the Balkar Council of Elders has continued its demands for the dismantlement of the Karbadino-Balkar Republic to create an autonomous Balkar republic (MRGI; Roth 2015). In light of this evidence and following the first of January rule, we code a claim for sub-state secession in 1989-1994, a claim for autonomy in 1995-1996, and a claim for sub-state secession in 1997-2020 [1989-1994: sub-state secession claim; 1995-1996: autonomy claim; 1997-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Balkars lies in the Kabardino - Balkaria autonomous region in southern Russia, where the Balkars live mainly in the high valleys of the Baksan and Malka Rivers (Minahan 2002: 249). The claim changed over the years, and in more recent times, the Balkars called for the establishment of a larger territory, the “Karachay-Balkar Republic”. However, the initial and dominant claim is for the establishment of a Balkar republic in southern Kabardino-Balkaria (Roth 2015: 184–86). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 174).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Balkar Congress unilaterally proclaimed a separate Balkar republic on November 17, 1991, and initiated an unofficial referendum on the question of national sovereignty (Radio Free Europe 2005; Roeder 2007: 130). According to Minahan (2002: 253), “[t]he Balkars have long felt disadvantaged in [Kabardino-Balkaria]…In a referendum in December 1991, they voted to create a separate Balkar republic within the Russian Federation.” There was a second declaration in 1991: also Kabardino-Balkaria declared its sovereignty (see Kabards). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]
* November 17, 1996, the Congress of Balkars once again unilaterally proclaimed a separate republic, suspending the laws of Kabardino-Balkaria on its territory, and declaring itself as the governing authority (Roeder 2007: 130-131; Orttung et al. 2000: 162; Hahn 2007: 144). [1996: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence above the threshold. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Balkars have come under Russian control in the late 18th century (Minahan 2002: 859). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. Still, in 1936, Kabardino-Balkaria was upgraded to ASSR status. During the Second World War, the Karachais (along with the Balkars) declared an independent state (Minahan 2002: 911). When the area was reconquered, the Karachais and the Balkars, as well as the Ingush and the Chechens were deported and their autonomous status abolished (in 1944). The Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR was renamed the Kabardin ASSR. Only in 1956 were the deported peoples allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99). The Balkars again attained titular status in Kabardino-Balkaria, and the territory was renamed as the Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR. However, the Balkars’ influence over the joint republic remained strictly limited (EPR).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’ (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. This does not mean that it did not have effects at all. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.
* In 1990 the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR. However, at the same time, republics, including ASSRs, were allowed to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Subsequently Kabard and Balkar attained official language status in Kabardino-Balkaria. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1994 the Kabardino-Balkarian government initiated a referendum on the question of separation, according to which 96 per cent of the Balkars supported a unified Kabardino-Balkaria (Roeder 2007: 130). It is somewhat ambiguous whether this should be coded a concession since the referendum was aimed *against* separation, that is the republican leadership aimed to weaken the movement thereby.
* Moreover, in 1994, Kabardino-Balkaria’s president reinstated the the region’s territorial divisions as they had existed prior to the Balkars’ deportation in 1944 (Orttung et al. 2000: 161; Minahan 2002: 254). It is unclear how this would have affected the Balkars’ autonomy.
* In 2005 Balkars protested a local territorial-administrative revision (Minority Rights Group International). The reform involved the redistricting of four small Balkar villages as sub-urbs of a nearby city. This appears too insignificant to be considered an autonomy restriction.
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017 cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Balkars |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Balkars |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36543000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.0002; 1992-2013: 0.001; 2014-2020: 0.0008]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 249), the vast majority of the Balkars settles in the southern part of the Kabardino-Balkaria republic, where they make up 57% of the local population. We corroborated Minahan’s figures with data from the 2010 census. According to the 2010 census, only 13% of Kabardino Balkaria’s population was Balkar. However, the Balkars predominantly settle in the republic’s southern part. They form an absolute majority in two southern districts (Elbrus and Chereksky). Both border Georgia, but are not directly contiguous. Other places with significant Balkar populations are Nalchik, the capital, and Chegem, the district that separates the two district with a majority Balkar population. While one would need more fine-grained data, it appears more likely than not that there exists a spatially contiguous area straddling the border with Georgia in which the majority of the Balkars lives, and where they form an absolute majority. Below some more detailed figures from the 2010 census. [concentrated]
  + Total Balkar population: 113,000 (2010 total)
  + Absolute majority:
    - Elbrus district: 25,000 Balkars (70% of local population)
    - Chereksky district: 17,000 (64%)
  + Other areas:
    - Chegem district: 14,000 (20%)
    - Zolsky district: 3,000 (6%)
    - Nalchik: 29,000 (12%)

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR. We found no evidence in other sources either (e.g. Minahan 2002). Note: the Balkars are closely related to the Karachai, another group in the Russian northern Caucasus. [no kin]

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## Bashkir

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

* The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Bashkortostan ASSR/Republic. The Bashkir make up only a minority of Bashkortostan's population. Still, they are the titular nationality and thus enjoy a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Moreover, the self-determination claim relates to the Bashkir republic. Hence, changes in Bashkortostan’s status affect the Bashkir.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In response to ethnic mobilization by Tatars in Bashkortostan, the Bashkirs began to organize in 1989, when White Yurt, a cultural organization, and the Bashkir National Center were formed. Bashkortostan declared sovereignty in October 1990; Bashkir organizations participated in the drafting process (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170-171). Hence, we peg the start date of the movement to 1989.
* With the disintegration of the USSR demands for increased autonomy, even independence, gained public support in the republic. News reports indicate that the movement for greater Bashkir autonomy has been consistently active (though at a much smaller scale; CNN 2011; Dzetsev 2013; also see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 1996, 2002; MRGI 1997).
* Bashkir nationalism gained new momentum after Bashkortostan’s government lifted the obligation to teach the Bashkir language in schools. In 2014, former members of the Kuk Bere movement created Bashkort, which became the most active separatist organization in the following years. Bashkort advocates for Bashkortostan’s right for self-determination and organized a large-scale Bashkir congress in 2016 (Free Ural Ude 2022; Jamal 2017; Mardanov 2020; MRGI). Bashkort and other organisations also held protests with demands to reinstate Bashkortostan’s language autonomy (Azatlyk radiosy 2017).
* In May 2020, Bashkortstan’s court acknowledged Bashkort as an extremist organisation and was banned in Russia (Kommersant 2020).
* In August 2020, Bashkir activists held protests against the plans to mine on the Kushtau hill, which is regarded as a sacred for Bashkir people (Ablyakimov 2021) [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There have been occasional calls for outright independence, but according to Minahan (2002: 282) the demands generally involved increased autonomy rather than secession. This remained current as of 2020 (Azatlyk Radiosy 2017). According to George (2009: 68-70), the claims made by Bashkortostan parallel those of the (neighboring and stronger) Tatar movement. Hence, we code a claim for sub-state secession in 1989-1991 (note that the sovereignty declaration implied an upgrade to union republic status, see above), and a claim for autonomy for 1992 onwards. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* No clear evidence for a politically significant movement for independence despite occasional calls for independence (see above). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Bashkir claims are tied to today’s Republic of Bashkortostan (formerly Bashkiria) in eastern Russia (Minahan 2002: 276). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Bashkortostan ASSR declared sovereignty on October 11, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic status (Kahn 2000: 60; George 2009: 68). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Bashkir are a formerly nomadic Turkic group, located in the Middle Volga region (Frank & Wixman 1997: 146). Bashkortostan was joined to Russia in 1557. It was in the Volga region where the Soviets first established their policy of division, or national delimitation, which was later applied throughout Muslim regions of the USSR (Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Northern Caucasus). The aim of national delimitation was to create a number of ethnic entities large enough to maintain distinct ethnic identity, but small enough to be controlled by Moscow (Frank & Wixman 1997: 149). At the time there was a strong pan-Turkic movement. The Bashkir ASSR became the first ethnically based entity in March 1919. The Tatar ASSR was created in 1920, despite an earlier promise of Union Republic status (Frank & Wixman 1997: 149). The newly established borders led to strong antagonism between Bashkir and Tatars, given that Ufa, a district and town inhabited mostly by Tatars, was assigned to the Bashkir ASSR rather than the Tatar ASSR (Frank & Wixman 1997: 151). Despite the promise of autonomy, subsequent years saw significant centralization (George 2009: 59). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. Under Soviet rule, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan became major industrial centers, leading to substantial economic growth, helped also by the discovery of oil and natural gas. Economic growth led to the in-migration of ethnic Slavs into the Volga region. Some groups became minorities in their own entity (e.g., the Bashkir, Mordvinians, the Maris, and the Komi). There was strong Russification. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems” (Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession). In line with this, according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like Bashkortostan). [[1]](#footnote-1) Note: it is not clear whether the concession was made before or after the SDM’s first activities. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Bashkir subsequently attained official status in Bashkortostan, along with Russian. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. In Bashkortostan, there were regional presidential elections in 1993. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of the regions. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction, and since Bashkortostan never had a representative assigned to it.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Bashkortostan and Sakha initially refused to sign the treaty, signing it only after they were given special concessions, including a special regime with regard to their contribution to the federal budget. Two republics – Tatarstan and Chechnya – refused to sign the treaty altogether. [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit a couple of months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1994: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
  + In 2002, Bashkortstan’s constitution was amended. Per Putin’s reforms, the republic’s sovereignty, right to own natural resources, the supremacy of republican laws over the federal ones were eliminated from the republic constitution (Mukhtasarova and Safin 2018).
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control over the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Yet, Bashkortstan continued to hold gubernatorial elections as of 2020, so we do not code a restriction (Tass 2019).
* In 2013, Russian lawmakers adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, which prohibit calls for separatism. According to the amendments, which entered into force in May 2014, "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation" are punishable for up to five years in prison (Harding 2014; Meduza 2016). However, this is not a restriction as defined here.
* In 2014, Bashkortstan’s assembly made amendments to the republic’s constitution. Per the law, Bashkortstan republic’s presidency is eliminated, and replaced with a title of “the head of the republic” starting from January 2015 (Tass 2014). We do not code a restriction because the change is rather symbolic and does not lead to a concrete loss of autonomy.
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR 2021: 1595). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Bashkortostan had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Bashkortostan has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. Note that while the Bashkir make up only a minority in their own republic, they as the titular nationality retain political and economic privileges (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170), even under Putin. (Minority Rights Group International). [1989-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bashkir |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bashkirs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36507000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.005; 1992-2013: 0.012; 2014: 0.0115; 2015-2020: 0.0113]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 276), approx. half of all Bashkirs resides in Bashkortostan, but they make up but 28% of the republic’s population. From the map depicted in Minahan it looks as if the Bashkorts could be concentrated in a spatially contiguous area covering the eastern part of the republic, and some adjacent areas in particular in Orenburg. We consulted 2002 census data to check this. First, we found that Minahan is right: the Bashkirs make up approx. 30% of the republic, up from 22% in 1989 census. We also found that Bashkortostan’s ethnic demography is rather checkered. There are, throughout the republic, but especially in the northern and southeastern parts, some districts with Bashkort majorities (they are listed below). However, only approx. 340,000 Bashkirs reside in these districts (out of 1.67 million, 75% of which reside in Bashkortostan). Another 250,000 reside in districts where the Bashkirs make up 40%-50%, and another 80,000 in districts in which they make up 30%-40%. The combination yields a roughly contiguous area with a narrow Bashkort majority of 51%, but only 40% of all Bashkirs reside there. We tried several combinations, also taking into account districts in Orenburg and Chelyabinsk, but it proved impossible to come up with a territory that would fulfil the threshold based on district level census data. [not concentrated]

>50%

Abzelilovsky 38,061 / 87.98%

Askin 16,959 / 70.88%

Baymak 38,795 / 87.74%

Baltachevsky 17,297 / 70.04%

Beloretsk 18,292 / 62.89%

Buraevskogo 23,045 / 81.37%

Burzian 16,277 / 96.66%

Zilair 10,555 / 55.73%

Ilishevsky 29,217 / 80.53%

Ishimbay 18,335 / 71.59%

Mechetlinsky 14,961 / 58.43%

Tatyshlinsky 18,770 / 70.03%

Tuimazinsky 18,515 / 59.87%

Haybullinsky 25,840 / 78.13%

Mr. Baymak 12,015 / 69.76%

Mr. Uchalu 21,535 / 56.64%

>40%

Arkhangelsk 9276/46%

Belokataysky 9836 / 43.48%

Blagovarsky 12,472 / 48.4%

Buzdyaksky 12,528 / 40.18%

Gafuriysky 18,325 / 49.85%

Davlekanovskiy 8365 /45.77%

Dyurtyuli 16,184 / 49.06%

Ermekeevsky 8428 / 46.29%

Karaidelsky 12,721 / 44.96%

Karmaskalinsky 23,296 / 42.68%

Kiginsky 8192 / 41.32%

Kuyurgazinsky 11,033 / 43.12%

Kushnarenkovsky 12,703 / 43.29%

Meleuzovsky 10,948 / 40.97%

Miyakinsky 14,126 / 44.44%

Yanaulsky 11,305 / 49.45%

Mr. Agidel 7806 / 41.69%

Mr. Sibai 29,315 / 48.74%

Mr. Yanaul 11,990 / 42.96%

>30%

Alsheevsky 17,930 / 37.05%

Iglinskiy 15,177 / 33.44%

Krasnokamsky 9668 / 35.09%

Nurimanovsky 7526 / 34.32%

Sterlibashevsky 7321 / 33.27%

Chekmagushevsky 11 445 / 34.65%

Sharansky 7614 / 31.09%

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR; we found no evidence in alternative sources either (e.g. Minahan 2002). [no kin]

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## Belarussians

Activity: 1987-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for agitation towards self-determination we found is in 1987, when the Confederation of Belarussian Youth Associations issues an appeal asking for popular support for the cause of self-determination. At its second convention, in January 1989, the Youth Association called for outright independence (Zaprudnik & Urban 1997: 287). In the meantime, in October 1988, the Belarussian Popular Front is established, which soon became the major vehicle of the Belarussian self-determination movement (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 1998). The Belarussian SSR issued a declaration of sovereignty in 1990. Belarus became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement (Banks et al. 1997). [start date: 1987; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* The Belarussian Youth Association issued an appeal to support self-determination in 1987. In 1989, it began to advocate independence, but by this time the Belarussian Popular Front had been established. The Front soon became the major vehicle of the movement. Inially, the Belarussian Popular Front advocated autonomy (Minahan 1998: 40). Outright secession was unpopular in Belarus. Even in mid-1991, independence was not on the agenda of most; more than four in five Belarussians were against secession (Zaprudnik & Urban 1997: 292). However, the Belarussian Popular Front began to advocate independence in August 1991 (Zaprudnik & Urban 1997: 293). Based on this, we code an autonomy claim throughout in accordance with the first of January rule. [1987-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1989; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Belarussian is the present-day Belarus state (formerly the Byelorussian SSR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Belarussian SSR issued a declaration on sovereignty on July 27, 1990 (Zaprudnik & Urban 1997: 290; Kahn 2000: 60, on the other hand, gives December 7, 1989, as the date when the declaration was adopted, but all other sources we consulted agree with Zaprudnik & Urban on July 1990). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* After the failed August Coup, Belarussian leaders reluctantly proclaimed independence on August 25, 1991 (Zaprudnik & Urban 1997: 303). This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and the declaration not “unilateral” in the sense employed here.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There are no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Between the First and the Second World War, Belarus was divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Treaty of Riga (1921) awarded part of Belarus to Poland, and Poland initiated a brutal policy of Polonization. Soviet Belarus was organized as the Belarusan Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), which was proclaimed in 1919, followed by harsh repression and Russification. The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact incorporated the Western, Polish parts of Belarus into the Soviet Union (i.e., into the Belarussian SSR). During the Second World War, Belarus was first occupied by the Soviets (1939-1941), and after by Germany (1941-1944). After the War, the Belarussian SSR (now including the formerly Polish parts), along with the Soviet Union as a whole and the Ukrainian USSR, was awarded a seat in the United Nations General Assembly to create a better balance between the West and the East. After Stalin’s death in 1953, there was a modest upward trend in the autonomy of Belarus. The center’s control loosened, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). Thus, Moscow’s control of personnel decisions in the BSSR became increasingly limited (Zaprudnik & Urban 1997: 285).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession. [1988: autonomy concession]
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems.” Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, in January 1990, a new Language Law is adopted in Belarus, which establishes Belarussian as the official state language, but allows for a transitional period of three to ten years. The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. In some cases the republican laws went far beyond what Gorbachev was willing to concede. Gorbachev sought to halt attempts at de-Russification, and guarantee (if not enhance) the privileged position of Russians and the Russian language in the Union. Gorbachev campaigned against the language laws of the Baltic Republics (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 127-128). [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Belarus achieved independence (Minahan 1998). [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the Belarussians as regionally autonomous throughout. [1987-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Belarussians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Byelorussians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36504000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.03]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were approx. 10 million Belarussians in the Soviet Union. Most (approx. 80%) resided in the Belarus SSR, where the Belarussians made up 78% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Approx. 250,000 Belarussians in Poland constitute close kindred across the border (see EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Buryats

Activity: 1990-2008

**General notes**

* The Buryat homeland was divided into three autonomous entities in 1937, the Buryat Republic, the Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug, and the Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug. Since the Buryat autonomy claim relates to all three entities, we combine concessions/restrictions given to all three entities. Moreover, note that the Buryats constitute a minority within the Buryat Republic and Ust-Orda (Fondahl 1997: 194); still the concession/restrictions codes refer to all three entities since the movement's claims relate to all three entities and since these are the Buryats’ ethnic homelands.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Buryat national movement, suppressed for over 50 years, resurfaced with the liberalization of Soviet life in the 1980s, demanding the reunification of the Buryat lands separated in 1937 and increased autonomy (Fondahl 1997: 209). In October 1990 the government of the Soviet Autonomous Republic of Buryatia issued a draft declaration on sovereignty stating that the republic enjoys the right of self-determination. In November 1990, the Buryat-Mongolian People’s Party was formed. Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1990.
* In 1990, the Buryat-Mongolian People's Party was formed, whose demands included the establishment of a single, united Buryat Republic within the Russian Federation and with increased autonomy from Moscow (MAR). According to some sources, elements of the Buryat-Mongolian People's Party demanded union with Mongolia (Balzer 1994: 79; MAR; Sanders 2010: 131), but advocates of outright secession have remained a minority (Balzer 1994: 79).
* In 1992, the Negedel National Unity Movement was registered in Buryatia (Fondahl 1997: 229). MAR non-zero protest scores for 1990-2005 suggest an ongoing movement.
* In 2008, two of the three titular Buryat units (the former Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug and the former Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug) were amalgamated with Irkutsk and Chita Oblast, respectively, and thereby lost their autonomous status, provoking protest among Buryats (MAR). The protests were suppressed, and movement members had to leave Russia. After this, we could not find evidence for separatist claims, though there has been some mobilization related to language (Kulagin 2021; Prokopeva 2018).
* Notably, we also found no evidence of organized separatist claims in the Republic of Buryatia. Some Buryats such as Zurtan Khaltarov and Vladimir Khagdaev were detained for sharing nationalist ideas on social media (Basae 2013; Sitnyk 2019), but we could not find evidence for a political movement. On this basis, we code the end of the movement in 2008. [start date: 1990; end date: 2008]

**Dominant claim**

* The Buryat ASSR declared sovereignty on October 8, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic status (Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 228). Hence, we code a sub-state secession claim for 1990-1991.
* Advocates of outright secession existed but remained a minority (Balzer 1994: 79). The dominant demand is for reunification of all Buryat lands (i.e. incorporation into the Buryat Republic) and increased autonomy (Fondahl 1997: 209; MAR). In June 1993, the Buryat government officially recognizes the Agin-Buryat and the Ust-Orda Buryat AOks, hence relinquishing the unification claim. In light of this evidence, we code a sub-state secession claim for 1992-1993 (reunification of all Buryat lands implies separation of the AOks from Irkutsk and Chita Oblast, respectively), and an autonomy claim for 1994 onwards, in accordance with the first of January rule. [1990-1993: sub-state secession claim; 1994-2008: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* In 1990, the Buryat-Mongolian People’s Party was formed. According to the detailed account by Chakars (2020), the party’s main demand was for the unification of Buryat lands and increased autonomy within Russia. However, some sources suggest that elements of the Buryat-Mongolian People’s Party also made claims for outright secession and subsequent union with Mongolia (Balzer 1994: 79; MAR; Sanders 2010: 131). Advocates of outright secession remained a minority (Balzer 1994: 79) but demands are mentioned in several sources, suggesting political significance. We could not find clear evidence regarding the end of irredentist claims. The last evidence for irredentist claims we found was in 1991 (Sanders 2010: 131). Following the ten-years of inactivity rule, we code the irredentist movement’s end date in 2001. [start date: 1990; end date: 2001]
  + Note: the decision to code an irredentist movement is ambiguous in part because of the unclear evidence on political significance of such claims, and in other part because the detailed account of Buryatia in the early 1990s by Chakars (2020) does not make mention of claims for union with Mongolia (but also does not state that there were no such claims).

**Claimed territory**

* Claims are focused on the Buryat republic and, especially in the early 1990s, also on the two Buryat autonomous okrugs (Minahan 1996: 93; 2002: 341). We code the following three territories: 1) Buryat republic; 2) Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug; and 3) Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug. The two okrugs are no longer autonomous, but otherwise their names have remained the same. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Buryat ASSR declared sovereignty on October 8, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic status (Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 228). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Historical context**

* The Buryats, located north of Mongolia, are one of two Mongol peoples in Russia (with the Kalmyks being the second Mongol people). Interethnic conflict, mainly with Russians, has emerged in the late 18th in response to increasing numbers of immigrants moving into the Buryat homelands (Fondahl 1997: 208). Under the Tsarist regime, the Buryats were deprived of their autonomous government (Fondahl 1997: 209). Following the Bolshevik recapture of the Buryat land, occupied by the Japanese between 1917 and 1918, in 1918, the Bolsheviks awarded the Buryats with aimaks – that is, their own administrative areas. With the formation of the Far Eastern Republic in 1920, a nominally independent state that was reintegrated into Russia in 1922, the Buryat nation was divided temporarily. In 1921, the Autonomous Buryat-Mongol Oblast was created, an autonomous entity within the Far Eastern Republic. In 1922 the Soviets established a Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Republic. The two were merged into a single Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923. Already at this time, Russians outnumbered Buryats in the ASSR (Fondahl 1997: 209; Minahan 2002: 345). The 1920s saw harsh repression against Buryats; in particular, Buddhism was suppressed (Minahan 2002: 345). In the 1930s, most members of the Buryat elite were accused of nationalism, pan-Mongolianism, and denounced as Japanese spies. As punishment, the Buryat homeland was divided into three titular units in 1937 – the Buryat ASSR, the Ust-Orda (Buryat) Autonomous Okrug (under the administration of Irkutsk Oblast; in 2008 Ust-Orda was meged with Irkutsk Oblast, and thereby lost its autonomous status), and the Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug (under the administration of Chita Oblast; in 2008 Aga-Buryat was merged with Chita Oblast to form the Zabaykalsky Krai and thereby lost its autonomous status). In 1946, Buryat Buddhism was officially re-established (Minahan 2002: 345). In 1948, another purge of repression followed. “Traditional art forms were banned, and Russian academics were put in charge of the education and assimilation of the Buryat population. Education in the Buryat language was forbidden. A Soviet policy of separating the Buryats from their Mongol roots included changing the name of the region from Buryat-Mongol Autononomous Soviet Socialist Republic to simply the Buryat ASSR, in 1958. Buryatia was declared a restricted area and access without special permission was denied, effectively cutting the Buryats off from outside contact. In 1976 there were only about 300 Buryat Buddhist lamas or monks, down from 16,000 before the Bolshevik Revolution, and only one officially sanctioned monastery” (Minahan 2002: 345-346). The situation eased with Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s. In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* And in 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels (powers were devolved to union republics and ASSRs, like the Buryat ASSR), including increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently, Buryat became an official language in the Buryat republic, along with Russian (Fondahl 1997: 210), hence we code a cultural rights concession in 1990. Note that the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (including Ust-Orda and Agin-Buryat) were not granted this right. The law was adopted in April 1990 and, therefore, before the formation of the SDM in October/November 1990. [1990: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Nikolai Potapov (previously Chairman of the Supreme Soviet) was elected governor of the Buryat Republic in 1994 (Orttung et al. 2000: 64). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* While republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991, Yeltsin, through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed), including two of the three Buryat units, the Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug and the Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug (Orttung et al. 2000: 12, 601). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
* Note that in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics (like Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug) were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). The constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics such as the Buryat Republic, hence we code an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* At the same time the 1993 constitution gave Autonomous Okrugs (including Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug) rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), which implies increased autonomy for these two entities. Hence we also code an autonomy concession in 1993. [1993: autonomy concession]
* Furthermore, in 1993, the Buryats’ language rights were increased, “primarily in areas of speaking and education in Buryat native tongue. This was negotiated with the government of the Buryat area and the Russian Minister of Education” (Cunningham 2014: 221). [1993: cultural rights concession]
* In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). Subsequently gubernatorial lections were held in Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug and Agin-Buryat Okrug in 1996 and 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 13, 601). Given the short-term nature of the moratorium, we do not code this as a concession.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). The Buryat Republic signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Moscow in August 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 65; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1995: autonomy concession]
* In May 1996 Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug signed a power-sharing agreement with Moscow and Irkutsk Oblast (by which it was administered in Russia's matrioshka federal system; Orttung et al. 2000: 601; Söderlund 2006: 94), implying increased autonomy. [1996: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* However, in June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In the name of administrative simplification, Putin moved to abolish certain ethnic entities in the early 2000s, promising improved economic performance. Following 2006 and 2007 referendums, Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug were merged with Irkutsk Oblast and Chita Oblast, respectively, in 2008. Both units thereby lost their autonomous status (Minority Rights Group International). Given the Buryats’ minority status within their entity and the strong political pressure to follow the official line, we code two restrictions. [2006, 2007: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The Buryat Republic had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. The two other Buryat units, Ust-Orda and Agin-Buryat, had the status of an autonomous okrug until 2008, when their autonomy was disbanded. Under the Soviets, the ethnic entities (in particular the ASSRs) had a certain measure of power, especially under Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117); they retained a certain measure of autonomy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see above). Despite the disbanding of the autonomous status of Ust-Orda and Agin-Buryat in 2008, we code the Buryats as autonomous beyond 2008 because the status of the Buryat Republic has remained intact and because most Buryats live in the Buryat Republic (Minahan 2002: 341). It has to be noted that the Buryats constitute a minority within the Buryat Republic and Ust-Orda (Fondahl 1997: 194). Titular nationalities generally have a privileged position in the regional administration, however (Frank & Wixman 1997: 174). [1990-2008: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Following 2006 and 2007 referendums, Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug were merged with Irkutsk Oblast and Chita Oblast, respectively, in 2008. Both units thereby lost their autonomous status (Minority Rights Group International). Conceptually, the two autonomous okrugs were autonomies within a larger federal unit; thus in line with the codebook this is coded as “Revocation of autonomy” rather than “Sub-state merger.” [2008: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Buryats |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Buryats |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36532000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.001; 1992-2008: 0.003]

**Regional concentration**

* There are three “Buryat” territories, the Buryat republic, the former Ust-Orda Buryat autonomous okrug and the former Agin Buryat autonomous okrug. The three territories are not adjacent. According to the 2010 census, there were 461,000 Buryats in Russia, 287,000 in the republic (where they made up 30% of the local population), 50,000 in the Ust-Orda Buryat okrug (40% of local population), and 50,000 in the Agin Buryat okrug (65% of local population). We found no territory that would fulfil the two times 50% rule. [not concentrated]
  + Note: Minahan (2002: 341) reports higher shares for the two smaller territories (71%/100,000 and 55%/42,000, respectively), but approx. the same for the much larger Buryat republic (28%/290,000). It is not clear on what Minahan’s figure base. Earlier census reported lower figures compared to the ones in the 2010 census. But this does not matter that much because the territories are not adjacent.

**Kin**

* The Buryats form part of the larger group of Mongols; thus the Mongols in Mongolia constitute numerically significant kin (MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Chechens

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* By 1987, the effects of Gorbachev’s liberalization began to be felt also in the North Caucasus. Several informal organizations sprang up in support of further liberalization (Dunlop 1998: 88; Minahan 2002: 440). In Chechnya, the first openly separatist organization, Bart (Unity), was formed in July 1989. At an August 1989 Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, members of Bart advocated the idea of “a federal statehood of the peoples of the Caucasus” (Dunlop 1998: 90). Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1989.
* In February 1990 Bart was transformed into the Vainakh Democratic Party; the organization’s leaders aimed for a sovereign Vainakh republic (Dunlop 1998: 90). In November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). At the Congress, there were three factions, with the moderate one composed of the republican leadership advocating full sovereignty within the Soviet Union, and the two others full-fledged independence, either as a secular or as an Islamic state (Dunlop 1998: 93). At the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet followed the suggestion, and adopted its declaration of sovereignty, and thereby not only claimed increased autonomy, but also unilaterally updated its administrative status to union republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60).
* Following the August Coup, Dudaev (a former Soviet Air Force general and leader of the Chechen separatist movement) and his Congress of the Chechen People stormed the Checheno-Ingush parliament in early September 1991, forcing the resignation of the Communist leadership (Dunlop 1998: 105). After the ouster, the Chechen nationalist movement moved to hold presidential and parliamentary elections, announced for October. This was met with fierce resistance from anti-Dudaev forces both in Moscow and in Chechnya itself (Dunlop 1998: 108).
* Yeltsin had initially supported the ouster of the Communist forces in Chechnya (Roeder 2007: 314). However, fearing that the outright secessionist Dudaev would win the presidential election, Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet attempted to stop the elections; in the end, their efforts proved unsuccessful. Dudaev was elected as Chechnya’s president on October 27, 1991 (Dunlop 1998: 113; George 2009: 80; Ormrod 1997: 104).
* The Russian Supreme Soviet declared the elections unlawful. Dudaev moved on to declare Chechnya independent on November 1 (Dunlop 1998: 114; Ormrod 1997: 103; Roeder 2007: 314). A week later, Yeltsin introduced emergency law in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, removed Dudaev from power, replaced him with Moscow-loyal Akhmet Arsanov, and sent troops to Grozny. However, Chechen forces managed to block the troops at Grozny airport. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s Supreme Soviet rescinded Yeltsin’s decree and ordered the troops back (though the Chechens, notably, kept their weapons; Dunlop 1998: 116-120).
* According to Minority Rights Group International, Moscow subsequently introduced an economic blockade of Chechnya. From this point on, Chechnya was de facto independent. Negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful middle ground went nowhere, for the Chechens demanded independence and Moscow was unwilling to let the new Russian Federation splinter any further. Moscow moved back and forth from a hard stance and negotiation offers; for instance, in early March a high-ranking official signed an agreement which recognized Chechnya’s independence and sovereignty, and at the end of the same month Moscow backed an attempted coup aimed at overthrowing Dudaev (Dunlop 1998: 171). In turn, Moscow either offered significant autonomy or threatened invasion.
* Chechnya, along with Tatarstan, refused to sign the 1992 Federal Treaty, which would have promised a much greater extent of republican autonomy.
* In 1994, the Yeltsin government began in earnest to seek to destabilize Chechnya, supporting and arming the Chechen opposition in an attempt to remove Dudaev from power (Dunlop 1998: 156). In May, there was a failed assassination attempt against Dudaev (Dunlop 1998: 192). In November, Moscow installed an alternative government in Chechnya (Dunlop 1998: 163). The “proxy-war”, however, failed, and eventually led to the decision, taken at the end of November, to invade Chechnya (Dunlop 1998: 206-209), leading to the First Chechen War. After a long and bloody war, in 1996, a cease-fire was signed, and in 1997a formal peace treaty.
* After the assassination of Dudaev in 1996, Aslan Mashkadov, a rebel leader, was elected president of Chechnya in 1997. Though he was more flexible compared to Dudaev, Mashkadov shared the latter’s goal of attaining independence for Chechnya (Orttung et al. 2000: 72). Negotiations over Chechnya’s status continued. In 1998, associate membership with the Russian Federation (a status giving maximum freedom, independence, and sovereignty) was allegedly discussed (MAR).
* In 1999, the Second Chechen War erupted, with Moscow’s stated ambition to end the insecurity in the region and bring back Chechnya under Russian control (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Though officially fighting terrorism, Russia also fought Mashkadov’s de facto government, claiming that Mashkadov was not elected to his post in accordance with Russian legal norms. Moscow no longer recognized Mashkadov as Chechnya’s legitimate president (Orttung et al. 2000: 75).
* In May 2000, Putin established president’s rule in Chechnya. By February 2000, Russian forces had taken control over Grozny, and by mid-2000 over most of Chechnya (Minahan 2002: 441; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Putin moved to appoint a Moscow-minded local administration. In 2000, the Chechen president, Maskhadov, was removed from office and instead Moscow placed its own ethnic Chechen clients in power. Putin named Akhmad Kadyrov “interim civilian administrator” of Chechnya. Kadyrov had fought with Dudaev against Russia in the First Chechen War, but had abandoned the cause in time. Nonetheless, clashes with rebel forces continued throughout the following years.
* In 2003, President Putin introduced a “peace plan”, which included a referendum on a new constitution for a Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation with some local autonomy. Kadyrov delivered the constitution, popularly ratified in 2003, that formally re-integrated Chechnya into Russia in 2003 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Maskhadov, one of the rebel leaders and the (former) president of Chechnya ousted by Putin, condemned the referendum and rejected the validity of the results.
* In October 2003, Kadyrov was elected as Chechnya’s president (Roeder 2007: 315). After his assassination in 2004, Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan Kadyrov, became deputy prime minister, only to be promoted to the presidency in 2007, once he reached the minimum age of 30. Both Kadyrovs have acted as Putin’s prolonged arm in the region (George 2009: 156-157). Still, both have had significant autonomy (George 2009: 157).
* Despite Putin’s establishment of a pro-Moscow minded government in Chechnya, the independence movement has been continually active. In recent years, the Chechen movement has split into two factions. One faction continues to agitate for an independent Chechnya, while the other aims to establish an Islamic state encompassing the whole of the North Caucasus, of which Chechnya would only form part. The movement is ongoing. [start date: 1989; end date ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Bart (Unity), the first Chechen self-determination organization, at an August 1989 Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, advocated the somewhat ambiguous idea of “a federal statehood of the peoples of the Caucasus” (Dunlop 1998: 90). Then, in November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). Already at the time, the Chechen national movement was divided. At the Congress, there were three factions, with the moderate one composed of the republican leadership advocating full sovereignty within the Soviet Union, and the two others full-fledged independence, either as a secular or as an Islamic state (Dunlop 1998: 93). It appears that in this initial face, the more moderate forces prevailed, given that at the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet in its sovereignty declaration did not claim independence, but increased autonomy. The declaration also unilaterally updated the republic’s administrative status to union republic, implying separation from the Russian Federation (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60). Hence, in the initial years we code a claim for sub-state secession.
* In the autumn of 1991, the leader of the independence-minded faction, Dudaev, mounted to power in Chechnya, and shortly thereafter declared Chechnya’s independence (Dunlop 1998: 114; Ormrod 1997: 103). Dudaev’s claim for independence was not completely unambiguous. George (2009: 81), for instance, argues that Dudaev vocally promoted a policy of aggressive separatism, but at the same time signaled his willingness to remain within Russia. “While he repeatedly referred to Chechnya as an independent state free of Russian repression, he also explicitly stated that his goal was to share competencies with Russia, particularly economic and military powers” (George 2009: 81). According to George, the Chechens’ demands in effect matched those of Tatarstan. However, while George may well be correct in arguing that Dudaev might have been willing to accept some weak form of relation with Russia, Dudaev repeatedly insisted on Chechnya’s independence. Furthermore, Chechnya moved to erect a de-facto independent state. Hence, under Dudaev, the dominant claim shifted to independence. After the assassination of Dudaev in 1996, Aslan Mashkadov, a rebel leader, was elected president of Chechnya in 1997. Though he was more flexible compared to Dudaev, Mashkadov shared the latter’s goal of attaining independence for Chechnya (Orttung et al. 2000: 72).
* The movement for independence continued after Chechnya’s de-facto state was crushed in 2000. In recent years, the Chechen movement has split into two factions. One faction continues to agitate for an independent Chechnya, while the other aims to establish an Islamic state encompassing the whole of the North Caucasus, of which Chechnya would only form part (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The claim of both factions, however, is for independence, if in a varied form. In light of this evidence, we code a claim for independence since Dudaev’s mounting to power, that is, as of 1992 (1st of January rule).
* Since the death of separatist leaders Aslan Maskhadov, Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev, and Shamil Basayev in 2005 and 2006, Doku Umarov became the most prominent leader of the Chechen separatist movement. In 2006 Umarov replaced Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev as the head Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI), the self-proclaimed secessionist government of Chechnya. In 2007, Umarov proclaimed the transformation of the CRI into Caucasus Emirate, which was a dominant SDM with independence claims during the 2010s (BBC 2018; Hahn 2011; Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Exact nature of claims was ambiguous in initial phase, but at minimum from 1990 and, probably, already from 1989 onwards there were factions making claims for outright independence (Dunlop 1998: 93). From 1991 onwards, the dominant claim was independence (see above). [start date: 1989; end date ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Between 1989 and 1991, Bart sought increased autonomy for the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, which corresponds to today's Chechnya and Ingushetia. In late 1991, however, Bart declared the independence of Chechnya alone (see above).
* From 2007 onwards (here coded as of 2008 due to January 1 rule), the movement’s main claim was for the establishment of a much larger Caucasus Emirate, consisting of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Nogay Steppe (Northern Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai), Cherkess and Southern Krasnodar Krai (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018 – see above for details). We code both territorial claims based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). At the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet followed the suggestion, and adopted its declaration of sovereignty, and thereby not only claimed increased autonomy, but also unilaterally updated its administrative status to union republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60). Since the declaration was adopted on the initiative of a Chechen congress, we attribute it to the Chechens only, and not to the Ingush. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]
* Dudaev declared Chechnya independent on November 1 (Dunlop 1998: 114; Ormrod 1997: 103; Roeder 2007: 314). [1991: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Marshall & Gurr (2003) code armed conflict in 1991-1993 and MAR suggests a rebellion score of 3 in 1992-1993 (suggesting a “local rebellion”). We found no reports of violence in other sources (e.g., UCDP/PRIO; Zürcher et al. 2005). Thus 1989-1993 are coded with NVIOLSD.
* The HVIOLSD coding for 1994-1996 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* Violence decreased significantly in 1997-1998, yet there continued to be sporadic violence. UCDP/PRIO reports 11 and 7 battle-related deaths in 1997 and 1998, respectively. We code ongoing LVIOLSD due to sustained fighting.
* The HVIOLSD coding for 1999-2016 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). The fighting began as fighting between Chechen separatists and the Russian military. Islamist tendencies became stronger over time and, in 2007, the focus shifted to the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate (UCDP/PRIO). Simultaneously, the conflict spread to large parts of the North Caucasus and increasingly also involved recruits from other ethnic groups from the area including Karachai, Cherkess, Balkars, Lezgins, Ingush, Kabards, Dargins, and Avars (EPR). The Caucausus Emirate was meant to include not only Chechnya, but also Dagestan, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The Emirate’s first and longest leader, Dokka Umarov, was a Chechen (2007-2013), so we associate the Caucasus Emirate insurgency with the Chechens. Dagestanis and Ingush also played an important role, so we also associate the insurgency with those groups. Note: we could not find disaggregated casualty figures.
* From 2015 onwards, large parts of the Caucasus Emirate swore allegiance to the Islamic state. According to UCDP/PRIO, this changed little on the ground, and as of 2020 local IS affiliates continued to wage a low intensity insurgency against Russian security forces, mainly in the Caucasus region. Following UCDP/PRIO, we code LVIOLSD in 2017-2020. In 2021, the number of battle-related deaths dropped to 2 according to UCDP/PRIO. [1989-1993: NVIOLSD; 1994-1996: HVIOLSD; 1997-1998: NVIOLSD; 1999-2016: HVIOLSD; 2017-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Northern Caucasus fell to the Russians in the 18th century (George 2009: 75). After a prolonged war, Chechnya was fully incorporated into Tsarist Russia in the 19th century (Minority Rights Group International). Up until the Soviet policy of national delimitation, the Chechens’ sense of national identity was weak at best (George 2009: 76). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. In 1934 the formerly autonomous Ingush were merged with the Chechens to form a single autonomous oblast. In 1936, the Chechen-Ingush region was upgraded to ASSR status (George 2009: 76). Accusing the Chechens of treason, the Soviets deported the whole Chechen people during the Second World War, along with other Caucasian groups (including the Ingush, the Karachais and the Balkars; George 2009: 76-77). Their autonomous status was abolished. In 1956 the deported peoples were allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99), that is, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was re-established, with both groups again attaining titular status (George 2009: 77). However, some territory that had once belonged to the Ingush remained with North Ossetia (George 2009: 87). “In the 1960s and 1970s, the Chechen leadership suffered periodic purges, and their Muslim religion remained the target of suppression and persecution (Minahan 2002: 440). In 1978 Soviet authorities permitted Mosques to reopen in Chechnya (Minorities at Risk Project). In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). We code a prior concession since in December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises.” And according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic).[[2]](#footnote-2) Note: the exact date of the concession is not clear; since the SDM was formed in July 1989, it is more likely than not that the concession was made before the SDM’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’ (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. It did have some effects. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), “the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly impplied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Chechnya-Ingushetia), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. The replacement of the centrally-appointed regional party secretaries (which de-facto yielded most of the power) with directly elected governors is tantamount to a reduction in the center’s control over the regions. Chechnya, however, is a special case. Dudaev and his entourage had ousted the old Soviet nomenclatura shortly after the August Coup, and moved on to organize parliamentary and presidential elections, announced for October. Yeltsin had initially supported the ouster of the Communist forces in Chechnya (Roeder 2007: 314). However, fearing that the outright secessionist Dudaev would win the presidential election, Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet (unsuccessfully) attempted to stop the elections. Still, the removal of the centrally appointed Communist nomenclatura and replacement with a directly elected governor represents a significant autonomy offer, and is coded as a concession on autonomy. [1991: autonomy concession]
* After the elections, the Russian Supreme Soviet declared the elections unlawful. A week later, Yeltsin introduced emergency law in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, removed Dudaev from power, replaced him with Moscow-loyal Akhmet Arsanov, and sent troops to Grozny. However, Chechen forces managed to block the troops at Grozny airport. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s Supreme Soviet rescinded Yeltsin’s decree and ordered the troops back (though the Chechens, notably, kept their weapons; Dunlop 1998: 116-120). According to Minority Rights Group International, Moscow subsequently introduced an economic blockade of Chechnya. In light of this, we code also an autonomy restriction in 1991. [1991: autonomy restriction]
* From this point on, Chechnya was de-facto independent. Negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful middle ground went nowhere, for the Chechens demanded independence and Moscow was unwilling to let the new Russian Federation splinter any further. Moscow moved back and forth from a hard stance and negotiation offers; for instance, in early March a high-ranking official signed an agreement which recognized Chechnya’s independence and sovereignty, and at the end of the same month Moscow backed an attempted coup aimed at overthrowing Dudaev (Dunlop 1998: 171). In turn, Moscow either offered significant autonomy or threatened invasion. The most significant autonomy offer came in 1992 with the Federal Treaty. The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Chechnya, along with Tatarstan, refused to sign the Federal Treaty, despite lengthy negotiations. [1992: autonomy concession]
* Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had granted to the republics with the 1993 constitution, adopted in a popular referendum that December. The 1993 constitution implied a significant policy change: the introduction of a symmetric federation, in which no entity was granted more powers than others. The Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Of course, the reform did not as such apply to Chechnya, given that it has self-excluded itself from Russia. But at least, it affected Chechnya by signifying the terms and conditions under which it could reintegrate. The extent of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy was reduced, and thereby had an impact on Chechnya, too (Dunlop 1998: 185; also see Atrokhov 1999). Hence, we code an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* In 1994, Moscow intervened militarily in Chechnya (this is not a restriction in the sense employed here). According to UCDP Conflict Encyclopeida, there were few serious efforts to negotiate a solution during the War. Russian and Chechen delegations met for peace talks on a few occasions, but the only notable result was reached with the Khasavuyrt Accord in 1996. The Khasavuyrt Accord was essentially a cease-fire agreement that called for demilitarization; it ended the bloodshed. The Khasavuyrt Accord was followed-up with a formal peace treaty signed between Moscow and Chechnya in 1997.While ending the fighting, the peace agreements were vague and in particular, they left the issue at heart – Chechnya’s status – unresolved. In fact, the Khasavuyrt Accord established a moratorium on the question of Chechnya’s status for five years (George 2009: 82, 153; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Minahan 2002: 441; Atrokhov 1999). Negotiations over Chechnya’s status continued, though with little tangible results. Still, the Russian side repeatedly offered Chechnya far-reaching autonomy in return for its reintegration into the Russian Federation (Atrokhov 1999). Most significantly, in September 1997, Yeltsin signed a decree ordering the preparation of a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Chechnya (Orttung et al. 2000: 74). Bilateral power-sharing treaties were introduced in early 1994 when Yeltsin signed such a treaty with Tatarstan’s Mintimer Shaimiev. Yeltsin had proceeded to sign such treaties with many other regions; they often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Chechnya, of course, refused to sign a bilateral power-sharing arrangement (Minahan 2002: 441; also see Söderlund 2006: 94).
* In 1999, the Second Chechen War erupted, with Moscow’s stated ambition to end the insecurity in the region and bring back Chechnya under Russian control (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Though officially fighting terrorism, Russia also fought Mashkadov’s de-facto government, claiming that Mashkadov was not elected to his post in accordance with Russian legal norms. Moscow no longer recognized Mashkadov as Chechnya’s legitimate president (Orttung et al. 2000: 75). This is not, however, a restriction in the sense employed here. Then, in May 2000, Putin established president’s rule in Chechnya (Saradzhyan 2008). Putin moved to appoint a Moscow-minded local administration. In 2000, the Chechen president, Maskhadov, was removed from office and instead Moscow placed its own ethnic Chechen clients in power. Putin named Akhmad Kadyrov “interim civilian administrator” of Chechnya. Kadyrov had fought with Dudaev against Russia in the First Chechen War, but abandoned the cause in time. We code an autonomy restriction in 2000 due to Putin’s establishment of presidential rule. 2000 also saw the introduction of centralization reforms (see other active movements coded under Russia, e.g. the Altaians). [2000: autonomy restriction]
* In 2003, President Putin introduced a “peace plan”, which included a referendum on a new constitution for a Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation with some local autonomy. Kadyrov delivered the constitution, popularly ratified in 2003, that formally re-integrated Chechnya into Russia in 2003 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). We do not code the end of temporary direct rule as concessions.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). The son of Akhmad Kadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov, was appointed president in 2007. [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control over the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Yet, in Chechnya, gubernatorial elections continued to be held after 2013, with the most recent election being held in 2021 (Echo Kavkaza 2021). We do not code a restriction.
* In 2013, Russian lawmakers adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, which prohibit calls for separatism. According to the amendments, which entered into force in May 2014, "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation" are punishable for up to five years in prison (Harding 2014; Meduza 2016). This is not a restriction of ethnic rights as defined here, though.
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR 2021:1595). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2018, Ingushetia and Chechnya signed a land swap agreement, which sparked protests in Ingushetia. According to the official statements, the two republics voluntarily swapped equal chunks of land. However, independent observers note that the swap was unequal and non-voluntary. Ingushetia transferred 26800 hectares to Chechnya and received only 1000 hectares in return under the pressure of Chechnya and Moscow (DW 2018; Kavkazsky Uzel 2018). We code a concession due to the territorial gain. [2018: autonomy concession]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Checheno-Ingush Republic had the status of an ASSR under the Soviets, and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (with Ingushetia separating in 1992, it became the Chechen Repubic). The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. The ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). In the late Soviet Union, the Chechens had increasing influence over their government; signifying their increased status, in 1989, the regional party secretary – an ethnic Russian – was removed from office and was succeded by Doku Zavgaev, an ethnic Chechen (Dunlop 1998: 89). Chechnya was de-facto independent from 1991-1999, hence we also code regional autonomy in that period. Despite Chechnya’s de-facto independence, the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of Chechnya was left untouched until 2000, when Putin introduced president’s rule. It appears that presidential rule ended in 2003 with the new constitution and the election of (old) Kadyrov as president. Both Kadyrovs have acted as Putin’s prolonged arm in the region (George 2009: 156-157). Still, both have had significant autonomy (George 2009: 157). In line with general practice, periods of president’s rule are coded with continued regional autonomy (since autonomy was suspended but not abolished). In the 2010s, the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov “has achieved more autonomy than separatist leaders ever dreamed of” (International Crisis Group 2015: 15). [1989-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Dunlop (1998: 123) suggests that Chechnya quickly became de-facto independent after Dudaev’s election in October 1991. Chechnya began to withhold all federal taxes in 1992 (Orttung et al. 2000: 75; Dunlop 1998: 126). And according to Caspersen (2012: 12) Chechnya enjoyed de facto independence from 1991 to 1999. Based on this, we begin to code de facto independence in 1992, following the 1st of January rule. However, we extend the de facto independence code to 2000 since i) Russian forces had not taken control of Grozny until February 2000, and by the most of Chechnya not until mid-2000 (Minahan 2002: 441; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia), and ii) since Putin established presidential rule and removed Mashkadov (Chechnya’s president) only in 2000. [1992-2000: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: erection of de facto state]
* [2000: de facto state abolished]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Chechens |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Chechens |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36516000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.002; 1992-2013: 0.009; 2014: 0.0104; 2015-2020: 0.0102]

**Regional concentration**

* The majority of Chechens resided in the Chechen republic, though there are also some communities especially in neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan. According to the 1989 census, the Chechens made up the majority of Chechnya’s population (Ormrod 1997: 103). Due to the Russian outmigration in the context of the Chechen wars and the split of Ingushetia in 1992, the share of Chechens has increased in recent years to more than 90% in the 2002 and 2010 censuses. This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes no kin. The Minorities at Risk data provides mixed evidence. In the older versions (MAR I-IV) the Chechens are coded as having no close kindred, whereas in the more recent version (MAR V) the Chechens are coded as having “close kindred across a border”. According to MAR, Kazakhstan has approx. 100,000 while Jordan has approx.. 250,000). The figure for Jordan could not be confirmed, and the figure for Kazakhstan is ambiguous. According to a report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Bhavna 2004) some 49,000 Chechens had officially lived in Kazakhstan by 1989. With the war in Chechnya an additional 30,000 (plus illegal immigrants) fled to Kazakhstan. Minahan (2002: 436) estimates that there are “100,000 [Chechens] in Central Asia, mostly in Kazakhstan.” There are other Chechen communities, but these do not count as numerically significant, including in Western Europe and the United States (Ghosh 2013). Based on this, we do not code ethnic kin. This is unambiguous for the period before the war. After the war, the Chechen population in Kazakhstan appears to come close to 100,000, though the best estimates we could find appear below the threshold. [no kin]

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## Cherkess

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Cherkess were historically a subgroup of the Circassian people. In 1922 the Soviet Union formed the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast, which in 1926 was split into two, a Karachai and a Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (note: until 1928 the Cherkess entity had the status of an Autonomous Okrug). In 1957, upon the return of the Karachai from their deportation to Central Asia, the joint Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast was reestablished.
* Note: Karachai-Cherkessia is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Karachais and the Cherkess. According to the 1989 census, the Karachais made up around a third of the local population and the Cherkess around ten per cent. At the time Russians made up a relative majority in the republic (around 40 per cent in 1989), but out-migration reduced their population share so that the Karachais now make up a relative majority in Karachai-Cherkessia (around 40 per cent). The Cherkess have had a certain level of power at the regional level throughout the movement’s activity, but overall their power over the region has been limited since 1991 (see below). Furthermore, the movement’s claims do not relate to Karachai-Cherkessia as a whole. For all those reasons, changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of self-rule from 1991 onwards are not coded as concessions or restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* During perestroika, ethnic separatism began to flare in the region. The Karachais began to agitate for a separate Karachai state in the late 1980s, and the local Cossacks for a Cossack autonomous state in 1991. The early 1990s also saw the emergence of a Cherkess movement for autonomy, with Cherkess leaders demanding the reunification of the Circassian people (comprised of Adyghes, Cherkess, Kabards, and Shapsugs) and the dissolution of Karachai-Cherkessia. The earliest evidence for separatist contention we found is in 1991, when a Cherkess republic was unialaterally proclaimed (Peters 1995: 208; also see Minahan 2002: 447 and Roeder 2007: 134). We associate pan-Circassian mobilization with the individual groups to avoid repetition of the same/similar claims.
* In 1991, the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast was elevated to Republic status.
* In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). Fearing loss of power, the Karachai-Cherkess government responded by calling a referendum on the unity of the republic, which was supported by 78.5 per cent of the vote. There were widespread reports of vote rigging, and soldiers were sent to polling places in Karachai areas. Many Karachais boycotted the vote; the entire process heightened ethnic tensions even further. Yeltsin subsequently withdrew his partition plan (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76).
* In the context of the heavily contested 1999 republican presidential elections (from which, under dubious circumstances, a Karachai turned victorious), Cherkess leaders declared a separate Cherkess state (Orttung et al. 2000: 198, 200; AFP). There were large-scale demonstrations. Cooperating with the Abazas, another local minority, the Cherkess leaders “drafted a legal document providing for a separate Abaza-Cherkess autonomous republic within Russia” (Minahan 2002: 5).
* In 2008 and 2010, the Cherkess people once again demanded a separate Cherkessia. The movement is hence coded as ongoing.
* Demands for separate Cherkessia continued in the 2010s. In 2015, the Extraordinary Conference of Circassian People in Karachaevo-Cherkessia resumed the demands for the Circassian autonomous republic (Dzutsati 2015). In 2018, several thousand Cherkess and Abazas signed a petition to secede from the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic (Stolicas.su 2018). [start date: 1991; end date ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Cherkess activists have repeatedly demanded the unification of Circassian lands (comprised of Adyghes, Cherkess, Kabards, and Shapsugs) and the dissolution of Karachai-Cherkessia (Dzutsati 2015; Minahan 2002: 5, 447; Roeder 2007: 134; Orttung et al. 2000: 198, 200; Circassian World News Blog 2010; Ria Novosti 2010; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 149; Stolicas.su 2018). No other claim was found. [1991-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* While some Circassian activists have implied secessionist aspirations, we could not find clear evidence for an organized independence movement (see UNPO 2023: Roth 2015: 185). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The claimed territory comprises the northwestern part of the republic of Karachai-Cherkessia, either in the form of a stand-alone Cherkess republic or in a unified republic together with other Circassians, including the Kabards and the Adyghes (Minahan 2002: 443). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 174).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Karachai-Cherkessia’s November 1990 sovereignty declaration is attributed to the Karachais. The fact that a *Karachai* SSR (rather than a Karachai-Cherkessian SSR) was declared makes it likely that Karachais played the decisive role in this process (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Minorities at Risk Project).
* October 24, 1991, Cherkess leaders proclaimed a Cherkess republic (Peters 1995: 208). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]
* In 1999 Cherkess leaders declared a Cherkess state separate from Karachai-Cherkessia (AFP 1999). [1999: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence above the threshold. 26 injuries were found from the 1999 agitation, but no casualties were reported. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic, with Karachai-Cherkessia sub-ordinated to Stavropol Krai (Orttung et al. 2000: 196). Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. Then, in 1926, the Karachai-Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast was split in two, that is, into a Karachai and into a Cherkess Autonomous Oblast. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. During the Second World War, the Karachais (along with the Balkars) declared an independent state (Minahan 2002: 911). When the area was reconquered, the Karachais and the Balkars, as well as the Ingush and the Chechens were deported and their autonomous status abolished (in 1944). What used to be the Karachai AO was ceded to the Georgian SSR. Only in 1956 were the deported peoples allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99). The Karachais were merged with the Cherkess again, and the Karachai-Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast was restored (hence, the previous status was not restored, but the unstable joint autonomous region that had existed between 1922 and 1926).
* In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). Also, there was some relaxation with regard to restrictions on religion. And, critically, in December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* Two further important reforms appear to have not affected the Cherkess. First, in 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, the initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Karachai-Cherkessia at the time had the status of an autonomous oblast. Second, April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (but not Autonomous Oblasts, like Karachai-Cherkessia), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, note that Karachai-Cherkessia was soon to be upgraded to republican status, and subsequently Russian along with Abazian, Cherkess, Karachai, and Nogai became official state languages.
* Despite their relatively small number, the Cherkess had some influence over the regional government prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Richmond 2008. 133). Yet, after 1991, the tables turned and the Karachais mounted to a more influential position within the region (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 911; Comins-Richmond 2002: 76). EPR suggests that the Karachai gained all power, and that the other titular nationality – the Cherkess – became powerless at the regional level. To reflect this, we code an autonomy restriction in 1991, which we peg prior to the SDM’s start date because the SDM emerged only in September 1991 (see above). [1991: autonomy restriction]
* In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Karachai-Cherkessia became independent from Stavropol Krai. Moreover, in August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected throughout Russia since 1991 – with the exception of Karachai-Cherkessia, where gubernatorial elections were postponed indefinitely. The incumbent head of administration, Khubiev (an ethnic Karachai), convinced Yeltsin that the holding of presidential elections would cause turmoil (Comins-Richmond 2002: 76), causing Yeltsin to intervene and appoint Khubiev as head of the administration. In 1995, Khubiev was appointed president, a move supported by the local parliament (Kahn 2002: 210). Only in 1999 were gubernatorial elections held. Still, the introduction of directly elected governors should be seen as an autonomy concession since it implies a significant autonomy offer by the center; it was regional forces (Khubiev) who prohibited the concession from taking effect, and not Moscow. Moreover, the institution of the centrally-appointed regional party secretary (who de-facto yielded most of the power) was abolished immediately in 1991. In the present case this all, of course, is primarily a concession to the Karachais (as the majority group in Karachai-Cherkessia); therefore, we do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). However, he withdrew the plan after a referendum in Karachai-Cherkessia on its unity, which turned out a majority against partition (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76). We do not code this as a concession since Yeltsin’s proposal appears to have never gone beyond planning stage. We do not code the referendum as a concession, either, since it was designed in a way to avoid partition.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Yet, as noted above, we do not code changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of self-rule as concessions or restrictions after 1991.
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. As noted above, we do not code changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of self-rule as concessions or restrictions after 1991.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). We have not, however, found evidence suggesting that Karachai-Cherkessia signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. Yet, as noted above, we do not code changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of self-rule as concessions or restrictions after 1991.
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). As noted above, we do not code changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of self-rule as concessions or restrictions after 1991.
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. Yet, as noted above, we do not code changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of self-rule as concessions or restrictions after 1991.
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control over the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Following the central order, Karachai Cherkessia’s assembly abolished gubernatorial elections in the same year (Muradov 2013; RBC 2013). Yet, as noted above, we do not code changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of self-rule as concessions or restrictions after 1991.
* In 2013, Russian lawmakers adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, which prohibit calls for separatism. According to the amendments, which entered into force in May 2014, "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation" are punishable for up to five years in prison (Harding 2014; Meduza 2016). This is not a restriction as defined here, though.
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR 2021). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Between 1989 and 1991, Karachai-Cherkessia had the status of an Autonomous Oblast, sub-ordinated to Stavropol Krai. In July 1991, it was elevated to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic status, implying it separated from Stavropol Krai. Karachai-Cherkessia became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Union. Under Gorbachev and later Yeltsin, the Russian ethnic entities did have a certain level of regional power (see above, as well as Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117).
* The actual influence of the Cherkess over their regional government, however, is somewhat ambiguous, and increasingly ambiguous in recent years. Karachai-Cherkessia has two titular nationalities – the Karachais (around a third of the local population in 1989) and the Cherkess (around ten per cent in 1989) – and a significant Russian/Slavic population. In effect, Slavs made up a relative majority in 1989 (around 40 per cent). Titular nationalities generally had a privileged situation within their own republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). But according to Comins-Richmond (2002: 70; also see Richmond 2008: 122-123), the Karachais faced difficulties mounting to advanced positions within their own republic. In particular, the region’s party secretary (de-facto the most powerful position) consistently was ethnic Russian from 1957 to 1991.
* Despite their relatively small number, the Cherkess had some influence over the regional government prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Richmond 2008. 133). Pustilnik (1995) agrees that the region was dominated by Slavs, but notes that there still was an ethnic power-sharing system in place. After 1991, the tables turned and the Karachais mounted to a more influential position within the region (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 911; Comins-Richmond 2002: 76). EPR suggests that the Karachai gained all power, and that the other titular nationality – the Cherkess – became powerless at the regional level. We follow EPR on this while noting that the Cherkess were not entirely powerless. [no autonomy]
  + According to Ormrod (1997: 112), in 1994 the parliamentary executive – in striking resemblance to the ethno-demographics – comprised 11 Russians, eight Karachai, four Cherkess, three Abazin, and three Nogai. There was though significant ethnic contention over ethnic representation at the regional level, in particular over elections to a regional presidency (direct elections to regional presidents were introduced in 1991). Elections to a new regional parliament were postponed indefinitely, and so were presidential elections. Khubiev convinced Yeltsin that the holding of presidential elections would cause turmoil (Comins-Richmond 2002: 76), causing Yeltsin to intervene and appoint Khubiev as head of the administration. In 1995, Khubiev was appointed president, a move supported by the local parliament (Kahn 2002: 210). Finally presidential elections were held in 1999, pitting an ethnic Karachai against an ethnic Cherkess. The elections threw the region into chaos, with violent protests and renewed calls for the separation of Cherkess, Russian (Cossack), and Abazian lands from the republic. Under dubious circumstances, the ethnic Karachai candidate, Vladimir Semenov, was elected president (Roeder 2007: 134-135; Orttung et al. 198-200). After a Muscovite intervention, the conflict was brought under control (Orttung et al. 2000: 201). A deal was struck, after which the presidency would go to a Karachai, while the prime ministry goes to a Cherkess and the vice-presidency and parliament speaker position go to ethnic Russians (Fuller 2008).
  + In 2008, the prime ministry went to an ethnic Greek, contrary to the prior deal (Radio Free Europe 2010a). Having caused massive protest, in 2010 an ethnic Cherkess was again named prime minister in 2010 (Radio Free Europe 2010b).
  + Ethnic Cherkess maintained some influence over the regional government in the 2010s. Per the power sharing rule, ethnic Cherkess was appointed as a prime minister in 2015 (ExpertSouth 2015).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Starting in 1991, the Cherkess have lost influence over regional politics (see above). [1991: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Cherkess |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Cherkess |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36544000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1991: 0.001; 1992-2001: 0.0003; 2002-2013: 0.0004; 2014-2020: 0.0005]
  + Note: these figures match broadly with Minahan (2002: 443), who reports an estimate of 76,000 Cherkess or a group size of 0.0005.

**Regional concentration**

* Most Cherkess are located in the Karachai-Cherkess republic, where they make up around ten percent of the local population according to the 1989 census (this share has increased slightly due to Russian outmigration). Thus the Cherkess cannot be considered concentrated in the republic as a whole. The Cherkess primarily reside in the northwestern part of Karachai-Cherkessia, yet they do not form a majority there either (Minahan 2002: 443). District level data from the Russian 2010 census confirms this. [not concentrated]
  + Around 73,000 Cherkess in Russia according to the 2010 census, 56,000 in Karachai-Cherkessia.
  + 29,000 Cherkess in Kabezhsky district (95% of the local population). This is the only district with an absolute majority, and only 40% of all Cherkess live there.
  + Adyghe-Khablsky district: relative majority (39%), 6,000.
  + Cherkessk, capital, 13%, 17,000

**Kin**

* The Cherkess form part of the EPR group ‘Circassians’, which is coded as not having any kin groups. Minahan (2002: 443), on the other hand, argues that there are Circassians, including Cherkess, in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel. Other sources (e.g. the UNPO) also mention that there are people of Circassian descent in particular in Turkey (estimated at up to several million). While many Circassians have assimilated, there appears to be a certain level of ethnic identification among at least some of the Circassians in Turkey and Syria (Ayhan 2005; Kabard 2019). Due to the Turkish Circassians, we code kin in a neighboring country before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and kin in non-neighboring country thereafter. [1991: kin in neighboring country; 1992-2012: kin in non-neighboring country]

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## Chukots

Activity: 1990-2001

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first openly separatist organization was formed in early 1990 (Minahan 2002: 459). In September 1990, the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug, facing Alaska across the Bering Strait, declared sovereignty and demanded control over its reindeer and fish resources. The sovereignty declaration entailed a unilateral upgrade to republican status, implying the separation from Magadan Oblast, to which it was subordinated (Fondahl 1997: 227). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990.
* In late 1991, the Chukot Autonomous Okrug’s government sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate republican status in a revamped Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 459). While Moscow refused to grant the status increase, the Chukot Autononous Okrug was granted separation from Magadan Oblast in 1992 (Fondahl 1997: 229). Thereby the Chukot Autonomous Okrug became the only fully independent Autonomous Okrug; all other regions with this status are subordinate to Oblasts or Krais (Orttung et al. 2000: 98).
* We found no evidence of separatist activity beyond 1991, though Minahan (2002: 461) suggests that the movement remained active at least until the end of the 1990s. Following our “ten-year inactivity rule” we code an end to the movement in 2001. [start date: 1990; end date 2001]

**Dominant claim**

* In September 1990, Chukchi Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty and demanded control over its reindeer and fish resources. The sovereignty declaration entailed a unilateral upgrade to republican status, implying the separation from Magadan Oblast, to which it was subordinated (Fondahl 1997: 227). In late 1991, the Chukot Autonomous Okrug’s government sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate republican status in a revamped Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 459). While Moscow refused to grant the status increase, the Chukot Autononous Okrug was granted separation from Magadan Oblast in 1992 (Fondahl 1997: 229). Thereby the Chukot Autonomous Okrug became the only fully independent Autonomous Okrug; all other regions with this status are subordinate to Oblasts or Krais (Orttung et al. 2000: 98). In light of this evidence, we code a claim for sub-state secession for 1990-1992. Since Chukotka was separated from Magadan Oblast and thereby became a fully independent region in 1992 (in the sense of being independent from any other Russian region), a claim for sub-state secession is no longer logically possible after 1992; hence, we code a claim for autonomy in 1993-2001. [1990-1992: sub-state secession claim; 1993-2001: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Chukot claims concern the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (also, Chukotka or Chukot) in northeastern Siberia (Minahan 2002: 456). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In September 1990, Chukchi Autonomous Okrug, declared sovereignty and demanded control over its reindeer and fish resources. The sovereignty declaration entailed a unilateral upgrade to republican status, implying the separation from Magadan Oblast, to which it was subordinated (Fondahl 1997: 227; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: sub-state secession declcaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Chukots (or Chukchis) are concentrated in the Chukot Autonomous Okrug, established in 1930. The Cukot AOk was subordinated to Magadan Oblast until 1992, when it was separated from Magadan. Due to in-migration and prisoners being sent to Chukotka, the Chukot's population share in the AOk rapidly declined during the Soviet period; in 1989 the Chukots made up only 7 per cent of the region's population (Fondahl 1997: 194). Due to massive Slavic out-migration in the 1990s, the Chukots' population share increased to about 27 per cent in 2012, but Russians continue to make up the majority of the area's population. The region was strongly Russified (Minahan 2002: 459). In the context of perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* Note that Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform in 1989 (Solnick 1996: 224), but the initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Chukotka had the status of an autonomous okrug, and hence was unaffected by the reform.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (like Chukotka) were not granted this right.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Against the earlier promise of direct elections, Yeltsin appointed Aleksandr Nazarow governor of Chukotka in 1991 (Orttung et al. 2000: 97). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* In late 1991, the Chukot Autonomous Okrug's government sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate republican status in a revamped Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 459). While Moscow refused to grant the status increase, the Chukot Autononous Okrug was granted separation from Magadan Oblast in 1992 (Fondahl 1997: 229). Thereby the Chukot Autonomous Okrug became the only fully independent Autonomous Okrug; all other regions with this status are subordinate to Oblasts or Krais (Orttung et al. 2000: 98). When Chukotka was still part of Magadan, much of the wealth generated from natural ersources went to the Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 97). Moreover, the March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. First of all, it granted the republics far-reaching autonomy. Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). While the constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics, it gave Autonomous Okrugs rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), hence we code an autonomy concession in 1993. [1993: autonomy concession]
* In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). The incumbent, Aleksandr Nazarov, was elected as Chukotka's governor in December 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000: 99). Given the short-term nature of the moratorium, we do not code this as a concession.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Chukotka did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The 1996 law “On the Fundamentals of State Regulation of Socioeconomic Development of the North of the Russian Federation” allowed small-numbered Russian peoples to establish relatively autonomous and self-governing structures. For instance, the Evenks established traditional structures known as “obschinas”. 1999 and 2000 lawd strengthened these rights (Donahue 2003). This initiative applies only to so-called “small numbered peoples”, which includes (among others) the Chukchis, the Evenks, the Itelmens, the Khanty, the Komis, the Koryaks, the Mansi, the Nenets, the Shors. Key components have not been implemented (IWGIA; Minority Rights Group International), thus we do not code a concession.
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Chukotka never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.

**Regional autonomy**

* Chukotka had the status of an Autonomous Okrug throughout the movement's activity. At least after Stalin, the autonomous entities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117), though it was limited, especially for the Siberian entities (Fondahl 1997: 200-203). Note, however, that the Chukots make up only a minority within their homeland. In 1989 the Chukots made up only 7 per cent of the region's population (Fondahl 1997: 194). Due to massive Slavic out-migration in the 1990s, the Chukots' population share increased to about 27 per cent by 2012, but Russians continue to make up the majority of the area's population. The Chukots’ actual influence over the regional government could not be determined, though it has to be noted that titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). That said, Fondahl (1997: 203) suggests that the influence of the Siberian peoples on their regional governments is limited. Noting the ambiguity, we still code the Chukots as regionally autonomous throughout (EPR does so, too). [1990-2001: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1992: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Chukots |
| *Scenario* | No match; 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Chukchi |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36548000 |

**Power access**

* EPR considers the Chukchi/Chukots irrelevant in 1990/1991. The Chukots are coded powerless from 1992 onwards. They did not have access to central state power in 1990/1991, either. [1990-2001: powerless]

**Group size**

* Estimates of the number of Chukots vary. Minahan (2002: 456) reports an estimate of 35,000. On the other hand, according to Olson et al. (1994: 158) there were about 15,000 Chukchi/Chukots in 1990. We draw on Minahan. According to the 1989 census the USSR had about 287 million inhabitants, which suggests a group size estimate of 0.0001. EPR reports the same group size for 1992-2001. [1990-2001: 0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* Due to in-migration and prisoners being sent to Chukotka, the Chukot's population share in their homeland rapidly declined during the Soviet period; in 1989 the Chukots made up only 7 per cent of the region's population (Fondahl 1997: 194). Due to massive Slavic out-migration in the 1990s, the Chukots' population share increased to about 27 per cent in 2012, but Russians continue to make up the majority of the area's population. Minahan (2002: 456) reports a higher estimate (38%), but still, this is clearly below the threshold. The Chukots have a higher concentration in the eastern Chukotka district, where they are close to an absolute majority, but we could not identify a territory within Chukotka that would meet the threshold for territorial concentration (see Robert-Lamblin 1993). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR, but according to Minahan (2002: 456), the Chukots are ethnically related to Native American peoples. We considered this too ambiguous; furthermore, while there could be ethnic kinship with a specific U.S. tribe, it is unlikely that the 100,000 threshold would be met. [no kin]

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## Chuvash

Activity: 1989-2014

**General notes**

* The Chuvash are also referred to as Chavash.

**Movement start and end dates**

* As of the 1960s, there was significant Slavic immigration into the Chuvash ASSR, prompting a cultural revival. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the movement took on a more nationalist agenda. By 1989, language and culture-related claims became linked to the issue of state sovereignty. The first organization we found that appears to have openly made claims for self-determination is the Chuvash Social and Public Cultural Center, which was formed in 1989 to promote Chuvash culture (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; Minahan 2002: 434). Thus, we peg the start date to 1989.
* In October 1990 the Chuvash ASSR declared sovereignty and union republic status within the Soviet Union. In October 1992 the Chuvash National Congress was formed. In addition to culture- and language-related demands, the Congress also made a number of self-determination demands in the sense we define it, including increased regional control over taxation, cultural, and education policies (Frank & Wixman 1997: 173).
* It appears that the movement continued to be active after this for some time, though evidence is scarce. The Chuvash Republic’ long-term president, Nikolai Fedorov, was one of the most outspoken critics of Putin’s federal reforms aimed at power verticalization (Orttung et al. 2000: 105). The Chuvash National Congress openly protested against Putin’s 2004 effort to abolish regional gubernatorial elections.
* Minahan (2016: 106) states that Chuvash nationalists continue to demand the unification of the whole Chuvash population in one republic, with some nationalists supporting the unification of the Chuvash, Tatars, Bashkorts, and other Volga Turkic peoples in a proposed Idel-Ural federation. We could not find confirming evidence though. Roth (2015:150) notes that there is not much in terms of self-determination claims. MRGI notes that Chuvash authorities are mainly concerned about the decline of the Chuvash language. We found no evidence for continued self-rule claims in other sources, either.
* Overall, the movement appears to not have been very active since the 1990s. The last somewhat clear evidence for a self-rule claim we could find is the above-mentioned 2004 protest against centralization. Based on this, and following the 10-year rule, we code the movement as ended in 2014. [start date: 1989; end date: 2014]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Frank & Wixman (1997: 173), the claims made by the Chuvash self-determination movement parallel those of the (neighboring and stronger) Tatar movement. Hence, we code a claim for sub-state secession in 1989-1991 (note that the sovereignty declaration implied an upgrade to union republic status, see above), and a claim for autonomy for 1992 onwards. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2014: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Chuvash is the present-day Chuvash Republic in eastern Russia (Minahan 2002: 430). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Chuvash ASSR declared sovereignty on October 24, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic status, which implies separation from the RSFSR (Kahn 2000: 60; Frank & Wixman 1997: 172, 184). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 by Ivan IV (the Terrible) brought Chuvashia under Russian control. The Chuvash are descendants of Volga Bulgars, speak their own language (Chavash), and tend to be Orthodox Christians (Minahan 2002: 430-432). It was in the Volga region where the Soviets first established their policy of division, or national delimitation, which was later applied throughout Muslim regions of the USSR (Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Northern Caucasus). The aim of national delimitation was to create a number of ethnic entities large enough to maintain distinct ethnic identity, but small enough to be controlled by Moscow (Frank & Wixman 1997: 149). At the time there was a strong pan-Turkic movement. The Bashkir ASSR became the first ethnically based entity in March 1919. The Tatar ASSR was created in 1920, despite an earlier promise of Union Republic status (Frank & Wixman 1997: 149). The Chuvash were first awarded with autonomous oblast status (in 1920). The status of the Chuvash homeland was upgraded to that of an autonomous soviet socialist republic (the second-highest status within the Soviet matrioshka federal system) in 1925 (Minahan 2002: 433-434). Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. As of the 1960s, there was significant Slavic immigration into the Chuvash ASSR, prompting a cultural revival. By the 1960s, the use of Chuvash was eliminated as a medium of instruction (Frank & Wixman 1997: 160). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the movement took on a more nationalist agenda. However, it has to be noted that the Chuvash never became a minority in their own region, contrary to other nearby groups, such as the Mordvins (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172). In fact, the Chuvash Republic has the lowest concentration of Russians in the Volga region (Minority Rights Group International). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems” (Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession). In line with this, according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like Chuvashia).[[3]](#footnote-3) Note: it is not clear whether the concession was made before or after the SDM’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently Chuvash became Chuvashia’s official language, along with Russian. Hence, we code a cultural rights concession [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. In Chuvashia, there were regional presidential elections in December 1993, from which Nikolai V. Federov turned victorious (inter-ethnic competition led to a postponement of the elections, see Roeder 2007: 132). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade for republis like Chuvashia, and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). The Chuvash Republic signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Moscow on May 27, 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000: 105; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system – a measure fiercely opposed by the Chuvash National Congress. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Considering that the reform stems from Moscow’s pressure, we code an autonomy restriction. [2013: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The Chuvash Republic had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Chuvash Republic has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. [1989-2014: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Chuvash |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Chuvashes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36506000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.007; 1992-2013: 0.013; 2014: 0.0105]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 430), there are approx. 2.3 million Chuvashes in Russia. Less than half (42%) of the Chuvashes live in the Chuvash republic according to Minahan, where they form 71% of the local population. This suggests that the threshold for territorial concentration is not met, at least if we only consider the Chuvash republic and no adjacent territories (from Minahan’s map it appears that there is also a limited number of Chuvashes in adjacent areas outside of the Chuvash republic; also see GeoEPR).
* We corroborated Minahan’s figures with census data, finding that Minahan’s estimate of the total number of Chuvashes may be too high. According to the 1989 census, there were 1.842 million Chuvashes living in the USSR, 907,000 of them in the Chuvash republic, where they made up 68% of the local population. In the 2002 census, the figures are: 1.637 million/890,000/68% and in the 2010 census 1.436 million/815,000/68%. The figures suggest that the threshold was met in both 2002 and 2010. In 1989, 49.2% of the Chuvashes lived in the Chuvash republic; it appears likely that the threshold is met if we add some adjacent territories from other units (only 15,000 more are needed). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Crimean Russians

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first calls for autonomy for Crimean Russians emerged in the summer and autumn of 1989 (Solchanyk 1994: 50), thus the start date. The calls intensified in 1990 (Sasse 2001: 87). Notably, it was the Communist party that began to mobilize for autonomy in Crimea. Among the first to act, Sevastopol’s city party committee proposed in August 1989 that a referendum be held on three questions, restoration of the autonomy status Crimea had enjoyed until 1945, bilingualism and whether Ukrainian should be taught in Crimea at all, and on the return of the Crimean Tatars. At the twenty-eighth Congress of Ukraine’s Communist Party in June 1990, autonomy for the Crimea was given green light, subject to a referendum. In January 1991 a referendum is held in the Crimea on restoring autonomy to the region. Over 80% of the electorate participated, of which 93% supported the “restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and as a party to the Union Treaty.” While Ukraine’s Rukh movement was opposed to autonomy, the official position of Kyiv remained favorable to autonomy. In February 1991 the Crimean ASSR was restored. We stop coding the movement in 1991 as Ukraine gained independence in this year. The movement continued in independent Ukraine.
* In 2014, Crimea was annexed by Russia. We found no evidence for self-rule claims in Russia post-2014. [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially the movement aimed at autonomy. It is not fully clear whether the aim was autonomy within Ukraine or rather an autonomous status outside of Ukraine. The ballot question in the 1991 referendum referred to “the establishment of the Crimean ASSR within the USSR” rather than within Ukraine. Crimea ended up being granted an ASSR within Ukraine, but Sasse (2001: 88) notes that with this, the demands of the movement were not fully met due to the sub-ordination to Ukraine. Presumably, the movement envisaged a status closer to a Union Republic. Hence we code a claim for sub-state secession. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Crimean Russians is the Crimean peninsula (formerly Crimean ASSR), which is de facto part of Russia at present but remains disputed between Russia and Ukraine (Roth 2015: 155f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In August 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine's independence, and a few days later, in September 1991, the Crimean parliament declared the state sovereignty of Crimea as a constituent part of the Ukraine (MAR). At this point Ukraine still belonged to the USSR (it held an independence referendum on December 1). Thus this is coded under the header of the USSR. Note though that the declaration followed Ukraine’s independence declaration and that the Union was quickly disintegrating after the August Coup. [1991: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of separatist violence, thus the NVIOLSD code. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After the Crimean Tatars were deported in 1944, the Crimean ASSR was downgraded to a (non-autonomous) Oblast status in 1945, and in 1954 Crimea was transferred to Ukraine (Sasse 2001: 87).
* In 1988 contested elections were introduced throughout the Union, which can be seen as a measure of decentralization (prior to this, officials were de-facto centrally appointed). However, groups without an autonomous entity (like the Crimean Russians at the time) did not profit much from increased local say over leader choice because non-autonomous entities’ decision rights were rather limited. Thus, we do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1989, Ukraine passed its language law, which made Ukrainian the official state language. The law was not overly restrictive. In particular, it stipulated that in those territories where minorities form a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration in addition to Ukrainian (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). Still, the elevation of Ukrainian to the only official language constitutes a downgrade of the Russian language, hence we code a restriction. The law was adopted in October and therefore after the SDM’s emergence. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* From the outset the Communist elite in Kyiv (and Moscow) adopted a favorable stance towards the autonomy issue. At the twenty-eighth Congress of Ukraine’s Communist Party in June 1990, autonomy for the Crimea was given green light, subject to a referendum. In January 1991 a referendum is held in the Crimea on restoring autonomy to the region. Over 80% of the electorate participated, of which 93% supported the “restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and as a party to the Union Treaty.” While Ukraine’s Rukh movement was opposed to autonomy, the official position of Kyiv remained favorable to autonomy. In February 1991 the Crimean ASSR was restored. In July 1991, Russian became the official language of the peninsula (Minority Rights Group International). We code a single autonomy concession in 1990 since this is when the referendum was granted. [1990: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Would only be coded as of 1992, when the Soviet Union did not exist anymore (first of January rule).
* Note: the Crimean Russians probably also took part in the Ukrainian SSR’s regional government; however, the Crimean Russians made up only about 2-3% of Ukraine’s population, thus we consider their influence too limited to code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In February 1991, the Crimean ASSR was restored. Even if the exact delineation of powers between Kyiv and Simferopol had still to be negotiated, this constitutes a major break with the prior status. [1991: erection of territorial autonomy]
* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Crimean Russians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* The Crimean Russians form a regional branch of the ‘Russians’ in EPR, which are coded as ‘senior partner’ in 1989-1991. We found no evidence that the Crimean Russians had representation in the Politburo, the Soviet Union’s most important executive organ, during the movement’s activity. However, European Russians (including Russians from the European part of the RSFSR and Russians from other western union republics, in particular Ukraine) were well represented in the Politburo at the time and there was no policy of exclusion against Crimean Russians. Thus, we apply a junior partner code, though noting that this case would profit from more in-depth research. [1989-1991: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to the 1989 census there were 1.22 million Russians in Crimea, which in combination with the 287 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union (in the same census) yields a group size estimate of 0.0043. [0.0043]

**Regional concentration**

* While there are Russians in different parts of Ukraine, this movement refers to Russians in Crimea. Crimea is the only region in Ukraine where Russians make up the majority of the population (58% according to the 2001 census). According to MAR, the majority of the Crimean Russians resides in Crimea. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We do not code ethnic Russians outside of the USSR (Russian Jews in Israel) as kin because this is a movement by ethnic Russians that was directed, at least in part, against a Russian-dominated government (i.e. the government of the USSR). [no kin]

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## Crimean Tatars

Activity: 1957-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Collectively accused of treason by Stalin, the Crimean Tatars were deported to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia in 1944.The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished in 1945, and the area was russified. In the second part of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Crimean Tatars launched a campaign for the full restoration of their rights, including in particular the right to return to Crimea and the re-establishment of their autonomous status. The campaign involved repeated petitions to Moscow and demonstrations (Minahan 2002: 502-503). The earliest evidence of activity we found is in 1957, when a petition campaign began and several thousands of signatures were collected asking for the full rehabilitation and repatriation. Hence, we code 1957 as the start date. The movement was severely repressed, but non-zero MAR protest scores indicate that the movement continued to be active throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In 1967 the Crimean Tatars were absolved from mass treason, but still denied the right to return. After 1967, some Crimean Tatars attempted to return, but most were re-deported. There were plans to an autonomous entity for the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan, but the Tatars rejected this plan. After almost 50 years of deportation, the Crimean Tatars were finally granted the right to return in 1990. Thousands of Crimean Tatars took the opportunity and returned to Crimea (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR). The movement remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Crimean Tatars under Ukraine). [start date: 1957; end date: host change (1991)]
* In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea. While Crimea remains part of Ukraine according to international law, by all intents and purposes, Crimea became part of Russia. The Crimean Tatar national movement had initially resisted the annexation and, after the annexation, Crimean Tatars became the subjects of persecution including harassment, intimidation, threats, intrusive and unlawful searches of their homes, physical attacks, and enforced disappearances. Crimean Tatar media and organizations which criticized Russia’s actions in Crimea were banned including, in 2016, the Majilis/Mejilis and, therefore, the main representative of the Crimean Tatar SDM, after a failed attempt at co-optation. Many Tatars were forced into exile, where mobilization for autonomy and a return Crimea’s to Ukraine continues (Human Rights Watch 2017; Useinow 2020; Wilson 2017, 2020). However, in Crimea itself, all open dissent ceased after 2014 Shnykarenko 2022). Therefore, we do not code a Crimean Tatar SDM in Russia after 2014.

**Dominant claim**

* From the outset, the movement’s core demands included repatriation and the restoration of all rights, including autonomy in Crimea. The 1991 sovereignty declaration confirmed the aspiration for an autonomous status within Ukraine (Minahan 2002: 503). No claim other than autonomy was found, hence we code a claim for autonomy throughout. [1957-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Crimean Tatars is the Crimean peninsula (formerly Crimean ASSR), which is de facto part of Russia at present but remains disputed between Russia and Ukraine (Roth 2015: 155f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* June 30, 1991, the Mejlis, the elected national congress of the Crimean Tatars, declared the sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar nation, and adopted a national anthem and flag. The declaration states that Crimea is the Crimean Tatars' rightful home where they “alone possess the right to self-determination” via some kind of national statehood (Minahan 2002: 503). [1991: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence and code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Crimea, previously part of the Ottoman Empire, was incorporated into Tsarist Russia in 1783 (MAR). Subsequently Slavs immigrated into the region, and after the Crimean War of 1854-1855, there was an active policy of encouraging Tatars to leave – the Tatars were accused of collaboration with the English and the French. While significant numbers of Tatars left, they remained the majority population in the Crimea. After the October Revolution, in December 1917 the Tatars declared the Crimean region independent, but were soon defeated, only to declare independence again in 1918, before being retaken by the Red Army in 1919. In 1921, the Bolsheviks awarded the Tatars autonomous status, and created the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR); still a period of harsh repression followed. From 1942 to 1943, Crimea was under the control of Nazi Germany. When the Stalin retook the region, he accused the Crimean Tatars collectively of collaboration with the Nazis (in fact there was a Tatar legion fighting on the German side; however, many Tatars also fought in the Red Army). The Crimean Tatars were deported to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia, and their autonomous entity was abolished in 1945. Following their departure from Crimea, place names were changed, graves were desecrated, and books in the Tatar language and architecture destroyed to eradicate indications of their presence. In 1954 Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. With Stalin’s death in 1953, the situation of the Crimean Tatars began to improve. However, in contrast to other deported groups, the Crimean Tatars were not rehabilitated in 1956-1957, and were denied the right to return (MAR; Minahan 2002: 502-503).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1967 Crimean Tatars were rehabilitated, that is, they were absolved of mass treason, but still denied permission to return to Crimea. After 1967, some Crimean Tatars attempted to return, but most were re-deported. Since the rehabilitation does not change the self-determination status as we define it, we do not code a concession. Note that there were plans to create an autonomous entity for the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan. The Tatars rejected this plan. The proposal appears not to have exceeded planning stage, thus we do not code a concession.
* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’ (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. This does not mean that it did not have effects at all. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.
* In 1990 (Minahan 2002: 503) the Crimean Tatars were granted the right to return to Crimea. Their demand for an autonomous entity was denied, but in line with the codebook we code an autonomy concession because the Crimean Tatars were allowed to return to Crimea. [1990: autonomy concession]
* In February 1991, the Crimean ASSR was re-established. However, this is not coded since Tatars were not included in the regional government, and in fact, are discriminated against by Russians on the peninsula. The Crimean Tatar language does not have official status in Crimea.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Crimean Tatars |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Crimean Tatars |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36549000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [discriminated]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* During WWII, Stalin deported the Crimean Tatar people to places in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia; accordingly GeoEPR codes them as dispersed. In 1990, the Crimean Tatars were granted the right to return. Many took advantage of this opportunity, and GeoEPR codes the Crimean Tatars as “regionally based” from 1991 onwards. Yet the Crimean Tatars remained a clear minority on the Crimean peninsula. According to the 2001 census, the Crimean Tatars made up 10% of Crimea’s population, up from 1.6% in 1989 (in 2001, almost all (98%) of the Crimean Tatars resided in Crimea). While there was a somewhat higher concentration of Crimean Tatars in some parts of the peninsula (especially those without a seashore), in no part did they make up an absolute majority of the population. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There were smaller Crimean Tatar communities outside of the USSR, but none above the threshold (Minahan 2002: 499). MAR, in its older release, coded the Turks in Turkey as ethnic kin (see gc10, gc10a, gc10b), but in the newer release it does no longer do so. [no kin]

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## Dagestanis

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* Dagestan compromises more than 30 ethnic groups. The largest include the Avars, the Dargins, the Kumyks, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans – and Russians (Ormrod 1997: 117). Several of Dagestan’s ethnic groups have agitated for increased self-determination for themselves, but there has also been a movement demanding increased self-determination for Dagestan as a whole. This is what we code here.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In May 1991, the Republic of Dagestan unilaterally declared sovereignty (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Ormrod 1997: 116), hence the start date of the movement. With the local elite closely allied to Moscow, and several of the groups located in Dagestan embroiled in their own self-determination movements, the Dagestan movement for increased sovereignty remained a short interlude, however. In the late 1990s, a Sunni Muslim sect referred to as the “Wahabbis” gained ground in Dagestan. Entertaining close links to Islamic Chechen rebels, the Wahabbis aimed for an independent Islamic Chechen-Dagestan region. In 1998, the Wahabbi sect declared the independence of Dagestan’s Buinaksk district, and took control of the area. Moscow retook the Buikanksk in August/September 1999. In 1999 there was a spill-over of violence to Dagestan led by Chechens and other Islamists. In 2000, the Wahabbi sect was banned by the Dagestani parliament. The insurgency then moved back to Chechnya until 2007, when it spread back to Dagestan.
* In 2007 Doku Umarov – an ethnic Chechen – unilaterally declared the independent Caucasus Emirate, which is supposed to span “all historically Muslim lands” in the North Caucasus including Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. The conflict spread to large parts of the North Caucasus and increasingly also involved recruits from other ethnic groups from the area including Karachai, Cherkess, Balkars, Lezgins, Ingush, Kabards, Dargins, and Avars (EPR). We associate the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate and the separatist violence associated with it with the Chechens, Dagestanis, and Ingush, given that they all played a major role in the insurgency and, in the case of the Dagesatanis, also since a lot of the fighting was concentrated in Dagestan (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). From 2015 onwards, large parts of the Caucasus Emirate swore allegiance to the Islamic state. According to UCDP/PRIO, this changed little on the ground, and as of 2020 local IS affiliates continued to wage a low intensity insurgency against Russian security forces, mainly in the Caucasus region. On this basis, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In May 1991 the Republic of Dagestan unilaterally declared sovereignty. Given close ties to Moscow, the Dagestani political elite’s thrive for increased autonomy faded in recent years, and from the late 1990s radical Islamists (called the “Wahabbis”) began to promote the creation of an Islamist state independent of Russia. According to the International Crisis Group (2008: 7), the Wahabbis’ lobbying for independent “Sharia mini-states” began in 1997. In 1998, the Wahabbi sect declared the independence of Dagestan’s Buinaksk district (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* In 2007 Doku Umarov unilaterally declared the independent Caucasus Emirate, which is supposed to span “all historically Muslim lands” in the North Caucasus including Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. We associate the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate to the Dagestan movement since rebel activity has been concentrated in this area (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The Caucasus Emirate claim remained the dominant claim between 2007-2020 (Hahn 2011, Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). [1991-1997: autonomy claim; 1998-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1997; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Dagestanis initially corresponded to the Dagestan ASSR. However, from 2007 onwards (reflected in 2008 due to January 1 rule), the movement called for the establishment of a much larger Caucasus Emirate, consisting of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Nogay Steppe (Northern Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai), Cherkess and Southern Krasnodar Krai (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). We code both territorial claims based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In May 1991 the Republic of Dagestan unilaterally declared sovereignty (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Ormrod 1997: 116). The declaration did not involve a unilateral status raise (Treisman 1997: 226), hence we code an autonomy declaration. [1991: autonomy declaration]
* In 1998, the Wahabbi sect declared the independence of Dagestan’s Buinaksk district (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [1998: independence declaration]
* In 2007 Doku Umarov unilaterally declared the independent Caucasus Emirate, which is supposed to span “all historically Muslim lands” in the North Caucasus including Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. We associate the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate to the Dagestan movement since rebel activity has been concentrated in this area (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). [2007: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* 1999 is coded as LVIOLSD following UCDP/PRIO. From 2007 onwards, Dagestanis were involved in the Caucasus Emirate insurgency, which is coded as a civil war in Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) (see Chechens for details). The LVIOLSD coding for 2017-2020 follows UCDP/PRIO, which codes a low-intensity armed conflict involving local IS affiliates. In 2021, the number of battle-related deaths dropped to 2 according to UCDP/PRIO. [1991-1998: NVIOLSD; 1999: LVIOLSD; 2000-2006: NVIOLSD; 2007-2016: HVIOLSD; 2017-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Dagestan came under Russian control in the 19th century (Minahan 2002: 512). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), by which union republics and autonomous republics (like Dagestan) gained autonomy (also see Gorbachev 1999: 99). [1989: autonomy concession]
* In 1990 the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR. However, at the same time, republics, including ASSRs, were allowed to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Subsequently Aghul, Avar, Azerbaijani, Chechen, Dargwa, Kumyk, Lezgian, Lak, Nogai, Rutul, Tabasaran, and Tsakhur (as well as Russian) attained official language status. Also in 1990 travel restrictions to Mecca were lifted (Minahan 2002: 513), which is not, however, a concession as defined in the codebook. [1990: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors clearly constitutes an autonomy concession since the introduction of direct elections to the regional executive implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. Fearing the introduction of a presidential system would cause ethnic unrest, Dagestan instead opted for a parliamentary system, as confirmed thrice in referendums throughout the 1990s (Orttung et al. 2000: 111). Still, Yeltsin’s offer of directly elected regional presidents constitutes a concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of the regions (note that the institution of the centrally appointed party secretary, which de-facto yielded most of the power, was abolished anyway). Moreover, at least initially, Moscow accepted Dagestan’s opting for a parliamentary system. Hence, we code a concession in 1991. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade for republics like Dagestan, and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral power-sharing treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties often conferred significant autonomy on regions. Dagestan did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Dagestan never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* In 2001, the Wahabbi movement (which we associate with the Dagestan movement, see the general coding notes) was outlawed and its religious schools and training camps were closed (Minahan 2002: 515). Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 81) suggest that the sect had already been outlawed before 2001, but they do not give more details. [2001: cultural rights restriction]
* Putin pressured Dagestan to abolish its parliamentary system in 2003 (Holland & O’Loughlin 2010: 300). Moscow had previously accepted Dagestan’s exceptionalism (see above), thus we code a restriction. The transition to a presidential system was implemented only in 2006. [2003: autonomy restriction]
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Dagestan was one of the first republics that scrapped regional elections in April 2013, two weeks after federal government’s legislation (RBC 2013). Given the central initiation of this change, we code an autonomy restriction. [2013: autonomy restriction]
* In 2013, Russian lawmakers adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, which prohibit calls for separatism. According to the amendments, which entered into force in May 2014, "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation" are punishable for up to five years in prison (Harding 2014; Meduza 2016). This is not a restriction of ethnic rights as defined here, though.
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017 cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Dagestan had the status of an ASSR under the Soviets and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Russian republics have retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. Note that Dagestan comprises more than 30 ethnic groups. The largest include the Avars, the Dargins, the Kumyks, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans – and Russians (Ormrod 1997: 117). Unlike other ethnic regions in Russia, Dagestan does not have a titular nationality. There is an ethnic power-sharing system in place in Dagestan, with the Republic’s chief executive body (at least in the 1990s and the early 2000s), the State Council, composed of representatives of different ethnic groups. No group is allowed more than one representative in the State Council (Ware & Kisriev 2001: 111). Notably, Dagestan clinged on to its parliamentary system (confirmed three times in referendums) until 2006, arguing that a presidential system would be detrimental to stability, despite federal pressure (Orttung et al. 2000: 111). According to Yemelianova (2005: 613), Holland & O’Loughlin (2010: 299), and Cornell (2001: 270), notwithstanding the consociational constitutional set-up in Dagestan, effective power has been confined to only two groups – the Dargins and the Avars – ever since 1991. Roeder (2007: 105) notes that in addition to the Dargins and Avars, the Kumyks were often represented in republican leadership positions. Minority Rights Group International, too, notes that the Kumyks have significant regional influence. This is of no concern here, however, because the movement at hand relates to Dagestan as a whole. Dagestan maintained its autonomous status as a national republic during the 2010s. [1991-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* The Wahabbis had de-facto control of the Buinaksk district in 1998-1999 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia); we do not code this as de-facto independence because the area is too small compared to Dagestan as a whole.

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Dagestanis |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Avars; Dargins; Lezgins |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36523000; 36526000; 36535000 |

**Power access**

* The term “Dagestanis” is a generic name given to all Caucasian peoples native to Dagestan, including the Avars, the Dargins, the Lezgins, the Laks, and the Tabasarans, as well as some smaller groups, such as the Rutuls and the Aguls (see Minahan 2002: 510-511). All major groups associated with the movement are coded as powerless throughout in EPR. [1991-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We rely on Minahan (2002: 510): 2.25 million Dagestanis in Russia and other parts of the former USSR. Total population of the USSR according to 1989 census was 287 million. Total population of Russia according to 2002 census: 145.2 million. For 1992 onwards we use a rough estimate of 2 million (Dagestanis in other countries, particularly Azerbaijan, should no longer be counted and there are around 200,000 Lezgins in Azerbaijan, see Minahan 2002: 1084). [1991: 0.0078; 1992-2020: 0.0138]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 510), >75% of all Dagestanis reside in Dagestan, where they make up 64% of the local population. The Dagestanis are concentrated mostly in the southern and central parts of Dagestan. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Dagestanis have numerically significant kin in Azerbaijan: the Lezgins, who according to Minahan are one of the Dagestanis’ constituent peoples (Minahan 2002: 510, 1084; OC Media 2017). [1991: no kin; 1992-2020: kin in neighboring country]

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## Don Cossacks

Activity: 1993-2020

**General notes**

* The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Don Cossacks are located in Southern European Russia. After
* Note: the Don Cossack movement claims the establishment of an autonomous Cossack republic in the Don region, the exact contours of which are unclear. The self-proclaimed Don Republic that existed between 1918 and 1920 laid claim on what today are the Rostov and Volgograd Oblasts in the modern Russian Federation and Luhansk and Donetsk in modern Ukraine. Goble (2013) argues that a Cossack republic would have to be carved out of existing territories (also see Ormrod 1997: 122); in the case of the Don Cossacks most likely parts of the Rostov Oblast and adjacent areas. Since the Don Cossacks do not lay claim on an existing region, and, more importantly, since the Don Cossacks do not have their own ethnic homeland/do not appear to have significant influence over one of the existing regions (see below), we do not code changes in the sovereignty of any of the existing regions as concessions/restrictions.
* Also note that the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060). According to Russia’s 2002 census, there are a mere 140,000 Cossacks in Russia (including branches other than the Don Cossacks). Minority Rights Group International pegs the total number of Cossacks (including branches other than the Don Cossacks) at 1.5-2 million. Minahan (2002: 538) estimates that Don Cossacks alone amount to 1.765 million, while nationalists claim that there are more than two million Don Cossacks.

**Movement start and end dates**

* After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1918 the Don Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state in the Don River Basin. The Don Republic claimed what today are the Rostov and Volgograd Oblasts in the modern Russian Federation and Luhansk and Donetsk in modern Ukraine. The self-proclaimed republic was defeated by the Red Army in 1920.
* Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death.
* The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018). The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. Still, the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060).
* From the 1990s, Cossack organisations were established throughout Russia. The first national Cossack organization, the Union of Cossacks, was organized in 1990 (Skinner 1994: 1018). Initially, the Cossack national movement was focused on the recognition as a separate people, the reinstatement of Cossack military duties, and a cultural revitalization. But soon also claims for increased territorial self-determination were made. In 1993 Don Cossack leaders demanded the establishment of an autonomous republic (Minahan 2002: 543). Hence, we code 1993 as the start date of the movement.
* Though Toje (2006: 1058) notes that the Cossack movements’ level of mobilization has faded in more recent years, the Don Cossack movement has remained active, led by the Don Cossack Grand Council. In November 2005 Don Cossack leaders reiterated their territorial demand, but their pledge was rejected. (Minority Rights Group International). A 2008 ‘All-National Congress of the Cossack People” called for the preparation of a draft constitution for the Don Cossack Republic (Goble 2010), with activity continuing in the most recent years (Goble 2013). July 3, 2010, Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks gathered to demand Cossack autonomy (Bugajski 2010: 40).
* Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks, in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if at all they were implemented (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543). Decrees in 1993 and 1994 promised special privileges and dispensations, but the demand for the establishment of a Don Cossack autonomy has remained unfulfilled.
* In the 2010s, Don Cossacks continued their claims for recognition as a separate ethnicity and sub-state secession (Shapovalov 2012, Volkhonsky 2019). [start date: 1993; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Don Cossack movement claims the establishment of an autonomous Cossack republic in the Don region, the exact contours of which are unclear. The self-proclaimed Don Republic that existed between 1918 and 1920 laid claim on what today are the Rostov and Volgograd Oblasts in the modern Russian Federation and Luhansk and Donetsk in modern Ukraine. Goble (2013) argues that a Cossack republic would have to be carved out of existing territories (also see Ormrod 1997: 122); in the case of the Don Cossacks most likely parts of the Rostov Oblast and adjacent areas. Hence we code a claim for sub-state secession. [1993-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Don Cossack movement has called for the establishment of an autonomous Cossack republic in the Don region, which appears to consist of the Rostov Oblast and some adjacent territories. However, the exact contours of this claim remain unclear, as we were unable to find reliable information on what areas are included beyond Rostov. We therefore flag this claim as ambiguous and code it based on the Rostov Oblast, which offers the best approximation (GADM 2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence and thus classify the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1918 the Don Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state in the Don River Basin. The self-proclaimed republic was defeated by the Red Army in 1920. Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Many Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 74). Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks, in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if at all they were implemented (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Decrees in 1993 and 1994 promised special privileges and dispensations (it is unclear whether anything was implemented; Toje 2006: 1058 suggests that little, if anything, was implemented). Critically, the demand for the establishment of a Don Cossack autonomous region has remained unfulfilled (Minahan 2002: 543). To c-oopt the Don Cossacks, the governor of Rostov Oblast named the Don Cossack leader, Vyacheslav Khizhnyakov, deputy governor in the late 1990s. Also, some Don Cossacks were included into the local administration of Rostov Oblast Novocherkassk (Orttung et al. 2000: 449; Minahan 2002: 539). It is, however, unclear how much real influence is attached to such positions (Toje 2006: 1069). The actual influence of the Don Cossacks appears limited; according to Orttung et al. (2000: 449), Don Cossack parties failed to even win a single seat in the region’s legislative – notably in the early 1990s, the period of their highest level of mobilization (Toje 2006: 1058). Hence, we do not code a concession. No restriction was found, either.

**Regional autonomy**

* Contrary to many other groups in Russia, the Don Cossacks do not have their own autonomous homeland. To c-oopt the Don Cossacks, the governor of Rostov Oblast named the Don Cossack leader, Vyacheslav Khizhnyakov, deputy governor in the late 1990s. Also, some Don Cossacks were included into the local administration of Rostov Oblast Novocherkassk (Orttung et al. 2000: 449; Minahan 2002: 539). It is, however, unclear how much real influence is attached to such positions (Toje 2006: 1069). The actual influence of the Don Cossacks appears limited; according to Orttung et al. (2000: 449), Don Cossack parties failed to even win a single seat in the region’s legislative – notably in the early 1990s, the period of their highest level of mobilization (Toje 2006: 1058).
* A similar pattern continued during the 2010s. Although Cossack General Viktor Goncharov served as the first deputy governor of Rostov Oblast (AIF 2018), his position was rather tokenistic and did not affect the autonomy of Don Cossacks. Another prominent Cossack, Victor Vodolatsky, was one of the 13 representatives of Rostov Oblast in Russia’s federal parliament. Despite his close ties to the regions’ Cossack community, he lacked authority in the region’s politics and could easily be replaced with another Cossack (Pozdnyak 2020). Based on this, we decided not to code the Don Cossacks as regionally autonomous. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Don Cossacks |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR the Cossacks (or rather: the various Cossack sub-groups) form part of the Russians, which are coded as dominant throughout. We found no evidence for Cossack representation in the national cabinet, though this requires more research. [powerless]
  + Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk (which can be seen as part of extended European Russia, even though we code it as part of SE Asia)). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai).
  + Note: key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). However, also under Yeltsin key government posts like the prime ministry were filled by European Russians (see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 304-305, 349, 407).

**Group size**

* The number of Don Cossacks in Russia is unclear. According to Russia’s 2002 census, there are a mere 140,000 Cossacks in Russia (including branches other than the Don Cossacks). Minority Rights Group International pegs the total number of Cossacks (including branches other than the Don Cossacks) at 1.5-2 million. Minahan (2002: 538) estimates that Don Cossacks alone amount to 1.765 million, while nationalists apparently claim there are more than two million Don Cossacks. We draw on Minahan, noting that this decision is ambigous. We combine this figure with Russia’s 2002 population (145.2 million according to 2002 census). [0.0122]

**Regional concentration**

* The Don Cossacks’ homeland lies in the southern part of European Russia. Most Don Cossacks settle in the Rostov oblast, where they according to Minahan (2002: 538) make up 44% of the local population. From the map depicted in Minahan it appears that most Don Cossacks reside in the southern part of Rostov oblast, which raises the possibility whether they make up an absolute majority there. However, as argued above, Minahan’s estimate of the number of Don Cossacks appears on the higher end; thus we do not code the Don Cossacks as concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Cossack communities also in Kazakhstan; estimated at approx. 300,000 (see the respective entry). [kin in adjacent country]

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## Estonians

Activity: 1945-1956; 1987-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Estonia had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, which caused violent resistance among Estonians. Between 1941 and 1944, Estonia was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Estonian SSR was re-established. The (re-) annexation by the USSR prompted a resistance campaign by the Forest Brothers (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). 1944 is coded as the start date. The movement had clearly already been active already in 1940-1941, but we found no evidence of organized activity during the German occupation, suggesting that the movement had ended in 1941. In the data set, we begin to code the Estonians in 1945, the earliest possible date. Since the resistance campaign started in 1944, we note prior violent activity. By the early 1950s the movement was defeated, and most of the remaining fighters gave up when offered an amnesty after Stalin’s death in 1953 (see Senn 1997: 355). However, Minahan (1998: 90) notes limited activity until 1956; hence we code an end to this first phase in 1956. The self-determination movement then appears to have been dormant until the late 1980s. [start date 1: 1944; end date 1: 1956]
* The first evidence for renewed organized separatist activity we found is in 1987, when Estonian dissidents organized a protest in Tallin against the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, thus questioning Soviet rule. 1987 is coded as second start date. In April 1988, the Estonian Popular Front was founded, and there were major demonstrations for Estonian sovereignty (Beissinger 2002). In 1989, the Estonian Supreme Soviet unilaterally annulled the 1940 annexation of Estonia to the USSR. Estonia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. [start date 2: 1987; end date 2: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* 1945-1956: the Estonian movement should be associated with the ‘Forest Borthers’, partisans resisting Soviet rule and annexation in the Baltic Republics and Ukraine (Minahan 1998: 168). Hence, we code an independence claim. [1945-1956: independence claim]
* Initially, the Estonian movement was more about economic autonomy and genuine federalism (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 77-80). Only in 1989, public opinion began to tend towards independence. The Estonian Popular Front, by then the major vehicle of the Estonian movement, explicitly endorsed independence in October 1989 (Raun 1997: 413-414). Hence, we code an autonomy claim in 1987-1989, and an independence claim in 1990-1991, following the first of January rule. [1987-1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim].

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date 1: 1944; end date 1: 1956]
* See above. [start date 2: 1989; end date 2: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Estonians consists of present-day Estonia (previously the Estonian SSR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Estonia was the first republic to declare its sovereignty November 16, 1988 (Kahn 2000: 60). [1988: autonomy declaration]
* March 30, 1990, Estonia’s Supreme Soviet declared Soviet power illegal in Estonia because Estonia had been unlawfully annexed into the Soviet Union, and proclaimed the beginning of a period of transition that would culminate in the restoration of an independent Estonia. The Estonian approach was more cautious compared to Lithuania (and thus similar to Latvia’s), making independence conditional on negotiations and a transition period; this was done in light of Gorbachev’s fierce response to Lithuania’s independence declaration in the form of an economic blockade. August 20, during the August coup, the Supreme Soviet reaffirmed the independence declaration; this time, independence was no longer made conditional on a transitional period (Raun 1997: 415). We only code the 1990 declaration because the second declaration occurred in the immediate context of Estonia’s independence (after the August Coup, the Soviet Union was effectively defunct and the declaration thus not really “unilateral”). [1990: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* TheHVIOLSD coding for 1945-1948 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Since the resistance campaign started in 1944, we note prior violent activity. UCDP/PRIO codes 1946-1948 as a minor war (it does not code 1945); however, while casualty estimates do vary, they are generally in the thousands, suggesting the HVIOLSD threshold was met. 1949-1956 is coded as NVIOLSD. The second phase of the movement is also coded as NVIOLSD. [Pre-1945-1948: HVIOLSD; 1949-1956, 1989-1991: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Estonia had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic was established on August 6, 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, Estonia was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Estonian SSR was re-established. After both Soviet occupations, mass deportations occurred. [1940, 1944: independence restriction]
* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). We found no concession or restriction in the 10 years before the second start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Between 1945 and 1952 there was little movement in the autonomy of union republics. A reform introduced in 1944 would have allowed the union republics to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states and have their own military formations. However, this reform had little effect, and if anything, there was a trend to even more centralization (Towster 1952).
* After Stalin’s death in 1953, the center’s control loosened and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). We found no exact date, but code a concession in 1953 to reflect the upward trend in autonomy. [1953: autonomy concession]
* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession. [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems.” Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Estonia) and autonomous republics. It is important to note that initially, Gorbachev saw the Baltic states as the ‘agents of perestroika’, and was thus willing to offer concessions (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 174). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics, including Estonia, had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. In some cases the Republican laws went far beyond what Gorbachev was willing to concede. Gorbachev sought to halt attempts at de-Russification, and guarantee (if not enhance) the privileged position of Russians and the Russian language in the Union. Gorbachev campaigned against the language laws of the Baltic Republics (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 127-128). We code a concession in 1990 since this is when Moscow granted the republics the installment of state languages. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* “During 1990, however, the Soviet government moved to restrict their [i.e., the Baltic Republic’s] autonomy sharply: Lithuania was blockaded, and Estonia was ultimately forced to forward tax payments it had been withholding” (Solnick 1996: 223). While the former concerns Lithuania and not Estonia, the latter is not coded as a restriction since Moscow was entitled to the tax money.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Gorbachev’s inability to halt the disintegration of the Union became ever clearer by the end of 1990, after the largely unsuccessful blockade of Lithuania in the spring. Reactionary forces gained ground, and in the fall of 1990, Latvia was singled out for a series of further provocations. First, several Baltic national monuments were blown up (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 148). By December 1990, conservative forces in Moscow threatened to overthrow the Baltic governments. The Soviet army started patrolling the streets, allegedly to help in the fight against the rising wave of violent crime (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 149; it is not clear from this passage whether this was restricted to Latvia or concerned all Baltic Republics). In December 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, warning of ‘a coming dictatorship’. Soviet paratroopers moved into Lithuania in January 1991, and occupied government buildings. For the next seven months, Lithuania was effectively occupied by Soviet troops who controlled the streets and supported the Communist Party; moreover, a few days later Soviet special forces (‘black berets’) attempted to storm Latvia’s Ministry of the Interior; five people were killed. This was part of a broader strategy to intimidate the independence-minded Latvian government and people (Karklins 1994: 29, 106-107, 130; Muiznieks 1997: 390; Suny 1993: 148). Direct rule was not imposed, however. The mentioned measures seem close to a government crack-down and one-sided violence, and are hence not coded.
* The independence of the Baltic states was officially recognized by Russia on August 24, and by the Soviet Union on September 6 (Brown 1996: 303). [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. Yet, autonomy was very limited in the Baltics, where large numbers of people were displaced (EPR). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). [1945-1956: no autonomy; 1987-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Independence in 1991 (Minahan 1998). [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Estonians |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Estonians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36524000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code 1945. We apply the 1946 discriminated code (that is due to the 1944 annexation and subsequent mass deportations) also to 1945. [1945-1956: discriminated: 1987-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.005]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there was approx. 1 million Estonians in the Soviet Union. Most (more than 90%) resided in the Estonian SSR, where the Estonians made up 62% of the local population (the share was even higher in the 1940s). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Finns in Finland constitute close kindred according to MAR. [kin in neighboring country]

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## European Russians

Activity: 1993-2003

**General notes**

* The European Russian movement combines claims put forward by a total of 15 regions: i) the Leningrad Oblast, ii) Vologda Oblast, iii) Voronezh Oblast , iv) Arkhangelsk Oblast and finally v) a total of eleven central Russian regions which in 1993 under the lead of Orel Oblast declared a republic. It is not entirely clear which regions the latter refers to, though Teague (1993) notes that the Central Russian Republic bases on the already exisisting Central Economic Region. The Central Ecocnomic Region includes a total of 13 regions (the Federal City of Moscow and the following Oblasts: Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Moscow, Orel, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tula, Tver, Vladimir, and Yaroslavl). These 13 and the above-mentioned additional four are all included in this movement in terms of concessions and restrictions and group size.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The 1992 Federal Treaty devolved powers to both ethnic and “normal”, non-ethnic regions, but the former gained much more than the latter and thus it created an asymmetrical federation in which ethnic republics enjoyed several privileges, including control over their natural resources, the right of secession, and citizenship (Ross 2002: 23). This caused resentment in many Russian-dominated non-ethnic republics, including many ‘European’ ones but also in other regions: in the Ural region, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk unilaterally raised their status (see Uralians), in Siberia Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk declared their republic (see the Siberians) and in the Far East, the Maritime Republic was declared in 1993 (see the Far-Eastern Slavs). The European Russian movement combines claims put forward in this context in a total of 15 regions: i) the Leningrad Oblast unilaterally declared itself a republic (implying increased autonomy) in 1993 (Ross 2002: 24), ii) Vologda Oblast organized a referendum on republican status in April 1993 and subsequently proclaimed the Vologda Republic on May 14 (Slider 1994: 264; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 315), iii) Voronezh Oblast sought some status in-between Republic and Oblast (Slider 1994: 264) and unilaterally in 1993 declared that the region was henceforth “an independent participant in international and foreign-economic relations” and that the federal bodies “may not promulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies of power” (Ross 2002: 25), iv) Arkhangelsk Oblast unilaterally declared itself the Pomor Republic in 1993 (Ross 2002: 24) and finally v) a total of eleven central Russian regions, in 1993, unilaterally proclaimed a unified Central Russian Republic under the lead of Orel Oblast. The republic appears based on the already existing Central Economic Region, which also includes Moscow (Teague 1993, 1994: 45; Ross 2002: 24). We found no evidence of organized separatist activity before 1993 and thus code 1993 as start date.
* Russia’s December 1993 constitution, at least at first sight, did away with the asymmetrically beneficial treatment of ethnic republics (though it left open the possibility of bilateral power-sharing treaties, thus introducing asymmetry again through the back door). The movements in the European Russian republics soon faded from view (though some regions continued to make claims for a while, see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 567-568). Thus, we code an end to the movement in 2003 in accordance with the ten-years rule. [start date: 1993; end date: 2003]

**Dominant claim**

* The European Russian movement combines claims for increased autonomy in a total of 15 regions: i) the Leningrad Oblast unilaterally declared itself a republic (implying increased autonomy) in 1993 (Ross 2002: 24), ii) Vologda Oblast organized a referendum on republican status in April 1993 and subsequently proclaimed the Vologda Republic on May 14 (Slider 1994: 264), iii) Voronezh Oblast sought some status in-between Republic and Oblast (Slider 1994: 264) and unilaterally in 1993 declared that the region was henceforth “an independent participant in international and foreign-economic relations” and that the federal bodies “may not promulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies of power” (Ross 2002: 25), iv) Arkhangelsk Oblast unilaterally declared itself the Pomor Republic in 1993 (Ross 2002: 24) and finally v) a total of eleven central Russian regions, in 1993, unilaterally proclaimed a unified Central Russian Republic under the lead of Orel Oblast. The republic appears based on the already existing Central Economic Region, which also includes Moscow (Teague 1993, 1994: 45; Ross 2002: 24). No other claim was found. [1993-2003: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the European Russians is composed of multiple regions that declared themselves republics. These regions are the Leningrad Oblast, the Vologda Oblast, the Voronezh Oblast, and the Arkhangelsk Oblast and twelve central Russian regions. The combined territories of the twelve central Russian regions correspond to the Central Economic region, which includes the following Oblasts besides the federal city of Moscow: Orel, Bryansk, Vladimir, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Moscow, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Yaroslavl (Ross 2002: 63f; Geographyofrussia.com n.d.). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* There were a number of autonomy declarations (except for Voronezh all unilateral upgrades to republican status) in 1993: in Leningrad Oblast (Ross 2002: 24), in Vologda Oblast (Slider 1994: 264; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 315), Voronezh Oblast (Ross 2002: 25), Arkhangelsk Oblast (Ross 2002: 24) and in a total of eleven central Russian regions which in 1993 proclaimed the Central Russian Republic under the lead of Orel Oblast (Teague 1993, 1994: 45; Ross 2002: 24). [1993: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Perestroika led to a couple of important autonomy concessions. Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Thus the Russian non-ethnic regions appear unaffected.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of the regions. Moreover, in June 1991 the Federal City of Moscow could have its first mayoral elections. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: Orel Oblast and Bryansk Oblast had their first gubernatorial election in April 1993 (Orttung et al. 2000: 58, 409); they were among the few who were granted such elections (in most regions there was a moratorium until 1995/1996).
  + In 1995 Yeltsin allowed gubernatorial elections in Moscow Oblast, Tver Oblast and Yaroslavl Oblast; these are among the few such elections that Yeltsin allowed before 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000). Only later in 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in the remaining non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). The following Oblasts held their first gubernatorial elections in 1996: Leningrad Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Ryazan Oblast , and Vladimir Oblast. In Tula Oblast the first gubernatorial elections were in 1997, and in Smolensk Oblast the first gubernatorial elections were in 1998. Finally, there were also gubernatorial elections in Bryansk in 1996 (the winning candidate had been removed from office soon after his election back in 1993, see above). In line with the codebook, the lifting of the moratorium is not coded as a concession because of the temporary nature.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). However, the constitution appears to have left untouched the autonomy of non-ethnic regions.
* In Brynsk Oblast, the elected governor was removed by Yeltsin in late 1993 (Orttung et al. 2000: 58). Gubernatorial elections were only held again in 1996. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70).
  + The following Oblasts signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement in 1996: Leningrad Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 306; Söderlund 2006: 94), and Tver Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 568; Söderlund 2006). [1996: autonomy concession]
  + The following Oblasts signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement in 1997: Vologda Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 306; Söderlund 2006: 94), Bryansk Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 59; Söderlund 2006: 94), and Yaroslavl Oblast (Orttung et al. 643; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1997: autonomy concession]
  + The following Oblasts or regions signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement in 1998: the Federal City of Moscow (Orttung et al. 2000: 339; Söderlund 2006: 94), Ivanovo Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 149; Söderlund 2006: 94), and Kostroma Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 270; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1998: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.

**Regional autonomy**

* The regions associated with the European Russians movement are all federal subjects of the Russian Federation, and as such have invariably enjoyed a certain level of autonomy, though the extent of autonomy varied over the years (see above). [1993-2003: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | European Russians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* Throughout 1993-2003, EPR codes the Russians as dominant. The European Russians have disproportional access to central state power. Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were from European Russia (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, while Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk (in our terminology Sverdlovsk belongs to the Ural region, which belongs to European Russia but not to the European Russians as understood here). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai). Moreover, key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). However, also under Yeltsin key government posts like the prime ministry were filled by European Russians (see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 304-305, 349, 407). Based on this, we code the European Russians as senior partner throughout. [1993-2003: senior partner]

**Group size**

* The population figures are taken from Orttung et al. (2000) and refer to the situation on January 1, 1998 (ethnic make-up is from 1989 census). Orel Oblast: 907,000 (97% Russians): Leningrad Oblast: 1,682,000 (91% Russians); Arkhangelsk Oblast: 1,492,000 (93% Russians); Vologda Oblast: 1,339,000 (97% Russians); Voronezh Oblast: 2,486,000 (93% Russians); Federal City of Moscow: 8,629,000 (90% Russians); Bryansk Oblast: 1,465,000 (96% Russians); Ivanovo Oblast: 1,246,000 (96% Russians); Kaluga Oblast: 1,094,000 (94% Russians); Kostroma Oblast: 797,000 (96% Russians); Moscow Oblast: 6,564,000 (94% Russians); Ryazan Oblast: 1,307,000 (96% Russians); Smolensk Oblast: 1,157,000 (94% Russians); Tula Oblast: 1,786,000 (95% Russians); Tver Oblast: 1,633,000 (94% Russians); Vladimir Oblast: 1,631,000 (96% Russians); Yaroslavl Oblast: 1,435,000 (96% Russians). In total, the European Russians coded under this movement thus numbered approximately 34.3 million. Russia’s population in 1998 was about 147.7 million according to the World Bank. [0.2322]

**Regional concentration**

* The movement relates to Russians from a number of regions in European Russia: the Federal City of Moscow and the following Oblasts: Leningrad, Vologda, Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Moscow, Orel, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tula, Tver, Vladimir, and Yaroslavl. Russians make up >90% in all these regions (see above). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Russians in various post-Soviet countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (EPR, MAR). There are also Russian Jews in Israel (EPR). We do not code these Russian communities as ethnic kin because this is a movement by Russians against a Russian-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Evenks

Activity: 1989-2012

**General notes**

* The Evenks are one of Siberia’s indigenous peoples. Until 2007, when it was amalgated with Krasnoyarsk Krai, the Evenks had their own autonomous okrug – in which they, however, made up only a minority (14% in the 1989 census, see Fondahl 1997: 194).
* The concessions/restrictions include changes in the Evenk okrug’s status, though it has to be noted that the Evenks make up only 14% of the local populations in 1989 (Fondahl 1997: 194). The Evenks are the titular nationality, which usually entails a certain degree of influence over the regional government. Therefore, we code changes in the region's self-determination status as concessions/restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Minahan (2002: 587) reports that a nationalist movement emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Minahan (2002: 587), “Evenki nationalism, which has developed since the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, presses for the production of new teaching materials in the Evenki language, creation of a cultural center in Tura, and enhancement of traditional economic activities. Activists support Evenki land claims, rights to traditional land use and resources, and a greater say in local government areas with Evenki populations. Evenk activists working for self-determination seek to revive the obshchina territorial system as the basis for territorial organization. Presentations by the Evenks to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples have emphasized the difficult circumstances in which they find themselves. Since the late 1980s, the Evenks have demanded reforms to reverse the process of alienation from their lands, which in turn would improve their control over their own destiny.” Lacking a clearer indication, we peg the start date at 1989.
* A 2002 report by the Guardian (Brown 2002) discussing the implications of a proposed pipeline through Evenk territory suggests that the Evenks continued to make land claims. We found no organized claims thereafter and code an end to the movement in 2012 based on the ten-years rule. [start date: 1989; end date 2012]

**Dominant claim**

* Minahan (2002: 587) reports that a nationalist movement emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Minahan (2002: 587), “Evenki nationalism, which has developed since the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, presses for the production of new teaching materials in the Evenki language, creation of a cultural center in Tura, and enhancement of traditional economic activities. Activists support Evenki land claims, rights to traditional land use and resources, and a greater say in local government areas with Evenki populations. Evenk activists working for self-determination seek to revive the *obshchina* territorial system as the basis for territorial organization. Presentations by the Evenks to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples have emphasized the difficult circumstances in which they find themselves. Since the late 1980s, the Evenkshave demanded reforms to reverse the process of alienation from their lands, which in turn would improve their control over their own destiny.” A 2002 report by the Guardian (Brown 2002) discussing the implications of a proposed pipeline through Evenk territory suggests that the Evenks continued to make land claims. [1989-2012: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Evenks have sought to improve their land rights and political autonomy in Russia. They are settled predominantly in their homeland in eastern Siberia (in the former Evenk autonomous Okrug), but their historic territory stretches beyond this area (Minahan 2002: 583). It is not clear to what specific territory Evenk claims are tied, but it seems that their claims concern the entire Evenk population. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s ethnic settlement area according to the World Language Mapping System, which serves as an approximation. This area overlaps with the former Evenk autonomous Okrug, but also extends further into the east.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Evenks autonomous okrug was established in 1930 (Orttung et al. 2000: 118). In the context of perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Note that Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform in 1989 (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). The Evenk territory had the status of an autonomous okrug and hence appears unaffected by this reform.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (like the Evenk territory) were not granted this right.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996. The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Against the earlier promise of direct elections, the governors in Evenk autonomous okrug was appointed until 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 119). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favour of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). The first gubernatorial elections were held in 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 119). We do not code the lifting of the moratorium as a concession due to the temporary nature of the restriction.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics (like the Evenk autonomous okrug) were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). While the constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics, it gave Autonomous Okrugs rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), which implies an autonomy upgrade for the Evenks. Hence we code an autonomy concession in 1993. Note that the upgrade led to an ambiguous situation as both autonomous okrugs and the oblasts/krais to which they were attached now had the same rights (Orttung et al. 2000: 236). [1993: autonomy concession]
* The 1996 law “On the Fundamentals of State Regulation of Socioeconomic Development of the North of the Russian Federation” allowed small-numbered Russian peoples to establish relatively autonomous and self-governing structures. For instance, the Evenks established traditional structures known as “obschinas”. 1999 and 2000 lawd strengthened these rights (Donahue 2003). This initiative applies only to so-called “small numbered peoples”, which includes (among others) the Chukchis, the Evenks, the Itelmens, the Khanty, the Komis, the Koryaks, the Mansi, the Nenets, the Shors. Key components have not been implemented (IWGIA; Minority Rights Group International), thus we do not code a concession.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). In 1997, the Evenk autonomous okrug signed such a bilateral power-sharing treaty (Orttung et al. 2000: 120; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1997: autonomy concession]
* By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law had little effect (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* Following a 2005 referendum, Evenk was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). Given the Evenks’ minority status within their entity and the strong political pressure to follow the official line, we code this as a restriction. [2005: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Evenk had autonomous okrug status until January 1, 2007, when it was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai. At least after Stalin, the autonomous entities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117), though it was limited, especially for the Siberian entities (Fondahl 1997: 200-203). Note that the Evenks made up only 14% of the local populations in 1989 (Fondahl 1997: 194). The Evenks are the titular nationalities, which usually entails a certain degree of influence over the regional government. We code regional autonomy until 2006, though noting that this requires further research. This follows EPR practice: EPR does not code the Evenks but codes ethnic groups with autonomous okrugs as autonomous even if they make up only a small share of the territory (see e.g. Chukots). [1989-2006: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Following a 2005 referendum, Evenk was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). Since Evenkya had had an autonomous status within a larger federal unit, this is coded as “Revocation of autonomy” in line with the codebook. [2007: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Evenks |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence of inclusion in the national executive. [1989-2012: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, the Evenks numbered 35,527 in 2002. Minahan (2002: 583), on the other hand, reports that there are approximately 50,000 Evenks in the Russian Federation, noting that the Soviet census reports only speakers of Evenk. Since the differences are so small we draw on Minahan. For 1989-1991 we combine this figure with the total population of the Soviet Union (287 millions according to 1989 census), and for 1992 onwards with the 2002 census (145.2 million). [1989-1991: 0.0002; 1992-2012: 0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* The Evenks make up but 14% of their okrug’s population according to the 1989 census (Fondahl 1997: 194). Minahan says the actual numer is higher, but with 27% his estimate is below the threshold too. The Evenks have no spatially contiguous homeland within the okrug either (see Minahan 2002: 583). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 583) there are 30,000 Evenks in northeastern China and a negligible number of Evenks in Mongolia. 30,000 is not numerically significant enough to be coded. We found no evidence for other groups that could be considered close kin. [no kin]

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## Far Eastern Slavs

Activity: 1991-2007

**General notes**

* The Far Eastern Slavs are descendants of ethnic Slav settlers (Ukrainians and Russian). Far Eastern Slavs are located in the Primorski and Khabarovsk Krais, in the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, and Sakhalin Oblasts, as well as in Yakutia (Minahan 2002: 600). We code changes in the level of self-determination of all these regions as concessions/restrictions – except for Yakutia. Since this is an ethnic republic, concessions/restrictions are attributed to the respective titular nationality. Note that for the same reason, the Autonomous Okrugs sub-ordinated to the coded regions (e.g. Koryakia) are not coded (these are ethnic entities, too, and are separately coded).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the late 1980s, nationalists began to call for the resurrection of the independent Far Eastern Republic of 1918. By June 1991 the Far East Freedom Party was actively demanding the restoration of the Far East Republic. Since this is the first clear evidence of separatist activity that we found, we peg the start date of the movement at 1991.
* In 1993, Primorski Krai unilaterally declared itself a republic (the Maritime Republic), a status that would imply increased political and economic autonomy (Minahan 2002: 603; Ross 2002: 25; Slider 1994: 264).
* Viktor Ishaev, the governor of Khabarovsk Krai, called for the creation of a Far Eastern Republic in 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 223).
* News reports indicate that in 1997, separatists were still actively demanding the restoration of the Far East Republic, but no subsequent activity could be found. Based on this, we code the end of the movement in 2007, following the ten-years of inactivity rule. [start date: 1991; end date: 2007]

**Dominant claim**

* The only demand we have found is for the establishment of one or more Far Eastern Republics, a measure that would increase the autonomy of the Far Eastern Slavs. For instance, in 1993 the Primorski Krai unilaterally declared itself a republic (the Maritime Republic), a status that would imply increased political and economic autonomy (Minahan 2002: 603; Ross 2002: 25; Slider 1994: 264). And Viktor Ishaev, the governor of Khabarovsk Krai, called for the creation of a Far Eastern Republic in 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 223). We code an autonomy claim throughout. [1991-2007: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Far Eastern Slavs consists of the Primorski and Khan territories, the oblasts of Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, Sakhalin, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), including the autonomous areas of Chukotka, Koryakia, and the Jewish Autonomous Region (Minahan 1996: 174; Minahan 2002: 600). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1993, one of the regions associated with the Far Eastern movement, Primorski Krai, unilaterally declared itself a republic (the Maritime Republic), a status that would imply increased political and economic autonomy (Minahan 2002: 603; Ross 2002: 25; Slider 1994: 264). [1993: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Siberia’s non-ethnic regions hence appear unaffected.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favour of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. We peg it post-SDM emergence because the first mobilization occurred before November 1991 (see above). [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1993, Yeltsin allowed for popular gubernatorial elections in Amur Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 23), though the popularly elected governor was removed shortly thereafter (see below).
  + In 1995, Yeltsin allowed for gubernatorial elections in selected non-ethnic entities, including Primosrskii Krai (winner in brackts: Yevgenii Nazdratenko; Orttung et al. 2000: 432).
  + Later, but still in 1995, Yeltsin lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections altogether (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). In 1996 gubernatorial elections were held in Khabarovsk Krai (Viktor Ishaev), in Kamchatka Oblast (Vladimir Biryukov), in Magadan Oblast (Valentin Tsvetkov), and in Sakhalin Oblast (Igor Farkhutdinov; Orttung et al. 2000: 225, 191, 318, 480).
  + Also in Amur Oblast gubernatorial elections were once again allowed, but the 1996 elections were annulled due to electoral fraud. The elections were repeated in 1997, upon which Anatolii Belonogov was elected governor (Orttung et al. 2000: 23).
  + Since a moratorium is meant to be temporary by definition, we do not code those elections as concessions.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since i) their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction, and ii) since presidential representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites and proved ineffective.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). However, the constitution appears to have left untouched the autonomy of non-ethnic regions.
* In 1993, Yeltsin allowed for popular gubernatorial elections in Amur Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 23). Yeltsin removed the popularly elected governor of Amur Oblast (Aleksandr Surat) from office only four months later. Subsequently, governors were again appointed in Amur Oblast until 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 23; see below). [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Khabarovsk Krai signed a bilateral treaty with Moscow in April 1996, followed by further agreements signed in July of the same year (Orttung et al. 2000: 224; Söderlund 2006: 94). Also Sakhalin Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in May 1996. The agreement dealt with land use, education, international economic ties, and other issues (Orttung et al. 2000: 481; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]
* Magadan Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in July 1997 (Orttung et al. 2000: 319; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1997: autonomy concession]
* Amur Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in May 1998 (Orttung et al. 2000: 23; Söderlund 2006: 94). Moreover, in 1998 Moscow gave Magadan Oblast increased autonomy for distributing funds, though the source does not make fully clear what this implied (Orttung et al. 2000: 319-320). But since Amur Oblast signed a bilateral treaty in 1998, we code an autonomy concession in this year anyway. [1998: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* However, in June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law had little effect (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* In June 1999 Yeltsin signed a decree which established a 15-year special economic zone in the city of Magadan, with tax exemptions and a favourable customs system (Orttung et al. 2000: 319-320). We do not code this because the agreement was confined to the local level.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question was how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In the name of administrative simplification, Putin moved to abolish certain ethnic entities in the early 2000s, promising improved economic performance. Following a 2005 referendum, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug was merged with Kamchatka Oblast in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). This could be seen as a concession for the Far Eastern Slavs, but we consider this to be too ambiguous.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Oblasts and Krais associated with the Far Eastern Slav movement are all federal subjects of the Russian Federation, and as such have invariably enjoyed a certain level of autonomy, though the extent of autonomy varied over the years (see above). [1991-2007: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Far Eastern Slavs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians; Ukrainians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000; 36502000 |

**Power access**

* The Far Eastern Slavs are descendants from ethnic Slav settlers (Ukrainians and Russian). Far Eastern Slavs are located in the Primorski and Khabarovsk Krais, in the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, and Sakhalin Oblasts, as well as in Yakutia (Minahan 2002: 600). In 1991, the last year the Soviet Union existed, EPR codes the Russians as senior partner and Ukrainians as junior partner. In all remaining years, Russians are coded as dominant. Compared to European Russians, the access to central-state executive power is much more limited in case of the Far Eastern Slavs. Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk, which can be seen as part of extended European Russia, even though we code it as part of SE Asia). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai). Moreover, key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). However, also under Yeltsin key government posts like the prime ministry were filled by European Russians (e.g., Viktor Chernomyrdin, the longest-acting prime minister under Yeltsin, is from Orsk south of the Ural mountains). Hence, we code the Far Eastern Slavs as powerless throughout, though noting that this case would profit from more in-depth research. [1991-2007: powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 603) notes that the Far East’s population is decreasing, but it is mostly European Russians which emigrate back to Russia’s European part, and not the Far Eastern Slavs (also see Minakin 1995: 178). According to Minahan (2002: 600), there are about 6.1 million Far Easterners in Russia. Combined with Russia’s population of 145.2 million in the 2002 census, this gives a group size of .042 for 1992-2007 and combined with the USSR’s total population in the 1989 census (287 million) this gives the estimate for 1991, 0.0213. [1991: 0.0213; 1992-2007: 0.042]

**Regional concentration**

* >85% of the Far Easterners live in the Far Eastern region, where they make up almost 80% of the population according to Minahan (2002: 600). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are some Far Easterner communities in the US and Canada, but these are not numerically significant (Minahan 2002: 600). The real question is whether we should code ethnic kin due to Russians in places like Ukraine and the Baltics, or because of groups such as the Ukrainians in Ukraine. We do not code kin here because the primary identity marker here relates to region and because this movement is directed against a Russian-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Gagauz

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the late 1980s Moldovan nationalists took a series of mostly symbolic steps that were widely seen as moves toward unification with Romania. Most threatening to non-Moldovans was legislation passed by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1989 that made Romanian the only official state language and required all officials to demonstrate proficiency in Romanian, even if serving in Gagauz and Russian-speaking communities. Largely in response to this law, in November 1989, the Gagauz formed the Gagauz Khalk movement and proclaimed autonomy within Moldova. In August of the next year, they declared the independence of the Republic of Gagauzia, announced their intention to remain within the Soviet Union, and called for presidential elections. In response, the Moldovan legislature declared the Gagauz Khalk illegal and ordered some tens of thousands of young Moldovan “volunteers” to enter Gagauz towns and block the elections (Doyle & Sambanis 2006; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR). We peg the start date to 1989. The Gagauz movement remained active when Moldova gained its independence in 1991 (see Gagauz under Moldova). [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1989 the Gagauz movement unilaterally declared autonomy, and in 1990 began to demand separation from the Moldovan SSR (see above). We code an autonomy claim for 1989 and 1990, and a claim for sub-state secession in for 1991, following the first of January rule. [1989-1990: autonomy claim; 1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Gagauz consists of small territories known as the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (Roth 2015: 130). We code this claim using GIS data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database (2019).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Gagauz autonomists self-proclaimed the establishment of the Gagau­zian ASSR in November 1989 (Sato 2009: 155). This is considered an autonomy declaration since ASSR status would not have implied full separation from the Moldovan SSR. [1989: autonomy declaration]
* In August 1990, the Gagauz leaders unilaterally raised the status of the Gagauzian ASSR to Republic status, implying complete separation from the Moldovan SSR (Minahan 2002: 634; Sato 2009: 155). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There is no evidence of separatist violence prior to the end of 1991. The violence that erupted in late 1991 is coded under the header of Moldova. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The history of the territorial belongings of Gagauzia is relatively complex: it has been part of Russia, Romania, the Ottoman Empire, and Moldova. In 1906, the Gagauz leaders had declared their homeland (then part of Tsarist Russia) an independent state, but the revolt was quelled within two weeks (Minahan 2002: 632). After World War II, Moldova again became part of the Soviet Empire after being part of Romania in the inter-war period. Under Soviet rule, the Gagauz were allowed to use their language, but publications had to use the Cyrillic alphabet. In 1986, there was a concession on the Gagauz demands for protection of Gagauz culture: the Gagauz were granted the right to use their language in TV and radio broadcasting (Minahan 2002: 633-4; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 109). [1986: cultural rights concession]
* Note: in 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). However, local choice of leaders had little effect for groups without an autonomous status as the respective regions’ decision rights were very limited. Hence, this is not coded as a concession.
* In 1989, Moldova’s Supreme Soviet adopted a new language law (Sato 2009: 144; Chinn & Roper 1995: 296-300). Moldovan (using Romanian script) was made the official language. Public officials as well as those with high positions in the private sector were required to acquire facility in both Russian and Romanian by 1994 (later this was postponed to 1997). The law contained compromises, too. Russian was to be used as the language for inter-ethnic relations, and the Gagauz language was to be protected and developed, and was to be the official language alongside Moldovan/Romanian and Russian in areas of Gagauz population (Vahl & Emerson 2004). Still the 1989 language law can be considered a decrease in the Gagauz’ cultural rights. A critical provision was that public officials and certain people in the private sector needed to be able to communicate in Romanian within five years (Neukirch 2001). Unsurpsingly, the law was perceived as a threat by both Slavic and Gagauz minorities (the Gagauz speak their own language, and typically Russian as a second language; several thousand Gagauzians protested against the new law, see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000). Hence, we code a cultural rights restriction in 1989. This restriction sparked the movement (see above); hence, we treat this as a prior restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In August 1990 the Gagauz Khalk unilaterally declared the separation from the Soviet Republic of Moldova, and the creation of its own Soviet Socialist Republic (Minahan 2002: 634). In response, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet dissolved and outlawed the Gagauz self-determination organization, the Gagauz Khalk. In addition, troops were sent in to prevent the elections the Gagauz Khalk had unilaterally called for October (Hewitt and Cheetham 2002). These repressive acts do not constitute restrictions as understood here, and hence they are not coded.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Moldavian SSR was highly centralized, and Gagauzia did not have a special status at the time.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Moldova attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Gagauz |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Gagauz |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36551000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* We found no indication that the Gagauz’ level of spatial concentration was fundamentally different before the dissolution of the USSR. These are the notes for the post-dissolution phase: According to Minahan (2002: 630) approx. 95% of all Gagauz in Moldova are located in the Republic of Gagauzia, where they make up more than 80% of the local population. This matches with information from MAR. Note that the Gagauz republic is not spatially contiguous as there are some exclaves, but it appears very likely that the threshold is met even if we just considered the main body. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR. The Minorities at Risk data (MAR V), on the other hand, codes “close kindred in more than one country which adjoins its regional base.” This appears to Gagauz groupings in Ukraine (35,000), Bulgaria (20,000), Greece (20,000), and Russia (10,000) mentioned by Minahan (2002: 630). None of these communities crosses the threshold. We found no other evidence for close kindred. [no kin]

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## Georgians

Activity: 1987-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In October 1987, the Il’ia Chavchavadze Society was formed and began to agitate for greater national autonomy (Beissinger 2002: 178; Wheatley 2005: 30-31, 42). In March 1988, the radical wing, whose demands fell well short of independence, split from the Il’ia Chavchavadze Society and formed the Fourth Group (later renamed the Society of Saint Il’ia the Just). Only months later, in August 1988, the National-Democratic Party of Georgia was formed, which openly proclaimed independence (Beissinger 2002: 179). In June 1989, the Georgian Popular Front was formed. In November 1989 the Georgian Supreme Soviet declared that its incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921 was the result of military force and was therefore involuntary and illegitimate. The Supreme Soviet also claimed that it had the right to secede from the USSR and to nullify laws and decrees emanating from the central government in Moscow. We peg the start date of the movement at 1987, the first year of organized nationalist activity.
* Note that there was some, though very limited activity towards territorial self-determination already prior to Glasnost. In particular, in the 1960s, the independence-minded Union for the Freedom and Independence of Georgia was established in Tbilisi (Mikaberidze 2007: 43). However, according to Beissinger (2002: 178) dissident activity before Glasnost was focused mainly on language, cultural issues, and human rights rather than self-determination as we define it. Thus, this earlier activity is not coded.
* Georgia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. [start date: 1987; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* The demands of the first self-determination organization, the Il’ia Chavchavadze Society, fell well short of independence, pertaining to economic autonomy, self-government, and cultural rights (Beissinger 2002: 178; Wheatley 2005: 30-31). Radicals separated in 1988 to form their own, independence-minded movement. The radical wing of the movement came to prevail after the Tbilisi crackdown on April 9, 1989 (Beissinger 2002: 182-185; Jones 2013: 28). In 1990, Gamsakhurdia, an outspoken advocate of Georgian independence, was elected as president with more than 85% of the vote. Following the first of January rule, we code an autonomy claim until and including 1989, and an independence claim for 1990 onwards. [1987-1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1988; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Georgians matches the current borders of Georgia (previously the Georgian SSR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Georgia declared sovereignty in November 1989 (Kahn 2000: 60; note that Kahn, erroneously, notes October 12). [1989: autonomy declaration]
* Georgia declared independence in April 1991, following the referendum of March 30 (Jones 1997: 537). [1991: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is 3 in 1985-1989. This is likely due to the April 1989 protests, in which Georgian protestors demanded Georgian independence and the punishment of Abkhaz separatists. The protests turned and 21 protestors died; while the authorities claimed that security personnel was attacked, the violence appears best-described as one-sided and most of the deaths (19) were the result of a stampe (Keesing’s; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April\_9\_tragedy). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Georgia enjoyed a short period of independence between 1918 and 1921, when it was reincorporated into the Soviet Union (Jones 1997: 507). In 1922, Georgia was joined to the Soviet Transcaucasus Republic. In 1936 Georgia was awarded full Union Republic status (Minahan 1998: 119). Despite Stalin being an ethnic Georgian, there was no favoritism to the Georgian republic, and there was harsh repression that only eased with Stalin’s death in 1953. Still, in 1943 the autonomy of the Georgian Orthodox Church was restored. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).
* Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had official status. In 1977/1978, there was an attempt to downgrade the status of the titular nations’ languages. This sparked major protests in Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Armenia, prompting Moscow to back down and not implement the downgrade (Minahan 1998: 120).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession. [1988: autonomy concession]
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems.” Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Georgia) and autonomous republics. [1989: autonomy concession]
* In 1989 there was a bloody crack-down on a pro-independence demonstration in Tbilisi (Minahan 1998: 120). However, this cannot be considered a downgrade in the self-determination status, and hence we do not code a restriction.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication, but de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. However, this cannot be seen as a concession, given that the Armenian, the Azerbaijan and the Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had already enjoyed official status prior to this.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Georgia became independent with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the Georgians as regionally autonomous throughout. [1987-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Georgians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Georgians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36510000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]
  + Note: this coding is ambiguous given Eduard Shevardnadze (a Georgian) being the Soviet Union’s foreign minister until 1990, but it is consistent with EPR practice.

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were approx. 4 million Georgians in the Soviet Union. Most (approx. 95%) resided in the Georgian SSR, where the Georgians made up 71% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* MAR codes the Laz in Turkey as ethnic kin, but they number <100,000 (Joshua Project). [no kin]

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## Ingrians

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

* Ingrians are ethnic Finns who live in Russia. The Ingrians do not possess their own region within Russia and make up a negligible share of Leningrad Oblast, where they are concentrated. Since they do not have significant influence over one of Russia’s regions, we do not code changes in the sovereignty of an existing region as concessions/restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Ingrian congresses held in 1990 and 1991 endorsed for the first time since after World War II the group’s right to self-determination and closer ties to Finland. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. News reports and the Independent Ingermanland website indicate that this self-determination movement has been consistently active throughout the 1990s and the 2000s (Free Saint Petersburg; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002). Ingrian activists continued their demands for increased self-rule during the 2010s. Artem Chebotarev, the founder of the Free Ingria community, was arrested, and his website was shut down (Alexandrov 2016; RBC 2017). [start date: 1990; end date ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim is not very clear, with Ingrian nationalists making claims both for secession and greater internal autonomy and the movement is rather fragmented. That said, according to local observers and Artem Chebotarev, the founder of the Free Ingria community, Ingrian nationalists primarily demand joining Saint Petersburgh to the Leningrad region, renaming the Leningrad region into Ingermanland, and greater autonomy for the region within Russia (Takye Dela 2016, RBC 2017, Alexandrov 2016; for evidence for the independence claim, see Kavkazcenter 2011; Manifesto of ‘Free Saint-Petersburg’). [1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* Minahan (2002: 781) suggests that Ingrians seek closer ties to Finland, which is too vague to code an irredentist claim. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ingrians is not entirely clear. According to Minahan (1996: 238), it lies in northwestern Russia between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland around St. Petersburg. According to Alexandrov (2016) and Minahan (2016), Ingrians claim the territory of St. Petersburg and around St. Petersburg within Leningrad Oblast. We code this claim based on this description and the map in Minahan, using GIS data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas Database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Ingrian homeland lies in northwestern Russia, and comprises part of Leningrad Oblast. In 1617 Sweden took hold of Ingria. In 1721 Ingria was ceded to Russia. In 1920 Ingria was declared independent, and shortly thereafter the western part of Ingria came under Finnish rule. The Red Army re-conquered the remaining bits in 1921. In 1928, the Soviets established a national district for the 115,000 Ingrians remaining in the Soviet Union. In 1938 the autonomous district was abolished, and Ingria incorporated into Leningrad Oblast. Between 1941 and 1944, Finland controlled the area; when the Red Army returned, the majority of Ingrians sought refuge in Finland. Those remaining in the Soviet Union (and those returning – Stalin demanded repatriation) faced harsh repression, with thousands deported. In 1956, after Stalin’s death, the Ingrians were allowed to return to their homeland. The number of Ingrians in the Soviet Union decreased over time because many opted to declare themselves as Russians in censuses (Minahan 2002: 776-780). In the context of perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). However, the Ingrians do not have their own homeland, and the number of Ingrians in Leningrad Oblast is so small it is unlikely this had any effect on the Ingrians.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns (Ingrians), Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’, though not the Finns (which includes the Ingrians) and the Khemshils; (Pohl 2000: 268).
* In subsequent years more rehabilitation laws followed. In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. It did have some very limited effects. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Ingrians comprise a negligible share of Leningrad Oblast, and are hence without significant influence at the regional level (Minahan 2002: 776). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ingrians |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence for representation in the national executive. [powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 776) reports about 85,000 Ingrians in Russia in 2002. Combined with the Soviet Union’s population in the 1989 census (about 287 million), this yields a group size estimate of about .0003 for 1990-1991. Combined with Russia’s population (145.2 million according to the 2002 census) this yields an estimate of about 0.0006 for 1992-2020. [1990-1991: 0.0003; 1992-2020: 0.0006]

**Regional concentration**

* The Ingrian homeland lies in northwestern Russia, and comprises part of Leningrad Oblast. The Ingrians make up a negligible share of the oblast. Minahan (2002: 776) gives more fine-grained data for the Ingrian district. According to Minahan, >70% of all Russian Ingrians reside there, yet they make up but 35% of the local population. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Ingrians in Finland (approx. 250,000 if we follow Minahan 2002: 776). More generally, the Ingrians are a Finnic people and thus closely related to Finland’s Finns. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Ingush

Activity: 1970-2020

**General notes**

* Until 1992, the Ingush shared an autonomous region with the Chechens. The Chechens outnumbered the Ingush by four to one; according to the 1989 census the Chechens made up about 58 per cent of the local population, and the Ingush only about 13 (Ormrod 1997: 117). But the Ingush enjoyed titular status within the region, which implies a privileged position (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Hence, changes in the region’s status affected not only the Chechens, but also the Ingush; accordingly, the concessions/restrictions coding includes concessions/restrictions to the Chechen-Ingush Republic until the two separated in 1992.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Ingush are among the thirteen peoples that, accused of treason, were deported to Central Asia during the Second World War. In 1956 they received official rehabilitation and were allowed to return to their homes, and shortly thereafter the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) that had existed prior to the deportation was re-established, with both groups again attaining titular status (George 2009: 77). However, the Prigorodny that had once belonged to the Ingush remained with North Ossetia (George 2009: 87), sparking the modern Ingush national movement. The earliest evidence of organized activity towards self-determination – that is, the restoration of the Prigorodny region – we found is in 1970, when there was an Ingush demonstration in the Prigorodny region demanding that the territory be ceded to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Minahan 2002: 785). Hence, we peg the start date at 1970.
* In the 1970s, the Ingush petitioned the Soviet government to restore the Prigorodny region to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107). In the late 1980s, the Ingush began to agitate for their own national homeland. In 1988-1989, about 60,000 signed a petition demanding the formation of an autonomous Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107).
* In March 1991 Ingush rallied for the restoration of Ingush statehood within a separate Ingush polity. Protestors also demanded the return of the majority-Ingush region of Prigorodny. In July 1991 the parliament of Ingushetia declared the region an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. In late 1991, a referendum was organized on the question of separation from Chechnya and formation of its own autonomous Ingush homeland, with an overwhelming majority turning out in favor (Dunlop 1998: 122). The Chechen Parliament agreed to the separation in early 1992. The federal center did not, initially, recognize this change, but the Russian Supreme Soviet approved the separation in June 1992 (George 2009: 80-81; Minahan 2002: 786; Ormrod 1997: 134).
* There was a violent conflict over the Prigorodnyi region in 1992 (see below). In 1994 Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed the Beslan Agreement, which provides for the return of Ingush refugees to the Prigorodnyi region in North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 135, 137). Apparently not implemented, another such agreement was signed in 1998, but the situation remained tense (Orttung et al. 2000: 375). Ruslan Aushev, the long-term president of Ingushetia, even threatened a referendum on independence if Moscow fails to solve the Prigorodny problem (Orttung et al. 2000: 132).
* In the late 1990s, Ingush nationalists proposed joint Ossetian-Ingush rule over Prigorodny, but this was rejected (Minahan 2002: 787). In addition, Ingushetia’s then-president Aushev demanded increased autonomy (Orttung et al. 2000: 132). In 2006, the Ingush Parliament called on Moscow to return the disputed Prigorodny region to Ingushetia (Minority Rights Group International). Non-zero MAR protest scores also suggest an ongoing movement.
* In 2007 Doku Umarov – an ethnic Chechen – unilaterally declared the independent Caucasus Emirate, which is supposed to span “all historically Muslim lands” in the North Caucasus including Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. The conflict spread to large parts of the North Caucasus and increasingly also involved recruits from other ethnic groups from the area including Ingush and several other groups such as the Karachai, Cherkess, Balkars, Lezgins, Kabards, Dargins, and Avars (EPR). The insurgency had the support of local groups in Ingushetia, such as the Ingush Islamic Jamaats. Therefore, we associate the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate and the separatist violence associated with it with the Ingush (as well as the Chechens and the Dagestanis; see their respective entries). From 2015 onwards, large parts of the Caucasus Emirate swore allegiance to the Islamic state. According to UCDP/PRIO, this changed little on the ground, and as of 2020 local IS affiliates continued to wage a low intensity insurgency against Russian security forces, mainly in the Caucasus region. [start date: 1970; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially, the Ingush movement’s claim was for the restoration of the Prigorodny region, meaning that the region should be separated from North Ossetia and amalgamated with the Chechen-Ingush Republic (sub-state secession claim). In 1970 there was an Ingush demonstration in the Prigorodny region demanding that the territory be ceded to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Minahan 2002: 785). Moreover, also in the 1970s, the Ingush petitioned the Soviet government to restore the Prigorodny region to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107).
* Then, in the late 1980s, the Ingush began to agitate for their own national homeland. In 1988-1989, about 60,000 signed a petition calling for the formation of an autonomous Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107). In March 1991 citizens rallied for the restoration of Ingush statehood within a separate Ingush polity. Protestors also demanded the return of the majority-Ingush region of Prigorodny. The Ingush appear to have upheld their claim for the restoration of the Prigorodny region after they had been granted their own homeland in 1992 (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 787). In 2006, the Ingush Parliament called on Moscow to return the disputed Prigorodny region to Ingushetia (Minority Rights Group International). In addition, Ingushetia’s then-president Aushev demanded increased autonomy (Orttung et al. 2000: 132), but the Prigorodny claim appears dominant.
* Then in 2007, the Islamic insurgency emerged demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate spanning Chechnya, Ingueshtia, Dagestan, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria spread to Ingushetia, supported by local Ingush groups, such as the Ingush Islamic Jamaats (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). It appears that the claim for an independent Ingushetia as part of the Caucasus Emirate has succeded restoration of the Prigorodny region as the dominant claim. Hence, we code a claim for sub-state secession until 2006, and an independence claim for 2007 onwards. Note: the January 1 rule would suggest we code independence as the dominant claim only from 2008; however, it is the independence claim which is associated with the insurgency that started in 2007. Independence claim remains dominant throughout the 2010s as the Caucasus Emirate was the most dominant claim in the region (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). [1970-2006: sub-state secession claim; 2007-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 2007; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ingush was initially the Prigorodny region within the North Ossetia Republic (today North Ossetia–Alania), until the Ingush also started to demand their own homeland in 1988 (which entailed the separation of Ingushetia from Chechnya). Hence, from 1989 onward the claimed territory consists of Prigorodny and the Ingushetia republic.
* From 2007 onwards (2008 with 1 January rule), the movement called for the establishment of a much larger Caucasus Emirate, consisting of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Nogay Steppe (Northern Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai), Cherkess and Southern Krasnodar Krai (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). We code all three territorial claims based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). At the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet followed the suggestion, and adopted its declaration of sovereignty, and thereby not only claimed increased autonomy, but also unilaterally updated its administrative status to union republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60). Since the declaration was adopted on the initiative of a Chechen congress, we attribute it to the Chechens only, and not to the Ingush.
* In September 1991, Ingush representatives in a congress of Ingush deputies of all levels proclaimed the establishment of an Ingush ASSR within the RSFSR (Dunlop 1998: 108; MAR; George 2009: 80-81; Minahan 2002: 786). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]
* On May 15, 1993, Ingushetia aped Tatarstan and declared its sovereignty, indicating its interest to establish a federal relationship with the center on the basis of treaties (George 2009: 88). [1993: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In 1991, armed Ingush forces had attempted to seize Ossetian homes in the Prigorodny region. In response, the North Ossetian government imposed a curfew over the region, and began armed retaliation against the region. The conflict continued to escalate throughout 1992, leading to 600 deaths and tens of thousands of internal refugees (Orttung et al. 2000: 375 Ormrod 1997: 108). Given the fighting and death count, we code LVIOLSD for 1992.
* MAR’s rebellion score is 4 (“small-scale guerilla activity”) in 2004 based on the following account: “[w]hile the war in Chechnya has largely ended, a low-level insurgency continues, and its violence has spread to neighboring republics, with militant Ingush organizations, such as the Ingush Jamaat, continuing to target the state (REB04 = 4) in what appears to be an increasingly religiously based movement.” We investigated this further using qualitative sources.
  + According to Sagromoso (2012), Ingush Jamaat declared Jihad against Russia in 2004 with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in all Ingush lands, including Prigorodny. In June 2004, Ingush Jamaat perpetrated a large-scale attack against government and security offices in Nazran. The 2004 attack in Nazran led to more than 50 deaths and Russian troops subsequently engaged in battles with the rebels. This attack is sometimes also attributed to Chechen rebels (The Guardian 2004), but as Sagramoso and MAR make clear, Ingush were at least involved and, according to Sagromoso, even the main initiators. According to Sagromoso, by 2005-2006, Ingusehtia had turned into one of the most unstable republics in the North Caucasus, “with attacks against law enforcement officials, Russian troops and members of the local administration occurring almost on a daily basis” (p. 582). We did not find total tallies of casualty estimates, but other sources confirm there were killings in subsequent years (e.g., Radio Free Europe 2007). This suggests continued fighting and we code ongoing LVIOLSD in 2005-2006.
* In 2007, the Islamic insurgency demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate spanning Chechnya, Ingueshtia, Dagestan, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria spread to Ingushetia, supported by local Ingush groups, such as the Ingush Islamic Jamaats (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code the Caucasus Emirate uprising as a war, but violence involving the Ingush is too limited to warrant a HVIOLSD code. Based on this, 2007-2016 is coded as LVIOLSD. The LVIOLSD coding for 2017-2020 follows UCDP/PRIO, which codes a low-intensity armed conflict involving local IS affiliates. In 2021, the number of battle-related deaths dropped to 2 according to UCDP/PRIO. [1970-1991: NVIOLSD; 1992: LVIOLSD; 1993-2003: NVIOLSD; 2004-2006: LVIOLSD; 2007-ongoing: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. In 1934 the formerly autonomous Ingush were merged with the Chechens to form a single autonomous oblast. In 1936, the Chechen-Ingush region was upgraded to ASSR status (George 2009: 76). Accusing the Chechens of treason, the Soviets deported the whole Chechen people during the Second World War, along with other Caucasian groups (including the Ingush, the Karachais and the Balkars; George 2009: 76-77). Their autonomous status was abolished. The Ingush had suffered from Stalin’s terror already prior to their deportation (Minahan 2002: 785). In 1956 the deported peoples were allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99), that is, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was re-established, with both groups again attaining titular status (George 2009: 77). We found no evidence for a concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’ (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. It did have some effects. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.
* A core demand of the Ingush movement is the restoration of the Prigorodny region, which upon the Ingush’ deportation was amalgated with North Ossetia and has not been returned when the Ingush were rehabilitated in the 1950s. The conflict over the Prigorodny region came to a head in the early 1990s. In 1991, armed Ingush forces attempted to seize Ossetian homes in the Prigorodny region, and there were large-scale demonstrations demanding the return of the region. In response, the North Ossetian government imposed a curfew over the region, and began armed retaliation against the region. The conflict continued to escalate throughout 1992, leading to 600 deaths and dozens of thousands of internal refugees. In subsequent years there were negotiations with North Ossetia, but these primarily concerned the return of refugees (Ormrod 1997: 135, 137; Orttung et al. 2000: 375); the Prigorodny region remains part of North Ossetia. Hence, we do not code a concession related to the Prigorodny region.
* In 1978 Soviet authorities permitted certain Mosques to reopen in Ingushetia (Minahan 2002: 786). [1978: cultural rights concession]
* In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet changed the USSR’s 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites were effectively hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism was more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises.” And according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like the Checheno-Ingush autonomous republic).[[4]](#footnote-4) [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), “the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Chechnya-Ingushetia), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In September 1990 the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet decided to suspend the right of Ingush to live in North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 107-108). Throughout 1991, the Ingush resisted this demand (Ormrod 1997: 108). This measure contributed significantly to the escalation of conflict in 1992. By mid-1993, dozens of thousands of Ingush from the Prigorodny region had fled to Ingushetia (Ormrod 1997: 108). The denial to reside in a given territory constitutes a restriction of group autonomy. [1990: autonomy restriction]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. The replacement of the centrally-appointed regional party secretaries (which de-facto yielded most of the power) with directly elected governors is tantamount to a reduction in the center’s control over the regions. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Shortly after the August Coup, Dudaev and his entourage ousted the local Soviet government, and called parliamentary and presidential elections. Moscow opposed the election, fearing that secessionist Dudaev would mount to power. Moscow mounted an unsuccessful, half-hearted “coup” that was aborted after after a few days, and then imposed an economic blockade on Chechnya (Minority Rights Group International). However, by that time Chechnya had already declared independence, leaving Ingushetia to its own devices. Thus, we do not code a restriction. Also, we do not code a restriction due to the introduction of presidential representatives, which occurred parallel to the introduction of directly elected regional governors (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* In late 1991, Ingushetia announced that it would split from Chechnya. The Russian Federation did not, initially, recognize this change, but the Russian Supreme Soviet approved the separation in June 1992 (George 2009: 80-81; Minahan 2002: 786; Ormrod 1997: 134). The same year, there was another significant concession to the ethnic republics, like soon-to-be Ingushetia: the March 1992 Federal Treaty. The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
  + Note: we code a separatist violence onset early in 1992 (some violence also occurred already in late 1991). This concession therefore came after the onset of violence. The violence continued throughout the remainder of 1992 (see above).
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had granted to the republics with the 1993 constitution, adopted in a popular referendum that December. The 1993 constitution implied a significant policy change: the introduction of a symmetric federation, in which no entity was granted more powers than others. The Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral power-sharing treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. However, Ingushetia did not sign such a treaty (George 2009: 88; also see Söderlund 2006: 94).
* In 1993 a “free economic zone” was established in Ingushetia. This implied tax breaks, among other things (Minahan 2002: 787; Orttung et al. 2000: 134). The free economic zone was disbanded in 1997 (Minahan 2002: 787). It is not clear whether there were autonomy concessions linked to this, but there are other grounds to code a concession in that year:
  + In December 1993, Yeltsin met with the governors of both Ingushetia and North Ossetia to negotiate a deal over the Prigorodny region conflict. The three signed a statement that foresaw that i) Ingushetia renounces its claims on the Prigorodny region, ii) that local armed units are disbanded, and iii) that North Ossetia allows the Ingush to live in the Prigorodny region and the many Ingush refugees the right to return (Ormrod 1997: 109). Note that North Ossetia had suspended the right of Ingush to live in the region back in 1990 (see above). In 1994 the parties signed the Beslan Agreement, which dealt with the Ingush refugees’ right to return (Ormrod 1997: 109). Implementation was slow. But over time a good share of the Ingush refugees were able to return. The grant of the right to return constitutes an autonomy concession. [1993: autonomy concession]
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Ingushetia never had a bilateral treaty.
* In 1999, Moscow and Ingushetia agreed to a dual system of oversight of judicial appointments (George 2009: 88), but this appears too limited to code a concession.
* In 2000, Putin began his assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: This restriction occurred only after the onset of separatist violence in June 2004 (see under Separatist armed conflict).
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Ingushetia was one of the first republics to scrap regional elections in April 2013, two weeks after the federal government’s legislation (Forbes Russia 2013). Given the central initiation of this change, we code an autonomy restriction. [2013: autonomy restriction]
* In 2013, Russian lawmakers adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, which prohibit calls for separatism. According to the amendments, which entered into force in May 2014, "public calls for actions violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation" are punishable for up to five years in prison (Harding 2014; Meduza 2016). However, this is not a restriction as defined here.
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before, republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017 cultural rights restriction]
* In 2018, Ingushetia and Chechnya signed a land swap agreement, which sparked protests in Ingushetia. According to the official statements, the two republics voluntarily swapped equal chunks of land. However, independent observers note that the swap was unequal and non-voluntary. Ingushetia transferred 26800 hectares to Chechnya and received only 1000 hectares in return under the pressure of Chechnya and Moscow (DW 2018; Kavkazsky Uzel 2018). We code a restriction due to the loss of territory. [2018: autonomy restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Checheno-Ingush Republic had the status of an ASSR under the Soviets, and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1992 Ingushetia became a Republic on its own. Ethnic entities like the Chechen-Ingush ASSR enjoyed a certain level of automy under the Soviets, at least after Stalin’s reign Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Ingush used to be outnumbered by the Chechens in their common ASSR by about four to one, but the Ingush enjoyed titular status within the region, which usually implied a privileged position within (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Hence, we code the Ingush as autonomous during Soviet rule (note: this is in line with EPR). Having attained separate republican status, Ingushetia continued to have regional autonomy beyond 1991, though the extent varied over the years (see above). [1970-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1992: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ingush |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Ingush |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36533000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1970-1991: 0.001; 1992-2013: 0.003; 2014-2020: 0.0032]

**Regional concentration**

* Until 1992, the Ingush shared an autonomous region with the Chechens. The Chechens outnumbered the Ingush by four to one; according to the 1989 census the Chechens made up about 58 per cent of the local population, and the Ingush only about 13 (Ormrod 1997: 117). However, the Ingush formed a majority in Ingushetia, the part that became a separate republic in 1992. According to Minahan (2002: 782), the Ingush make up about 80% of the local population (also see the 1970, 1979, 1989, 2002, and 2010 censuses. There are also some Ingush outside of Ingushetia, in particular in North Ossetia, though many of them were expelled in 1992. However, most Ingush are located in Ingushetia itself. The code matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 782) mentions “sizeable Ingush population” in the Central Asian republic (particularly Kazakhstan), but these appear to be only a few thousand (Nichols 1997). EPR does not code kin. MAR does not code kin in older versions, while in phase V it does, but it is unclear to whom they refer (most likely though the Kazakh Ingush noted above). [no kin]

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## Kabards

Activity: 1991-2002; 2008-2020

**General notes**

* From 1992 onwards the Kabard movement demanded separation from the Kabardino-Balkaria republic. Still, the concessions/restrictions includes concessions/restrictions to the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic as a whole. Kabardino-Balkaria is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Kabards (making up about half of the local population) and the Balkars (making up about ten per cent of the republic’s population). The Kabards have significant significant influence over the regional government (Ormrod 1997: 109-111; Roeder 2007: 130). Hence increases/decreases in Kabardino-Balkaria’s autonomy directly affect the Kabards.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In January 1991 Kabardino-Balkaria, at the time an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, declared sovereignty, meaning it proclaimed increased autonomy and unilaterally raised its status to union republic, implying separation from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Orttung et al. 2000: 162; Kahn 2000: 60). Kabardino-Balkaria is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Kabards (making up about half of the local population) and the Balkars (making up about ten per cent of the republic’s population). We attribute the sovereignty declaration to the Kabards for three reasons. First, while both Kabards and Balkars participate in the regional government, given the numerics the Kabards are more influential (Ormrod 1997: 109-111). Second, Kabardino-Balkaria’s sovereignty declaration was proclaimed upon Valerii Kokov’s initiative, an ethnic Kabard and soon the region’s governor. Third, already prior to the sovereignty declaration in 1991, a separate Balkar movement had emerged which demanded separate Balkar autonomy (see Balkars). We code 1991 as the start date. In reaction to the Balkars’ demand for a separate republic, a Kabard congress convened in early 1992, and proclaimed a separate Kabard republic. In September activists of the Kabard movement attempted to seize the local television center and the regional parliament (Roeder 2007: 131). We could not find much evidence of separatist activity beyond 1992. Minahan (2002: 861) notes that the Kabards renewed their calls for a separate Kabard republic in 1996, but without giving further details. Hence, we code an end to the movement in 2002, following the ten-year rule. [start date 1: 1991; end date 1 2002]
* Kabard's self-determination gained a new impetus in 2007 when Sochi, a part of historically Circassian lands, was chosen as a site for Winter Olympics. Initially, claims focused on recognition of the Russian Empire’s genocide of the Circassian people, including Kabards. However, in 2008, Kabard Congress joined efforts with peer Circassian organisations in the Caucasus and demanded the reunification of the Circassian (Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug) lands and the creation of a united Circassian autonomous region within Russia (Kabard 2019; Shazzo 2008). Roth notes this entails a separation of Kabardino-Balkaria into Kabard and Balkar republics as an intermediate goal (Roth 2015: 184). In the run-up to the 2010 census, Circassian activists in Kabardino-Balkaria and other Circassian republics launched the “I’m a Circassian, are you?” campaign to nudge people to identify themselves as Circassian in the state registry as opposed to Kabard or Shapsug. The “I’m a Circassian, are you?” campaign was also repeated in the run-up to the 2020 census (Kabard 2019). The movement also conducts remembrance events that commemorate the victims of the Caucasian war (1763-1864) on an annual basis and demands the acknowledgement of Circassian genocide (Maratova and Gritsevich 2020; Kuzhev and Kmuzov 2022). We associate pan-Circassian mobilization with the individual groups to avoid repetition of the same/similar claims. [start date 2: 2008; end date ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The 1991 sovereignty declaration proclaimed Kabardino-Balkaria a subject of the Soviet Union, implying separation from the RSFSR (Orttung et al. 2000: 162). In 1992 a Kabard Congress made demands for a separate Kabard republic.
* Starting from 2008, Kabards have demanded creation of a unified Circassian republic. Roth notes this entails a separation of Kabardino-Balkaria into Kabard and Balkar republics as an intermediate goal (Roth 2015: 184; Kabard 2019; Shazzo 2008). Hence, we code sub-state secession claim. [1991-2002: sub-state secession claim; 2008-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* While some Circassian activists have implied secessionist aspirations, we could not find clear evidence for an organized independence movement (see UNPO 2023: Roth 2015: 185). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kabards in 1991 was the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, but from 1992 onwards, only the Kabard-inhabited region of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic (also named “Kabardia”) was claimed (see above). We code these claims based on the Global Administrative Areas Database and Roth (2015: 174), respectively.
* Since 2008, the area of the claimed territory includes a broader set of Circassian lands, which includes the lands of Adyghe, Abazin, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug (Roth 2015: 184). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 174).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In January 1991 Kabardino-Balkaria, at the time an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, declared sovereignty: it proclaimed increased autonomy and unilaterally raised its status to union republic, implying separation from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Orttung et al. 2000: 162; Kahn 2000: 60; Minority Rights Group International). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of violence above the threshold. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Kabards have come under Russian control in the late 18th century (Minahan 2002: 859). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. Still in 1936, Kabardino-Balkaria was upgraded to ASSR status. A crucial event in the North Caucasus was the abolishment of the autonomous entities and the deportation of the Karachai, Balkars, Ingush, and Chechens in 1944. The Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR was renamed the Kabardin ASSR. Only in 1956 were the deported peoples allowed to return and the autonomies restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99). The Balkars again attained titular status in Kabardino-Balkaria, and the territory was renamed as the Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR. In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), by which union republics and autonomous republics (like Kabardino-Balkaria) gained autonomy (Gorbachev 1999: 99). [1989: autonomy concession]
* In 1990 the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR. However, at the same time, republics, including ASSRs, were allowed to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Subsequently Kabard and Balkar attained official language status in Kabardino-Balkaria. [1990: cultural rights concession]

2nd phase:

* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. In January 1992, Vaerii Kokov, an ethnic Kabard, was elected president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic (Orttung et al. 2000: 163). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of the regions. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994. Kabardino-Balkaria followed suit on July 1, 1994, becoming the second republic to sign a bilateral power-sharing treaty. Among other things, the treaty conferred significant economic autonomy upon Kabardino-Balkaria (Orttung et al. 2000: 164; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1994: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). In 2013, Kabardino-Balkaria became the fourth republic where direct gubernatorial elections were scrapped (Pertsev 2013). Considering that the reform stems from Moscow’s pressure, we code an autonomy restriction. [2013: autonomy restriction]
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017 cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Kabardino-Balkaria had the status of an ASSR since 1936, and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Russian republics have retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. The Kabards have significant significant influence over the regional government (Ormrod 1997: 109-111; Roeder 2007: 130). The region’s president had been an ethnic Kabard throughout the movement’s activity (Valerii Kokov, see Orttung et al. 2000: 162-163). Kabardin elites have maintained their dominance in Kabardino-Balkaria. The head of the region is consistently Kabardin, and Kabardins control security services and the judicial system (International Crisis Group 2012: 22-24; Tekushev 2012). [1991-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kabards |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kabardins |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36528000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1991: 0.001; 1992-2002, 2008-2013: 0.004; 2014-2020: 0.0038]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 857), >85% of all Kabards reside in the proposed Kabard republic, where they form a majority (61%). The Kabards also make up a majority of the Kabardino-Balkaria as a whole (57.2% according to 2010 census, up from 48.2% in 1989 census). Below a list of districts with absolute Kabard majorities in the 2010 census (these straddle the republic’s central area from east to west). The capital, Nalchik, has a plurality of Kabards. [concentrated]
  + Total number of Kabards in Russia: 590,000
  + Absolute majority:
    - Baksan district: 58,000 Kabards (96% of local population)
    - Zolsky district: 45,000 (91%)
    - Leskensky district: 25,000 (90.2%)
    - Urvansky district: 58,000 (81%)
    - Chegem district: 50,000 (73%)
    - Baksan: 33,000 (90%)
    - Terek district: 45,000 (88%)
  + Plurality:
    - Nalchik: 118,300 (49%)

**Kin**

* The Kabards form part of a larger group, the Circassians. There are Circassians, including Kabards (Minahan 2002: 857), in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel. Other sources (e.g. the UNPO) also mention that there are people of Circassian descent in particular in Turkey (estimated at up to several million). While many Circassians have assimilated, there appears to be a certain level of ethnic identification among at least some of the Circassians in Turkey and Syria (Ayhan 2005; Kabard 2019). [1991: kin in neighboring country; 1992-2020: kin in non-adjoining country]

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## Kaliningrad Slavs

Activity: 1990-2010

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Königsberg, previously Prussian territory, was assigned to the Soviet Union after the Second World War, was associated with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (as an Oblast) and was given its current name, Kaliningrad (Orttung et al. 2000: 168). Subsequently Kaliningrad, Russia’s only exclave, was de-Germanized, and Slavs moved in. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Poland and Lithuania’s subsequent accession to the EU and NATO, left Kaliningrad increasingly isolated from the rest of Russia. In the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a coalition of national and cultural groups gained support, including the Baltic Republican Party. Claims for increased autonomy were for the first time raised in 1990, hence the start date of the movement (Minahan 2002: 1020; Holtom 2003: 168).
* In October 1991, Yuri Matchokin, then governor of Kaliningrad, proposed upgrading the status of Kaliningrad Oblast to the status of an autonomous republic (the fourth Baltic Republic, in addition to the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian SSRs; Holtom 2003: 170). Kaliningrad’s political elite continued to demand an autonomy upgrade throughout the 1990s (see Holtom 2003: 170-172).
* Minahan (2002: 1022) notes that the demand was again voiced in mid-2000. Subsequently the movement appears to have petered out. In 2005 the Baltic Republican Party was disestablished due to a new law that requires political parties to have regional branches in at least half of all Russia’s regions. We code an end to the movement in 2010, following the ten-years of inactivity rule.
* According to Minahan (2016: 61), 10 percent of the people in Kaliningrad preferred separation from the Russian Federation in a 2013 opinion poll, and another 20 percent felt this was a possibility. However, we found on evidence for a re-emergence of an organized movement. [start date: 1990; end date: 2010]

**Dominant claim**

* A coalition of national and cultural groups, including the Baltic Republican Party, and at least in the early to mid-1990s the head of the regional administration. In October 1991, Yuri Matchokin, then governor of Kaliningrad, proposed to upgrade the status of Kaliningrad Oblast to the status of an autonomous republic (the fourth Baltic Republic, in addition to the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian SSRs; Holtom 2003: 170). Kaliningrad’s political elite continued to demand an autonomy upgrade throughout the 1990s (see Holtom 2003: 170-172). Minahan (2002: 1022) notes that the demand was again voiced in mid-2000. No other claims were found, hence we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1990-2010: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kaliningrad Slavs is the current Kaliningrad Oblast, which lies next to the Baltic Sea. The enclave is separated from Russia and is bordered by Poland and Lithuania (Minahan 2002: 1017). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After the Second World War, Königsberg, previously Prussian territory, was assigned to the Soviet Union, associated with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (as an Oblast) and was given its current name, Kaliningrad (Orttung et al. 2000: 168). Subsequently Kaliningrad, Russia’s only exclave, was de-Germanized, and Slavs moved in. In the context of perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* Note that Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform in 1989 (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Kaliningrad had the status of a “normal” Oblast, and hence appears unaffected by the reform.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Kaliningrad Oblast, on September 25, 1991, was declared a Free Economic Zone (FEZ), a measure conferring very substantial economic autonomy (in particular, taxing autonomy) on the region (Holtom 2003: 168). In 1995, the FEZ was revamped into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ; Holtom 2003: 169, 171; Orttung et al. 2000: 172). Moreover, in August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. We code an autonomy concession due to the establishment of the FEZ and the introduction of direct gubernatorial elections. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Yurii Matochkin was appointed governor of Kaliningrad in September 1991. Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). In Kaliningrad, gubernatorial elections took place in 1996, with Matochkin, the incumbent, being defeated by Leonid Gorbenko (Orttung et al. 2000: 168). Given the temporary nature of the moratorium, this is not coded as a concession, in line with the codebook.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions like Kaliningrad (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). The constitution appears to have left untouched the autonomy of non-ethnic regions, thus we code no concession or restriction.
* In August 1993 the Russian Supreme Soviet agreed to a status upgrade for Kaliningrad Oblast, but the promise soon became moot after the Supreme Soviet lost the stand-off with Yeltsin in October (Holtom 2003: 170). Thus, we do not code a concession.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Kaliningrad was awarded with a bilateral treaty in January 1996, a measure conferring additional competencies on the region (Holstom 2003: 172; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
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* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* As one of Russia’s federal subjects, the homeland of Kaliningrad Slavs, Kaliningrad Oblast, has invariably enjoyed regional autonomy, though the extent of autonomy varied over the years (see above Orttung et al. 2000: 166-173). [1990-2010: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kaliningrad Slavs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* In 1990-1991, the last years the Soviet Union existed, EPR codes the Russians as senior partner and the Ukrainians as junior partner. In all remaining years, the Russians are coded as dominant. In both the USSR and Russia, Russians from the European part dominated the government. Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk (which can be seen as part of extended European Russia, even though we code it as part of SE Asia)). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai). Moreover, key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). Based on this, it is not inconceivable that Kaliningrad had a minister or two in the twenty-odd years of the movement’s activity, but we found no evidence for this and in any case representation would have been very sporadic given Kaliningrad’s small relative size. Thus we apply a powerless code, though noting that this case would profit from more in-depth research. [1990-2010: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1017) the Kaliningrad Slavs numbered approximately 865,000 in 2002. This matches more or less with Orttung et al. (2000: 167) who report that the Kaliningrad Oblast in 1998 had 943,000 residents with 79% Russians, 9% Belarussians and 7% Ukrainians. We use Minahan’s figure and combine it with the Soviet Union’s 1989 census (total population of 287 millions) for 1990-1991 and with Russia’s 2002 population (145.2 million according to 2002 census) for the remaining years. [1990-1991: 0.003; 1992-2010: 0.006]

**Regional concentration**

* The vast majority of the Kaliningrad Slavs resides in their homeland, Kaliningrad oblast, where they make up a clear absolute majority of the population (Minahan 2002: 1017). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We do not code Russians in other countries as such because this is a movement by ethnic Russians against a Russian-dominated government. According to Minahan (2002: 1017), there are only few Kaliningrad Slavs outside Kaliningrad. [no kin]

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## Kalmyks

Activity: 1990-2008

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s led to the emergence of a number political movements in the Kalmyk Republic. The Popular Front of Kalmykia was created in 1990 (Minority Rights Group International). In August 1990, a Kalmyk congress met in Elista, the capital of Kalmykia, adopting a nationalist agenda and advocating Kalmyk self-determination (Minahan 2002: 886). Hence, we code 1990 as the start date of the movement. In October 1990, the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic proclaimed its sovereignty and unilaterally upgraded its administrative status. The Kalmyk movement remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, with demands focusing on increased local control of natural resources and increased autonomy. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 149) report that there were also demands for the return of former Kalmyk territories that are now part of Dagestan. The last evidence of separatist activity we found was in 1998, when Kalmykia's governor, Kirsan Ilyumzhinow (an ethnic Kalmyk) publicly demanded increased sovereignty (potentially even independence) for the Kalmyk Republic (Minahan 2002: 887). Subsequently the movement appears to have petered out. We thus code the end of the movement as 2008 in accordance with the 10-year inactivity rule.
* Note: Minahan (2016: 199) states that nationalists, particularly in the diaspora, work for the independence of Kalmykia. We found no confirming evidence, however. [start date: 1990; end date: 2008]

**Dominant claim**

* The Kalmyk ASSR declared sovereignty on October 18, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic status (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). Hence, we code a sub-state secession claim for 1990-1991. The Kalmyk movement remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, with demands focusing on increased local control of natural resources and increased autonomy. The last evidence of separatist activity we have found was in 1998, when Kalmykia's governor, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (an ethnic Kalmyk) publicly demanded increased sovereignty for the Kalmyk Republic (Minahan 2002: 887). Ilyumzhinov's statement was interpreted as a secession threat in Moscow; however, Kalmykia's president was quick to assert that this was based on a misunderstanding (Solovyova 1998). Hence, we code an autonomy claim for 1992 onwards, following the first of January rule. [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2008: autonomy claim]
  + Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 149) report that there were also demands for the return of former Kalmyk territories that are now part of Dagestan, but the evidence we have collected suggests that the autonomy claim was dominant after 1991.

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kalmyks is the current Kalmykia Republic in southwestern Russia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Kalmyk ASSR declared sovereignty on October 18, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic status, implying separation from Russia (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding for 1990-2008. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After having declared independence in 1918, Kalmykia was conquered by the Red Army in 1920. In 1920, the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast was created. In 1935 Kalmykia was upgraded to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Minahan 2002: 885; Minority Rights Group International). In the context of forced collectivization, the 1920s and 1930s saw heavy repression. In 1943 the Kalmyk people, accused of collaboration with the Nazis, was deported to Siberia. Officially rehabilitated in 1956, three years after Stalin's death, many Kalmyks began to return to their homeland. In 1957 Kalmykia was officially re-established as an Autonomous Oblast, to be upgraded to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1958 (Minahan 2002: 886; Minority Rights Group International). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* And in 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels (including Kalmykia), implying, among other things, increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently, Kalmyk became an official language in the Kalmyk republic, along with Russian. We treat this as a prior concession since the SDM emerged only in August 1990 and the law was adopted in April 1990. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’ (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. It did have some effects, though. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. After the 1991 law, more than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). In December 1993, Yeltsin signed a decree “on the rehabilitation of the Kalmyk people and support for their cultural revival and development” (Ormrod 1997: 136-137). We were unable to identify concrete consequences. Overall, it is difficult to pinpoint a concrete concession related to the rehabilitation laws, which is why we do not code a concession related to the rehabilitation laws.
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Kirsan Ilyumzhinov was elected president of the Kalmyk Republic in 1993 (Orttung et al. 2000: 181). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Note that in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). The Kalmyk Republic did not sign such a treaty (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94). Its longstanding president, Ilyumzhinov, opposed “the madness of sovereignties” (Orttung et al. 2000: 179).
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since the Kalmyk Republic never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
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**Regional autonomy**

* The Kalmyk Republic had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Under the Soviets, the ethnic entities (in particular the ASSRs) had a certain measure of power, especially under Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117); they retained a certain measure of autonomy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see above). In 1989/1990 the Kalmyks were a relative majority in their region; today, the Kalmyks make up an absolute majority of Kalmykia's population (Minority Rights Group International); the Kalmyks as the republic’s titular nationality are hence likely to have exerted significant influence over the regional government. We code regional autonomy throughout. [1990-2008: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kalmyks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kalmyks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36553000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 882), there are 212,000 Kalmyks in Russia, approx. 66% in the Kalmyk republic, where they form a relative majority of 45%. This would suggest that the threshold for spatial concentration is not met.
* We also had a look at census figures, and based on these, the threshold is clearly met in 2002/2010, but ambiguous 1989.
  + 1989: 174,000 Kalmyks in the USSR, 84% in Kalmykia, 45% of local population.
  + 2002: 174,000, 156,000 in Kalmykia, 53% of local population.
  + 2010: 183,000, 163,000 in Kalmykia, 57% of local population
* The question is what we do in the movement’s early years. We decided to code the Kalmyks as concentrated throughout; the 1989 figures are rather close to the threshold, and from the settlement pattern in Minahan as well as GeoEPR it appears that the Kalmyks primarily settle in the eastern part of the republic, suggesting that they likely form an absolute majority there. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Kalmyks are closely related to Mongols in Mongolia or Kazakhstan (Minahan 2002: 882-883). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Karachais

Activity: 1989-2011

**General notes**

* Karachai-Cherkessia is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Karachais and the Cherkess. According to the 1989 census, the Karachais made up around a third of the local population, and the Cherkess around ten per cent. At the time Russians had made up a relative majority in the republic (around 40 per cent in 1989), but out-migration reduced their population share so that the Karachais now make up a relative majority in Karachai-Cherkessia (around 40 per cent).
* The concessions/restrictions section includes concessions/restrictions to Karachai-Cherkessia as a whole, starting in 1991. Karachai-Cherkessia is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Karachais and the Cherkess. According to the 1989 census, the Karachais made up around a third of the local population, and the Cherkess around ten per cent. At the time Russians had made up a relative majority in the republic (around 40 per cent in 1989), but out-migration reduced their population share so that the Karachais now make up a relative majority in Karachai-Cherkessia (around 40 per cent). The Karachais’ influence over regional politics started to increase from 1991 (see below). Hence increases/decreases in Karachai-Cherkessia’s autonomy directly affect the Karachai from that year onwards.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In October 1989 the first Karachai congress met, demanding the creation of a separate Karachai homeland – ultimately with the status of a union republic. Several other such congresses followed (Roeder 2007: 134). Hence, we code 1989 as the start date.
* Karachai activists gathered more than 70,000 signatures on a petition to declare Karachai autonomous (Comins-Richmond 2002: 74). According to Comins-Richmond (2002: 74), a Karachai republic was unilaterally declared on June 9, 1990; he may, however, refer to the November 17 declaration in which Karachai-Cherkessia declared sovereignty and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic level (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Minorities at Risk Project). The fact that a *Karachai* SSR (rather than a Karachai-Cherkessian SSR) was declared makes it likely that Karachais played an important role in this process.
* In July 1991, Karachai-Cherkessia, formerly an Autonomous Oblast sub-ordinated to Stavropol Krai, was elevated to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic status (it became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the fall of the Soviet Union).
* In November 1991 Karachai nationalists rallied, demanding the restoration of their own autonomous status, which the Karachai had enjoyed prior to their deportation in 1944 (Minahan 2002: 911). A Karachai congress held in 1992 again called for the restoration of the Karachai’s autonomous status, along with similar proclamations in the same year (Minorities at Risk Project).
* In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). Fearing loss of power, the Karachai-Cherkess government responded by calling a referendum on the unity of the republic, which was supported by 78.5 per cent of the vote. There were widespread reports of vote rigging, and soldiers were sent to polling places in Karachai areas. Many Karachais boycotted the vote; the entire process heightened ethnic tensions even further. Yeltsin subsequently withdrew his partition plan (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76).
* According to Richmond (2008: 137), the Karachai movement lost momentum after 1994. According to Minahan (2004: 305), calls for a separate state resurfaced in 2001 (Minahan 2004: 305).
* According to Minahan (2016: 200-201) and Roth (2015: 184-185), there were some some calls for a joint republic with the Balkars or an independent state, but we found no evidence for an organized movement after 2001. Since we were unable to find evidence of organized activity beyond 2001, we code an end to the movement in 2011, following the ten-year rule. [start date: 1989; end date: 2011]

**Dominant claim**

* The first Karachai congress met in 1989; it ultimately demanded the creation of a Karachai SSR, implying separation from Karachai-Cherkessia, Stavropol Krai (to which the former was sub-ordinated), and the Russian Federation. The 1991 sovereignty declaration also declared a Karachai union republic. In 1991 Karachai-Cherkessia was separated from Stavropol Krai, but separatists continued to demand the creation of a separate Karachai republic (Minahan 2004: 305; Minorities at Risk; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 149). [1989-2011: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* From 1989-1991 the Karachais’ dominant claim applied to the whole Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (today, the Karachai-Cherkess Republic). However, after the elevation of the Oblast to a Republic in 1991, the only claim was for the creation of a separate Karachai republic (see above). We code these claims based on Roth (2015: 174) and the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Comins-Richmond (2002: 74), a Karachai republic was unilaterally declared on June 9, 1990. Other sources mention a November 17 declaration in which Karachai-Cherkessia declared sovereignty and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic level (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Minorities at Risk Project). The fact that a *Karachai* SSR (rather than Karachai-Cherkessian SSR) was declared makes it likely that Karachais played an important role in this process; hence we attribute this declaration to the Karachais and code it as a sub-state secession declaration. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No separatist violence was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Karachai have come under Russian control in the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire was forced to cede the area (Minahan 2002: 909). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic, with Karachai-Cherkessia sub-ordinated to Stavropol Krai (Orttung et al. 2000: 196). Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. Then, in 1926, the Karachai-Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast was split in two, that is, into a Karachai and into a Cherkess Autonomous Oblast. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. During the Second World War, the Karachais (along with the Balkars) declared an independent state (Minahan 2002: 911). When the area was reconquered, the Karachais and the Balkars, as well as the Ingush and the Chechens were deported and their autonomous status abolished (in 1944). What used to be the Karachai AO was ceded to the Georgian SSR. Only in 1956 were the deported peoples allowed to return and the autonomies subsequently restored (Ormrod 1997: 98-99). The Karachais were merged with the Cherkess again, and the Karachai-Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast was restored (hence, the previous status was not restored, but the unstable joint autonomous region that had existed between 1922 and 1926). In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). Also, there was some relaxation with regard to restrictions on religion. Particularly important, in December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). As noted above, we only code changes in Karachai-Cherkessia’s level of autonomy from 1991 onwards, however.
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’ (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. This does not mean that it did not have effects at all. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws. Thus, we do not code a concession.
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, it appears that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Karachai-Cherkessia at the time had the status of an autonomous oblast, and hence appears unaffected by the reform.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous oblasts and okrugs (like Karachai-Cherkessia) were not granted this right. However, note that Karachai-Cherkessia was soon to be upgraded to republican status, and subsequently Russian along with Abazian, Cherkess, Karachai, and Nogai became official state languages in the region. [1991: cultural rights concession]
* In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Karachai-Cherkessia became independent from Stavropol Krai. [1991: autonomy concession]
  + There are more reasons to code a concession on autonomy in 1991: First, starting in 1991, the Karachai’s influence over regional politics increased (see under “Regional autonomy”).
  + Furthermore, in August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected throughout Russia since 1991 – with the exception of Karachai-Cherkessia, where gubernatorial elections were postponed indefinitely. The incumbent head of administration, Khubiev (an ethnic Karachai), convinced Yeltsin that the holding of presidential elections would cause turmoil (Comins-Richmond 2002: 76), causing Yeltsin to intervene and appoint Khubiev as head of the administration. In 1995, Khubiev was appointed president, a move supported by the local parliament (Kahn 2002: 210). Only in 1999 were gubernatorial elections held. Still, the introduction of directly elected governors is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a significant autonomy offer by the center; it was regional forces (Khubiev) who prohibited the concession from taking effect, and not Moscow. Moreover, the institution of the regional party secretary (who de-facto yielded most of the power) was abolished immediately.
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). However, he withdrew the plan after a referendum in Karachai-Cherkessia on its unity, which turned out a majority against partition (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76). We do not code this as a concession since Yeltsin’s proposal appears to have never gone beyond planning stage (but one could construct a case for coding it).
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). We have not, however, found evidence suggesting that Karachai-Cherkessia signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Karachai-Cherkessia never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Between 1989 and 1991, Karachai-Cherkessia had the status of an Autonomous Oblast, sub-ordinated to Stavropol Krai. In July 1991, it was elevated to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic status, implying it separated from Stavropol Krai. Karachai-Cherkessia became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Union. Under Gorbachev and later Yeltsin, the Russian ethnic entities did have a certain level of regional power (see above, as well as Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The actual influence of the Karachais over their regional government, however, is somewhat ambiguous, at least in the final years of the Soviet Union. Karachai-Cherkessia has two titular nationalities – the Karachais (around a third of the local population in 1989) and the Cherkess (around ten per cent in 1989) – and a significant Russian/Slavic population. In effect, Slavs made up a relative majority in 1989 (around 40 per cent). Titular nationalities generally had a privileged situation within their own republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). But according to Comins-Richmond (2002: 70; also see Richmond 2008: 122-123), the Karachais faced difficulties mounting to advanced positions within their own republic. In particular, the region’s party secretary (de-facto the most powerful position) consistently was ethnic Russian from 1957 to 1991. Based on this, EPR codes the Karachai as not regionally autonomous until the fall of the Union. In line with this, Ormrod (1997: 112) notes that Karachais did not hold politically sensitive positions in Karachai-Cherkessia under Soviet rule.
  + Additional information: Comins-Richmond suggests that there was a very notable exception to the general lack of Karachai representation: Vladimir Khubiev, an ethnic Karachai, had been chair of the local executive committee since the early 1980s, at least formally the highest position in the region. Comins-Richmond continues to argue that Khubiev rose to an influential position only after 1991, suggesting the Karachai were effectively powerless prior to 1991. [1992-2011: regional autonomy]
* After 1991, the tables turned and the Karachais mounted to a more influential position within the region (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 911; Comins-Richmond 2002: 76). EPR argues that the Karachai gained all power, and that the other titular nationality – the Cherkess – became powerless at the regional level. Hence, we code the Karachai as autonomous from 1992 onwards.
  + Additional information: the Cherkess did not lose all power. An ethnic power-sharing system, though fundamentally re-negotiated and altered, has remained in place. According to Ormrod (1997: 112), in 1994 the parliamentary executive – in striking resemblance to the ethno-demographics – comprised 11 Russians, eight Karachai, four Cherkess, three Abazin, and three Nogai. There was though significant ethnic contention over ethnic representation at the regional level, in particular over elections to a regional presidency (direct elections to regional presidents were introduced in 1991). Elections to a new regional parliament were postponed indefinitely, and so were presidential elections. Khubiev convinced Yeltsin that the holding of presidential elections would cause turmoil (Comins-Richmond 2002: 76), causing Yeltsin to intervene and appoint Khubiev as head of the administration. In 1995, Khubiev was appointed president, a move supported by the local parliament (Kahn 2002: 210). Finally presidential elections were held in 1999, pitting an ethnic Karachai against an ethnic Cherkess. The elections threw the region into chaos, with violent protests and renewed calls for the separation of Cherkess, Russian (Cossack), and Abazian lands from the republic. Under dubious circumstances, the ethnic Karachai candidate, Vladimir Semenov, was elected president (Roeder 2007: 134-135; Orttung et al. 198-200). After a Muscovite intervention, the conflict was brought under control (Orttung et al. 2000: 201). A deal was struck, after which the presidency would go to a Karachai, while the prime ministry goes to a Cherkess and the vice-presidency and parliament speaker position go to ethnic Russians (Fuller 2008). In 2008, the prime ministry went to an ethnic Greek, contrary to the prior deal (Radio Free Europe 2010a). Having caused massive protest, in 2010 an ethnic Cherkess was again named prime minister in 2010 (Radio Free Europe 2010b).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The Karachai’s influence at the regional level increased after 1991 (see above). [1991: establishment of regional autonomy]
* Full republic status was granted in 1991 and fully implemented in 1992 (see above). [1992: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Karachais |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Karachai |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36554000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.0004; 1992-2011: 0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* The vast majority of the Karachais lives in the southeastern part of Karachai-Cherkessia, where they make up 80% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 907). Data from the 2010 census leads to the same conclusion (see below). [concentrated]
  + 194,000 Karachais in Russia.
  + Karachayevski district: 26,000 Karachais (86% of local population)
  + Malokarachayevsky district: 38,000 (88%)
  + Prikubansky district: 22,000 (76%)
  + Ust-Dzhegutinsky: 35,000 (69%)

**Kin**

* No kin according to MAR and EPR. We found no evidence in other sources either (e.g. Minahan 2002). Note: the Karachais are closely related to the Balkars, another group in the Russian northern Caucasus. [no kin]

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## Karakalpaks

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Karakalpak nationalists advocating autonomy began to organize in 1989 and in 1990 the Karapalak government declared the republic a sovereign state. Therefore, we peg the start date to 1989 (Minahan 2002; MRGI; Saidazimova 2008; UZ News 2008). The Karakalpak movement remained active when Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991 (see Karakalpaks under Uzbekistan). [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002: 924), the Karakalpak demanded separation from Uzbekistan and the creation of an autonomous Karakalpak republic within the Soviet Union. Hence, we code a sub-state secession claim. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Karakalpaks consists of the autonomous republic Karakalpakstan within the Republic of Uzbekistan (Minahan 1996: 277). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Supreme Soviet of the Karalkapak ASSR issued a declaration of sovereignty in December 1990 (Minahan 2002: 924). The declaration included the right to and the possibility of independence from the Uzbek SSR or even the Soviet Union, but appears to not have directly called for outright separation, hence we code an autonomy declaration. [1990: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The affiliation of the Karakalpak territory changed multiple times during the Soviet period. In 1925, Karakalpakstan was granted the status of an autonomous region (autonomous oblast) as part of the Kazakh ASSR. In 1930, it was transferred to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, only to be joined to the Uzbek SSR in 1936. That same year, Karakalpakstan was elevated to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Uzbek SSR (Hanks 2000). In 1988 the Supreme Soviet introduced multi-candidate, contested elections at all levels of the Union, which can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Following the example of the Baltic Republics, in October 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR adopted a language law that made Uzbek the official government language (Gleason 1997: 583-597); however, the law did not apply in Karakalpakstan, where local authorities were allowed to regulate the language status (Article 3 of the Uzbek language law, see Refworld). This change was confirmed half a year later by the Soviet government when it passed the All-Union Language Law on April 24, 1990. The Union law made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Karakalpakstan), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Prior to this, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. We code a cultural rights concession in 1989 since this is when Karakalpakstan appears to have gained the right to establish their language as state language. Note: it is not clear whether the concession was made before or after the movement’s formation in 1989, but since the law was adopted in October, it is more likely than not that the movement had already been active. [1989: cultural rights concession]
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (ASSRs such as Karakalpakstan). Note: it is not clear whether the concession was made before or after the movement’s start. [1989: autonomy concession]
* In 1990, a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric; hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.

**Regional autonomy**

* Karakalpakistan had the status of an ASSR in the USSR, the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Thus, we code the Karakalpaks as regionally autonomous. [1989-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, implying a host change for the Karakalpaks. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Karakalpaks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Karakalpaks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36555000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Karakalpaks are located in Karakalpakstan. According to Minahan (2002: 921), the Karakalpaks form a relative majority in the Karalpak republic, but with 34% they do not form an absolute majority. We found no evidence suggesting that they would form an absolute majority in a smaller, spatially contiguous territory within the Karakalpak republic. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there are no kin groups (scenario 1:1). Minahan (2002: 921) reports “small Karakalpak communities” in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. While these are too small to be coded, the Karakalpak language is closely related to Kazakh, and some Kazakhs even consider the Karakalpaks as Kazakhs (see Minahan 2002: 921-922). Other than Kazakhstan, there are numerically significant Kazakh populations in China, Turkmenistan, and Russia. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Karelians

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

* The Karelians are a Finnic people. The Karelian homeland borders Finland.
* Self-identified Karelians make up a mere 10 per cent of the Karelian Republic (though Russification may play its part here), and the Karelians’ actual influence over the region is not fully clear, though titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Noting the ambiguity, we still code changes in the Karelian Republic’s sovereignty as concessions/restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic declared sovereignty on August 9, 1990. Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1990.
* In June 1991 a Karelian congress met, demanding increased autonomy for the Karelian nation (Minahan 2002: 932).
* Nationalist mobilization increased after the fall of the Soviet Union. Due to Karelian out-migration to Finland, Slavic in-migration and Russification of the local Karelian population, the Karelians make up a minority within the Karelian Republic only. In the 1990s, Karel organisations campaigned for the partition of the Karelian Republic so as to provide for a Karelian-majority homeland (Minahan 2002: 932). Other Karelians want Karelia to become part of Finland. According to Minority Rights Group International, the Karelian Association campaigns for unification with Finland. In Finland itself, an organization called ProKarelia campaigns for the incorporation of Karelia into Finland. Moreover, Free Karelia continually campaigned for greater autonomy within the Russian Federation.
* In 2015 activists launched a campaign for the proclamation of the restoration of the Ukhta Democratic Republic and an end to the Russian genocide of the Karelian nation (Minahan 2016: 206). However, Karelian nationalism faces major obstacles due to the adoption of restrictive laws (Meduza 2016; MRGI 2020). We code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Karelian movement is linked to several claims. A 1991 Karelian congress demanded increased autonomy for the Karelian nation (Minahan 2002: 932), and an organization called Free Karelia continues to campaign for greater autonomy within the Russian Federation. Other organizations demand the partition of Karelia so as to provide for a majority-Karelian homeland (Minahan 2002: 932). Finally, the Karelian Association, according to Minority Rights Group International, has consistently advocated unification with Finland. Since we were unable to establish what claim is dominant, we code the most radical claim (irredentism). [1990-2020: irredentist claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. Note: it is not fully clear whether irredentist claims were made from the start or not based on the information we found. [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Karelians consists of the current Republic of Karelia, a region bordering Finland in northwest Russia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Karelian ASSR declared its sovereignty on August 9, 1990, without unilaterally upgrading its status to union republic (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). Hence we code an autonomy declaration. [1990: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Karelia has a turbulent history. Russia took hold of the area in 1721, when it was ceded by Sweden. In the aftermath of the February and October Revolutions, Karelia proclaimed itself independent and in union with Finland. The Red Army re-conquered Karelia in 1920, and in 1923 the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established. Further South, a second autonomous entity was created for the Tver Karelians. Of course, under Stalin’s heavily repressive system the promise of autonomy was an empty one, and there was strong repression of Karelian leaders and culture. In 1939 the Tver Karelian autonomous regoin was abolished. In late 1939 the Soviets demanded that Finland cedes Western Karelia so as to unite Karelians under Soviet rule; the ensuing conflict (the Winter War) ended with Finnish defeat. In 1940 a union republic (highest status within the Soviet federal system) was created out of the Karelian ASSR, with the addition of Western Karelia. In collaboration with Nazi Germany, Finland took hold of the region again in 1941, only to be drawn out again in 1944. The Soviets divided the Karelian land in 1945-1946, with parts of Karelia transferred to Leningrad Oblast and others to Murmansk Oblast. In 1956, Karelia was downgraded from union republic status to an autonomous republic. Due to out-migration of Karelians to Finland, Slavic in-migration and assimilation of the local Karelian population, the Karelian population share in the region has declined over the last century from almost 40 per cent to about 10 per cent (Minahan 2002: 930-932; Minority Rights Group International). Immediately prior to the start of the movement, the Soviet government made significant concessions to its regions, however. In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, including increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication, but de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Finnish subsequently became Karelia’s second official language, alongside Russian (Minahan 2002: 932-933; note that Finnish and not Karelian (which some consider a language in its own right, others a dialect of Finnish) is the second official language). Hence, we code a cultural rights concession. Since the concession was made in April and the movement emerged only in August 1990, we treat this as a prior concession. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. In 1994, the centrist Viktor Stepanov was elected as Karelia’s governor (until 2002 the governor was called prime minister, and though directly elected, the prime minister simultaneously was chairman of the legislative assembly). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Karelia did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Karelia never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). However, direct elections of governors in Karelia have not been scrapped and Artur Parfenchikov won the 2022 regional elections (Interfax 2022).
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Karelia had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Note, however, that self-identified Karelians make up a mere 10 per cent in the Karelian Republic (Russification may play its part here), and the Karelians actual influence over the region is not fully clear, though it has to be noted that titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Noting this ambiguity, we still code the Karelians as regionally autonomous, thereby following EPR. [1990-2020: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Karelians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Karelians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36556000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-2013: 0.001; 2014-2020: 0.0004]

**Regional concentration**

* Self-identified Karelians make up a mere 10 per cent of the Karelian Republic in the 1989 census, and the figures for later years are even lower. Minahan (2002: 927) reports a higher estimate, but even according to this, Karelians make up but 26% of the region and are scattered across the region. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Karelians are a Finnic people, and closely related to the Finns in Finland (Minahan 2002: 928). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Kazakhs

Activity: 1988-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In December 1986, there was a nationalist uprising in Alma-Ata (today: Almaty) when the long-standing leader of the Republic, ethnically Kazakh Kunaev, was forced to retire and replaced with Kolbin, a Russian with no prior connection to Kazakhstan. The subsequent crack-down on the demonstration cost dozens, if not hundreds, of lives (Olcott 1997: 451-452). We do not code a start to the movement in 1986, however, since no clear-cut autonomy demand was raised in the context of the demonstration.
* In 1988, Kazakh nationalist groups began to form, with some groups even advocating independence from the Soviet Union (Minahan 1998: 135). Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1988.
* In September 1989, Kolbin was replaced with Nazarbaev. Nazarbaev began to demand increased sovereignty, but he also was Gorbachev’s staunchest ally in keeping the Union together. In his address to the newly elected Parliament in April 1990, Nazarbaev spoke of a need for increased Kazakh self-finance and self-administration. However, due to close ties with Moscow, Kazakhstan did not issue a declaration of sovereignty until October 1990, more than four months after Russia had declared sovereignty. Kazakhstan withheld its declaration of independence until December 16, 1991, only 9 days before the official disintegration of the USSR. Kazakhstan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. [start date: 1988; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* It is fair to say that Nazarbaev was the most important player in the Kazakh self-determination movement; Kazakh nationalist groups were severely repressed under Nazarbaev (Olcott 1997: 554). Nazarbaev was Gorbachev’s staunchest ally in keeping the union together, defending Gorbachev’s plan to create “a strong center and strong republics”. Not even the August coup prompted Nazarbaev to demand independence. Rather he continued to support Gorbachev in his final attempt to hold the Union together. Nazarbaev accepted, rather than wanted, independence. Thus, we code an autonomy claim for 1988-1991 (Olcott 1997: 549, 555-556). [1988-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* According to Minahan (1998: 135): In 1988, Kazakh nationalist groups began to form, with some groups advocating independence from the Soviet Union. [start date: 1988; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kazakhs is the state of Kazakhstan. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Kazakhstan SSR declared sovereignty on October 25, 1990 (Olcott 1997: 555; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* Kazakhstan declared its independence on December 16, only 9 days before the Union was officially dissolved (Olcott 1997). By that time the union had already been effectively dissolved. Hence, we do not code this as a unilateral independence declaration.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* According to Olcott (1997: 551): “After the [October] Revolution, when the boundaries of the Kazakh republic were being drawn up, the northernmost part of the Steppe territory was attached to two Siberian oblasts, and the rest, plus most of the former *guberniias* of Syr Darya and Semirech’e, became an autonomous part of the Russian Federation (briefly as an autonomous oblast, then from 1924-1936 as an autonomous republic). Finally, in 1936, Kazakhstan was awarded full union republic status.” Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).
* Note that a nationalist uprising in the context of the appointment of an ethnic Russian as Kazakhstan’s governor provoked a bloody crackdown in Alma Ata (now: Almaty) in 1986. This is not considered a restriction (see codebook).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession. Note: since the concession was made in December 1988, it is likely that it was after the SDM’s start date. [1988: autonomy concession]
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, in Kazakhstan a new language law was adopted in August 1989. The new language law would make Kazakh the state language of the Republic, with immediate effect in regions where Kazakhs constitute 70 per cent or more and a delay until 2000 in regions where non-Kazakhs were in the majority (Olcott 1997: 553, 565). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. In some cases the Republican laws went far beyond what Gorbachev was willing to concede. Gorbachev sought to halt attempts at de-Russification, and guarantee (if not enhance) the privileged position of Russians and the Russian language in the Union. Gorbachev campaigned against the language laws of the Baltic Republics (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 127-128). [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Kazakhstan became independent on December 16. It was the last Republic to secede before the Union was dissolved on December 25. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Kazakhs, while a minority in the Kazakh SSR, still held many important posts in Kazakhstan; Nazarbaev, for instance, is an ethnic Kazakh. That Moscow parachuted an ethnic Russian to the Kazakh presidency in 1986 (Kolbin) was the exception rather than the rule. Thus, we code the Kazakhs as regionally autonomous. [1988-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kazakhs |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kazakhs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36512000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were approx. 8.1 million Kazakhs in the Soviet Union. Most (approx. 80%) resided in the Kazakh SSR, but the Kazakhs made up only 40% of the local population. Nevertheless, the threshold for spatial concentration is met. The majority of the Russian population (the largest minority) resided in the northern part of Kazakhstan. If one combines the six western and southern oblasts in which the Kazakhs formed an absolute majority (West Kazakhstan, Atyrau, Mangistau, Aktobe, Kyzylorda, and South Kazakhstan), adds two oblasts in which the Kazakhs formed a plurality (Zhambyl and Almaty) as well as the city of Almaty, where the Kazakhs formed a significant minority, we get a contiguous territory in which 4.319 million Kazakhs resided (53% of all Kazakhs), and where Kazakhs made up 52% of the local population (for the figures on which this estimates are based, see http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Report/pdf/2006\_04\_31\_ch3.pdf) [concentrated]

**Kin**

* MAR codes ethnic kin in China (>1 million Kazakhs), and EPR in both China and Mongolia (also due to Kazakhs in these countries). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Khakass

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

* The concessions/restrictions coding primarily refers to the Khakass AO/ Republic despite the fact that the Khakass make up only 11-12 per cent of the region's population (Fondahl 1997: 207; Minority Rights Group International). The Khakass are the titular nationality, which usually entails a certain degree of influence over the republican government. Moreover, the movement's claim relates to the Khakass ASSR/Republic, which provides further justification to code changes in the region's self-determination status as concessions/restrictions. Note: the coding also refers to the Shor territory that however lost its autonomous status in 1939 (see below). We found no changes in the Shor’s status after 1939 separate from the Khakass.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1989, Khakass intellectuals formed the Siberian Cultural Center, an organization that lobbied for increased national autonomy for the South Siberian peoples (Khakass, Shor, Altay), for improvements in language protection and protection from “degradation caused by industrialization” (Fondahl 1997: 207). According to Fondahl (1997: 207), “SSC [Siberian Cultural Center] membership spanned the political spectrum from radical separatists to more conservative “sovereignists”. Some dreamt of an independent South Siberia Turkic republic, reminiscent of the vision of Oirotia erlier in this century. Pragmatists pointed to basic demographic problems inherent in establishing such a republic – the indigenous peoples are now minorities throughout their homelands. A less radical component of this movement proposed establishing indigenous administration over an archipelago of rural areas which do still have an indigenous majority.” This is the earliest evidence of self-determination activity we found, thus 1989 is coded as start date.
  + Note: the Altai are coded separately while the Shor are coded together with the Khakass since they form a sub-group of the Khakass (Minahan 2002: 979).
* Another organization, Tun, was also formed in 1989 (Minahan 2002: 983) and began to make calls for an autonomous region for the Khakass within Khakassia (the Khakass are territorially concentrated but constitute only 11-12% of the local population, see Fondahl 1997: 207; Minority Rights Group International). According to Fondahl (1997: 207), “[Tun] also lobbied for a bicameral republican government, with at least half the seats in one of the two chambers, the Council of Nationalities, dedicated to Khakassy, and a prerequisite of Khakass nationality applied to the positions of prime minister, parliamentary chair, and minister of culture. Such platforms incurred the wrath of Russian and Cossack factions, who accused the association of separatist tendencies. While some of Tun’s radical members do espouse separation, the group as a whole has not, rather working to ensure avenues for Khakaass participation in the republic.”
* In August 1990 Kakassia declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated its status to that of a republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 207).
* In July 1991 Moscow indeed granted Khakassia republican status (Fondahl 1997: 207, 227; Orttung et al. 2000: 229). The Khakass movement quickly declined after 1991 and claims in subsequent years were primarily related to cultural (rather than territorial) autonomy (Gorenburg 2003: 195-196). Orttung et al. (2000: 231) also report that nationalist sentiment has not been a local factor since 1991. Based on this we code an end to the movement in 1991.
* Note: Minahan (2016:215) states that poor living standards in Khakassia generate support for nationalism and demands for real autonomy. We could not find evidence for renewed political organization, however. [start date: 1989; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* A number of claims have been put forward, ranging from autonomy within Khkassia to separation from Krasnoyarsk Krai (to which Khakassia belonged until 1991/1992) and possibly even independence (though agitation for independence was limited). Specifically, in 1989, Khakass intellectuals formed the Siberian Cultural Center, an organization that lobbied for increased national autonomy for the South Siberian peoples (Khakass, Shor, Altay), for improvements in language protection and protection from “degradation caused by industrialization” (Fondahl 1997: 207). According to Fondahl (1997: 207), “SSC [Siberian Cultural Center] membership spanned the political spectrum from radical separatists to more conservative “sovereignists”. Some dreamt of an independent South Siberia Turkic republic, reminiscent of the vision of Oirotia earlier in this century. Pragmatists pointed to basic demographic problems inherent in establishing such a republic – the indigenous peoples are now minorities throughout their homelands. A less radical component of this movement proposed establishing indigenous administration over an archipelago of rural areas which do still have a indigenous majority.” Another organization, Tun, was also formed in 1989 (Minahan 2002: 983) and began to make calls for an autonomous region for the Khakass within Khakassia (the Khakass are concentrated in some areas but constitute only 11-12% of the local population, see Fondahl 1997: 207; Minority Rights Group International). According to Fondahl (1997: 207), “[Tun] also lobbied for a bicameral republican government, with at least half the seats in one of the two chambers, the Council of Nationalities, dedicated to Khakassy, and a prerequisite of Khakass nationality applied to the positions of prime minister, parliamentary chair, and minister of culture. Such platforms incurred the wrath of Russian and Cossack factions, who accused the association of separatist tendencies. While some of Tun’s radical members do espouse separation, the group as a whole has not, rather working to ensure avenues for Khakass participation in the republic.” Overall, it appears that the claim for an autonomous region within Khakassia was dominant, at least in the initial years. Based on this, we code a claim for autonomy in 1989-1990. [1989-1990: autonomy claim]
* In August 1990 Kakassia declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated its status to that of a republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 207). Thus the sub-state secession claim in 1991. [1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* While there were some activists who “dreamt” of an independent state, agitation for independence was strictly limited (see above). We do not code an independence due to low political significance. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Khakass is the Republic of Khakassia in south-central Siberia, even though the traditional Khakass homeland does not cover this whole administrative unit (Minahan 2002: 979). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In August 1990 Kakassia declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated its status to that of a republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 207). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The union of the Khakass with Russia dates to the early 1600s (Fondahl 1997: 205). After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks established a Khakass entity; it was given national okrug status in 1925 and autonomous oblast status in 1930 (Fondahl 1997: 206). The Shor (which are included under the header of the Khakass as they form a Khakass sub-group of about 20,000, see Minahan 2002: 979) were also granted a national okrug in 1929, but in 1939 it was abolished and the land became part of the Kemerovo Oblast. Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. Slavic in-migration meant that the Khakass’ share in the local population decreased from 49% in 1926 to 12% in 1959 (Fondahl 1997: 194). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Liberalization under perestroika initiated a series of significant concessions. Shortly before the movement emerged, in December 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Khakassia at the time had the status of an autonomous oblast; hence it appears unaffected by the reform. We do not code a concession.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous oblasts and okrugs (like Khakassia at the time) were not granted this right. Note that the Khakassia achieved republican status in 1991 (see below). [1991: cultural rights concession]
* In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21; Fondahl 1997: 207, 227; Orttung et al. 2000: 229; Roeder 2007: 51). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Khakassia became independent of the Krasnoyarsk Krai. [1991: autonomy concession]
  + There is a second reason to code an autonomy concession in 1991. In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. Note: due to inter-ethnic deadlock, Khakassia only held its first elections in 1996 (Roeder 2007: 133).
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* Khakassia had the status of an Autonomous Oblast (under the administration of Krasnoyarsk Krai) until 1991, when it was upgraded to republican status. At least after Stalin, the autonomous entities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117), though it was limited, especially for the Siberian entities (Fondahl 1997: 200-203). Note, however, that the Khakass make up only 11-12 per cent of the region's population (Fondahl 1997: 207; Minority Rights Group International). The Khakass' actual influence over the regional government is thus somewhat cloudy, though it has to be noted that titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). In contrast, Fondahl (1997: 203) suggests that the influence of the Siberian peoples on their regional governments is limited. Noting the ambiguity, we still code the Khakass as regionally autonomous throughout (EPR does so, too). [1989-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In July 1991, the status of four autonomous oblasts (Adygea, Gorno Altai, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) was raised to that of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, the highest federal status in Russia. This brought the total number of ethnic republics in Russia to twenty (Ross 2002: 21; Fondahl 1997: 207, 227; Orttung et al. 2000: 229; Roeder 2007: 51). By this measure (fully implemented in March 1992), Khakassia became independent of the Krasnoyarsk Krai. Normally we would code the major change in 1992, but by this time the movement had ended. Thus, we code it in 1991. [1991: sub-state secession]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Khakass |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Khakass |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36557000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* The Khakasses’ homeland, the republic of Khakassia, lies in Siberia. The Khakass are greatly outnumbered by Russians within their homeland, and make up but 14% of the local population according to Minahan (2002: 979). From the map shown in Minahan, it appears that the Khakass primarily reside in the southern part. We checked census figures and found no indication that the Khakass would form an absolute majority in a larger area (i.e. across multiple districts), however. Minahan’s figures match roughly with census data, though the census figures suggest an even lower share of Khakass in the area. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Khants and Mansi

Activity: 1990-1997; 2008-2020

**General notes**

* The Khants and Mansi make up only a combined two per cent of their region. This makes it likely that their influence over their regional government is limited (usually titular nationalities have a privileged position within their homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170), but it is unclear whether this is true also for the Khants and Mansi, given the numerics – more detailed evidence could not be found). Nevertheless, the concessions/restrictions coding includes changes in the status of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug unilaterally declared itself independent from Tyumen Oblast in 1990 (Fondahl 1997: 228), hence the start date of the movement. Khanty-Mansi is extremely rich in natural resources. Separation would allow Khanty-Mansi to retain an increased share of the tax revenues.
* In 1993, the Yamalo-Nenets and the Khanti-Mansi pressed for a separate republic, encouraged by the Chukchi autonomous okrug’s separation from Magadan Oblast and the prospect of controlling the area’s oil resources (Minority Rights Group International). Aleksandr Filipenko, the region’s governor until 2010, ran on a platform of increased sovereignty for the Autonomous Okrug and separation from Tyumen Oblast in the 1996 gubernatorial election (Orttung et al. 2000: 237).
* Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug filed a complaint with the constitutional court against their subordination to Tyumen Oblast. In 1997 the court ruled against their pledge, reaffirming that all three had an equal status as federal subjects but that the two Autonomous Okrugs are subordinate to Tyumen Oblast. Subsequently Filipenko halted separatist activities (Orttung et al. 2000: 239), hence we code an end to the movement in 1997. [start date 1: 1990; end date 1: 1997]
* Roth (2015: 169) notes that the Khanti-Mansi have been pushing for more autonomy or a separate republic in recent years. Similarly, Minahan (2016: 440) states that the Khants and Mansis have mobilised around demands for a separate autonomous state and control over their land and resources since 2008. In the 2010s, traditional reindeers resisted land takeovers by Russia’s major oil companies and demanded greater self-determination rights (Borodyansky 2014; Dominique Samson 2021). [start date 2: 2008; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In the first phase, the dominant claim is for separation from Tyumen Oblast, as evidenced by the 1990 unilateral upgrade (Fondahl 1997: 228; Treisman 1997: 226) and the subsequent filing of a case against the subordination under Tyumen Oblast with the constitutional court (Orttung et al. 2000: 237). [1990-1997: sub-state secession claim]
* In the second phase, there are two competing claims: a sub-state secession claim that entails the separation of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug from Tyumen Oblast (Minahan 2016: 440); and the traditional reindeers’ claim for increased self-determination and autonomy within the existing autonomous district (Dominique Samson 2021). Based on the available information, it seems like the autonomy claim is dominant. [2008-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Khants and Mansi is the Khanty - Mansi Autonomous Okrug in northwestern Siberia (Minahan 2002: 1432). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug unilaterally declared itself independent from Tyumen Oblast in 1990 (Fondahl 1997: 228; Treisman 1997: 226). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Khants and Mansi came under Russian influence in the 16th century. The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug was established in 1930 (Minority Rights International Group), but nonetheless the Soviet authorities launched Russification policies (Minahan 2002: 1435). Slavic in-migration reduced the Khants and Mansis to a small minority within their own homeland. Shortly before the movement emerged, in December 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

2nd phase:

* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Khanty-Mansy never had a bilateral treaty.
* In 2000, Putin began his assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. As discussed elsewhere (e.g., Ingush), regional autonomy decreased as a result. [2000: autonomy restriction]
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). The evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (like Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug) were not granted this right.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). In Khanty-Mansi, Aleksandr Filipenko was appointed as governor in December 1991 (Orttung et al. 2000: 237). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). In Khanty-Mansi, Filipenko, the incumbent, was re-elected in 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000: 236). Given the temporary nature of moratoriums, this is not coded as a concession.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Ethntities oer than republics (like Khanty-Mansi) were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts like Khanty-Mansi) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). While the constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics, it gave Autonomous Okrugs rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), which implies an autonomy upgrade for Khanty-Mansi. Hence we code an autonomy concession in 1993. Note that given that Khanty-Mansi was subordinated to Tyumen Oblast, the upgrade led to an ambiguous situation (both now had equal rights) and conflict with Tyumen Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236). [1993: autonomy concession]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Khanty-Mansi did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug filed a complaint with the constitutional court against their subordination to Tyumen Oblast. In 1997 the court ruled against their pledge, reaffirming that all three had an equal status as federal subjects but that the two Autonomous Okrugs are subordinate to Tyumen Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 239). Since the ruling reaffirmed the status quo, we do not code a restriction.
* The 1996 law “On the Fundamentals of State Regulation of Socioeconomic Development of the North of the Russian Federation” allowed small-numbered Russian peoples to establish relatively autonomous and self-governing structures. For instance, the Evenks established traditional structures known as “obschinas”. 1999 and 2000 lawd strengthened these rights (Donahue 2003). This initiative applies only to so-called “small numbered peoples”, which includes (among others) the Chukchis, the Evenks, the Itelmens, the Khanty, the Komis, the Koryaks, the Mansi, the Nenets, the Shors. Key components have not been implemented (IWGIA; Minority Rights Group International), thus we do not code a concession.
* By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Direct elections of governors were scrapped in November 2014 (Kovalev 2014). Given the central initiation of this change, we code an autonomy restriction in 2013.
  + A second reason for us to code a restriction in 2013: A legislation adopted in 2013 excludes the “territories in traditional usage” of the native peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East from the list of “specially protected natural territories.” For the 525,000 hectares of the Numto Nature Park, this has meant the lifting of prohibitions on constructing industrial complexes, roads, oil and gas pipelines, electrical lines, agricultural farms, etc. The decision affects some three hundred permanent inhabitants, the majority of whom are Khanty from Kazym or Forest Nenets (Dominique Samson 2021). [2013: autonomy restriction]
* In 2017, a Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before ethnic regions were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017 cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Khanty-Mansi had the status of an Autonomous Okrug throughout. The Khants and Mansi make up a very small minority in the region (around a combined 2 per cent), rendering it likely that their influence over the regional government is limited (usually titular nationalities have a privileged position within their homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170), but this may not be the case for the Khants and Mansi, given the numerics). Nonetheless, in line with general practice we code the Khants and Mansis as autonomous. Note that the claim we have picked up (increased autonomy and separation from Tyumen Oblast) was also raised by local Russians than; the movement could thus be seen as relating to the region as a whole (which unambiguously has autonomy). [1990-1997, 2008-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Khants and Mansi |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Khants and Mansi are powerless. [1990-1997: powerless; 2008-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 1432) reports approximately 50,000 Khants and Mansi in 2002. This figure is considerably higher compared to census figures. According to the 1989 census, there were about 28,000 Khants and Mansi in the USSR (Olson et al. 1994: 755-756). Russia’s 2002 census counted about 29,000 Khants and Mansi (Minority Rights Group International). We draw on Minahan (we do the same e.g. in the case of the Chukots), though noting that this number may bee too high. According to the 1989 census the USSR had about 287 million inhabitants. In 2002, Russia had a population of about 145.2 million (2002 census). According to the 2010 national census, the number of Khants and Mansi did not change substantially, and there were 30,943 Khants and 12,269 Mansi in the Russian Federation (MRGI 2020). [1990-1991: 0.0002; 1992-2020: 0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Khants and Mansis settle in their homeland (>90% according to 2010 census), the Khanty and Mansi autonomous okrug. The okrug covers a large area in western Siberia, and is only sparsely populated. The Khants and Mansi make up only a combined two per cent of their region, while Russians make up approx. two thirds of the population, followed by Tatars and Ukrainians. According to Minahan (2002: 1432), the Khants and Mansis mostly live in the basin of the Ob river. We found no indication that the Khants and Mansi would dominate a larger area, however. The Khants and Mansis live scattered across a vast area (Minahan 2002: 1433). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Komi

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

* The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Komi ASSR/ Republic. The Komis make up less than 25 per cent of the region's population. But the Komi as the titular nationality appear to have a certain degree of influence over the republican government. Moreover, the movement's claim relates to the Komi ASSR/Republic, which provides further justification to code changes in the region's self-determination status as concessions/restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* An extraordinary session of the Komi Supreme Soviet in August 1990 adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty and declared that from now on the official name of the political unit would be Komi Soviet Socialist Republic. While this name change did not change the unit’s status, it was an indication that a step had been taken toward greater independence for the Komi Republic. More specifically, under the declaration of sovereignty the republic's mineral wealth, water resources, air space, flora and fauna, as well as cultural heritage were proclaimed its property and on the territory of the sovereign republic only its laws would have primacy. Since the declaration of sovereignty is the first evidence of organized self-determination agitation we found, we code 1990 as the start date of the movement.
* Several nationalist Komi organizations were formed in 1991, demanding local control of natural resources and increased fiscal autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1007).
* In addition to increased autonomy, the movement demands re-unification of the Komi Republic with the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (which was separated from the former in the late 1920s).
* The Komi People’s Congress continued to demand increased sovereignty and reunification with Komi-Permyansk during the 2000s (Curtis 1998; Frank & Wixman 1997; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002; MRGI).
* The movement remained active during the 2010s (Minahan 2016: 225). Since the autumn of 2018, waves of protests against the construction of a new landfill near the Shiyes train station transformed into demands for greater national autonomy. In 2019, a new organization, Doryam Asnymos (another nationalist organization with same name was active during the 1990s) was created. The movement demands greater autonomy over language policy and taxation (Pertsev 2019). [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The 1990 sovereignty declaration unilaterally raised the status of the Komi region to union republic status. Hence, we code a sub-state secession claim in 1990-1991. [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim]
* After Russia’s independence, nationalist organizations, which had emerged mainly in 1991, continued to demand increased control over natural resources and fiscal autonomy, as well as reunification with the Komi-Permyak region (Minahan 2002: 1007). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 156) report that extremists have also called for independence, but this does not appear to be the dominant claim. A new self-determination organization, Doryam Asnymos, emerged in the 2010s; it denies independence claims and demands greater taxation and language autonomy rights (Pertsev 2019). [1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Komi claims primarily relate to the Komi Republic, though at times nationalists also demanded the reunification of this region with the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug. The Komi-Permyaks are coded separately in SDM, so we associate this claim only with the Komi Republic. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In August 1990 the Komi ASSR proclaimed sovereignty. Among other things, the declaration unilaterally raised the administrative status to union republic, implying separation from Russia (Frank & Wixman 1997: 183; Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* What today constitutes the Komi Republic was incorporated into Russia in the 14th century. The Komi were awarded with autonomous oblast status in 1921, and upgraded to autonomous Soviet socialist republic status (the second-highest status within the Soviet matrioshka federal system) in 1936 (Minahan 2002: 1006; Minority Rights Group International). Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. Slavic in-migration reduced the Komi to a minority within their own ethnic homeland. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). At the same time, however, Russification continued in the smaller entities of the Volga region: “by the 1960s the Komi, Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts, Mordvinians, and Mari saw the virtual end of support by the state for their cultures” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 155). By the 1960s, the use of Komi, Komi-Permyak, Mari, Mordvinian, Udmurt, and Chuvash had been eliminated as a medium of instruction in the schools even within the respective ethnic homelands" (Frank & Wixman 1997: 160). Liberalization under perestroika initiated a couple of significant concessions, however. Shortly before the movement emerged, in December 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to union and autonomous republics (like Komi), including increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Komi), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. The Komi language subsequently attained official status at the regional level. We treat this as a prior concession because the law was adopted in April 1990 while the movement emerged only in August 1990. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action did not imply tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Yurii Spiridonov, the former first secretary of the regional branch of the Communist party, was elected president in 1994 (Orttung et al. 2000: 250). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics (including Komi) far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). The Komi Republic signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Moscow in 1996 (Minahan 2002: 1008; Minority Rights Group International; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* However, in June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). However, direct elections of governors in Karelia have not been scrapped and Artur Parfenchikov won the 2022 regional elections (Interfax 2022).
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Komi region had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. The Komi make up less than a quarter of the republic's population. Still the Komi as the titular nationality appear to have a certain degree of influence over the republican government, and the nationalist movement appears to support the republican government (Minahan 2002: 1008). The official Komi movement, Komi Voityr has the right to initiate legislation and influence regional government through official channels (Pertsev 2019). Hence, we code the Komi as regionally autonomous throughout. [1990-2020: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Komi |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Komi |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36537000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.001; 1992-2013: 0.002; 2014: 0.0017; 2015-2020: 0.0016]

**Regional concentration**

* The Komi’s homeland is the Komi republic in northwestern Russia. While > 85% of all Komis reside in the Komi republic, they make up only a minority, there: 24% of the population according to the 2010 census and 33% according to Minahan (2002: 1003). We browsed census data, finding that there is no alternatively defined territory that would fulfil the threshold. However, it has to be noted that there are several sparsely populated, rural areas where Komis dominate. According to the 2010 census, the Komis totaled 228,000 and formed absolute majorities in the following five districts of the Komi republic (Izhma district 89% out of 19,000, Ust-Kulom district 76% out of 27,000, Kortkeros district 67% out of 20,000, Sysolskiy district .64% out of 14,000, and Priluzskiy area 55% out of 21,000). Thus 32% of the Komis reside in districts where they form an absolute majority. Furthermore, they formed significant parts of Syktyvdinskiy district (46% out of 23,000), Udorsky district (44% out of 20,000), and Koygordodsky district (35% out of 8,000). Larger Komi concentrations can be found in Ust-Vym district 26% out of 29,000, Trinity-Pechora district 26% out of 14,000, Knyazhpogostsky district 17% out of 23,000, and Usynsk: 14% out of 47,000. In all other areas, the Komis make up a lower share. Taking the sum of all named areas, a small majority of the Komis resides there (52%), but the Komis make up but 45%. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Komi-Permyaks

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

* Most Komi-Permyaks live in what used to be the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, an autonomous ethnic entity sub-ordinated under Perm Oblast, established in 1925. In 2005 Komi-Permyak lost its autonomous status and became the Komi-Permyak Okrug. Subsequent changes in the status of Perm Krai are not coded concessions or restrictions, given that the Komi-Permyaks make up only a negligible share of the Krai’s population and that the Komi-Permyaks lost their status as “titular nationality.”

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to the World Directory of Minorities and Minahan (2002: 1508), in the late 1980s a local movement emerged advocating the unification of the Autonomous Okrug with the neighboring Komi Republic, and thus separation from the Perm oblast. We were unable to find more detailed information on the start date of the movement. Somewhat arbitrarily, we peg the start date at 1989.
* October 11, 1990, the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty and thereby unilaterally upgraded its administrative status (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226).
* In the early 1990s a number of nationalist organizations were formed, advocating increased regional control over natural resources, the upgrading of the (former) Autonomous Okrug to the status of a full republic. Others continued to advocate unification with the neighboring Komi Republic (Minahan 2002: 1508). Minahan (2002: 1508-1509) suggests that the movement was active at the time of his writing.
* December 1, 2005, the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug was downgraded and merged with Perm Oblast to form the Perm Krai, following a 2003 referendum. The merger led to the birth of a movement demanding the re-establishment of the autonomous status, which was ongoing as of 2020 (Goble 2009, 2012, MariUver 2012; MRGI). [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The movement that emerged in the late 1980s was associated with multiple demands: increased autonomy for the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug and a status upgrade (Minahan 2002: 1508), on the one hand, and separation from Perm and unification with the neighboring Komi Republic (Minahan 2002: 1508), on the other hand. Evidence was too scarce to decide which claim is dominant, hence we code the stronger claim, that is, the claim for separation from Perm Oblast. [1989-2005: claim for sub-state secession]
* The 2005 merger of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug gave way to a movement for the re-establishment of Komi-Permyak's autonomy (Goble 2009, 2012, MariUver 2012, MRGI). Since this would not imply outright separaton from Perm Krai, we code an autonomy claim for 2006 onwards in accordance with the first of January rule. [2006-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Komi-Permyaks is mainly the former Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, though nationalists have also demanded reunification with the Komi Republic. The Komis are coded separately in SDM, so we associate this claim only with the former Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug. Since 2005, the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug has been part of the Perm Krai. The districts that previously made up the autonomous Okrug are the Gaynsky District, Kochyovsky District, Kosinsky District, Kudymkarsky District, Yurlinsky District, and Yusvinsky District (Wikipedia). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* October 11, 1990, the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty, and thereby unilaterally upgraded its administrative status (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). We were unable to find out about the exact nature of the status increase; it could mean the unilateral declaration of ASSR status or even union republic status (implying separation from Perm Oblast, or even Russia), or only elevation to Autonomous Oblast status. Elevation to ASSR status seems most likely to us, implying that we should code a sub-state secession declaration since it implies separation from Perm Oblast. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Most Komi-Permyaks live in what used to be the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (in 2005 Komi-Permyak lost its autonomous status and became the Komi-Permyak Okrug), an autonomous ethnic entity sub-ordinated under Perm Oblast, established in 1925 (Minority Rights Group International). Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). At the same time, however, Russification continued in the smaller entities of the Volga region: “by the 1960s the Komi, Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts, Mordvinians, and Mari saw the virtual end of support by the state for their cultures” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 155). “By the 1960s, the use of Komi, Komi-Permyak, Mari, Mordvinian, Udmurt, and Chuvash was eliminated as a medium of instruction in the schools even within the respective ethnic homelands” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 160). Liberalization under perestroika initiated a couple of significant concessions, however. Shortly before the movement emerged, in December 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Komi-Permyak had the status of an autonomous okrug, and hence was unaffected by the reform. We do not code a concession.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (like Komi-Permyak) were not granted this right.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of the regions. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). In Komi-Permyak, Nikolai Poluyanov was appointed as governor in 1991 (Orttung et al. 2000: 259). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). The incumbent, Nikolai Poluyanov, was elected as Komi-Permyak's governor in November 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000: 259). Given the temporary nature of the moratorium, we do not code a concession due to this in line with the codebook.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs like Komi-Permyak and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). While the constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics, it gave Autonomous Okrugs (like Komi-Permyak) rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), implying increased autonomy. Hence we code an autonomy concession in 1993. [1993: autonomy concession]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Yeltsin signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty with Perm Oblast and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug in May 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000: 260; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* In the name of administrative simplification, Putin moved to abolish certain ethnic entities in the early 2000s, promising improved economic performance. The Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug was the first to be abolished in December 2005, following a 2003 referendum; Komi-Permyak was merged with Perm Oblast to form the Perm Krai (Minority Rights Group International; Goble 2009, 2012). There was strong political pressure to follow the official line. We code the autonomy restriction in 2003, the year of the referendum. [2003: autonomy restriction]
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). This is not coded since the loss of Komi-Permyak’s autonomy had already been decided at this point.

**Regional autonomy**

* Komi-Permyak had the status of an Autonomous Okrug until 2005, when it was integrated with Perm Oblast to form Perm Krai. [1989-2005: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug was abolished in December 2005 and merged with Perm Oblast to form the Perm Krai (Minority Rights Group International; Goble 2009, 2012). Since Komi-Permyak used to be an autonomy within a larger federal unit, this is coded as “Revocation of autonomy” in line with the codebook. [2005: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Komi-Permyaks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1/No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | Komi-Permyaks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36558000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR, the Komi-Permyaks are irrelevant from 2006 onwards. They do not have access to central state power. [1989-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.001]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Komi Permyaks reside in the Komi Permyak okrug in northeastern European Russia, 70% according to Minahan (2002: 1505) and 65% according to Russia’s 2002 census. The Komi Permyaks make up an absolute majority there, 74% according to Minahan, 59% according to the 2002 census. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Koryaks and Itelmen

Activity: 1990-2007

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1990, the Koryaks joined with other small northern nations to form the Association of Northern Minorities, a coalition of nationalist and cultural groups dedicated to reclaiming the northern people’s lands, cultures and languages. In October 1990, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty and unilaterally raised its administrative status. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990.
* In 1991 the local Soviet attempted to secede from Kamchatka Oblast, hoping to establish a Koryak republic within the Russian Federation.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1028) claims for increased autonomy continued throughout the 1990s. Indigenous rights ranked among the top priorities of Valentina Bronevich (herself an ethnic Itelmen), the region’s governor from 1996 to 2001 and vice-governor from 2005 to 2008 (Orttung et al. 2001: 264).
* In 2005, Koryakia voted in favour of a referendum to merge with Kamchatka Oblast to form Kamchatka Krai, implying the loss of Koryakia’s autonomy. In 2007, the merger was accomplished. No separatist claims were found after the merger and, on this basis, we code the movement as ended in 2007.
* In 2020, the governor of Kamchatka Krai proposed to merge the Koryakia district administration with one of the Krai’s ministries. The proposal sparked protests and threats to withdraw from Kamchatka Krai if the district administration is merged. However, the protesters did not demand greater autonomy (Vostok Today 2020). [start date: 1990; end date: 2007]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially the movement aspired to attain republican status, implying the separation from Kamchatka Oblast. The 1990 sovereignty declaration unilaterally raised Koryakia’s status to republican level. In 1991 (Orttung 2000: 264; 1993 according to Minahan 2002: 1028, but Minahan appears to have gotten the year wrong) the Koryak Soviet attempted to separate from Kamchatka Oblast. Koryakia later agreed to retain the Autonomous Okrug status (Fondahl 1997: 228), but claims for increased autonomy continued (Minahan 2002: 1028). No other claims were found. The sources we have consulted do not make it clear when the Koryaks and Itelmen abandoned their demand for sub-state secession. Since the 1991 attempt is the last clear-cut evidence for a claim for sub-state secession, we code a sub-state secession claim in 1990-1991, and an autonomy claim for 1992 onwards. [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2007: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Koryaks and Itelmen claimed the previous Koryak Autonomous Okrug, which today consists of the Koryak Okrug within the Kamchatka Krai in northeastern Siberia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* October 9, 1990, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty, and thereby unilaterally upgraded its administrative status to republican level (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Fondahl 1997: 228). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Koryaks, located in Russia’s Far East, were subdued by Tsarist Russia in the 17th/18th century. The Soviets took control of Koryakia in 1920, and subsequently outlawed their nomadic lifestyle. Collectivization followed, with the former nomads forced to work for the state and to settle in permanent villages. The traditional Shamanist religion was outlawed (Minahan 2002: 1026-1027). In 1931 the Koryak Autonomous Okrug was formed. The Second World War increased the number of Russians settling in the region substantially. In 1989 the Koryaks and Itelmen made up a combined 20 per cent of the Autonomous Okrug’s population only (Fondahl 1997: 194). Due to Slavic out-migration their share has increased to a combined 35 per cent by 2010. Despite their minority status we code changes in the Koryak Autonomous Okrug’s sovereignty as concessions/restrictions since i) the Koryaks are the titular nationality, and titular nationalities typically have at least a certain degree of influence over the regional government, and ii) because the movement's claim relates to the Koryak Autonomous Okrug.
* Shortly before the movement emerged, in December 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224); however, this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Koryakia had the status of an autonomous okrug, and hence was unaffected by the reform. We do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (like Koryakia) were not granted this right.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). In Koryakia, Sergei Leushkin was appointed as governor in 1991 (Orttung et al. 2000: 264). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). Valentina Bronevich was elected as governor in 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000: 264). Given the moratorium’s temporary nature, this is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). While the constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics, it gave Autonomous Okrugs rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), hence we code an autonomy concession in 1993. [1993: autonomy concession]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Koryakia did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The 1996 law “On the Fundamentals of State Regulation of Socioeconomic Development of the North of the Russian Federation” allowed small-numbered Russian peoples to establish relatively autonomous and self-governing structures. For instance, the Evenks established traditional structures known as “obschinas”. 1999 and 2000 lawd strengthened these rights (Donahue 2003). This initiative applies only to so-called “small numbered peoples”, which includes (among others) the Chukchis, the Evenks, the Itelmens, the Khanty, the Komis, the Koryaks, the Mansi, the Nenets, the Shors. Key components have not been implemented (IWGIA; Minority Rights Group International), thus we do not code a concession.
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Koryakia never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In the name of administrative simplification, Putin moved to abolish certain ethnic entities in the early 2000s, promising improved economic performance. Following a 2005 referendum, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug was merged with Kamchatka Oblast in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). The merger implies the loss of Koryakia’s autonomous status. Given the Koryaks’ minority status within their entity and the strong political pressure to follow the official line, we code this as a restriction. [2005: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Koryakia had the status of an Autonomous Okrug until 2007, when it was integrated with Kamchatka Oblast to form Kamchatka Krai. Koryaks and Itelmen, despite their minority status within Koryaka, appear to have had a certain influence over the region’s affairs. For instance, Valentina Bronevich, the region’s first directly elected governor, was an ethnic Itelmen (Orttung 2000: 264). Hence, we code the Koryaks and Itelmen as autonomous until (and including) 2007. [1990-2007: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Following a 2005 referendum, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug was merged with Kamchatka Oblast in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). The merger implies the loss of Koryakia’s autonomous status. Since Koryakia had had an autonomous status within a larger federal unit, this is coded as “Revocation of autonomy” in line with the codebook. [2007: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Koryaks and Itelmen |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Koryaks and Itelmens do not have access to central state power. [powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 1989 census, there were about 10,000 Koryaks and Itelmen in the USSR (8,500 Koryaks and 1,300 Itelmen; see Olson et al. 1994: 755), which in combination with the Soviet Union’s population in 1989 (about 287 million) yields a group size estimate of .0000348 for 1990-1991. Russia’s 2002 census counted about 12,000 Koryaks and Itelmen (8,800 Koryaks and 3,200 Itelmen; see Minority Rights Group International), which in combination with the total population (145.2 million according to 2002 census) yields a group size estimate of .0000826. [1990-1991: 0.00003; 1992-2007: 0.0001]
  + Note: With approx. 16,000, Minahan’s (2002: 1024) estimate is slightly higher. Due to rounding, the resulting group size would be the same, however, for the post-1991 phase.

**Regional concentration**

* A majority of the Koryaks and Itelmen lives in the Koryak okrug, 51% according to Minahan (2002: 1024) and 65% according to the 2002 census. They make up only 31% of the local population according to both Minahan and the 2002 census, however. We found no evidence for an alternatively defined territory that would cross the threshold for territorial concentration, though it has to be noted that we could not locate district level ethnicity data for all four districts. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1024), the Koryaks and Itelmen are ethnically related to Native American peoples. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Kuban Cossacks

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Kuban Cossacks are located Russia’s Kuban region, which encompasses the modern Krasnodar Krai, parts of Stavropol Krai, and the republics of Adygea and Karachai-Cherkessia.
* The Kuban Cossack movement is associated with multiple claims. Some Kuban Cossack nationalists demand the creation of a Kuban Cossack autonomous republic, while others demand outright independence or even the establishment of a pan-Cossack entity encompassing numerous historic Cossack lands (including the lands of branches other than the Kuban Cossacks). From Minahan (2002: 1039) it appears that the claim for the erection of an autonomous Kuban Cossack republic is dominant. The exact contours of such a republic are unclear. Minahan (2002: 1035-1040) suggests that the Kuban Cossacks lay claim on Krasnodar Krai, but the historic Kuban land encompasses not only the modern Krasnodar Krai, but also parts of Stavropol Krai, and the republics of Adygea and Karachai-Cherkessia. Since the Cossacks’ influence over Krasnodar Krai seems limited (Toje 2006: 1069), we do not code changes in the sovereignty of Krasnodar Krai as concessions/restrictions. The same applies analogously to other regions claimed by the movement.

**Movement start and end dates**

* After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1917 the Kuban Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state in the Kuban region, the Kuban People’s Republic. The self-proclaimed republic was defeated by the Red Army in 1920. Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland.
* Krasnodar Krai, at least partly coinciding with the historic Kuban Cossack homeland, was established in 1937 (Minahan 2002: 1039), but not as an ethnic homeland, hence the Kuban Cossacks do not have the status of a titular nation in Krasnodar Krai. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018).
* The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. Still, the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060). From the 1990s, Cossack organisations were established throughout Russia. The first national Cossack organization, the Union of Cossacks, was organized in 1990 (Skinner 1994: 1018). Initially, the Cossack national movement was focused on the recognition as a separate people, the reinstatement of Cossack military duties, and a cultural revitalization. But soon also claims for increased territorial self-determination were made. Some Kuban Cossack nationalists demanded the creation of a Kuban Cossack autonomous republic, while others demanded outright independence or even the establishment of a pan-Cossack entity encompassing numerous historic Cossack lands (including the lands of branches other than the Kuban Cossacks). The first evidence for separatist activity we found is in 1991, when a Cossack group proclaimed an autonomous middle-Kuban Cossack Republic (Minahan 2002: 1039), hence we peg the start date at 1991.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1040), the movement remained ongoing in subsequent years. While Toje (2006: 1058) notes that the Cossack movements’ level of mobilization faded in more recent years, there is evidence of continued activity, given that on July 3, 2010, Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks gathered to demand Cossack autonomy (Bugajski 2010: 40; Goble 2010). In 2019, Cuban Cossacks attempted to organise a car procession to bring attention to their demands on recognition of Cossacks as a separate nation (Gritsevich 2019). They also continued their demands for a separate entity (Tzaraga 2013). Hence, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020.
* Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks, in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if at all they were implemented (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543). In 1995, Krasnodar Krai adopted a flag similar to the traditional Cossack flag (Minahan 2002: 1040). In 1997, the governor of Krasnodar Krai set up a regional Kuban Cossack militia. [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Kuban Cossack movement is associated with multiple claims. Some Kuban Cossack nationalists demand the creation of a Kuban Cossack autonomous republic, while others demand outright independence or even the establishment of a pan-Cossack entity encompassing numerous historic Cossack lands (including the lands of branches other than the Kuban Cossacks). From Minahan (2002: 1039) and Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 149) it appears that the claim for the erection of an autonomous Kuban Cossack republic is dominant. Most likely such a republic would have to be carved out from existing territories (in particular Krasnodar Krai; see Ormrod 1997: 122); hence we code a claim for sub-state secession. [1991-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan (2002: 1039) suggests that some radical activists want an independent Kuban Cossack while even more radical nationalists aspire at a greater Cossack state including territories in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia. However, the account in Minahan suggests that the number of outright secessionists is strictly limited, while other sources including Roth (2015) or Hewitt & Cheetham (2000) do not reference any secession claims. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The main territory claimed by the Kuban Cossacks is the Kuban region in southern Russia. This consists of the modern Krasnodar Krai but also includes parts of Stavropol Krai, and the republics of Adygea and Karachai-Cherkessia. We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 174).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In December 1991 a Cossack group proclaimed an autonomous middle-Kuban Cossack Republic (Minahan 2002: 1039). We code a sub-state secession declaration in 1991 since Ormrod (1997: 122) suggests that a Kuban Cossack Republic would likely have to be carved out of existing regions. [1991: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence and thus classify the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Kuban Cossacks are located in Russia’s Kuban region, which encompasses the modern Krasnodar Krai, parts of Stavropol Krai, and the republics of Adygea and Karachai-Cherkessia. After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1917 the Kuban Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state in the Kuban region, the Kuban People’s Republic. The self-proclaimed republic was defeated by the Red Army in 1920. Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Krasnodar Krai, at least partly coinciding with the historic Kuban Cossack homeland, was established in 1937 (Minahan 2002: 1039), but not as an ethnic homeland, hence the Kuban Cossacks do not have the status of a titular nation in Krasnodar Krai. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 74).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if there was implementation at all (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543). We do not code a concession.
  + Note: There may have been some measures that could be coded, though we decided not to. In particular, in 1995, Krasnodar Krai adopted a flag similar to the traditional Cossack flag (Minahan 2002: 1040).
* In 1997, the governor of Krasnodar Krai set up a regional Kuban Cossack militia, but this is not a concession.
* In Krasnodar Krai, some Kuban Cossacks have managed to be included in the regional administrations, with Cossack leaders often holding the position of vice-chairman in the administration at local government, city, and regional levels. However, according to Toje (2006: 1069), “[i]t is not clear how much real influence is attached to these positions, but it serves the symbolic function of forging a connection between the Cossacks and the Krasnodar territory.” We do not code a concession.
* In 2012, Krasnodar Krai governor Alexander Tkachev called Cossack paramilitary units to control "illegal" immigrants from other North Caucasian republics to stop the decrease in the proportion of the republic's Russian population (Tzaraga 2013). Although the statement reflects the increased status of Kuban Cossacks in the region, it was rather symbolic and does not contribute to greater self-rule. We do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Contrary to many other groups in Russia, the Kuban Cossacks do not have their own autonomous homeland. Formed in 1937, Krasnodar Krai partly corresponds to the historic homeland of the Cossacks, but Krasnodar Krai is not an ethnic territory for the Kuban Cossacks. Moreover, the Kuban Cossacks appear to have limited influence over the regional government (Toje 2006: 1069). Hence, we do not code the Kuban Cossacks as regionally autonomous.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kuban Cossacks |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR the Cossacks (or rather: the various Cossack sub-groups) form part of the Russians, which are coded as senior partner in 1991 and dominant thereafter. Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk (which can be seen as part of extended European Russia, even though we code it as part of SE Asia)). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai). We found no evidence for Cossack representation in the national cabinet, though this requires more research. Note: key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). However, also under Yeltsin key government posts like the prime ministry were filled by European Russians (see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 304-305, 349, 407). [1991-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (one reason for this is that many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060). According to Russia’s 2002 census, there are a mere 140,000 Cossacks in Russia (including branches other than the Kuban Cossacks). Minority Rights Group International pegs the total number of Cossacks (including branches other than the Kuban Cossacks) at 1.5-2 million. We draw on Minahan, who reports a significantly higher number, but note that this decision is ambiguous.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1035) the Kuban Cossacks numbered approximately 1.73 million in 2002. We combine this figure with the Soviet Union’s 1989 census (total population of 287 millions) for 1991 and with Russia’s 2002 population (145.2 million according to 2002 census) for the remaining years. [1991: 0.006; 1992-2020: 0.0119]

**Regional concentration**

* Getting by reliable population data on Cossacks in Russia is difficult (see above). We rely on Minahan. According to Minahan (2002: 1035), the Kuban Cossacks do not make up a majority of their homeland in the northern Caucasus region. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Cossack communities also in Kazakhstan; estimated at approx. 300,000 (see the respective entry). We do not code Russians in other countries as ethnic kin because this is a movement by Cossacks, who typically see themselves also as Russians, against a Russian-dominated government. [1991: no kin; 1992-2020: kin in neighboring country]

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## Kumyks

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

* The Kumyks are a Turkic minority group located primarily in the lowlands along the coast of the Caspian Sea in the complex Dagestan republic. There has been a movement demanding increased self-determination for Dagestan as a whole, but at the same time several of Datestan’s ethnic groups have agitated for increased self-determination themselves. These are listed separately from the Dagestan movement.
* Dagestan comprises more than 30 ethnic groups. The largest include the Avars, the Dargins, the Kumyks, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans – and the Russians (Ormrod 1997: 117). Unlike other ethnic regions in Russia, Dagestan does not have a titular nationality. There is an ethnic power-sharing system in place in Dagestan, with the Republic’s chief executive body (at least in the 1990s and the early 2000s), the State Council, composed of representatives of different ethnic groups. No group is allowed more than one representative in the State Council (Ware & Kisriev 2001: 111). Yemelianova (2005: 613), Holland & O’Loughlin (2010: 299), and Cornell (2001: 270) note that – notwithstanding the consociational constitutional set-up in Dagestan – effective power has been confined to only two groups – the Dargins and the Avars – ever since 1991. However, the Kumyks appear to have had significant influence on regional politics, too. Roeder (2007: 105) notes that in addition to the Dargins and Avars, the Kumyks were often represented in republican leadership positions. Minority Rights Group International, too, notes that the Kumyks have significant regional influence. Still, the Kumyks’ regional influence is comparatively limited, and we therefore do not code changes in Dagestan’s level of autonomy as concessions or restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Kumyks organized a national movement called Tenglik (“Equality”) in November 1989 (Minahan 2002: 1046), hence the start date of the movement. At the first national congress of the Kumyk, held in November 1989, the Kumyk movement announced its aim of creating a Kumyk autonomous republic within a revamped Dagestan (Roeder 2007: 131; Minahan 2002: 1046). In 1990, the Kumyk movement repeated its claim, and Kumyk deputies in the regional Soviet called for increased sovereignty for Kumyk-dominated territories within Dagestan (Ormrod 1997: 118). Minahan (2002: 1046) suggest similar calls were made throughout 1991. Towards the mid-1990s, the Kumyk campaign for autonomy lost ground. But Minority Rights Group International (2020) notes that activists associated with the Tenglik movement have continued to advocate autonomy within the Dagestan Republic. Hence, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* At the first national congress of the Kumyk, held in November 1989, the Kumyk movement announced its aim of creating a Kumyk autonomous republic within a revamped Dagestan (Roeder 2007: 131; Minahan 2002: 1046). In 1990, the Kumyk movement repeated its claim, and Kumyk deputies in the regional Soviet called for increased sovereignty for Kumyk-dominated territories within Dagestan (Ormrod 1997: 118). Minahan (2002: 1046) suggest similar calls were made throughout 1991. Towards the mid-1990s, the Kumyk campaign for autonomy lost ground. But Minority Rights Group International notes that activists associated with the Tenglik movement have continued to advocate autonomy within the Dagestan Republic. In the 2010s, Kumyks continued their demands for greater autonomy (International Crisis Group 2012: 27; Roth 2015: 181; MRGI 2020). Since the Kumyks aimed for autonomy within Dagestan, and not separation from Dagestan, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1989-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kumyk lies in the northeastern Caucasus region and is called by the Kumyks “Kumykstan”. Kumykstan is composed of the following seven districts within the Dagestan Republic; Khasavyurt, Babayurt, Kizilyurt, Buinaksk, Karabudakhkent, Kaiakent, and Kaitak (Minahan 2002: 1042). A map can be found in Roth (2015: 174). We code this claim using GIS data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Dagestan’s 1991 sovereignty declaration is not coded since it called for sovereignty for Dagestan as a whole (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Ormrod 1997: 116), and because it was rejected by the Kumyk deputies (Minahan 2002: 1046).

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Dagestan has come under Russian control in the 19th century (Minahan 2002: 512). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions. The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98). After state-sponsored cultural development in the entities’ initial years, Stalin’s repression and Russification and the curtailment of national language education under Krushchev in the late 1950s harmed the cultural development. In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), by which union republics and autonomous republics (like Dagestan) gained autonomy (Gorbachev 1999: 99).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). There were hardly any tangible consequences as ASSRs such as Dagestan had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Dagestan), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently Aghul, Avar, Azerbaijani, Chechen, Dargwa, Kumyk, Lezgian, Lak, Nogai, Rutul, Tabasaran, and Tsakhur (as well as Russian) attained official language status. [1990: cultural rights concession]
  + Furthermore, in 1990 travel restrictions to Mecca were lifted (Minahan 2002: 513), which is not, however, a concession as defined in the codebook.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. In principle, the introduction of directly elected governors clearly constitutes an autonomy concession since the introduction of direct elections to the regional executive implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. However, whether or not it should be coded is ambiguous in the case of the Kumyks is ambiguous for two reasons. First, the Kumyks are only the third-largest group in Dagestan (Ormrod 1997: 117), and the presidency would have been likely to go to an Avar or a Dargin (the two larger groups). Second, Dagestan refused to introduce a directly elected president. Fearing the introduction of a presidential system would cause ethnic unrest, Dagestan instead opted for a parliamentary system, as confirmed thrice in referendums throughout the 1990s (Orttung et al. 2000: 111).
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the republics far-reaching autonomy; in particular, it gave the ethnic republics considerable control over their natural resources and increased sovereignty (Ross 2002: 23). The republics were also granted their own constitutions and were given the right to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries.
* From 1992 to 2003, fourteen mostly Kumyk villages were merged with Makhachkala, allegedly without residents’ consent (International Crisis Group 2012: 27). We do not code autonomy restriction because the territory remains within Dagestan.
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade for autonomous republics such as Dagestan. As noted above, we do not code changes in Dagestan’s level of autonomy because the Kumyks’ influence at the regional level was relatively limited.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Dagestan did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction for ASSRs such as Dagestan. As noted above, we do not code changes in Dagestan’s level of autonomy because the Kumyks’ influence at the regional level was relatively limited.
* Putin pressured Dagestan to abolish its parliamentary system in 2003 (Holland & O’Loughlin 2010: 300). The transition to a presidential system was implemented in 2006.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). As noted above, we do not code changes in Dagestan’s level of autonomy because the Kumyks’ influence at the regional level was relatively limited.
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012). Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). Dagestan was one of the first republics that scrapped regional elections in April 2013, two weeks after federal government’s legislation (RBC 2013).
* In 2017, a new Russia-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Dagestan comprises more than 30 ethnic groups. The largest include the Avars, the Dargins, the Kumyks, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans – and Russians (Ormrod 1997: 117). Unlike other ethnic regions in Russia, Dagestan does not have a titular nationality. There is an ethnic power-sharing system in place in Dagestan, with the Republic’s chief executive body (at least in the 1990s and the early 2000s), the State Council, composed of representatives of different ethnic groups. No group is allowed more than one representative in the State Council (Ware & Kisriev 2001: 111). Notably, Dagestan clinged on to its parliamentary system (confirmed three times in referendums) until 2006, arguing that a presidential system would be detrimental to stability, despite federal pressure (Orttung et al. 2000: 111). According to Yemelianova (2005: 613), Holland & O’Loughlin (2010: 299), and Cornell (2001: 270), notwithstanding the consociational constitutional set-up in Dagestan, effective power has been confined to only two groups – the Dargins and the Avars – ever since 1991. Roeder (2007: 105) notes that in addition to the Dargins and Avars, the Kumyks were often represented in republican leadership positions. Minority Rights Group International, too, notes that the Kumyks have significant regional influence. Still, the Kumyks’ influence appears comparatively limited; therefore, we do not code regional autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kumyks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kumyks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36534000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.001; 1992-2013: 0.003; 2014-2020: 0.0037]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1042), the Kumyks cannot be spatially concentrated: While approx. 75% of all Kumyks live in their homeland eastern Dagestan, they make up but 48%. We corroborated Minahan’s estimate drawing on data from the Russian 2010 census. According to the Russian 2010 census, there were 503,000 Kumyks in Russia, the vast majority in Dagestan. We found that the Kumyks make up an absolute majority in four adjacent districts, but only 27% of the Kumyks reside there. They make up a plurality in another district, but if this is added still only 31% of all Kumyks reside in the area. There are a number of additional adjacent districts in which Kumyks form a significant minority, but as soon as those are added, the Kumyks no longer make up an absolute majority in the territory. Below detailed figures from the census. According to Roth (2015: 181) Kumyks are rather dispersed. [not concentrated]
  + Absolute majority
    - Karabudakhkent district: 47 393 (65%)
    - Buynaksk district: 44 861 (61%)
    - Kayakentsky district: 28 357 (52%)
    - Kumtorkalinsky district: 16 647 (67%)
  + Plurality
    - Babayurtovsky district: 22 067 (48%)
  + Minority
    - Buynaksk: 19 247 (31%)
    - Khasavyurt district: 43 321 (31%)
    - Khasavyurt: 36 883 (28%)
    - Kaspiysk: 9 697 (10%)
    - Izberbash: 8 424 (15%)
    - Kizilyurtovsky district: 6 469 (10%)
    - Makhachkala: 133 592 (15%)

**Kin**

* There are no Kumyk communities >100,000 outside of Russia (see Minahan 2002: 1042). MAR and EPR also code no kin. [no kin]

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## Kyrgyz

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the summer of 1989, Ashar was formed, becoming the first independent association in Kyrgyzstan. Ashar mobilized around housing and land matters. Soon after other groups emerged, many of which were openly nationalist. We code 1989 as the start date of the movement. In May 1990, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, an umbrella group for various pro-democracy and pro-independence movements, was founded. Kyrgyzstan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement (Banks et al. 1997; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Huskey 1997; Minahan 1998). [start date: 1989; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Huskey (1997: 661), the Democratic Movement Kyrgyzstan, an umbrella grouping of several nationalist organizations that was formed in 1990, advocated increased sovereignty, meaning increased Kyrgyz self-government and autonomy. We found no evidence on the exact nature of the claim made by the smaller organizations that had emerged in 1989, and thus apply the autonomy code to 1989 as well. Also, we found no evidence that the Democratic Movement would have espoused outright independence before 1991, and thus extend the autonomy claim to 1991. [1989-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1991; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kyrgyz is today’s Kyrgyzstan. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* December 10, 1990, the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet issues a declaration of sovereignty (Huskey 1997: 678; according to Kahn 2000: 60 the declaration was adopted October 28, 1990). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* After the August Coup, on August 31, 1991, the Kyrgyz Supreme issues a declaration of independence (Huskey 1997: 678). This is not coded since by then, the Soviet Union was effectively defunct and this cannot thus be considered a unilateral declaration.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1924 the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast was created as part of the RSFSR, only to be transformed into an ASSR in 1926. In 1936 the Kyrgyz homeland gained the status of a separate Union Republic. Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). We code a prior concession for several reasons. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). Finally, in 1988 the Supreme Soviet introduced multi-candidate, contested elections at all levels of the Union, which can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are de-facto appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Kyrgyzstan) and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk Oblast were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. Note: it is not clear when this concession was made exactly; the movement emerged in the second half of 1989, hence chances are the concession was before the movement’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. [1990: cultural rights concession]
  + Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, in Kyrgyzstan a new language law was adopted in September 1989, which made Kyrgyz the state language and Russian the language of interethnic communication. The requirement to speak Kyrgyz is extended to all management and professional personnel (Huskey 1997: 677). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Kyrgyzstan became independent in late 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Thus, we code the Kyrgyz as regionally autonomous. [1989-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kyrgyz |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Kirghis |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36522000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.005]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were 2.5 million Kirgizin the Soviet Union. 2.3 million (>90%) resided in the Kirgiz SSR, where they made up 52% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to MAR and EPR, the Kyrgyz had ethnic kin in China (Kyrgyz). Ethnologue puts the number of Kyrgyz in China at 160,000. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Kyrgyz Uzbeks

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1989, Kyrgyz Uzbeks first demanded local autonomy from Moscow and some pressed for annexation of the Uzbek populated area in Kyrgyzstan by neighboring Uzbekistan. Such demands were raised, in particular, in the context of the Osh riots in 1990.
* The movement appears to have faded soon after the 1990 riots. Minorities at Risk notes that demands for union with Uzbekistan or territorial autonomy have not been heard recently, and that demands have shifted to civil rights and greater Uzbek representation in the government. Writing in 2007, Fumagalli notes that Uzbeks are wary of any move that might be interpreted from part of the Kyrgyz elites as separatist or autonomist, and that even radical representatives of the Uzbek ethnic movement gradually moderated their demands. Furthermore, Fumagalli (2007: 583) reports that in interviews conducted in 2003 and 2005, the number of Uzbeks advocating autonomy is practically zero.
* However, note that part of the Kyrgyz elite continues to accuse the Uzbeks of separatist agitation. In particular, the mayor of Osh explained the riots in Osh in 2010 as a reaction to a secessionist coup attempt by ethnic Uzbeks. According to the International Crisis Group (2012: 7), this assertion should be dismissed since the Uzbeks are no longer demanding autonomy.
* Since we lack a clear date when the self-determination claim was abandoned, we continue to code the movement in independent Kyrgyzstan, and peg the end of the movement in 2000, following the 10-year rule. [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* Adalat, the major organization linked with the Uzbek movement, aimed at local autonomy for the Osh province and eventual integration with Uzbekistan (MAR; Fumagalli 2007: 572; Melvin 2001: 180 only notes an autonomy claim). We were not able to establish which claim is dominant. Since outright separation from the Kyrgyz SSR is a more extreme claim, we code a claim for sub-state secession. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Kyrgyz Uzbeks is the Osh region, which has traditionally been predominantly populated by Uzbeks (Rezvani 2013: 67; Fumagalli 2007). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The 1990 Osh riots led to 300-600 deaths (official estimates) or 1,000 deaths (unofficial estimates). The 1990 Osh riots are nonetheless not coded since this was an incident of inter-ethnic strife involving the local Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Beginning in 1730, Central Asia was gradually incorporated into Russia. Confronted with a pan-Turkic nationalist movement, the Soviets introduced the policy of national delimitation, that is, the division of Central Asia into distinctive administrative units, designed to serve as national homelands for their titular populations (Melvin 2001: 167-169). National delimitation was completed with the elevation of the five Central Asian territories to full Republic status in 1936. For the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, this implied a restriction in their SD status. According to Fumagalli (2007: 571): “While Uzbeks occupied a privileged position in Soviet Uzbekistan, they played a secondary role in the life of the neighbouring republics. Because they already enjoyed titular status in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), Kyrgyzstan's Uzbeks, or in fact all Uzbeks outside the Uzbek SSR, were not granted territorial autonomy.” Moreover, “[following the principles of Soviet ethno-federalism, non-titular groups (co-ethnics living outside their alleged homeland) were not endowed with any form of special protection. This meant that, for example, while Uzbeks living outside the Uzbek SSR would enjoy cultural rights as individuals, they would not be granted the series of privileges that titular groups typically enjoyed (e.g. territorial autonomy, language protection).”
* Note that in 1988 multi-candidate, contested elections were introduced throughout the Union, at all levels. This can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are de-facto appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). However, this had limited consequences for the Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz SSR as they did not control an autonomous region; hence we do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In September 1989 a new language law was adopted in Kyrgyzstan which made Kyrgyz the state language and Russian the language of interethnic communication. The requirement to speak Kyrgyz was extended to all management and professional personnel (Huskey 1997: 677). The requirement to speak Kyrgyz can be seen as a decrease in the protection of the Uzbek language, at least relative to the Kyrgyz language, which was elevated to a pre-eminent status in Kyrgyzstan. Note: it is not clear whether this restriction occurred before or after the movement’s start date; it is coded as post-emergence because it was adopted in September, which makes this more likely than not. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* According to Huskey (1997: 677), in May 1990 “[a] housing lobby organization in Osh is granted several hectares of land belonging to an Uzbek-dominated collective farm. Local Uzbeks respond by calling for autonomy for the region and adoption of Uzbek as the official language.” This seems difficult to reconcile with self-determination as we define it, and moreoever too limited to be coded as an autonomy restriction. Furthermore, in the context of the Osh riots a state of emergency and a curfew were introduced in Osh, and the border between Uzbekistan and Kirghizia was closed to traffic (MAR). The state of emergency, while an indication of repression, appears not to have directly affected the autonomy status of Uzbeks, which was zero anyway, and is not coded either.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan cannot be considered regionally autonomous (Fumagalli 2007: 571).

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Kyrgyzstan became independent in 1991. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kyrgyz Uzbeks |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Uzbeks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36505000 |

**Power access**

* The Uzbeks, including those in Kyrgyzstan, were powerless (see EPR). [1989-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 1989 census, there were around 550,000 Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan (Huskey 1997: 659). The 1989 census put the Soviet Union’s total population at approximately 287 millions. [0.0019]

**Regional concentration**

* According to MRGI, the Kyrgyz Uzbeks “are concentrated mainly in the south and western parts of the country, especially the Ferghana valley and the three administrative provinces of Batken, Osh, and Jalal-Abad.” According to MAR, in 1990 > 75% of all Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan resided in that area (see gc7). According to MRGI, the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan make up a majority in one province, Osh, but census data suggests otherwise: according to the 2009 census, only 28% of Osh’s population (approx. 1 million) was Uzbek. The figures for the two other regions are: Batken: 15% out of 430,000, Jalal-Abad: 24.8% out of 940,000. Overall, according to the 2009 census, 75% of all 768,000 Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan resided in the three named provinces, but they clearly made up less than 50% of the population.
  + Note: Jalal-Abad was newly created in 1990 and Batken in 1999. Both were split from Osh province, thus earlier figures suggest that the share of the Uzbeks residing in the Osh region is much higher (approx. 60% in the 1990s compared to approx. 36% in the 2009 census).
* This is confirmed by Zokirov (2011: 247): “The proportion of Kyrgyz in Osh province rose from 56.7% in 1989 to 63.8% percent [in 2006], with the percentage of Uzbeks remaining unchanged.” Furthermore: “In Jalalabad province, the percent of Kyrgyz grew from 60.9 percent to 70 percent during this period.”
* Data reported in an OSCE report also points in the same direction. Throughout 1991-2004, the Uzbeks formed a minority within Osh province.
* Finally, we checked district level data from the 2009 census. We found that Uzbeks form a majority in but one district, Aravan district in Osh oblast (59% out of 106,000). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR, there is numerically significant kin in Afghanistan. Afghanistan bordered the former USSR. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Latvians

Activity: 1945-1953; 1986-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Latvia had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic was established on July 21, 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, Latvia was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Latvian SSR was re-established (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 168). This prompted a resistance campaign by the Forest Brothers (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). We begin to code the movement in 1945, the earliest possible date in our data set, but note prior violent activity. As this is also the first evidence for organized separatist activity we found, 1944 is coded as start date.
* In Latvia, there were around 40,000 partisans fighting against the USSR to end the occupation. The Latvian resistance was significantly weaker than the Lithuanian resistance, and by the end of 1946, USSR soldiers had regained control of Latvian territory. The war petered out by 1947 based on UCDP/PRIO. The Latvian movement was militarily weaker from the beginning of the war. Statiev attributes this to the Latvians’ belief that they would be unable to achieve independence, which therefore translated to lesser support for the resistance. By the end of 1945, when Latvians realized there would be no foreign support for their movement, “they lost interest in the insurgency” so “[t]he government firmly controlled most of the Latvian countryside even in 1945” (Statiev 2010: 115). In late 1945, Latvian rebel groups attempted to merge and form a larger movement, “but the police destroyed their general headquarters in 1945-1946, killing and arresting their top leaders…” (Statiev 2010: 115). By the end of the war in 1947, the government had clearly overpowered the rebels. There was no peace agreement or ceasefire. Still resistance appears to have continued, though at very low intensity. By the early 1950s the movement was defeated, and most of the remaining fighters gave up when offered an amnesty after Stalin’s death in 1953 (see Senn 1997: 355). Hence, we code an end to this first phase in 1953. [start date 1: 1944; end date 1: 1953]
* The movement re-erupted with Perestroika and Glasnost. The first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is the forming of Helsinki ’86 in 1986. The organization called for an end to Russification and the restoration of Latvian independence. In 1988, diverse groupings coalesced into a Popular Front that sought to support Perestroika and decentralization of authority from Moscow (Muiznieks 1997). Latvia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. [start date 2: 1986; end date 2: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* 1945-1953: the Latvian movement should be associated with the ‘Forest Borthers’, partisans resisting Soviet rule and the annexation of the Baltic Republics and Ukraine (Minahan 1998; 168). Hence, we code an independence claim. [1945-1953: independence claim]
* 1986-1987: the severely repressed Helsinki ’86, it appears, was the only self-determination organization in Latvia at the time; Helsinki ’86 explicitly called for the restoration of Latvia’s independence (Muiznieks 1997: 382-384). [1986-1988: independence claim]
* In 1988, the Latvian self-determination movement grew considerably and diverse groupings coalesced into a Popular Front that sought to support Perestroika and decentralization of authority from Moscow (Muiznieks 1997: 376, 385). Since the program of the Popular Front explicitly mentions sovereignty (meaning autonomy in the Soviet context) as its official aim, we code an autonomy claim beginning in 1989, following the first of January rule. Soon after, the movement radicalized its demand towards the restoration of Latvian independence. In May 1989, independence became the Front’s explicit goal (Muiznieks 1997: 376, 389). Following the first of January rule, we code an independence claim for 1990-1991. [1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. Note: Helsinki ’86 remained active throughout 1986-1991 and, therefore, the independence claim is maintained throughout 1986 even if autonomy was the dominant claim in some of those years. [start date 1: 1944; end date 1: 1953] [start date 2: 1986; end date 2: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Latvian claims for independence concerned the current state of Latvia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Latvia declared sovereignty on July 29, 1989 (Kahn 2000: 60). [1989: autonomy declaration]
* Latvia’s newly elected Supreme Soviet voted for the restoration of Latvia’s independence on May 4, 1990, though making the declaration conditional on a transitional period of indeterminate length in light of Gorbachev’s fierce response to Lithuania’s independence declaration (Moscow installed an economic blockade of Lithuania). We consider this an independence declaration notwithstanding the ambiguous notion of a transitional period. [1990: independence declaration]
* Independence was declared again (this time unconditional) during the August coup (Muiznieks 1997: 390-391). This is not coded since by that time, the Soviet Union was essentially defunct and the declaration not really unilateral in the sense employed here.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 1945-1947 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), although we note prior violence in 1944: the war began in 1944 around the same time as the Lithuanian insurgency. Casualty estimates for this partisan war range in the thousands. 1948-1953 and 1986-1991 are coded as NVIOLSD. [Pre-1945-1947: HVIOLSD; 1948-1953: NVIOLSD; 1986-1991: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Latvia had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic was established on July 21, 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, Latvia was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Latvian SSR was re-established. After both Soviet occupations, mass deportations occurred (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 168). [1940, 1944: independence restriction]
* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Between 1945 and 1952 there was little movement in the autonomy of union republics. A reform introduced in 1944 would have allowed the union republics to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states and have their own military formations. However, this reform had little effect, and if anything, there was a trend to even more centralization (Towster 1952).
* After Stalin’s death in 1953, the center’s control loosened and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). We found no exact date, but code a concession in 1953 to reflect the upward trend in autonomy. [1953: autonomy concession]
* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession. [1988: autonomy concession]
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems.” Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics. It is important to note that initially, Gorbachev saw the Baltic states as the ‘agents of perestroika’, and was thus willing to offer concessions (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 174). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. [1990: cultural rights concession]
  + Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, in September 1988, Latvia’s Supreme Soviet declared Latvian the state language and legalized the independence-era flag. Subsequently, on May 5, 1989, a law is adopted which makes Latvian the official language (Minahan 1998: 158; Muiznieks 1997: 199). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. In some cases the Republican laws went far beyond what Gorbachev was willing to concede. Gorbachev sought to halt attempts at de-Russification, and guarantee (if not enhance) the privileged position of Russians and the Russian language in the Union. Gorbachev campaigned against the language laws of the Baltic Republics (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 127-128).
* Gorbachev’s inability to halt the disintegration of the Union became ever clearer by the end of 1990, after the largely unsuccessful blockade of Lithuania in the spring. Reactionary forces gained ground, and in the fall of 1990, Latvia was singled out for a series of further provocations. First, several Baltic national monuments were blown up (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 148). By December 1990, conservative forces in Moscow threatened to overthrow the Baltic governments. The Soviet army started patrolling the streets, allegedly to help in the fight against the rising wave of violent crime (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 149). In December 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, warning of ‘a coming dictatorship’. Soviet paratroopers moved into Lithuania in January 1991, and occupied government buildings. For the next seven months, Lithuania was effectively occupied by Soviet troops who controlled the streets and supported the Communist Party; moreover, a few days later Soviet special forces (‘black berets’) attempted to storm Latvia’s Ministry of the Interior; five people were killed. This was part of a broader strategy to intimidate the independence-minded Latvian government and people (Karklins 1994: 29, 106-107, 130; Muiznieks 1997: 390; Suny 1993: 148). The mentioned measures are probably best seen as a government crack-down and one-sided violence, and are hence not coded.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* The independence of the Baltic states was officially recognized by Russia on August 24, and by the Soviet Union on September 6 (Brown 1996: 303). [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. Yet, autonomy was very limited in the Baltics, where large numbers of people were displaced (EPR). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). [1945-1953: no autonomy; 1986-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Independence in 1991 (Minahan 1998). [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Latvians |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Latvians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36521000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code 1945. We apply the 1946 discriminated code (that is due to the 1944 annexation and subsequent mass deportations) also to 1945. [1945-1953: discriminated; 1986-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.006]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were 1.4 million Latvians the Soviet Union. Almost all (96%) resided in the Latvian SSR, where they made up 58% of the local population. The share had been higher in the 1940s/1950s. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR/MAR. [no kin]

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## Lezgins

Activity: 1990-2011

**General notes**

* The Lezgins are located in the North Caucasus, with significant populations in Russia’s Dagestan Republic and adjacing Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1084). The Lezgin do not have titular status in any of the regions, and they do not have significant power in Russia’s Dagestan, where the Avars and Dargins (Ware & Kisriev 2011: 111; Yemelianova 2005: 613; Cornell 2001: 270) along with the Kumyks (Roeder 2007: 105; Minority Rights Group International) effectively control the regional government. Since the Lezgins do not have significant influence over any of the existing regions, we do not code changes in the sovereignty of any of the existing regions as concessions/restrictions.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union, the Lezgin national council – Savdal (Unity) – began to demand the creation of a Lezgin homeland within Russia (Roeder 2007: 131). According to Minahan (2002: 1088), Savdal was founded in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. On September 28, 1991, the third national council proclaimed a Lezgin republic within the Russian Federation (Roeder 2007: 131).
* In December 1991, a Lezgin congress called for the creation of a “national-state formation, Lezgistan”, which would unite the Lezgin populations and territories (Ormrod 1997: 118). This, most likely, implies that less than full independence would be acceptable.
* Lezgin separatist activity continued in the post-Soviet period period (also see Lezgins under Azerbaijan). The Lezgins began to protest what they consider an arbitrary boundary resulting from the Soviet Union’s collapse. Since the division of territories, the Lezgins have been unable to continue their traditional lifestyles. The Lezgins are herders who have spent centuries grazing their flock on Dagestani land and remaining on the Azerbaijani land during the winter. Grazing activity has decreased drastically as a result of the new international boundary. Similarly, burial grounds are located in Azerbaijan, and water-sharing traditions between the Lezghis have ended as a result of the formal split.
* In 1993, more than 10,000 protested near the Azeri-Dagestani border to demand the unification of the Lezgin people (Ormrod 1997: 135). In 1996, the Lezgin movement sent a letter to the Russian and the Azeri governments, calling for the unification of their nation (Minahan 2002: 1089).
* According to Minority Rights Group International and Minorities at Risk, the Lezgin’s movement split into two in 1998. The radical faction continued to demand the creation of an independent Lezgistan, to which the Lezgin-populated regions in Northern Azerbaijan should also be annexed. The more moderate wing instead advocated an autonomous status within Dagestan (note that Minahan (2002: 1089) in contrast argues that the more radical wing aimed for a separate republic within the Russian Federation). In 2004, the demand for the unification of the Lezgin people in a state was repeated, according to Minorities at Risk.
* Although Sadval’s activities were much less visible during the 2000s, it seems like the movement maintained its territorial claims up until 2011 (BBC Monitoring 2011). The movement became more active in 2012 after the Russia-Azerbaijan border agreement, which had transferred two Lezgin villages (Khrakh-uba and Uryan–Uba) to Azerbaijan in 2011. From 2012 onwards, Sadval did not voice territorial demands, however, and mainly focused on socio-economic issues (International Crisis Group 2012: 28; Kavkazsky Uzel 2015; 2021). Sadval’s leaders, Ruslan Magomedragimov and Nazim Hajiyev, were murdered in 2015 and 2016 respectively (Kavkazsky Uzel 2021).
* In the 2010s the Federal Lezgin National-Cultural Autonomy (FLNCA) became the leading Lezgin representative. The FLNCA maintains close contact with state authorities, regularly organizes hearings, academic conferences, and backs protests in Moscow and the North Caucasus in support of the Lezgin enclave (International Crisis Group 2012: 28). FLNCA tried to prevent the 2011 Russia-Azerbaijan border agreement and demanded greater autonomy for Lezgins in Azerbaijan (Kerimov 2012, 2017). In this regard, Roth (2015: 182) notes that Moscow welcomes Lezgin nationalism to weaken Azerbaijan. However, there is no evidence that FLNCA voiced demands for more territorial autonomy within Russia.
* Overall, Sadval appears to have made territorial demands until 2011 and we found no evidence for separatist claims thereafter. We therefore code the movement as ended in 2011. [start date: 1990; end date: 2011]

**Dominant claim**

* The Lezgin’s claim is unambiguous prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. All sources consulted point to a claim for sub-state secession. Shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union, the Lezgin national council – called Savdal (Unity) – began to demand the creation of a Lezgin homeland within Russia (Roeder 2007: 131). On September 28, 1991, the third national council proclaimed a Lezgin republic within the Russian Federation (Roeder 2007: 131). This appears to imply that less than full independence would be acceptable. [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim]
* In December 1991, a Lezgin congress called for the creation of a “national-state formation, Lezgistan”, which would unite the Lezgin populations and territories (Ormrod 1997: 118). Furthermore, according to Radio Free Europe (2014), Sadval began to campaign for an independent Lezgistan soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union (also see Roth 2015: 181f). Following infights, Sadval renounced the independence claim in 1996 (Radio Free Europe 2014). However, radicals continued to make claims for independence (see e.g. Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 174). In 1998, the movement split into a radical and a moderate faction (Radio Free Europe 2014; MAR; Minority Rights Group International). The radical faction continued to demand the creation of an independent Lezgistan, to which the Lezgin-populated regions in Northern Azerbaijan should also be annexed. The more moderate wing instead advocated an autonomous status within Dagestan. What claim is dominant is not clear.
  + Note: In contrast to this, Minahan (2002: 1089) argues that the more radical wing aimed for a separate republic within the Russian Federation, but most sources suggest that radicals demanded independence.
* In 2004, the demand for the unification of the Lezgin people in a state was repeated, according to Minorities at Risk. Demands for autonomy as well as independence were apparently repeated in later years, too (BBC Monitoring 2011). In sum, there were claims for both independence and autonomy. Since it is not clear which is dominant we code the more radical claim throughout. [1992-2011: independence claim]
* Radio Free Europe (2014) cites an Azeri newspaper article according to which (the moderate wing of ) Sadval changed its ultimate goal to the merger of Russian Lezgistan with Azerbaijan and the creation of an autonomous region for all Lezgins within Azerbaijan. The Azeri article cites a single (unididentified) source from the ranks of Sadval, thus the report seems not very credible.

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1991; end date: 2011]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Lezgin territorial claims initially included all of the Kurakh, Kasumkent, Magaramkent, Akhty, Derbent, and Dokuzpara rayons of Dagestan in today’s Russian Federation, as well as the Kuba, Khachmaz, and Qusar (Guzar) Rayons of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1088f). Following Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, we include only the regions within the Russian Federation, in keeping with the SDM dataset’s coding rules on cross-border claims. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On September 28, 1991, the third national council proclaimed a Lezgin republic within the Russian Federation, implying separation from Dagestan (Roeder 2007: 131). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There has been no violence associated with the Lezgin movement. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Russians took control of the Lezgin homeland in the early 18th century (Minahan 2002: 1086). In Russia, the Lezgins suffered from Russification policies and religious discrimination (Minahan 2002: 1087-1088). Similarly, there were assimilationist policies against ethnic minorities in neighboring Azerbaijan (Müller 2000: 71).
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Dagestan), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently the Lezgian language, along with Aghul, Avar, Azerbaijani, Chechen, Dargwa, Kumyk, Lak, Nogai, Rutul, Tabasaran, and Tsakhur (as well as Russian), attained official language status in Dagestan. Note: it is not clear whether the concession was made before or after the movement’s emergence in 1990, but since the law was adopted in April, it is more likely than not that the SDM emerged after the concession. [1990: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Per the 2011 Russia-Azerbaijan border agreement, two Lezgin villages (Khrakh-uba and Uryan–Uba), once part of Dagestan but 40-50km inside Azerbaijan, were put under Baku’s authority. Initially, Russia offered no compensation for lost property or resettlement help (International Crisis Group 2012: 28). However, in 2015, the Russian state provided financial assistance to those who wanted to move from these villages to Dagestan under the pressure from the Federal Lezgin National-Cultural Autonomy (Kerimov 2017). This could be seen as a restriction, but is overall ambiguous given the Lezgins’ lack of autonomy already before the transfer.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Lezgins are located in the North Caucasus, with significant populations in Russia’s Dagestan Republic and adjacent Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1084). The Lezgin do not have titular status in any of the regions, and they do not have significant power in Russia’s Dagestan, where the Avars and Dargins (Ware & Kisriev 2011: 111; Yemelianova 2005: 613; Cornell 2001: 270) along with the Kumyks (Roeder 2007: 105; Minority Rights Group International) effectively control the regional government. Nor were they included in Azerbaijan’s regional government. Since the Lezgins lack significant influence over any of the existing regions, we do not code them as autonomous. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1991, a significant part of Lezgins became part of newly independent Azerbaijan. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lezgins |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Lezgins |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36535000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.001; 1992-2011: 0.003]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1084), the Lezgins are concentrated in the North Caucasus in parts of the Dagestan republic and adjacent areas in Azerbaijan. Across Russia and Azerbaijan, the Lezgins form a majority in Lezginistan (75%). Based on Minahan, the Lezgins can thus be considered spatially concentrated before the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.
* Minahan does not give figures specifically for Russia. Data from Russia’s 2010 suggests that the Lezgins can be considered spatially concentrated. The 2010 census counted 476,000 Lezgins. The Lezgins form an absolute majority in five of Dagestan’s districts (that all straddle the border with Azerbaijan). 38% of all Lezgins live there. If we add three adjacent territories in which the Lezgins make up a plurality or a significant majority (see below), the 50% threshold is met, while the Lezgins still make up an absolute majority across the whole territory. [concentrated]
  + Absolute majority
    - Dokuzparinsky district: 14,000 Lezgins (94% of local population)
    - Akhtynsky district: 32,000 (98%)
    - Kurakhsky district: 15,000 (98%)
    - Magaramkentsky district: 60,000 (96%)
    - Suleyman-Stalsky district: 58,000 (99%)
  + Plurality
    - Derbent: 40,000 (34%)117
  + Minority
    - Khivsky district: 9,000 (39%)
    - Derbent district: 19,000 (19%)

**Kin**

* Approx. 200,000 Lezgins in adjacent Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1084). No other kin found. [1990-1991: no kin; 1992-2011: kin in neighboring country]

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## Lithuanian Poles

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In response to Lithuania’s 1989 language law, in 1989 the Salcininkai regional council began to advocate greater autonomy for ethnic Poles in Lithuania. In 1991 the Third Congress of the Union of Poles in Lithuania declared their intention to form a political party with the aim of uniting the Polish-dominated districts of Vilnius and Soleczniki into a single district with considerable autonomy. Thus, we peg the start date to 1989. The movement remained active when Lithuania gained its independence in 1991 (Akcja Wyborcza Polakow Na Litwie; Lexis Nexis; MAR; MRGI; Sato 2009). [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* The movement, supported by Moscow which sought to weaken the Lithuanian drive to independence, was about autonomy within the Lithuanian SSR (Sato 2009: 145). [1989-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Lithuanian Poles have called for autonomy of the Vilnius and Soleczniki districts, which are dominated by the Lithuanian Poles and declared themselves autonomous national districts in 1989 (Senn 1997). These districts are located within Vilnius county in present-day Lithuania. We code this claim using data from Open Map (https://shapes.openmap.lt/) for polygon definition, which offers a better approximation than GADM in this case.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* September 6, 1990, the Polish National-Territorial Region was proclaimed by ethnic Poles. The Lithuanian government declared the unilateral formation of an autonomous district unconstitutional. The proposal does not appear to have implied outright separation from Lithuania, hence we code an autonomy declaration. [1990: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no report of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1988 contested elections were introduced throughout the Union, which can be seen as a measure of decentralization (prior to this, officials were de-facto centrally appointed). However, local choice of leaders had limited consequences for the Lithuanian Poles as they do not control an autonomous entity; the Lithuanian districts where they dominate have very little decision rights. Thus, we do not code a concession.
* However, more importantly, in 1988 (1989 according to Sato 2009: 145, but he seems mistaken), Lithuania adopted a new language law. Lithuania’s law is considerably stricter compared to the ones adopted by the other two Baltic Republics, with a timeline that demanded a demonstrated competence in Lithuanian within two years by all public officials (later prolonged to five years), together with several measures aiming to install Lithuanian as the sole official state language (Hogan-Brun et al. 2008: 515-516, 519). There were no exceptions for dominantly Polish districts (Sato 2009: 145). The new language law led to the emergence of the Polish movement (Sato 2009). [1988: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* The Lithuanian SSR was highly centralized and thus the Poles cannot be considered autonomous.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Lithuania became independent in 1991. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lithuanian Poles |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Poles |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36518000 |

**Power access**

* Poles in the USSR, including the Lithuanian Poles, were powerless [1989-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* There were Poles in both the Belarussian and the Lithuanian SSR. According to the 1989 census, Lithuania’s Poles made up about 7 per cent of the Lithuanian SSR’s population of approximately 3.7 millions. According to the 1989 census the USSR had about 287 million inhabitants. [0.0009]

**Regional concentration**

* According to MAR, the Lithuanian Poles’ regional base is in the Vilnius and the Soleczniki districts, though less than 50% of all Lithuanian Poles reside there (see gc7 in phase I-IV release). The 2011 census provides corroborating evidence. According to the 2011 census, Poles make up a majority in the Vilnius district (52.07%) as well as in the adjacent Soleczniki district (78%). However, less than 40% of Lithuania’s approx. 200,000 Poles reside in the two districts. In no other district is there a Polish majority. Note: almost half of all Poles in Lithuania resides in the city of Vilnius (which is not the same as Vilnius district), but they form but 17% of the local population. Data from the 2001 census leads to the same conclusion, and so does data from the Soviet 1989 census. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Numerically significant kin (Poles) in Poland (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Lithuanians

Activity: 1945-1953; 1978-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Lithuania had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was established on July 21, 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, Lithuania was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Lithuanian SSR was re-established (Senn 1997; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 175). The Soviet annexation was resisted by the Forest Brothers, who organized a resistance campaign throughout the Baltic states. We begin to code the Lithuanians in 1945, the earliest possible date, but note prior violent activity. As this is the first evidence for organized separatist activity, 1944 is also coded as start date.
* Similar wars took place in the other two Balitc regions, Latvia and Estonia, over the same issues. However, the Lithuanian war was the largest of the three due to the high level of participation. Rieber (2003: 158) writes, “Of the three Baltic peoples the Lithuanians continued to display the highest level of political consciousness and organization. An estimated 100,000 took part at least one time or another in the struggle against the restoration of Soviet power.”
* According to Vardys, there were two distinct phases in the war: 1944-1948 saw a full-fledged resistance and the anti-Soviet resistance received popular support as well as a large number of volunteer fighters. Battles took place between the partisans and the USSR, with the partisans retaining strong control of the Lithuanian countryside. 1949-1952 was then a period of decline for the rebels, which led to a reorganization of the resistance. They formed a new rebel group, the Lietwos Laisves Kovu Sajudis (LLKS), and used tactics more suitable for small bands of anti-resistance fighters before petering out by 1952. Most of the remaining fighters gave up when offered an amnesty after Stalin’s death in 1953 (see Senn 1997: 355). Hence, we code an end to this first phase in 1953. [start date 1: 1944; end date: 1953]
* The ensuing period of dormancy ended at the latest when large-scale protests for Lithuanian sovereignty began in the late 1980s (Beissinger 2002). In August 1987, the dissident Liberty League organized a demonstration against the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. While this is the first evidence of sovereignty-related protest we found, the independence-minded Liberty League was founded already in 1978, operating underground until the late 1980s (Senn 1997: 370). Hence, we peg the start date to 1978. In June 1988, the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika (better known as ‘Sajudis’) was formed; initially, this was a reform movement, but soon the Sajudis turned nationalist and advocated Lithuanian sovereignty (Senn 1997: 355). In 1990, the secessionist Lithuanian Reform Movement became politically active. Lithuania became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. [start date 2: 1978; end date 2: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* 1945-1953: the Lithuanian movement should be associated with the ‘Forest Borthers’, partisans resisting Soviet rule and the annexation of the Baltic Republics and Ukraine (Minahan 1998; 168). Hence, we code an independence claim. [1945-1953: independence claim]
* 1978-1987: the only organization we have found advocating self-determination for Lithuania is the Liberty League, an underground organization. The Liberty League advocated independence (Senn 1997). [1978-1988: independence claim]
* In 1988 the Sajudis was formed and soon became the dominant vehicle in the Lithuanian struggle for self-determination. Initially, the Sajudis embraced Gorbachev’s perestroika; only in February 1989 did the Sajudis begin to demand independence (Minahan 1998: 168; Senn 1997). Hence, we code a claim for autonomy in 1989, and an independence claim in 1990-1991 (in accordance with the first of January rule). [1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. Note that Liberty League remained active throughout 1978-1991; therefore, we code an independence claim throughout even though autonomy was dominant for part of this time period. [start date 1: 1944; end date: 1953] [start date 2: 1978; end date 2: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Lithuanians matches present-day Lithuania (previously the Lithuanian SSR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* May 18, 1989, the Lithuanian Republic declared itself sovereign (Kahn 2000: 60). [1989: autonomy declaration]
* March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian Republic declared itself independent from the Soviet Union (Senn 1997: 353). [1990: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 1945-1948 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) although we note prior violence in 1944: the war began on August 3rd 1944, when Lithuanian partisans launched an insurgency against the Soviet Union over the occupation of Lithuania.
* Based on deaths estimate in PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset v.3, fatalities decreased from almost 4000 per year in 1946 and 1947 to 900 in 1948. This indicates that the war had decreased greatly in scale by 1948 and supports Vardys’s claim that 1949-1952 was a period of decline.
* MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score continues to be coded with 6 until 1954, suggesting “large-scale guerilla activity”. Yet, we could not find evidence of more than 25 deaths per years. Thus 1949-1953 are coded with NVIOLSD.
* 1978-1991 is coded as NVIOLSD. [Pre-1945-1948: HVIOLSD; 1949-1953: NVIOLSD; 1978-1991: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Lithuania had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was established on July 21, 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, Lithuania was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Lithuanian SSR was re-established. After both Soviet occupations, mass deportations occurred (Senn 1997; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 175). [1940, 1944: independence restriction]
* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Roman Catholic Church, to which most Lithanians belonged, was officially recognized, in contrast to the Ukrainian Uniate Church (Senn 1997: 354). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Between 1945 and 1952 there was little movement in the autonomy of union republics. A reform introduced in 1944 would have allowed the union republics to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states and have their own military formations. However, this reform had little effect, and if anything, there was a trend to even more centralization (Towster 1952).
* After Stalin’s death in 1953, the center’s control loosened and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). We found no exact date, but code a concession in 1953 to reflect the upward trend in autonomy. [1953: autonomy concession]
* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession. [1988: autonomy concession]
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems.” Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Lithuania) and autonomous republics. It is important to note that initially, Gorbachev saw the Baltic states as the ‘agents of perestroika’, and was thus willing to offer concessions (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 174). [1989: autonomy concession]
* In reaction to Lithuania’s independence declaration of March 1990, in April, Moscow imposed a blockade on Lithuania, scrapping the shipment of oil and gasoline and cutting natural gas deliveries (Solnick 1996: 223). In line with the codebook, the blockade is coded as an autonomy concession. [1990: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: the blockade was lifted in June the same year after Lithuania promised a moratorium on legislation implementing the independence declaration of March 11, 1990 (Senn 1997: 359). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* Moreover, April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. [1990: cultural rights concession]
  + Note that many Republics, including Lithuania, had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. These are not coded as concessions since the Republic’s language laws constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. In some cases the Republican laws went far beyond what Gorbachev was willing to concede. Gorbachev sought to halt attempts at de-Russification, and guarantee (if not enhance) the privileged position of Russians and the Russian language in the Union. Gorbachev campaigned against the language laws of the Baltic Republics (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 127-128).
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Gorbachev’s inability to halt the disintegration of the Union became ever clearer by the end of 1990, after the largely unsuccessful blockade of Lithuania in the spring. Reactionary forces gained ground, and in the fall of 1990, Latvia was singled out for a series of further provocations. First, several Baltic national monuments were blown up (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 148). By December 1990, conservative forces in Moscow threatened to overthrow the Baltic governments. The Soviet army started patrolling the streets, allegedly to help in the fight against the rising wave of violent crime (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 149; it is not clear from this passage whether this was restricted to Latvia or concerned all Baltic Republics). In December 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, warning of ‘a coming dictatorship’. Soviet paratroopers moved into Lithuania in January 1991, and occupied government buildings. For the next seven months, Lithuania was effectively occupied by Soviet troops who controlled the streets and supported the Communist Party; moreover, a few days later Soviet special forces (‘black berets’) attempted to storm Latvia’s Ministry of the Interior; five people were killed. This was part of a broader strategy to intimidate the independence-minded Latvian government and people (Karklins 1994: 29, 106-107, 130; Muiznieks 1997: 390; Suny 1993: 148). Direct rule, however, was not established. The mentioned measures are probably best seen as a government crack-down and one-sided violence, and are hence not coded.
* The troops left after the August coup, and Gorbachev gave up the resistance against Lithuania’s secession (Suny 1993: 153). The independence of the Baltic states was officially recognized by Russia on August 24, and by the Soviet Union on September 6 (Brown 1996: 303). [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. Yet, autonomy was very limited in the Baltics, where large numbers of people were displaced (EPR). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). [1945-1953: no autonomy; 1978-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Independence in 1991 (Minahan 1998). [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Lithuanians |
| *Scenario* | 1945/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Lithuanians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36513000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code 1945. We apply the 1946 discriminated code (that is due to the 1944 annexation and subsequent mass deportations) also to 1945. [1945-1953: discriminated; 1978-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were 3.1 million Lithuanians the Soviet Union. Almost all (94%) resided in the Lithuanian SSR, where they made up 80% of the local population. The share had been approx. the same in the 1940s/1950s. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to EPR/MAR. [no kin]

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## Mari

Activity: 1989-2000

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Mari Ushem, a nationalist organization demanding increased sovereignty for the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Repbulic about 500 kilometers east of Moscow, official status for the Mari language, and an end to Russification, was formed in 1989 (Giuliano 2011: 172; Minahan 2002: 1191). Hence, the start date of the movement is coded as 1989.
  + Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 186) (erroneously according to several other sources) note that the organization was formed only in 1990.
* According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 186), a yet more nationalist grouping was formed in 1990, Kugeze Mlande (Land of Our Fathers) that called for the separation of Mari El from Russia.
* In October 1990 the Mari ASSR proclaimed sovereignty, announcing that its natural resources would become the exclusive property of its people and that Mari and Russian would become official state languages. The republic adopted the new vernacular name “Mari El” (meaning “Mari Territory”) and that name won official approval from the government in Moscow.
* The influence of Mari Ushem remained insignificant (Giuliano 2011: 172), and so did the influence of Kugeze Mlande, on which we found no information except for a short note in Hewitt & Cheetham (2000; 186). We did not find further reports of organized separatist claims. Thus, following our “ten-year inactivity rule” we peg an end to the movement in 2000.
* Note: According to Minahan (2016: 261), nationalists worked for unification and independence within a proposed federation of Volga states in the 2010s. We could not find confirming evidence. According to Seregin (2017), nationalist organizations such as Mari Ushem, Mer Kanash, and Mari National Congress are active, but they are mainly focused on social and cultural issues, and do not demand greater autonomy. Other sources also provide no evidence of renewed autonomy demands (e.g., Roth 2015; MRGI). [start date: 1989; end date: 2000]

**Dominant claim**

* Mari Ushem, the main organization associated with this movement (founded in 1989), demanded increased sovereignty for the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Repbulic, official status for the Mari language, and an end to Russification (Giuliano 2011: 172; Minahan 2002: 1191). It is not fully clear whether the movement immediately demanded outright separation from Russia, but the 1990 declaration of sovereignty unilaterally raised the status of the Mari ASSR to union republic status and another organization, Kugeze Mlande (Land of Our Fathers), that was founded in 1990 demanded the separation of Mari El from Russia (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 186). Noting that the 1989 and 1990 codes are slightly ambiguous, we code a sub-state secession claim throughout 1989-1991. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim]
* For 1992-2000, we code a claim to autonomy. Sub-state secession was no longer possible, and we found no claim to independence. [1992-2000: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 186) suggest that an organization called Kugeze Mlande (Land of Our Fathers) called “for the separation of Mari El from Russia and strict laws against non-Mari immigrants” starting in 1990. This could imply a claim for outright independence, but it could also imply the creation of a separate Mari union republic on par with Russia, but still part of the USSR. Most sources suggest that this movement was about internal autonomy; therefore, we do not code an independence claim. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Mari is the Mari El Republic. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In October 1990 the Mari ASSR proclaimed sovereignty, announcing that its natural resources would become the exclusive property of its people and that Mari and Russian would become official state languages (Frank & Wixman 1997: 184; Kahn 2000: 60). Moreover, the declaration unilaterally raised the administrative status to union republic (Treisman 1997: 226), implying separation from Russia. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Mari were incorporated into Russia following the defeat of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 by Ivan IV (the Terrible). The Mari are a Finno-Ugric people. The Mari were awarded with autonomous oblast status in 1920, and upgraded to autonomous Soviet socialist republic status (the second-highest status within the Soviet matrioshka federal system) in 1936 (Minahan 2002; 1191: Minority Rights Group International).
* Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. Slavic in-migration reduced the Mari to a minority within their own ethnic homeland.
* The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). At the same time, however, Russification continued in the smaller entities of the Volga region: “by the 1960s the Komi, Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts, Mordvinians, and Mari saw the virtual end of support by the state for their cultures” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 155). “By the 1960s, the use of Komi, Komi-Permyak, Mari, Mordvinian, Udmurt, and Chuvash was eliminated as a medium of instruction in the schools even within the respective ethnic homelands” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 160; also see Minahan 2002: 1191; Minority Rights Group International).
* Liberalization under perestroika initiated a couple of significant concessions, however. Shortly before the movement emerged, in December 1988, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Mari ASSR/Mari El Republic. The Maris make up only slightly more than 40 per cent of Mari El's population. Still the Mari as the titular nationality appear to have a certain degree of influence over the republican government, at least prior to Markelov's presidency in the mid-2000s (Minority Rights Group International; Roeder 2007: 132-133). Moreover, the movement's claim relates to the Mari ASSR/Mari El Republic, which provides further justification to code changes in the Mari ASSR's/Mari El Republic's self-determination status as concessions/restrictions.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In late 1989 the Baltic states received a special economic status that allowed them to define their own tax and fiscal systems” (Belarus und Sverdlovsk Oblast received the same concession). In line with this, according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like Mari El).[[5]](#footnote-5) Note: it is not clear whether this concession was made before or after the movement’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. The two Mari languages subsequently became official languages at the state level. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Vladislav Zotin was elected president of Mari El in December 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics (including Mari El) far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994. Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). The Mari El Republic was among the last to sign a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Moscow; the agreement was signed in May 1998 (Orttung et al. 2000: 326; Söderlund 2006: 94). Still this constitutes an autonomy concession. [1998: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Mari El region had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Mari make up slightly more than 40 per cent of the republic’s population and Russians tend to occupy most of the important positions in the regional administration (Frank & Wixman 1997: 176). Still the Mari as the titular nationality appear to have a certain degree of influence over the republican government, at least prior to Markelov's presidency in the mid-2000s (Minority Rights Group International; Roeder 2007: 132-133). Hence, we code the Mari as regionally autonomous throughout. [1989-2000: regionally autonomous)

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mari |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Mari |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36529000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.002; 1992-2000: 0.004]

**Regional concentration**

* The Mari’s homeland is Mari El, a Russian federal subject in the Volga region. Less than half (46%) of the Maris resides in Mari El according to Minahan (2002: 1187), where he claims they make up 48% of the population.
* Census figures differ. According to the 2002 census, slightly more than half of all Maris resides in Mari El (52%), but they make up but 43% of Mari El’s population. We accessed district level data from the 2010 census to check whether there is an alternatively defined territory that would cross the threshold for territorial concentration. We could not find one, though it is close. The census counted 548,000 Maris across Russia. The largest concentration, 53% of all Maris, resided in the Mari republic. We found that the Maris made up an absolute majority in a total of eight districts, and a plurality in a further three districts. Altogether, 32% of the Maris reside in these elven districts, and they make up 68% of the population of these eleven districts (for the exact figures see below). There are three further districts in which the Maris make up a significant minority. The resulting figures if those are added are: 40% of all Maris/60% of local population. This is close to the threshold, but we could not find a territory that if added would push us above the threshold, also considering territories adjacent to Mari El (in particular in Kirov oblast, which harbors 30,000 Maris). Note: almost 20% of the Maris live in the non-adjacent Bashkortostan. [not concentrated]
  + Absolute majority:
    - Volzhsky district: 21,000/24,000
    - Gornomariysky district: 22,000/26,000
    - Morkinsky district: 26,000/32,000
    - Sernursky district: 20,000/26,000
    - Kuzhenersky district: 10,000/15,000
    - Nvotoryalksy area: 12,000/17,000
    - Soviet district: 20,000/31,000
    - Orsha district: 8,000/15,000
  + Plurality
    - Marie-Turek district: 11,000/23,000
    - Zvenigovsky area: 22,000/45,000
    - Kilemarsky area: 6,000/14,000
  + Signifcant minority
    - Paranginsky area: 7,000/16,000
    - Medvedevsky district: 29,000/68,000
    - Kozmodemjansk: 7,000/21,000
  + Other city with significant Mari population:
    - Yoshkar ola: 61,000/259,000

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Moldovans

Activity: 1969-1971; 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1969, the National Patriotic Front was founded, an organization seeking the establishment of the Moldavian Democratic Republic, separation from the Soviet Union, and union with Romania. Eventually, the organization totaled over 100 members. Three of the Front’s leaders were arrested in 1971, and the Front was dissolved (Brezianu & Spanu 2007: 91). The organization is described as clandestine, thus it is somewhat ambiguous whether the criterion of public claims for self-determination is fulfilled. Noting the ambiguity, we nonetheless include it. Hence, we code a start to the movement in 1969 and an end in 1971. [start date 1: 1969; end date 1: 1971]
* In early 1988, the Moldavian intelligentsia formed the Democratic Movement in Support of Restructuring, which in 1989 was reconstituted as a Popular Front, following the example of the Baltic Republics. Initially, mobilization focused on revising the Republic’s language laws, but as of 1989 agitation towards independence and/or unification with Romania began. Hence, we code 1989 as the second start date of the movement (Chinn & Roper 1995; Crowther 1997, 1998; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000).
* Moldova became independent in 1991 (Banks et al. 1997), hence the end date of the movement. [start date 2: 1989; end date 2: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* The organization associated with the first phase of activity (1969-1971), the National Patriotic Front, sought the establishment of the Moldavian Democratic Republic, separation from the Soviet Union and subsequent union with Romania (Brezianu & Spanu 2007: 91). [1969-1971: irredentist claim]
* The Moldovan Popular Front advocated the sovereignty and independence of Moldova, but also unification with Romania. According to Crowther (1998: 149), the pan-Romanian forces within the Front were dominant (also see: Chinn & Roper 1995: 297). [1989-1991: irredentist claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1989; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date 1: 1969; end date 1: 1971] [start date 2: 1989; end date 2: 1991]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Moldovans consists of the Moldavian Democratic Republic. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The MSSR declared its sovereignty on June 23, 1990 – notably several days after the declaration of the Russian Federation (RSFSR; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* After the August coup, the Moldovan Parliament issues a declaration of independence on August 27, 1991. This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and the declaration thus not “unilateral” in the sense employed here.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + The Moldovian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in 1940, through the merger of Bessarabia (previously part of Romania) and the pre-existing Moldavian ASSR, which had been part of the Ukrainian SSR. Having joined the axis powers, Romania reconquered Bessarabia, and in addition took Transnistria, but by the end of the Second World War, Stalin had reconquered all territories. The MSSR was re-established (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 192).
  + Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).
  + We did not find a concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.
* 2nd phase:
  + In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + However, note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Molodva) and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (the Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. Note: it is not clear whether this concession was made before or after the SDM’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. [1990: cultural rights concession]
  + Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, following the example of the Baltic Republics, in August 1989 the Moldovan Supreme Soviet adopts a new language law that raises the status of Moldavian to official language status (Crowther 1997: 319). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, and Moldova’s independence officially recognized. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the Moldovans as regionally autonomous throughout. [1969-1971; 1989-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Independence in 1991. [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Moldovans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Moldovans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36514000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were 3.4 million Moldovans in the Soviet Union. 82% of the Moldovans resided in the Moldovan SSR, where they made up 65% of the local population. The share had been approx. the same in the 1960s/1970s. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Romanians in Romania (approx. 20 million at the time) constitute ethnic kin according to MAR. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Mordvins

Activity: 1989-1994

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Like other indigenous peoples of Russia, Mordvins experienced a rise of national consciousness following Soviet disintegration. In 1989, Mordvin nationalists formed the Mordvin Mastorava Society for National Rebirth, an organization devoted to defend the interests of the Mordvin nation (IRB). Mastorava held its constituent congress in April 1990 (Frank & Wixman 1997: 175, 183). Among the demands of the movement was the introduction of bilingualism in the Mordvin republic (which was soon to be granted), Mordvin language education, and increased economic and political autonomy (Frank & Wixman 1997: 175-176; Minahan 2002: 1313). Hence, we code 1989 as the start date of the movement.
* The Mordovian ASSR declared sovereignty in December 1990 (according to Kahn 2000: 60; Frank & Wixman 1997: 184, by contrast, report that the Mordovian ASSR dropped the word autonomous from its name, but did not declare sovereignty).
* After 1993 a more radical wing which demanded re-unification of all Mordvin lands in an independent state began to gain grounds. However, both the more moderate and the radical wings remained weak and did not substantially influence republican politics (Frank & Wixman 1997: 176). By 1994, the Mastorava Society had disappeared, following the death of its founder.
* In early 1994, another organization was formed, the Council for the Rebirth of the Mordovian People, but the Council limited itself to culture-related claims and did not demand increased sovereignty (IRB 2000). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1994.
* Note: Minahan (2016: 278) claims that more militant groups supported plans for independence within a proposed Volga federation in the 2010s, but we could not find confirming evidence. [start date: 1989; end date 1994]

**Dominant claim**

* The Mordvin Mastorava Society for National Rebirth made claims for increased economic and political autonomy (Frank & Wixman 1997: 175-176; Minahan 2002: 1313). After 1993 a more radical wing which demanded reuinification of all Mordvin lands in an independent state began to gain grounds, but the majority of the movement continued to support more moderate claims (Minahan 2002: 1313; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 196). Since the 1990 declaration of sovereignty unilaterally raised the status of the Mordovian ASSR to union republic status, we code a sub-state secession claim in 1991, and a claim for increased autonomy in 1989-1990 and 1992-1994. [1989-1990: autonomy claim; 1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-1994: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1993; end date: 1994]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Mordvin claims primarily concern the Republic of Mordovia, located in Russia’s East European Plain. According to Minahan (2002: 131), the claim also includes Mordvin-populated districts in three oblasts adjacent to Mordvinia: Nizhni Novigrad, Penza, and Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk). However, the dominant claim appears to be limited to the Republic of Mordovia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Kahn (2000: 60) and Treisman (1997: 226), the Mordovian ASSR declared sovereignty in December 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its administrative status to union republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 184, in contrast, note that the Mordovian ASSR dropped the word autonomous from its name, but did not declare sovereignty). We follow Kahn and Treisman, though noting that there is some ambiguity involved in this code. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, and thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Mordvinia became part of Russia in 1552, after the defeat of the Mongol horde (Orttung et al. 2000: 330). It was in the Volga region where the Soviets first established their policy of division, or national delimitation, which was later applied throughout Muslim regions of the USSR (Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Northern Caucasus). Mordvinia was awarded with autonomous oblast status in 1930, and upgraded to an autonomous Soviet socialist republic (the second-highest status within the Soviet matrioshka federal system) in 1934 (Minority Rights Group International). Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression.
* The post-World War II period saw significant industrialization. Slavic in-migration reduced the Mordvins to a minority within their own ethnic homeland. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). At the same time, however, Russification continued in the smaller entities of the Volga region: “by the 1960s the Komi, Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts, Mordvinians, and Mari saw the virtual end of support by the state for their cultures” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 155). “By the 1960s, the use of Komi, Komi-Permyak, Mari, Mordvinian, Udmurt, and Chuvash was eliminated as a medium of instruction in the schools even within the respective ethnic homelands" (Frank & Wixman 1997: 160).
* There were, however, significant concessions made in the late 1980s, when Gorbachev initiated perestroika. In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Mordvin ASSR/Republic, despite the fact that Mordvins make up less than a third of Mordovia’s population, and that Russians make up the majority in the region (Frank & Wixman 1997: 175). But the Mordvins are the titular nationality, and titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170; note, however, that the sources consulted were insufficient to confirm whether this holds true in the specific case of the Mordvins). Moreover, the Mordvin movement's self-determination claim relates to the Mordvin republic, which provides further justification to code changes in the Mordvin Republic's self-determination status as concessions/restrictions.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises.” In line with this, according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like Mordvinia).[[6]](#footnote-6) Note: it is not clear when this concession was made exactly, but since the SDM emerged in April 1989, it is more likely than not that the concession occurred after the SDM’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action did not imply tangible consequences. Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. The two Mordvin languages, Moksha and Erzya, subsequently attained official language status in the republic. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Nikolai Merkushkin was elected president of Mordavia in 1995. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics (like Mordvinia) far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The Mordvinian Republic had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Mordvinian Republic has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. Note, however, that the Mordvins make up less than a third of Mordvinia's population. But the Mordvins are the titular nationality, and titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170; note, however, that the sources consulted were insufficient to confirm whether this holds true in the specific case of the Mordvins). Noting the ambiguity, we still code the Mordvins as regionally autonomous throughout. [1989-1994: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mordvins |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Mordva |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36520000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.006]

**Regional concentration**

* Less than half of the Mordvins live in their homeland, the Mordvin republic (21%), and the Mordvins are outnumbered by Russians in their homeland (52% vs 43%) according to Minahan (2002: 1309). The remaining Mordvins live scattered in various other parts of the Volga region (Minahan 2002: 1309). While Russian census data suggests a much lower number of Mordvins (approx. 1.7 million in Minahan vs 850,000 in 2002 census), census data confirms the basic insight: Less than half of the Mordvins live in Mordovia, and the remaining Mordvins live scattered across other parts of Russia, mostly in the Volga region. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Nenets

Activity: 1990-2011

**General notes**

* The Nenets are a Siberian people living in the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug, the Nenets autonomous okrug and the former Taimyr (Dolgano) autonomous okrug (Taimyr was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 following a 2005 referendum).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In October 1990, the Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrug declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated itself to a republic (Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 228; Orttung et al. 2000: 636). According to Treisman (1997: 226) and Minahan (2002: 1358), the Nenets autonomous okrug also unilaterally raised its status in 1990 and the Taimyr autonomous okrug at least declared sovereignty in 1990.
* Already in December 1989, the Association of the Nenets people had been founded but it is not clear whether this organization had separatist goals (Blakkisrud 2002: 179). Furthermore, Minahan (2002: 1358) suggests that there had been some protests before that, but he does not give a clear date. Hence, 1990 is coded as the start date.
* In 1993, the Yamalo-Nenets and the Khanti-Mansi pressed for a separate republic, encouraged by the Chukchi autonomous okrug’s separation from Magadan Oblast and the prospect of controlling the area’s oil resources (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1358). Similarly, activists in the Nenets and Taimyr autonomous oblasts agitated for republican status (Minahan 2002: 1358-1359).
* In 1996 the Nenets autonomous okrug boycotted the elections of Arkhangelsk oblast, of which it is formally a part. According to Orttung et al. (2000: 360), “[T]his measure was taken as an attempt to increase Nenets’ control over its natural resource revenues.” Analogously, the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug boycotted Tyumen oblast’s 1996 gubernatorial elections (Minahan 2002: 1358).
* Orttung et al. (2000: 530, 635) suggests that separatist agitation continued in the mid-1990s to late 1990s in the Taimyr and the Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs, which wanted to secede from Krasnoyarsk Krai and Tyumen oblast, respectively.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1359), “Nenet activists, in early 2001, presented a plan for a new autonomous region to include the northern districts of the three administrative regions from the Taimyr Peninsula to the Kanin Peninsula to the west. The plan, which would include areas of vital economic interest to the Russian government, was accepted for study, but the Nenets and the other small national groups of the vast region have little hope that their desires will be respected.”
* We did not find further separatist activity. In the 2000s, the three autonomous okrugs were busy attempting to preserve their limited autonomy as there were plans to abolish the three autonomous okrugs (Lexis Nexis 2006; Economic Press Review 2006). Following a 2005 referendum, Taimyr was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007. The other two autonomous okrugs have been spared this fate thus far. In 2020, a memorandum on joining the Nenets autonomous okrug to Arkhangelsk oblast was signed (Anisimova 2020). However, so far the merger has not been taken further.
* Blakkisrud (2002: 178) reports that demands for “full sovereignty” have been abandoned in the Nenets autonomous okrug. Roth (2015: 170) reports continued separatist sentiment, but we found no evidence of separatist mobilization. The expansion of oil and gas projects in Yamalo-Nenets sparked mobilization of reindeer breeders and the creation of Golos Tundry [Voice of Tundra], an organization focused on defending the rights of traditional reindeer-breeders and preserving the environment (Magomedov 2020). We found no evidence that Golos Tundry made self-rule claims as defined here. Based on this, we code an end to the movement in 2011, following the ten-years inactivity rule. [start date: 1990; end date 2011]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant claim was for separation of the three Nenets territories from the respective oblasts and krais to which they were attached:
  + In October 1990, the Yamal-Nenets autonomus okrug declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated itself to a republic, implying separation from Tyumen oblast (Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 228; Orttung et al. 2000: 636). According to Treisman (1997: 226) and Minahan (2002: 1358), the Nenets autonomous okrug unilaterally also raised its status in 1990 and the Taimyr autonomous okrug at least declared sovereignty in 1990.
  + In 1993, the Yamalo-Nenets and the Khanti-Mansi pressed for a separate republic, encouraged by the Chukchi autonomous okrug’s separation from Magadan Oblast and the prospect of controlling the area’s oil resources (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1358). Similarly, activists in the Nenets and Taimyr autonomous oblasts agitated for republican status (Minahan 2002: 1358-1359).
  + In 1996 the Nenets autonomous okrug boycotted the elections of Arkhangelsk oblast, of which it is formally a part. According to Orttung et al. (2000: 360), “[T]his measure was taken as an attempt to increase Nenets’ control over its natural resource revenues.” Analogously, the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug boycotted Tyumen oblast’s 1996 gubernatorial elections (Minahan 2002: 1358). Orttung et al. (2000: 530, 635) furthermore suggests that separatist agitation continued in the mid-1990s to late 1990s in the Taimyr and the Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs, which wanted to secede from Krasnoyarsk Krai and Tyumen oblast, respectively.
  + According to Minahan (2002: 1359), “Nenet activists, in early 2001, presented a plan for a new autonomous region to include the northern districts of the three administrative regions from the Taimyr Peninsula to the Kanin Peninsula to the west. The plan, which would include areas of vital economic interest to the Russian government, was accepted for study, but the Nenets and the other small national groups of the vast region have little hope that their desires will be respected.” [1990-2007: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The areas claimed by the Nenets are three regions in which they are concentrated: the Yamalo - Nenets autonomous okrug, the Nenets autonomous okrug, and the former Taimyr (Dolgano) autonomous okrug. The Taimyr (Dolgano) autonomous okrug was merged in 2007 with the Krasnoyarsk Krai and lost its autonomous status as a result. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In October 1990, the Yamal-Nenets autonomus okrug declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated itself to a republic, implying separation from Tyumen oblast (Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 228; Orttung et al. 2000: 636). According to Treisman (1997: 226) and Minahan (2002: 1358), the Nenets autonomous okrug unilaterally also raised its status in 1990 and the Taimyr autonomous okrug declared sovereignty in 1990 too, though it is not clear whether it raised its status. We code a single sub-state secession declaration. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Nenets’ attachment to Russia dates to the 1600s. In the late 1920s/early 1930s the Nenets were granted three autonomous okrugs, the Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrug, the Nenets autonomous okrug and the former Taimyr (Dolgano) autonomous okrug (Taimyr was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 following a 2005 referendum) (Fondahl 1997: 194; Minority Rights Group International; Orttung et al. 2000: 634). In the context of perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* Note that Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform in 1989 (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). The three Nenets territories had the status of autonomous okrugs, and hence were unaffected by the reform.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Nenets’ three autonomous okrugs, though it has to be noted that the Nents make up only 4-13% of the local populations in 1989 (Fondahl 1997: 194). The Nenets are the titular nationalities, which usually entails a certain degree of influence over the regional government. Moreover, the movement's claim relates to these three areas, which provides further justification to code changes in the region's self-determination status as concessions/restrictions.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). However, the evidence we have found suggests that autonomous okrugs (like the three Nenets territories) were not granted this right.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996. The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Against the earlier promise of direct elections, the governors in the three Nenets territories were appointed until 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). In all three Nenets territories, the first direct gubernatorial elections were staged in 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000). We do not code a concession due to the temporary nature a moratorium.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Ethntities other than republics (like the Nenets autonomous okrugs) were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). While the constitution constituted a downgrade for ethnic republics, it gave Autonomous Okrugs rights equal to an Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 236), which implies an autonomy upgrade for the Nenets. Hence we code an autonomy concession in 1993. Note that the upgrade led to an ambiguous situation as both autonomous okrugs and the oblasts/krais to which they were attached now had the same rights (Orttung et al. 2000: 236). [1993: autonomy concession]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). In 1997, one of the three Nenets territories, Taimyr autonomous okrug, signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Moscow (Orttung et al. 2000: 529-530; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1997: autonomy concession]
* The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug filed a complaint with the constitutional court against their subordination to Tyumen Oblast. In 1997 the court ruled against their pledge, reaffirming that all three had an equal status as federal subjects but that the two Autonomous Okrugs are subordinate to Tyumen Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 239). Since the ruling reaffirmed the status quo, we do not code a restriction.
* By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In the 2000s, there were plans to abolish the Nenets’ three autonomous okrugs (Lexis Nexis 2006; Economic Press Review 2006). Following a 2005 referendum, Taimyr was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007. There was strong political pressure to follow the official line. The other two autonomous okrugs have been spared this fate thus far. [2005: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The three Nenets territories have autonomous okrug status, except for Taymir, which lost that status in 2007. At least after Stalin, the autonomous entities enjoyed a certain level of autonomy (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117), though it was limited, especially for the Siberian entities (Fondahl 1997: 200-203). Note that the Nents make up only 4-13% of the local populations in 1989 (Fondahl 1997: 194). The Nenets are the titular nationalities, which usually entails a certain degree of influence over the regional government. We code regional autonomy throughout (while one of the three Nenet territories lost their status in 2007 the two others managed to keep it), though noting that this requires further research. This follows EPR practice: EPR does not code the Nenets but codes ethnic groups with autonomous okrugs as autonomous even if they make up only a small share of the territory (e.g. the Chukots). [1990-2011: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In the 2000s, there were plans to abolish the Nenets’ three autonomous okrugs (Lexis Nexis 2006; Economic Press Review 2006). Following a 2005 referendum, Taimyr was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007. The other two autonomous okrugs have been spared this fate thus far. Since Taimyr had had an autonomous status within a larger federal unit, this is coded as “Revocation of autonomy” in line with the codebook. [2007: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Nenets |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence of inclusion in the national executive. [1990-2011: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, the Nenets numbered 41,302 in 2002. This matches with the figure in Minahan (2002: 1354). For 1990-1991 we combine this figure with the total population of the Soviet Union (287 millions according to 1989 census), and for 1992 onwards with Russia’s 2002 census (145.2 million). [1990-1991: 0.0001; 1992-2011: 0.0003]
  + Note that Minahan (1996: 217) reports a slightly higher figure (54,000) because he also includes tribes related to the Nenets, including the Dolgans.

**Regional concentration**

* The Nenets’ homeland comprises three adjacent regions in north-central Siberia, the Nenets autonomous okrug, the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug, and the Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Okrug. The Nenets make up only 4-13% of the local populations according to the 1989 census (Fondahl 1997: 194). Minahan (2002: 1354) reports a similar estimate. While the Nenets’ share is thus very low, the Nenets tend to live in the area’s northern parts. We browsed 2010 census data, and found that the Nenets make up an absolute majority in two spatially contiguous northern areas, both in the Yamalo-Nenets okrug: Taz district (9,000/17,000 according to 2010 census) and Yamal district (11,000/16,000). The total Nenets population in the census was 45,000, thus less than 50% of the Nenets live there. There could be adjacent Nenets-dominated areas and if those are counted the threshold could potentially be crossed, but for this we would need demographic data below the district level. Based on the data we could access, we conclude that the Nenets are not concentrated. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Nogai

Activity: 1989-2020

**General notes**

* The majority of the Nogai live in northern Dagestan and the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, with some in the in the Chechen and Ingush Republics and in Stavropol Krai (Minority Rights Group International; Ormrod 1997: 120). Unlike many other ethnic groups of the Caucasus, the Nogai do not have an administrative territory of their own.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Nogai national movement (Birlik) was founded as a cultural organization in 1957. Birlik turned into a self-determination movement in the sense employed here when it first demanded an autonomous Nogai republic to be carved out of the several territories with significant Nogai populations in 1989 (Minahan 2002: 1380-1381; Roeder 2007: 131). The activities of Birlik focused on the Nogai region in Dagestan, the only region with a compact Nogai settlement (Ormrod 1997: 120). The start date of the movement is pegged at 1989.
* According to Ormrod (1997: 120), the Nogai’s interest in increased sovereignty had weakened by the mid-1990s. Minority Rights Group International, too, suggests that Nogai demands for the creation of a Nogai homeland had become less virulent by the mid-1990s. However, Minahan (2002) suggests that the Nogai movement was active at the time of his writing. Other evidence suggests that Birlik continued to be active, and we found calls for increased sovereignty in 1997, 2011 and 2012 (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union 2011, 2012; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 81, 207, 254ff; Radio Free Europe 2009; Russian Press Digest 1997).
* In the 2010s, Nogais demanded the annulment of the 1957 decree, which reestablished the Chechen-Ingush republic and carved up Nogais' traditional territory between Dagestan, Chechnya, and Stavropol Krai (Fuller 2017, Musaev 2011). Nogai activists called the state authorities to create a conciliation commission that should facilitate self-determination of the Nogai people within a single administrative-territorial unit (Musaev 2011). They also protested against the plans to grant official municipal status to 199 small non-Nogai settlements in the predominantly Nogai-populated Kizlyar, Nogai, and Tarumov administrative districts (Fuller 2017). Based on this, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1989; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Nogai movement, called Birlik, began to call for an autonomous Nogai republic to be carved out of the several territories with significant Nogai populations in 1989 (Minahan 2002: 1380-1381; Roeder 2007: 131; Roth 2015: 182). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Nogai movement demanded the creation of an autonomous district within Dagestan with the ultimate aim of a separate Nogai republic within the Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 1381; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 207). The demand for a separate republic was repeated in the 2010s (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union 2012; Fuller 2017; Musaev 2011). Since the ultimate aim is for a separate republic, we code a sub-state secession claim. [1989-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* This movement’s claims concern the Nogai-inhabited area in northern Dagestan and parts of Chechnya and Stavropol Krai (Roth 2015: 182). The exact contours of territory are unclear based on the sources we consulted. We tentatively treat the Nogaysky District of the Republic of Dagestan as the movement’s claim, relying on data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas database. This territory broadly resembles the area shown in Roth, though it is a bit smaller.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* None of the sovereignty declarations in the regions with significant Nogai populations (see Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226) can be associated with the Nogais since none called for a Nogai homeland (including the declarations in Dagestan and Karachai-Cherkessia).

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, and thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Russians took formal control of the Nogai homeland in the early 18th century (Minahan 2002: 1378). In the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks had promised the Nogai regional autonomy, but the promise remained unfulfilled (Minahan 2002: 1379). Until 1957, teaching of the Nogai language was widespread, but then it became confined to the northern region of Dagestan (Minahan 2002: 1377; Ormrod 1997: 120).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The majority of the Nogai live in northern Dagestan and the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, with some in the in the Chechen and Ingush Republics and in Stavropol Krai (Minority Rights Group; Ormrod 1997: 120). The Nogai do not have titular status in any of the regions, and they do not have significant power in any of the regional governments. In Dagestan, the Avars and Dargins (Ware & Kisriev 2011: 111; Yemelianova 2005: 613; Cornell 2001: 270) along with the Kumyks (Roeder 2007: 105; Minority Rights Group International) effectively control the regional government; the situation is similar in the other regions with significant Nogai populations, including Karachai-Cherkessia where power is shared between the titular nationalities and the local Russians (Ormrod 1997: 120). Since the Nogai do not have significant influence over any of the existing regions, we do not code changes in the sovereignty of any of the existing regions as concessions/restrictions.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs (like Dagestan), to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently the Nogai language, along with Aghul, Avar, Azerbaijani, Chechen, Dargwa, Kumyk, Lezgian, Lak, Rutul, Tabasaran, and Tsakhur (as well as Russian), attained official language status. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1996, a new Daghestani law titled "On The Status Of Territory For Transhumance" allocated lands inhabited by Nogais to be used by herders from mountain regions, mostly ethnic Avars (Fuller 2017, Musaev 2011). [1996: autonomy restriction]
* In Karachai-Cherkessia, Nogai municipal district was created in 2007 (Nogai district administration n.d.). Per the federal law on *On the general principles of the organization of local self-government in the Russian Federation,* the district’s powers are restricted to tasks such as providing utilities, maintaining local roads, public spaces, and cultural heritage sites (State Duma 2020). A concession is not coded because this relates to a change in self-rule at the municipal level.
* In 2017, the Dagestani government considered plans to grant official municipal status to 199 small settlements in the predominantly Nogai-populated Kizlyar, Nogai, and Tarumov administrative districts. Those settlements were established illegally by herders from mountain regions who pastured their herds of sheep there during the winter months (Fuller 2017). However, there is no evidence that these plans were implemented.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Nogai do not have titular status in any of the regions where they are located, and they do not have significant power in any of the regional governments. In Dagestan, the Avars and Dargins (Ware & Kisriev 2011: 111; Yemelianova 2005: 613; Cornell 2001: 270) along with the Kumyks (Roeder 2007: 105; Minority Rights Group International) effectively control the regional government; the situation is similar in the other regions with significant Nogai populations, including Karachai-Cherkessia where power is shared between the titular nationalities and the local Russians (Ormrod 1997: 120). Since the Nogai do not have significant influence over any of the existing regions, we do not code them as autonomous.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Nogai |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence for government inclusion. [powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 1376) suggests a group size of 105,000. This is similar to the 2010 census, which counted 104,000 Nogais. The USSR’s total population is estimated at approximately 287 million in the 1989 census while Russia’s total population according to the 2010 census was 142.9 mio. [1989-1991: 0.0004; 1992-2020: 0.0007]

**Regional concentration**

* Though he does not give clear figures, the account in Minahan (2002: 1376) suggests that the Nogai cannot be considered spatially concentrated. We bolstered this up with data from the Russian 2010 census. The census counted a total of 103,000 Nogais. We found two districts with an absolute Nogai majority, the Nogai district in Dagestan (19, 556 Nogais, 87% of the local population) and the Nogai district in Karachai-Cherkessia (11,851 Nogais, 76% of local population). The two districts are far from adjacent. We found two other administrative units with significant Nogai populations. One of them, the Neftekumsk district in Stavropol krai, borders Dagestan’s Nogai district, but the Nogais make up but 19% of the local population (13,110 Nogais live there). The other district lies a bit further north in Dagestan (non-adjacent): Babayurtovsky district (7,553 Nogais, 16% of local population). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## North Ossetians

Activity: 1990-1995

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the early 1990s, the North Ossetian Republic was involved in a bargaining process with Moscow, demanding increased sovereignty (Ormrod 1997: 114, 116). The North Ossetian elite also supported the South Ossetian attempt to join North Ossetia, and thereby the Russian Federation (Ormrod 1997: 115).
* The Republic of North Ossetia declared sovereignty in July 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its administrative status. Since this is the first evidence of separatist activity we could find, we code 1990 as the start date of the movement.
* The conflict with the Ingush over the Prigorodnyi region (which North Ossetia had gained in 1944 after the deportation of the Ingush) led to violence in October 1992 which caused 600 deaths (Orttung et al. 2000: 375).
* In 1993 the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet recognized the independence of South Ossetia from Georgia (Ormrod 1997: 135).
* In 1994 Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed the Beslan Agreement, which provides for the return of Ingush refugees to the Prigorodnyi region in North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 135, 137). Apparently not implemented, another such agreement was signed in 1998, but the situation remained tense (Orttung et al. 2000: 375).
* In March 1995, North Ossetia signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty with Moscow, becoming the fourth republic to do so (Ormrod 1997: 139; Orttung et al. 2000: 377). We were unable to find evidence of organized separatist claims beyond that and therefore code an end to the movement in 1995. [start date: 1990; end date: 1995]

**Dominant claim**

* The July 1990 sovereignty declaration unilaterally raised the administrative status of North Ossetia, implying separation from the RSFSR. Hence, we code a claim for sub-state secession in 1990-1991 (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim]
* Following the dissolution of the Union, the North Ossetian Republic was involved in a bargaining process with Moscow, demanding increased sovereignty (Ormrod 1997: 114, 116). [1992-1995: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the North Ossetians consists of the republic of North Ossetia within the Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 1774). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Republic of North Ossetia declared sovereignty in July 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its administrative status, implying separation from the RSFSR (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The 1992 conflict is treated as an uprising by the Ingush, who claimed the Prigorodnyi region from North Ossetia. Therefore, this is not coded as separatist violence here.
* The North Ossetians are technically a part of the Northern Caucasus war from 1999-ongoing, but that is attributed to the Islamists rather than the people of North Ossetia in general. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The North Ossetians are concentrated in what today is the North Ossetian Republic, where they make up the majority. The region came under Russian control in the late 18th century (Minahan 2002: 1476). After 1917’s October Revolution, a conglomerate of North Caucasian peoples formed a relatively independent political entity, the Mountain Republic, in 1918. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the Mountain Republic was made an autonomous republic in 1921, with Dagestan carved out as a separate Dagestan autonomous republic. As part of the Soviet policy of national delimitation, several more ethnic entities were subsequently carved out of the Mountain Republic. In 1922, separate Adyghe, Chechen, Karachai-Cherkessian and Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblasts were created out of the Mountain Republic. Finally, in 1924 the Mountain Republic was fully dissolved, with its territory divided between the newly created North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Regions.
* The Soviet policy of creating national homelands for what previously were weak common identities, if at all, had the main effect of fostering national consciousness (Ormrod 1997: 97-98), while at least in the initial years, the majority of posts were held by Russians (Minahan 2002: 1478). In 1936 the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was upgraded to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) status (Minority Rights Group International). Following the deportation of the Ingush in 1944, North Ossetia was enlarged with the Prigorodny region, a former Ingush land (Minahan 2002: 1478). When the Ingush were allowed to return in 1956, Prigorodny remained with North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 98-99).
* In the more relaxed atmosphere under Gorbachev, assimilation pressure eased and local authorities embroiled in education reforms (Ormrod 1997: 99). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989, the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, including increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Ossetian subsequently attained official status at the regional level. Since the law was adopted in April and therefore three months before the SDM’s emergence, we treat this as a prior concession. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), “the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly impplied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Akhsarbek Galazov, an ethnic Ossetian, was elected North Ossetia’s first governor in 1994. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). North Ossetia became the fourth Republic to sign a bilateral treaty in March 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 377; Ormrod 1997: 139; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1995: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* North Ossetia was an autonomous republic under the Soviet Union, and became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. North Ossetians form the majority in the region, and as such are well represented in the regional government. [1990-1995: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | North Ossetians |
| *Scenario* | n:1/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Ossetes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36527000 |

* In 1990-1991, there are two Ossetian movements, the South Ossetian movement in the Georgian SSR and the North Ossetian movement in North Ossetia, Russia. After 1991, the South Ossetian movement is active in Georgia and the North Ossetian in Russia. Hence, in 1990-1991, we have a n:1 scenario, and for 1992 onwards we have a 1:1 scenario (note though that this figure includes South Ossetian refugees).

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* For the 1990-1991 group size, we draw on the Soviet Union’s 1989 census. According to this, there were approximately 600,000 Ossetians in the USSR, 164,000 of them in the Georgian SSR (that is, in South Ossetia). Thus there were about 436,000 Ossetes in North Ossetians. We use this figure as an estimate of the number of North Ossetians. The USSR’s total population is estimated at approximately 287 million in the 1989 census. [1990-1991: 0.0015]
* For the period after 1991, we follow EPR. [1992-1995: 0.004]

**Regional concentration**

* The North Ossetians are concentrated in what today is the North Ossetian Republic, where they make up the majority (Minahan 2002: 1476). Their share in the republic’s population increased from 53% in the 1989 census to 65% in the 2010 census. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Ossetians have transnational kin in Georgia after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 (see EPR; Minahan 2002: 1474). The number of South Ossetians appears significant (164,000 according to the 1989 Soviet census; Minahan 2002: 1474 reports a similar number), though unclear in recent years due to the unstable situation in South Ossetia. There is no reliable data on the number of South Ossetians in South Ossetia (there were 65,000 in 1989; it may be fewer now), while in Georgia itself the number decreased from 100,000 in 1989 to 40,000 in the 2002 census. Estimates run that the number of Ossetians in Georgia has decreased further as a result of the 2008 war (Sordia 2009). Noting the ambiguity that the numeric threshold may no longer be met, we code kin throughout.
* We found no other kin (see e.g. MAR), and thus code kin from the dissolution of the USSR onwards. [1990-1991: no kin; 1992-1995: ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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## Pamiri Tajiks

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Lali Badakhshan, a political party seeking increased autonomy for the Gronyi-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in the Tajik SSR, was formed in 1989 in reaction to the rising Tajik nationalism (Bliss 2006: 276). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1989. Lali Badakhshan gained control of the region in 1991. The movement remained active after the Soviet Union was dissolved (see Pamiri Tajiks under Tajikistan). [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* The Pamiri movement sought increased autonomy (Roeder 2007: 316). [1989-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Pamiri Tajiks consists of their homeland Gorno-Badakhshan in eastern Tajikistan (Roth 2015: 312f). We code this claim using GIS data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The homeland of the Pamiri Tajiks, Gorno-Badakshan, lies in the mountains of southeastern Tajikistan and adjoining parts of Afghanistan. The Pamiri Tajiks are sometimes considered Tajiks, but many self-identify as a distinct ethnic group. Moreover, there are ethno-linguistic differences. The language of the Pamiri Tajiks belongs to the eastern branch of the Iranian linguistic family, and is thus distinct from Tajik, which belongs to the western branch. Moreover, there are differences with regard to religion: Pamiri Tajiks tend to be Shia, while Tajiks are typically Sunnis (Atkin 1997: 608; Shirazi 1997: 613; Minority Rights Group International).
* The Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast was created in 1925, as part of the Tajik ASSR. Tajikistan gained full Union Republic status in 1929; Gorno-Badakshan remained with Tajikistan and kept the status of an AO. “Soviet policy toward the Pamiri peoples was assimilationist, with education and publications generally being available in Tajik or Russian but not in the Pamiri languages. This began to change in the final years of the Soviet era […] (Atkin 1997: 608).”
* We found no better indication as to when education policies changed, but code a concession in 1988 because in this year, the Supreme Soviet introduced multi-candidate, contested elections at all levels of the Union, which can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are de-facto appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. However, according to Gorbachev (1999: 99, also see Suny 1993: 144) this initiative was restricted to Union Republics and autonomous republics. Gorno-Badakhshan had the status of an Autonomous Oblast, a lower hierarchy in the Soviet Union’s federal system.
* The same year the Tajik SSR elevated Tajik to the status of the official language (Atkin 1997: 628); however, in article 3 Badakshan was explicitly excluded and allowed to regulate independently on language issues. Until 1989/1990 (the Republican language laws were sanctioned ex-post via the 1990 All-Union language law, see Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99), the Soviet Union did not have de jure an official language. Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Note: it is not clear whether the concession was made before or after the movement’s start. [1989: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* During Soviet rule, Gorno-Badakhshan had the status of an Autonomous Oblast under the administration of the Tajik SSR. While the AO status is clearly not at the top of the hierarchies in the Soviet multi-layered federal system, ethnic entities had a certain measure of power as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the Pamiri Tajiks as regionally autonomous throughout. [1989-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Tajikistan became independent in 1991. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Pamiri Tajiks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Pamir Tajiks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36563000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.0002]

**Regional concentration**

* The homeland of the Pamiri Tajiks, Gorno-Badakshan, lies in the mountains of southeastern Tajikistan and adjoining parts of Afghanistan. Data from the Soviet Union’s 1989 census suggests that almost all Pamiris resided in Gorno-Badakshan (approx. 101,000), where they made up approx. 65% of the local population (demoscope.ru). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Pamiri Tajiks also in neighboring Afghanistan, but they numbered only about 75,000 in the early 1990s according to figures from EPR. No other kin found. We do not count Tajiks e.g. in Afghanistan as ethnic kin because the movement is directed against a Tajik-dominated government. [no kin]

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## Rusyns

Activity: 1990-1991

**General notes**

* The Rusyns are located mainly in Transcarpathia (Zakarpattya Oblast), once a province of interwar Czechoslovakia, but after 1945 a part of Soviet Ukraine.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In February 1990 the Society of Carpathian Rusyns was formed, demanding the restoration of the autonomy Rusyns had enjoyed under Czechoslovak rule (Batt 2002: 159). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. The movement remained active after Ukraine’s independence (see Rusyns in Ukraine). [start date: 1990; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* The most important vehicle of the Rusyn movement, the Society of Carpathian Rusyns, advocated autonomy for Transcarpathia. After the rejection of self-government in the early 1990s, some more radical elements emerged which demanded outright independence, but these remained marginal (Batt 2002: 159-160; Bugajski 2000: 178; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 257). Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1990-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The independence claim emerged only in 1993 (Batt 2002: 160) and, therefore, after Ukraine’s independence. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Rusyns is the Zakarpattya Oblast (also Transcarpathian Oblast) in present-day Ukraine. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In September 1990 the Society of the Carpathian Rusyns issued a declaration of sovereignty demanding the “return” of an Autonomous Republic to the Zakarpattya. It is somewhat ambiguous whether the declaration called for an autonomous republic within the USSR or within Czechoslovakia, and it is not even clear whether the declaration would imply separation from Ukraine or autonomy within Ukraine (Solchanyk 1994: 62). Since autonomy within Ukraine appears to have been the focus of the movement (see below), we code an autonomy declaration. [1990: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Between the two World Wars, Transcarpathia was part of Czechoslovakia. In 1938, Transcarpathia was made an autonomous entity within a federal Czechoslovakia. Transcarpathia declared independence in 1939, but it was quickly occupied by Hungarian forces. The Polish Western Ukraine, Czechoslovak Transcarpathia, and Romanian Bessarabia were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after the Second World War (Minahan 1998: 282-283; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 257).Ukraine as a whole can be considered autonomous during the Soviet period. However, the Ukrainian regions (oblasts) had very limited powers – Ukraine under Soviet rule was highly centralized (Wolczuk 2002: 68-69). Transcarpathia lost the autonomous status they had enjoyed under Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet regime attempted to Ukrainize the Ruthenians (Minahan 2002: 394).
* Political liberalization in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s allowed the Uniate church to function openly again after 1987, and received official sanction in 1988 (Minahan 2002: 2075). The Uniate Catholic church, to which many Western Ukrainians belonged, had been absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church during Stalin’s reign. Thus, the Rusyns received a major concession immediately prior to the start date. [1987: cultural rights concession]
  + Note: in 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). However, local choice of leaders had little effect for groups without an autonomous status as the respective regions’ decision rights were very limited. Hence, this is not coded as a concession.
  + Note that Ukraine’s 1989 language law contained an important concession to national minorities. According to Article 11, in those territories where minorities from a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration, in addition to Ukrainian. However, the Rusyns were not recognized as a national minority (Minahan 2002: 395), thus the language law does not constitute a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1990 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was given autonomy from the Russian Orthodox Church (Minahan 1998: 283). This is not coded as a concession since in Western Ukraine, the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church was dominant (Batt 2002: 160) and the Uniate church had been legalized already in the late 1980s (Minahan 2002: 2075).
* In late 1991, the Zakarpattya decided to call a referendum on its autonomy. According to Solchanyk (1994: 62-63), Kravchuk then met with local leaders, after which the referendum question was changed and became less radical. One could argue that Kravchuk thereby gave his endorsement to a less radical sovereignty referendum, and thus code a concession. But we consider this too ambiguous, not least because there was no reaction after the (endorsed) referendum.

**Regional autonomy**

* While Ukraine as a whole can be considered regionally autonomous, Ukraine itself was heavily centralized and thus cannot be considered regionally autonomous.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Rusyns |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Ukrainians are coded as junior partner, but it was mostly Ukrainians from the central and eastern parts who were represented in the national executive (see the Western Ukrainians entry). [1990-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* The number of Rusyns is disputed. The controversy results from the fact that the Rusyns were re-classified as Ukrainians after 1945 and thus not included in the census. Moreover, many Rusyns seem to self-identify as both Rusyns and Ukrainians. More specifically, some argue that the number of people self-identifying at least partly as Rusyns is not fully clear, but likely to be significant (Batt 2002: 156; Sasse 2001: 83). Bugajski (2000) suggests that Ukrainians who self-identify as Rusyns are in a minority even in Zakarpattya Oblast. In contrast, according to Minahan (2002: 389), the Rusyns make up around two thirds of Zakarpattya Oblast. We draw on Minahan. Overall, there are around 1.5 million Rusyns in Ukraine according to Minahan. In line with general practice, we draw on Minahan. According to the 1989 census the USSR had about 287 million inhabitants. [0.0052]

**Regional concentration**

* The number of Rusyns is disputed. Again, we draw on Minahan (see above). According to Minahan (2002: 389), approx. 60% of all Rusyins in the USSR were located in Ukraine’s Zakarpattya Oblast, also called Transcarpathia, where they made up two thirds of the population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We follow Minahan. According to Minahan (2002: 389), there are 330,000 Rusyns in Slovakia, and another 100,000 in Poland, called Lemkos or Lemkians. [kin in adjacent country]

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## Sakhas

Activity: 1990-2010

**General notes**

* The Sakhas are also known as Yakuts.
* The Republic of Yakutia, the largest autonomous republic in the Russian Federation, is located in north-central Siberia.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Sakha nationalism increased with the decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. In 1989, Sakha Omuk was formed, an organization to preserve and revive Sakha (Yakut) culture (Fondahl 1997: 227). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 263) describe Sakha Omuk as nationalist, but it is not clear whether they made self-determination claims already in 1989.
* In September 1990, Yakutia proclaimed its sovereignty within the Russian Federation, thereby upgrading its status to union republic (Fondahl 1997: 227; Kahn 2000: 60; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 263). As this is the first clear evidence of an organized separatist claim we could find, we peg the start date of the self-determination movement at 1990.
* Yakutia continued to make claims for increased autonomy throughout the 1990s and especially increased control over natural resources (Fondahl 1997: 213; Minority Rights Group International). However, after Putin took office in 2000 and began his centralization drive, the main focus became preserving existing autonomy rather than demanding increased autonomy (MAR). In 2000, Putin demanded Sakha and other republics to bring their constitutions in line with the federal laws. Sakha initially resisted these demands by adopting only partial changes (Okunev 2020). Between 2003 and 2006, Moscow’s plans to take control of the diamond industry caused protests with demands to preserve Sakha’s control over the industry (MAR). We found no evidence for a movement for *increased* self-rule after 2000 (cf. Roth 2015: 170; MRGI). Still, the evidence is insufficient for us to code an end in 2000; instead, we code the end date in 2010, following the ten-year rule. [start date: 1990; end date: 2010]

**Dominant claim**

* In September 1990 Yakutia proclaimed its sovereignty within the Russian Federation, thereby upgrading its status to union republic (hence we code a sub-state secession claim for 1990-1991).
* Yakutia has been at the forefront of the movement demanding increased control over natural resources (Fondahl 1997: 213; Minority Rights Group International). According to Fondahl (1997: 219) Siberians are not seeking full sovereignty, including the most active among them, the Yakuts (Roth 2015: 170; though see Minahan 2002: 1635). Also MAR notes that autonomy demands – in particular demands for increased control of natural resources – are dominant. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 263) agree. Hence, we code an autonomy claim for 1992 onwards [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2010: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Sakhas’ claims concern the present-day Yakutia region (officially the Sakha Republic) in north-central Siberia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Yakutian ASSR declared sovereignty on September 27, 1990, and thereby unilaterally upgrade its status to union republic (Fondahl 1997: 227; Kahn 2000: 60; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 263). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1922, the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established. Collectivization was met by fierce resistance in the 1930s, countered by harsh repression (Minahan 2002: 1633; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 263). In-migration reduced the Yakuts to a minority within their own homeland over the course of the 20th century. Despite their minority status, the Yakuts dominated the regional government (Fondahl 1997: 212-213), and the Yakut's population share increased again after 1989, now comprising a relative majority within Yakutia (Minority Rights Group International). Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s included a couple of concessions to Yakutia. In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, including increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently Sakha attained official status in Yakutia, along with Russian (and some other languages of indigenous groups in those regions where they are concentrated). Since the law was adopted in April and the movement only emerged in September, we code this as a prior concession. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Mikhail Nikolayev, the former parliamentary chairman, turned out victorious from the elections. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of the regions. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutia) initially refused to sign the treaty, signing it only after they were given special concessions, including a special regime with regard to their contribution to the federal budget. Two republics – Tatarstan and Chechnya – refused to sign the treaty altogether. Note: there was a second concession in 1992. In 1992, Moscow signed an agreement with Yakutia that granted Yakhutia 32 per cent of the resource rents from diamonds and 11.5 per cent of the resource rents for gold (Fondahl 1997: 213). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* In April 1994 Yeltsin issued a decree denouncing the persecution of ethnic Yakuts under Stalin (MAR). This is difficult to reconcile with our concept of a concession, and hence not coded.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first republic to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994 (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170; Minahan 2002: 1860). In 1995 Sakha (Yakutia) became the fifth republic to sign a power-sharing agreement with Moscow. The agreement included increased spending autonomy, exemption from the Russian privatization program, and financial concessions (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 263; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1995: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Yakutia had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Under the Soviets, the ethnic entities (in particular the ASSRs) had a certain measure of power, especially under Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117); they retained a certain measure of autonomy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see above). The Yakuts have dominated the regional government (Fondahl 1997: 212-213). [1990-2010: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sakhas |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Yakuts |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36536000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.001; 1992-2012: 0.003]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1630), approx. 75% of the 520,000 Yakuts lives Yakutia in northeastern Russia, a vast and sparsely populated area where the Yakuts make up a relative majority of the population with 42%.
* Census figures suggest a similar conclusion, though also a somewhat lower number of Yakuts and, importantly, that the share of Yakuts in the area has increased tremendously since the end of the Cold War. According to the 1989 census, 96% of the 382,000 Yakuts lived in Yakutia, where they made up 33% of the population. According to the 2002 census, 97% of the 444,000 Yakuts lived in Yakutia, where they made up 46% of the population. And according to the 2010 census, 97% of the 478,000 Yakuts lived in Yakutia, where they made up 49.9% of the population. Based on the 2010 census, the threshold for spatial concentration is (almost) met, even if we consider Yakutia as a whole. This is mainly due to Russian outmigration. The number of Russians in the region fell from 550,000 in 1989 to 391,000 in 2002 to 353,000 in 2010.
* We also checked district level census figures, finding that the Yakuts primarily settle in a spatially contiguous area including both western and central areas of the republic. According to 2002 figures, the Yakuts make up an absolute majority in a total of 16 districts, a plurality in another three districts, and a significant minority in another three (see below). Combining these districts, we get a spatially contiguous area in which 66% of all Yakuts lived and where they make up 78% of the local population. We could not find district level data for 1989, but given the high level of concentration in this area, the threshold was likely also met in 1989. [concentrated]
  + Absolute majority
    - Abyysky district: 81% out of 5,000
    - Amginsky district: 91% out of 17,000
    - Verkhnevilyuisk Ulus district: 98% out of 21,000
    - Verkhoyansky district: 70% out of 14,000
    - Vilyuysky district: 83% out of 25,000
    - Gorny district: 95% out of 11,000
    - Kobyaysky district: 65% out of 14,000
    - Megino-Kangalassky district: 91% out of 31,000
    - Moma district: 70 % out of 5,000
    - Namsky district: 96% out of 22,000
    - Nyurbinsky district: 85% out of 25,000
    - Suntarsky district: 93% out of 25,000
    - Tattinsky district: 95% out of 17,000
    - Ust-Aldan Ulus district: 98% out of 22,000
    - Khangalassky district: 60% out of 35,000
    - Churapcha district: 97% out of 20,000
  + Plurality
    - Allaikhovsky district: 40% out of 3,000
    - Anabarsky district: 27% out of 4,000
    - Ust-Yansky district: 38% out of 10,000
  + Significant minority
  + Olenyoksky district: 32% out of 4,000
  + Olyokminskydistrict: 42% out of 27,000
  + Tomponsky district: 30% out of 14,000

**Kin**

* No kin according to MAR/EPR. No evidence found in other sources either (in particular Minahan 202). [no kin]

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## Shapsugs

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* There existed a Shapsug national district between 1924 and 1945. In 1990 the first congress of the Shapsug people (ca. 10-12,000 people) was organized. The congress called for the re-establishment of their autonomous status in the Tuapse area in Krasnodar Krai in southwestern Russia. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990 (Goble 2011; Ormrod 1997).
* In 1993, the third Congress of the Shapsug people was held in Sochi, whereupon calls for autonomy within Krasnodar Krai were repeated (Ormrod 1997: 137).
* Shapsug self-determination gained a new impetus in 2007 when Sochi, a part of historically Circassian lands, was chosen as a site for Winter Olympics. Initially, claims focused on recognition of the Russian Empire’s genocide of the Circassian people. However, in 2008, Circassian organisations in the Caucasus, including Shapsug, and demanded the reunification of the Circassian (Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug) lands and the creation of a united Circassian autonomous region within Russia (Kabard 2019; Shazzo 2008). We associate pan-Circassian mobilization with the individual groups to avoid repetition of the same/similar claims.
* Goble (2011) notes that Shapsug representatives repeated their demand for the formation of an autonomous district within Krasnodar Krai at a pan-Circassian congress (that is including Adyge, Cherkess, and Kabard representatives) in 2011. In 2018, the leadership of “Adyge Khase” in Krasnodar Krai reiterated the demands for an autonomous district (Gritsevich and Krasnov 2018). Hence, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1990 the Shapsug began to agitate for the restoration of their autonomous district within Krasnodar Krai (Ormrod 1997: 137; Goble 2011; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 161). No other claim was found. Since the restoration of the autonomous district would not imply complete separation from Krasnodar Krai, we code a claim for autonomy. The autonomous district claim continued throughout the 2010s (Gritsevich and Krasnov 2018). [1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Shapsug people is the Tuapse area in Krasnodar Krai in southwestern Russia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Shapsugs number around 10-12,000 and are located in today’s Krasnodar Krai in the region around Sochi (Ormrod 1997: 137; Goble 2011). In 1924 a Shapsug autonomous raion (district) was established. In 1945 the Shapsug’s autonomous status was abolished.

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Shapsugs |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* |  |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* |  |

**Power access**

* The Shapsugs were powerless throughout. [1990-2012: powerless]

**Group size**

* The Shapsugs number around 10-12,000 (Ormrod 1997: 137; Goble 2011; note that census figures are lower with approx. 4,000). According to the 1989 census the USSR had about 287 million inhabitants. [1990-1991: 0.00004]
* According to Russia’s 2002 census, Russia had a population of approximately 145.2 million according to 2002 census. [1992-2020: 0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* We could not find exact figures, but it is near impossible that the threshold for territorial concentration is met. The Shapsugs, who number approx. 10-12,000, primarily reside in the region around Sochi; more specifically and according to census figures in the Sochi city district and the adjacent Tuapse district. According to the 2002 census, the two districts have a population of approx. 333,000 and 61,000, respectively. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Shapsugs form a subbranch of the Circassian people (Goble 2011). According to the UNPO, there are people of Circassian descent in particular in Turkey (estimated at up to several million). While many Circassians have assimilated, there appears to be a certain level of ethnic identification among at least some of the Circassians in Turkey (Ayhan 2005). [1990-1991: kin in neighboring country; 1992-2012: kin in non-adjoining country]

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## Siberians

Activity: 1988-2020

**General notes**

* The term “Siberians” as employed here relates to Slavs in the Siberian region, which according to Minahan (2002: 1708) comprises Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Kurgan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, and Chita Oblast (the latter is now the Zabaykalsky Krai), Altai and Krasnoyarsk Krai, as well as several ethnic regions – the Republics of Altai, Buryat, Khakass, and Tuva.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Siberian national movement, dormant for decades, reemerged in 1988 with demands that Siberia should become the sixteenth union republic (Minahan 2002: 1712). The start date of the movement is pegged at 1988.
* After the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the movement’s principle demand changed to republican status within the new Russian Federation (see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 216). More militant groups debated the issue of Siberian independence.
* The movement was ongoing as of 2020 based on news sources (e.g., Eurasian Hub 2013; Goble 2011, 2013). For example, in August 2014, Novosibirsk activists planned a “March for the federalization of Siberia" (Podrabinek 2014). [start date: 1988; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1708), the Siberian movement initially demanded the creation of Siberia as the sixteenth union republic, implying separation from Russia (known as the RSFSR at the time). After the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the movement’s principle demand changed to republican status within the new Russian Federation (see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 216). More militant groups debated the issue of Siberian independence, but calls for independence have remained limited in numbers. Increased autonomy continues to be the dominant claim (see Goble 2013). Autonomy claims continued in the 2010s (Podrabinek 2014). [1988-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There appears to be secessionist sentiment. For example, Minahan (2016: 381) suggests that according to Siberian nationalists, 25–30 percent supported full independence in 2015, 60–70 percent wanted greater autonomy, and about 10 percent were satisfied with the status quo. Furthermore, Minahan (2002: 1712) suggests that there was a debate around independence in the 1990s. Yet, we found little in terms of an organized movement for independence (also see Roth 2015: 169). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Siberian claims concern eight Oblasts (Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Kurgan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, and Chita Oblast, which is today the Zabaykalsky Krai), two Krais (Altai and Krasnoyarsk Krai), and multiple ethnic regions (the Republics of Altai, Buryat, Khakass, and Tuva) in present-day Russia (Minahan 2002: 1708). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk Oblast unilaterally declared republican status in 1993 (as the East Siberian Republic), a status implying increased autonomy (Teague 1994: 45; Ross 2002: 24-25). [1993: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* We code changes in the self-determination status of ten of the fourteen regions as concessions/restrictions (Chita, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Kurgan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, and Tyumen Oblast, and Altai and Krasnoyarsk Krai). Changes with regards to the status of the Autonomous Okrugs (i.e., ethnic/non-Russia territories) located within these territories are not coded (e.g. Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug) since these are better seen as concessions/restrictions to the respective titular nationalities/ethnic minorities.
* We were unable to identify concessions or restrictions in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession. Since the concession was made in December 1988, it is more likely than not that the concession occurred after the SDM’s start date. [1988: autonomy concession]
* In 1989 Moscow initiated a modest decentralization reform (Solnick 1996: 224), but it seems that this initiative was limited to union republics and autonomous republics (Gorbachev 1999: 99). Siberia’s non-ethnic regions hence appear unaffected.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + Probably as a reward for the local governor’s support in the 1993 stand-off between Yeltsin and the Parliament, Yeltsin subsequently allowed gubernatorial elections in Irkutsk oblast. In 1994, Yuri Nozhikov was elected as Irkutsk Oblast’s first directly elected governor (Zlotnik 1997: 184). Given the temporary nature of a moratorium, we do not code a concession.
  + In 1995, Yeltsin allowed for gubernatorial elections in selected non-ethnic entities, including Novosibirsk (winners in brackts: Vitali Mukha), Omsk Oblast (Leonid Polezhaev), and Tomsk Oblast (Viktor Kress; Orttung et al. 2000: 391, 399, 551). Later, but still in 1995, Yeltsin lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections altogether (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). In 1996 gubernatorial elections were held in Altai Krai (Aleksandr Suriko) and in Chita oblast (Ravil Geniatulin; Orttung et al. 2000: 17, 91). Also in Kurgan Oblast, the first gubernatorial elections were held in 1996, from which Oleg Bogomolov turned victorious (Orttung et al. 291). In 1997 gubernatorial elections were held in Kemerovo Oblast (Aman Tuleev) and in Tyumen Oblast (Leonid Roketskii; Orttung et al. 2000: 217, 573). And in 1998, Aleksandr Lebed, the former military commander involved in both the Transdniestrian and the Chechen War, was elected as Krasnoyarsk Krai’s first directly elected governor in 1998 (Orttung et al. 2000: 281). Given the temporary nature of a moratorium, we do not code a concession.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). However, the constitution appears to have left untouched the autonomy of non-ethnic regions.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). In May 1996 Moscow signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty with Irkutsk Oblast and Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug, which is located in and sub-ordinated to Irkutsk (Orttung et al. 2000: 141; Söderlund 2006: 94). Also in May 1996, Yeltsin signed a power-sharing treaty with Omsk Oblast (Orttung et al. 2000: 401; Söderlund 2006: 94). In November, Altai Krai also signed a power-sharing agreement (Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]
* Krasnoyarsk Krai signed a bilateral treaty in November 1997, together with Taimyr and Evenk Autonomous Okrugs (both sub-ordinated to Krasnoyarsk; (Orttung et al. 2000: 286; Söderlund 2006: 94). Kemerovo Oblast did not sign a bilateral treaty, but there were negotiations and Moscow offered a power-sharing treaty in 1997. Kemerovo Oblast rejected the offer, allegedly since it would have conferred too many powers on the region (Orttung et al. 2000: 216). [1997: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* Following a 2005 referendum, the Evenk Autonomous Okrug and the Taymyr Autonomous Okrug were merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International). The two ethnic regions had previously been sub-ordinated to Krasnoyarsk, but had retained certain powers. This could be coded as a concession, but we consider this too ambiguous.
* Following 2006 and 2007 referendums , in 2008, the Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug was merged with Irkutsk Oblast, and the Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug with Chita Oblast to form Zabaykalsky Krai (Minority Rights Group International). This could be coded as a concession, but we consider this too ambiguous.
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). However, direct elections of governors were scrapped only in North Caucasus. In the rest of Russia, including Siberia, regional elections were not affected as of 2020 (Regnum 2022).

**Regional autonomy**

* The Siberian entities (as of 1991 federal subjects of Russia) have invariably enjoyed regional autonomy, though the extent of autonomy varied over the years (see above). [1988-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Siberians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* In 1988-1991, the last years the Soviet Union existed, EPR codes the Russians as senior partner and the Ukrainians as junior partner. In all remaining years, the Russians are coded as dominant. The Siberians have rather limited access to central state power compared to European Russians. Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai). Moreover, key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). However, also under Yeltsin key government posts like the prime ministry were filled by European Russians (e.g., Viktor Chernomyrdin, the longest-acting prime minister under Yeltsin, is from Orsk south of the Ural mountains). Hence, we code the Siberians as powerless throughout, though noting that this case would profit from more in-depth research. [1988-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1708) the Siberians numbered approximately 20.5 million in 2002. We combine this figure with the Soviet Union’s 1989 census (total population of 287 millions) for 1988-1991 and with Russia’s 2002 population (145.2 million according to 2002 census) for the remaining years. [1988-1991: 0.0714; 1992-2020: 0.1412]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 81% of Russia’s Siberians lives in the Siberian region, where they form an absolute majority with 73% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 1708). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* For 1992 onwards, Siberian Russians in Kazakhstan can be considered ethnic kin according to Minahan (2002: 1708). According to Minahan, there are “large” Siberian communities in Kazakhstan; he does not give exact figures, but given the size of the Russian community in Kazakhstan (4-6 million), the numeric threshold is likely met.
* For 1988-1991, we do not code kin. We do not code ethnic Russians outside of the USSR (Russian Jews in Israel) as kin because this is a movement by ethnic Russians that was directed against a Russian-dominated government (i.e. the government of the USSR). [1988-1991: no kin; 1992-2020: kin in adjacent country]

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## South Ossetians

Activity: 1988-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1478) and Minorites at Risk, the South Ossetians began to demand unification with North Ossetia in 1988. South Ossetia at the time was part of the Georgian union republic and North Ossetia part of the Russian union republic, today’s Russian Federation. We code the start date in 1988.
* In October 1989 South Ossetian activists, organized into the Popular Front of South Ossetia, called for an end to the official use of Russian and Georgian and demanded a revision of Ossetia’s status from an Autonomous Region to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a measure that would significantly increase the territory’s independence from authorities in Tbilisi
* The movement remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Gurr 2000: Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 110f, 254ff, 277f; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 431ff, 2002: 1474ff; MAR; also see South Ossetians under Georgia). [start date: 1988; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* Minorities at Risk argues that in the early phases of the movement, South Ossetians lobbied for separation from Georgian jurisdiction and merger with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation. George (2009: 110), in contrast, suggests that the initial demand was more modest and involved increased autonomy from Tbilisi only, and not outright separation. In particular, in November 1989, the South Ossetian congress requested an upgrade from the Autonomous Oblast status to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (George 2009: 110). The more modest demand appears to have radicalized in September 1990, when the South Ossetian parliament called for union with North Ossetia, and thus the Russian federation (Jones 1997: 513, 536; Jones 2013: 45; Kahn 2000: 60). In light of this evidence, we code a claim for increased autonomy in 1988-1990 and a claim for sub-state secession in 1991 in accordance with the first of January rule. [1988-1990: autonomy claim; 1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the South Ossetians is the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, today a territory in northern Georgia (Wheatley 2017: 46). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 174: also see UNCS 2015).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Jones (2013: 237) the South Ossetian Soviet declared South Ossetia an Autonomous Republic and established South Ossetian as the state language in November 1989. George (2009: 110), in contrast, suggests that the South Ossetian Congress requested rather than declared an upgrade from the Autonomous Oblast status to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. We follow Jones and code a declaration in 1989, though noting that this code is somewhat ambiguous. [1989: autonomy declaration]
* In September 1990, the South Ossetian Regional Soviet declared sovereignty, the establishment of a Soviet Democratic Republic of South Ossetia, and called for its incorporation into the USSR (Jones 1997: 513, 536; Jones 2013: 45; Kahn 2000: 60; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 277). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There is no evidence for separatist violence under the header of the USSR, thus a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1922 South Ossetia was awarded Autonomous Oblast status (Jones 1997: 509). From the 1930s, there was a policy of Georgianization vis-à-vis the ethnic minorities. Most minority rights were restored after Stalin’s death in 1953, but from the 1960s there was a policy of affirmative action. By the 1980s, South Ossetians dominated the local party structures (Jones 2013: 44-45).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections to party secretaryships and legislatures at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Since the concession occurred in December, it is more likely than not that it was after the SDM’s start date. [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* While it led to decentralization at the Union level, in Georgia, perestroika initiated a phase of Georgianization, with several policies that explicitly discriminated against minorities. In particular, in August 1989, Georgia publishes measures designed to increase the use of the Georgian language in all spheres of life (MAR). Georgia was one of only three Republics where the language of the titular language had had official status already prior to perestroika, but still this law constitutes a restriction since it made Georgian the only official language throughout Georgia (Wolff n.d.). According to George (2009: 110), the law made the use of Georgian mandatory for all administrative, party, and policy organs. According to Jones (2013: 35, 45, 48-49), the program was designed to increase the status of Georgian throughout the region, and implied a requirement of proficiency of Georgian for state employment also in autonomous entities. April 14 was made the Georgian language day. Thus, the 1989 language law restricted the language rights of ethnic minorities within Georgia, and we code a cultural rights restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* There were other measures in the direction of Georgianization, including programs for the promotion of Georgian history and the defense of historical monuments. A republican army was created, comprised by Georgians only. There was a policy of resettling Georgians to minority areas. An electoral law that was adopted in 1989 effectively prohibited ethnic, regionally-based parties from running in the elections (Jones 1997: 511-512). However, these measures do not change the self-determination status as defined in the codebook.
* In December 1990 the Georgian Soviet abolished the autonomous status of South Ossetia and its parliament, and imposed military rule over the territory. The South Ossetian parliament continued to operate illegally (Jones 1997: 536; George 2009: 110-111; Jones 2013: 45; Minority Rights Group International). [1990: autonomy restriction]
* The Union government intervend in January 1991 and revoked both South Ossetia’s decision to separate from Georgia and Georgia’s revocation of South Ossetia’s autonomous status (Peters 1995: 210). Georgia refused to comply; South Ossetia’s autonomous status was not re-established. Thus, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* South Ossetia had the status of an Autonomous Oblast until December 1990, when the Georgian Soviet abolished the autonomous status of South Ossetia (Jones 1997: 509, 536; George 2009: 110-111; Jones 2013: 45). While the AO status is clearly not at the top of the hierarchies in the Soviet multi-layered federal system, ethnic entities had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the South Ossetians as regionally autonomous in 1988-1990 in accordance with the first of January rule. [1988-1990: autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1990: abolishment of territorial autonomy]
* In 1991, South Ossetia became part of Georgia, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | South Ossetians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Ossetes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36527000 |

**Power access**

* From 1988-1991, the South Ossetians form part of EPR’s Ossetes, which also includes the North Ossetians located in Russia’s North Ossetia. The Ossetes are coded as powerless, which applies to both North Ossetians and South Ossetians. [1988-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the Soviet Union’s 1989 census, there were 164,000 Ossetians in the Georgian SSR. The USSR’s total population is estimated at approximately 287 million [1988-1991: 0.0006]

**Regional concentration**

* Note: until 1991 there were also Ossetians in the RSFSR; these are treated separately, see “North Ossetians”. What we understand by South Ossetians here is Ossetians in the former Georgian SSR.
* Information on the South Ossetians’ spatial concentration is contradictory. According to Minahan (2002: 1474) there are approx. 170,000 South Ossetians in Georgia, concentrated in the de-facto entity of South Ossetia and adjacent areas. Approx. 60,000 South Ossetians live in the separatist entity according to Minahan, where they make up 63% of the local population (as we will see, Minahan appears to report the figures from the 1989 census). MAR, on the other hand, suggests that most South Ossetians reside in South Ossetia, both in 1990 (see gc7 in phase I-IV release) and in recent years (see GC7 in phase V release).
* Our own research suggests that the South Ossetians cannot be considered spatially concentrated according to our rules before 1991, but thereafter. According to the Soviet 1989 census, there were approx. 165,000 Ossetians in the Georgian SSR, 65,000 of them in the former South Ossetian autonomous oblast, and they made up approx. 66% of the local population (Sordia 2009: 6). The evidence we collected suggests that the remaining approx. 100,000 Ossetians in Georgia mostly lived dispersed across Georgia. The largest community was in Tbilisi, the capital, with approx. 30,000. Other areas with higher concentrations of Ossetians include Borjomi and Akhmeta districts, each with about 10-15% Ossetians. Both these districts are not adjacent to South Ossetia. It has to be noted that there was a somewhat higher concentration in a number of districts adjacent to South Ossetia: Gori, Kaspi, and Qareli, though the Ossetians made up only 10-15% of the local population in these districts (Bondyrev et al. 2015: 35). Nevertheless, though we cannot be 100% sure, this suggests that the double 50% rule was not fulfilled before the war (i.e. we cannot fully preclude the possibility that there is an area consisting of South Ossetia plus some adjacent areas that would fulfil the criteria, but this appears unlikely).
* The situation changed as a result of the war that began in 1991 (Sordia 2009: 6). Many South Ossetians left Georgia, mostly for Russia (North Ossetia, in particular). Few returned after the war. The 2002 census in Georgia counted but 40,000 Ossetians (not counting South Ossetia). The number has become yet smaller as a result of the 2008 war. At the same time, many Georgians left South Ossetia as a result of the war (Sammut & Cvetkovski 1996). Though no reliable census data is available for South Ossetia, the assumption is safe that there is spatial concentration since the war that broke out in 1991. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The South Ossetians have transnational kin in Russia (Ossetians), but only since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 (see EPR; Minahan 2002: 1474). We found no other kin (see e.g. MAR). [no kin]

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## Tajiks

Activity: 1990-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The movement for the sovereignty of the Tajik Soviet Republic emerged in August 1990 when the Tajik Democratic Party was formed to push for Tajik sovereignty within a framework of confederal states. This movement ended with the independence of Tajikistan in 1991 (Atkin 1997; Banks et al. 1997; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 287f; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; MAR). [start date: 1990; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* Tajik nationalist organizations sprang up in the last days of the Soviet Union. According to Atkin (1997: 606), the common themes included sovereignty, but not outright independence, even in 1991. Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1990-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Tajiks consists of present-day Tajikistan (previously the Tajik SSR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Tajik SSR declared its sovereignty on August 25, 1990 (Kahn 2000: 60; August 24, 1990, according to Atkin 1997: 628). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* The Tajik SSR declared its independence shortly after the August Coup, on September 9, 1991. This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and the declaration thus cannot be considered unilateral.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the 1920s, the Soviet territories in Central Asia were sub-divided into several nationally defined republics, as part of a policy of ‘national delimitation’. Tajikistan became an ASSR in 1924, under the administration of the Uzbek SSR. In 1929, Tajikistan was separated from Uzbekistan and was awarded full Union Republic status (Atkin 1997: 605). Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952).
* The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).
* The Gorbachev era saw further decentralization, with the introduction of contested, multi-party elections throughout the Union in 1988 (however, the 1990 legislative elections in Tajikistan were nonetheless uncontested, see Atkin 1997: 610) and a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels in 1989 (Suny 1993: 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99). [1988, 1989: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, following the example of the Baltic Republics, in July 1989 the government of the Tajik SSR adopted a language law which gave Tajik primacy over Russian as the state language, even if it did not exclude the use of Russian. The law also called for the adoption of Tajik, rather than Russian or Russianized, personal and place names (Atkin 1997: 628). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. We treat this as a prior concession since the movement emerged in August 1990 and the law was adopted in April. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* There were two further measures in 1990 to be mentioned. These measures affected all union republics and (only the second) all autonomous republics. First, April 3, 1990, a new law on secession was enacted, that made it more difficult for union republics to secede (Brown 1996: 289). Also, the Supreme Soviet reaffirms the supremacy of union law. If at all, this had limited consequences for the autonomy status, and we do not code this. Second, April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Prior to this, only autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 30), “the implication was that the union republics and they alone had entered the USSR voluntarily and therefore retained some kind of right to leave. The apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a restriction of the sovereignty of union republics. At the same time, we do not code this as a concession to ASSRs. Note that it was this policy which motivated Yeltsin to proclaim that “the autonomous [sub-units] can take as much sovereignty as they can swallow. We can agree to all of that. But they will have independently to answer, of course, for the well-being of their people. We make one condition: they will have to take part in a federation treaty with Russia. I underline: we will not let anyone pull Russia down” (Dunlop 1997: 36). Note that while tolerating sovereignty demands, Yeltsin also had a strong focus on the consolidation of central government power (George 2009: 55).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, and Tajikistan’s independence officially recognized. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Under Gorbachev, there was further decentralization. Hence, we code the Tajiks as regionally autonomous throughout. [1990-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Tajikistan became independent. [1991: independence]
* Furthermore, some Tajiks became part of Uzbekistan. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tajiks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tajiks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36519000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.007]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Tajiks were located in the Tajik SSR, and most of the rest in the Uzbek SSR. In the Tajik SSR, the Tajiks made up more than 60% of the local population according to the 1989 census (Atkin 1997: 605, 608). This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Both EPR and MAR code ethnic kin due to the Tajiks in Afghanistan and China, as well as the Persians in Iran (only EPR). [kin in adjoining country]

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## Tatars

Activity: 1988-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the summer of 1988, the Tatar Social Center was formed, a Tatar nationalist organization dedicated to Tatar sovereignty and self-determination. 1988 is therefore coded as the start date of the movement. The Center held its first congress in February 1989 and announced its support for increased sovereignty for the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 183).
* In September 1990 the legislature of the Tatar ASSR declared sovereignty and in 1992 Tatarstan approved a constitution that described the republic as being on an equal footing with the Russian Federation. News reports indicate that the Tatars have continued their campaign for political autonomy as of 2012.
* Tatars are represented by a variety of groups within Tatarstan, including the Ittifak Party, the Tatar National Congress, and the All-Tatar Public Centre. The Ittifak Party and the Tatar National Congress advocate independence, and some members advocate independence as an Islamic state. The All-Tatar Public Center, while formerly advocating independence, has softened its stance and now advocates increased autonomy for Tatarstan, especially greater control over economic resources. These organizations have enjoyed relative freedom to organize in Tatarstan in the 1990s and 2000s (Azatlyk 2008; Curtis 1998; Frank & Wixman 1997; Georgia Times 2013; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 254ff, 292f, 323f; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002: 1856ff; MAR).
* The All-Tatar Public Center remained active throughout the 2010s, although its activists were systematically harassed. In June 2022, the Supreme Court of Tatarstan ruled to liquidate the All-Tatar Public Center on extremism charges (Antonov 2022, Jamal 2021). In 2015, there were protests with demands for Tatarstan’s sovereignty, education in Tatar language and the freeing of Rafis Kashapov, a prominent nationalist who had been sentenced for three years (MRGI).
* In addition, Tatars in the neighboring Bashkortostan have also called for autonomy within Bashkortostan or even a merger with Tatarstan (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 38). [start date: 1988; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* What constitutes the dominant claim of Tatars is somewhat ambiguous. There are organizations in Tatarstan that aim for increased autonomy, and others for outright independence (e.g. Ittifak, All-Tatar Social Center). In the early 1990s there were demonstrations for independence in Kazan, Tatarstan's capital (Minahan 2002: 1860; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 293). In addition, Tatars in the neighboring Bashkortostan have also called for autonomy within Bashkortostan or even a merger with Tatarstan (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 38).
* However, since the Republican leadership was the most important player in the movement, we base our coding on the claims made by the Republican leadership, in particular the long-term president, Mintimer Shaimiyev. Shaimiyev repeatedly insisted that Tatarstan does aim at increased autonomy, but not independence from Russia (George 2009: 58, 62; MAR). The 1990 sovereignty declaration was very close to declaring outright independence, but did not. The declaration upgraded Tatarstan's status to Union Republic, and it was stressed that Tatarstan would remain within the Soviet Union. In another act of brinkmanship, Tatarstan in May 1991 indicated that it planned to sign the new Union Treaty, albeit under the condition that it is granted Union Republic status (George 2009: 62). Minahan (2002: 1860) gives further evidence for a claim for full Union Republic status, hence we code a claim for sub-state secession in 1988-1991. [1988-1991: claim for sub-state secession]
* After Russia’s independence in late 1991, a claim for sub-state secession is no longer logically possible since Tatarstan became a first-order province. In March 1992 there was a self-determination referendum organized in Tatarstan. What was actually voted on is ambiguous. The ballot question asked whether Tatarstan should be a sovereign state, a subject of international law that regulates its relations with Russia on the basis of bilateral treaties. Moscow was infuriated, arguing that the referendum was on outright secession, but the Tatarstan leadership was quick to argue that the referendum did not involve outright secession, and that a yes vote would not lead to a violation of Russia's integrity. The referendum passed, with 61.4 per cent voting yes. The subsequently adopted 1992 constitution defines Tatarstan as a sovereign state, a subject of international law that is associated with the Russian Federation (George 2009: 63). With the signing of the bilateral treaty in 1994, claims for outright independence lost ground. Given the repeated insistence of the Tatar leadership that Tatarstan does not aim at independence, we code a claim for increased autonomy throughout. This is supported by Minority Rights Group International, which notes that the main nationalist drive has not been for full independence, but rather for maximal autonomy within Russia (for a dissenting opinion, see Treisman 1997). Increased autonomy remained the main demand in the 2000s and 2010s (Antonov 2022; Jamal 2021; MRGI). [1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Several organized actors made claims for outright independence in the movement’s initial phase including Ittifak, which was formed in 1990, and the All-Tatar Social Center, which was formed in 1988. In the early 1990s there were demonstrations for independence in Kazan, Tatarstan's capital (Minahan 2002: 1860; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 293). Yet, after the signing of the bilateral treaty in 1994, claims for outright independence lost ground. Yet, the All-Tatar Social Center (also: All-Tatar Public Center) remained active at least until 2022, when the party was forbidden by the Russian government for extremism. Ittifak also appears to have remained active. Roth (2015: 149) also suggests that a small independence was active at the time of his writing. [start date: 1988; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Tatars is the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia’s Volga Federal District (Roth 2015: 149f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Only a few days after Yeltsin's visit to Tatarstan, where he famously proclaimed that Russia's regions should take 'as much sovereignty as they can swallow', the Tatarstan ASSR declared sovereignty on August 30, 1990, and thereby unilaterally upgraded its status to union republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 168, 183; Ross 2002: 20-21; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 293) suggest that Tatarstan declared independence in 1991 (Minahan 2016: 485 suggests 1992), but we found no corroborating case study evidence and do not code this.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Tatarstan was conquered by Ivan IV (or Ivan the Terrible) in 1552, and has remained with Russia ever since. The Tatars allegedly are descendants of the Volga Bulgarians, who converted to Islam in the early tenth century and remain overwhelmingly Muslim as of today. The Tatars speak a Turkic language related to modern Kazakh and Crimean Tatar (Frank & Wixman 1997: 146).
* It was in the Volga region (where Tatars are located) where the Soviets first established their policy of division, or national delimitation, which was later applied throughout Muslim regions of the USSR (Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Northern Caucasus). The aim of national delimitation was to create a number of ethnic entities large enough to maintain distinct ethnic identity, but small enough to be controlled by Moscow (Frank & Wixman 1997: 149).
* At the time there was a strong pan-Turkic movement. The Bashkir ASSR became the first ethnically based entity in March 1919. The Tatar ASSR was created in 1920 (Frank & Wixman 1997: 149), despite an earlier promise of Union Republic status (Minority Rights Group International).
* The newly established borders led to strong antagonism between Bashkir and Tatars given that Ufa, a district and town inhabited mostly by Tatars, was assigned to the Bashkir ASSR rather than the Tatar ASSR (Frank & Wixman 1997: 151).
* Despite the promise of autonomy, subsequent years saw significant centralization (George 2009: 59). Under Soviet rule, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan became major industrial centers, leading to substantial economic growth, helped also by the discovery of oil and natural gas. Economic growth led to the in-migration of ethnic Slavs into the Volga region. Some groups became minorities in their own entity (e.g., the Bashkir, Mordvinians, the Maris, and the Komi). By contrast, the Tatars remained a relative majority in Tatarstan, though with a substantial Russian minority (Frank & Wixman 1997: 163-164). There was strong Russification.
* The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet changed the USSR’s 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises.” In line with this, according to Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144), the newly formed Congress of Deputies beginning in 1989 enacted a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (like Tatarstan).[[7]](#footnote-7) [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently Tatar attained official status in Tatarstan. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. In Tatarstan, there were regional presidential elections in 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction, and since Tatarstan never had a representative assigned to it.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Bashkortostan and Sakha initially refused to sign the treaty, signing it only after they were given special concessions, including a special regime with regard to their contribution to the federal budget. Two republics – Tatarstan and Chechnya – refused to sign the treaty altogether. Even if Tatarstan refused to sign the Federal Treaty, Moscow was willing to offer a significant autonomy concession. Hoping for a yet better deal, Tatarstan organized a referendum on its sovereignty in March 1992. The referendum passed, with 62.2% voting yes upon a turnout of 82%. Note: the relatively low yes-share has to be seen in the context of the high number of Russians living there). The subsequently adopted 1992 constitution defines Tatarstan as a sovereign state, a subject of international law that is associated with the Russian Federation (George 2009: 63). After the referendum, Russia recognised the ‘special relations’ with Tatarstan and accepted Tatarstan’s constitution (Peters 1995: 205). Furthermore, in November 1992, Russia and Tatarstan signed an agreement by which Tatarstan was allowed to retain half of its oil revenue (George 2009: 66). Hence, we code an autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first republic to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994 (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170; Minahan 2002: 1860; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1994: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* Tatarstan ignored the June 2002 deadline to annul treaties that violated federal legislation. It also missed a September 2001 deadline to bring Tatarstan's Constitution and laws into conformity with the Russian Constitution and federal legislation. In 2005, a new bilateral treaty was signed between Tatarstan and Moscow, despite Putin's earlier intention to abolish all bilateral power-sharing agreements. The new treaty reduced Tatarstan's powers relative to the 1994 agreement, but preserved Tatarstan's special status (Minority Rights Group International; Radio Free Europe 2005). This is coded as a concession since Putin had originally aimed to abolish all bilateral treaties. [2005: autonomy concession]
* In 2007, Moscow granted Tatarstan stronger control over economic, environmental, cultural, and other issues (Minority Rights Group International). Tatarstan's amount of autonomy continues to be smaller compared to the 1994 agreement, but still this constitutes a concession. [2007: autonomy concession]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). However, direct elections of governors were scrapped only in North Caucasus. In the rest of Russia, including Tatarstan, regional elections were not affected (Regnum 2022).
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In July 2017, Moscow announced that it would not be extending the bilateral power-sharing agreement with Tatarstan after it expired in 2017 (MRGI). [2017: autonomy restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* Tatarstan had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Tatarstan has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991, even under Putin (Minority Rights Group International; EPR 2021). [1988-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tatars |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tatars |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36503000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1988-1991: 0.02; 1992-2013: 0.038; 2014-2020: 0.0387]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan, less than 30% of the Tatars lives in Tatarstan, the “core” of their homeland, where they make up a narrow absolute majority of 51%. Census figures are similar. According to the 2010 census, there were 5.3 million Tatars in Russia and approx. 2 million in Tatarstan, where they made up 53% of the population. In other words, only 38% of all Tatars resided in Tatarstan. The largest Tatar community outside of Tatarstan was in adjacent Bashkortostan, where approx. 1 million lives. Across the Bashkort republic, the Tatars made up approx. 25%; the concentration is higher in areas adjacing Tatarstan, but they make up an absolute majority in only few parts. In addition to Bashkortostan, there were large Tatar communities (>100,000) in other parts of the Volga region (e.g. Chelyabinsk and Orenburg oblast), but also in Siberia (Tyumen oblast). In sum, we found no territory that would allow us to code the Tatars as concentrated. [not concentrated]
  + Note: According to the 1989 census the Tatars had only a relative majority in Tatarstan (48.5%) and only later (2002, 2010) this share increased to 53%.

**Kin**

* We found no kin before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but thereafter: Tatars in Kazakhstan (approx. 200,000-300,000) and Tajikistan (approx. 80,000) (see MAR, EPR). There are also Tatars in Uzbekistan (approx. 200,000) and smaller communities in other countries, including Ukraine. Finally, there were approx. 200-250,000 Crimean Tatars in Ukraine; however, the Crimean national movement (i.e., the Mejlis) explicitly rejects “Tatarism”, that is, the idea that there is a pan-Tatar identity and the existence of close ties with Tatars elsewhere (Wilson 2017). [1988-1991: no kin; 1992-2020: kin in adjoining country]

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## Terek Cossacks

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Terek Cossacks are located in the Northern Caucasus in what today is North Ossetia, Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia (Ormrod 1997: 121) as well as Stavropol Krai (Minahan 2002: 1875). After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1918 the Terek Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state. By 1920 the Soviets had taken hold of most of the breakaway region. Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Terek homeland was divided among several regions. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018). The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. Still, the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060).

**Movement start and end dates**

* From the 1990s, Cossack organizations were established throughout Russia, including the Terek homeland. The first national Cossack organization, the Union of Cossacks, was organized in 1990 (Skinner 1994: 1018). Initially, the Cossack national movement was focused on the recognition as a separate people, the reinstatement of Cossack military duties, and a cultural revitalization. But soon also claims for increased territorial self-determination were made. In 1991, a Terek organization proposed the establishment of an autonomous Terek republic (Minahan 2002: 1880). Hence, we code 1991 as the start date of the movement.
* Toje (2006: 1058) reports that the Cossack movements’ level of mobilization decreased over the next good decade, but the movement retained some activity. In 1999, a Terek leader reiterated the claim for a Terek Cossack autonomous homeland (Minahan 2002: 1880). July 3, 2010, Don, Kuban, and to demand Cossack autonomy (Bugajski 2010: 40; Goble 2010).
* In 2013 Terek Cossacks petitioned President Putin for territory in the North Caucasus along with other concessions. In 2014, Terek Cossacks submitted a request to change federal laws that regulate the Cossacks’ ability to carry out policing and to reconsider Cossacks funding mechanisms (Regnum 2014). [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Terek Cossack movement claims the establishment of an autonomous Cossack republic, the exact contours of which are unclear. The Terek Cossacks are located in the Northern Caucasus in what today is North Ossetia, Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia (Ormrod 1997: 121) as well as Stavropol Krai (Minahan 2002: 1875). According to Ormrod (1997: 122), Terek Cossack nationalists aim to separate territories from these regions, in particular Ingushetia and Chechnya, to form their own autonomous republic. Demands for a separate autonomous entity continued during the 2000s and 2010s (Minahan 2016: 420; Regnum 2014). Hence, we code a claim for sub-state secession. [1991-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* According to Minahan (2016: 420), some activists also independence in a Cossack federation in the North Caucasus. No other source references secession claims, though, suggesting that independence claims are below the level of political significance required here. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Terek Cossack claims concern their homeland, which lies in the Northern Caucasus and covers territories in North Ossetia, Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Stavropol Krai. We code this claim based on the map shown in Roth (2015: 148).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. The Terek Cossacks were involved in inter-ethnic strife (Minahan 2002: 1880) but inter-ethnic strife is not coded as LVIOLSD. Thus we classify the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017).
* The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Terek Cossacks are located in the Northern Caucasus in what today is North Ossetia, Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia (Ormrod 1997: 121) as well as Stavropol Krai (Minahan 2002: 1875). After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1918 the Terek Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state. By 1920 the Soviets had taken hold of most of the breakaway region. Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Terek homeland was divided among several regions. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Some Cossacks had fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 74; Skinner 1994: 1018).
* The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. Still, the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Terek Cossack movement claims the establishment of an autonomous Cossack republic, the exact contours of which are unclear. The Terek Cossacks are located in the Northern Caucasus in what today is North Ossetia, Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia (Ormrod 1997: 121) as well as Stavropol Krai (Minahan 2002: 1875). According to Ormrod (1997: 122), Terek Cossack nationalists aim to separate territories from these regions, in particular Ingushetia and Chechnya, to form their own autonomous republic. Since the Terek Cossacks do not lay claim on an existing region, since the Terek Cossacks do not have their own ethnic homeland, and since the Terek Cossacks appear not to have significant influence over one of the existing regions (see below), we do not code changes in the sovereignty of any of the existing regions as concessions/restrictions.
* Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks, in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if at all they were implemented (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543). We do not code a concession.
* In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Terek Cossacks). However, he withdrew the plan after a referendum in Karachai-Cherkessia on its unity, which turned out a majority against partition (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76). We do not code this as a concession since Yeltsin’s proposal appears to have never gone beyond planning stage (but one could construct a case for coding it).

**Regional autonomy**

* Contrary to many other groups in Russia, the Terek Cossacks do not have their own autonomous homeland. We found no evidence of them playing a significant role in any of the regional governments of the Northern Caucasus, and hence do not code the Terek Cossacks as regionally autonomous.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Terek Cossacks |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR the Cossacks (or rather: the various Cossack sub-groups) form part of the Russians, which are coded as senior partner in 1991 and dominant thereafter. We found no evidence for Cossack representation in the national cabinet, though this case would profit from more research. [1991-2020: powerless]
  + Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk (which can be seen as part of extended European Russia, even though we code it as part of SE Asia)). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai).
  + Note: key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). However, also under Yeltsin key government posts like the prime ministry were filled by European Russians (see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 304-305, 349, 407).

**Group size**

* The actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (one reason is that many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060). According to Russia’s 2002 census, there are a mere 140,000 Cossacks in Russia (including branches other than the Terek Cossacks). According to Minority Rights Group International, there are at 647,732 Cossacks (including branches other than the Terek Cossacks). For the group size estimate we draw on Minahan (2016: 420), who estimates that the Terek Cossacks alone number 800,000-1,000,000. We combine this figure with the Soviet Union’s 1989 census (total population of 287 millions) for 1991, and with Russia’s 2002 population (145.2 million according to 2002 census) for the remaining years. [1991: 0.003; 1992-2020: 0.0058]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1875) the Terek Cossacks do not form a majority in their homeland in the northern Caucasus region. Minahan provides a detailed estimate of the Terek Cossacks’ population share for Stavropol Krai (24%), where most Terek Cossacks appear to reside. Note: the actual “homeland” also includes parts of North Ossetia, Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* For 1992 onwards: There are Cossack communities also in Kazakhstan; estimated at approx. 300,000 (see the respective entry).
* For 1991: We do not code Russians in other countries as ethnic kin because this is a movement by Cossacks, who typically see themselves also as Russians, against a Russian-dominated government. [1991: no kin; 1992-2012: kin in adjacent country]

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## Trans-Dniester Slavs

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the late 1980s Moldovan nationalists took a series of mostly symbolic steps that were widely perceived as moves toward unification with Romania. The most threatening of these steps to non-Moldovans was legislation passed by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1989 that made Romanian the only official state language and required all officials to demonstrate proficiency in Romanian, even if serving in Gagauz and Russian-speaking communities. In September 1990 the Moldovan Supreme Soviet declared its sovereignty and nullified the transfer of Moldavia from Romania to the USSR by the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
* In response to these moves, Slavs in the Dniester Region began to mobilize for autonomy in 1989 (Sato 2009: 144-146). The Trans-Dniester Slavs created the Dniester Soviet Republic and announced their intention to secede from Moldava in order to rejoin the Soviet Union. Moldova attained independence in 1991, thus we stop coding the movement in 1991, though noting that it continued to be active in Moldova (BBC 2011; Benea 2013; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 192, 256, 296f; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 153ff, 2002: 532ff; MAR; Sato 2009). [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* 1989 the movement began with a claim to separate from Moldova, but remain within the Soviet Union. In 1989-1990 a unilateral referendum was organized on the question of the creation of a fully-fledged Transdniestrian Soviet Republic, and in September 1990 the Dniestr Soviet Republic was self-proclaimed. The demand began to radicalize with the total collapse of the Soviet Union and Moldova becoming independent in the second half of 1991, but this is coded under the header of Moldova. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The movement’s claim relates to the Transnistria region, which lies between the river Dniester and the border to Ukraine (Roth 2015: 128. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* September 2, 1990, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed as a fully-fledged Soviet Republic (Neukirch 2001). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Violence erupted soon after Moldova’s independence, but we found no evidence of separatist violence when Moldova was still part of the Soviet Union. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). However, local choice of leaders had little effect for groups without an autonomous status (like the Trans-Dniester Slavs) as the respective regions’ decision rights were very limited. Hence, this is not coded as a concession.
* In 1989, Moldova’s Supreme Soviet adopted a new language law (Sato 2009: 144; Chinn & Roper 1995: 296-300). Moldovan (using Romanian script) was made the official language. Public officials as well as those with high positions in the private sector were required to acquire facility in both Russian and Romanian by 1994 (later this was postponed to 1997). The law contained compromises, too. Russian was to be used as the language for inter-ethnic relations, and the Gagauz language was to be protected and developed, and was to be the official language alongside Moldovan/Romanian and Russian in areas of Gagauz population (Vahl & Emerson 2004). Still, the law was perceived as a threat by both Slavic and Gagauz minorities, and can be considered a decrease in their cultural rights. The critical provision was that public officials and certain people in the private sector needed to be able to communicate in Romanian within five years (Neukirch 2001). This restriction sparked the movement (see above); hence, we code it as a prior restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* The Moldavian SSR was highly centralized, and Transdniestria cannot be considered regionally autonomous.

**De facto independence**

* Transdniestrian authorities began to disregard Chisinau’s authority in 1990. In February 1991, the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet decided to organize a central bank of Transnistria, which was created in April the same year (Sato 2009: 156). According to Caspersen (2012: 12), Transdniestria is a de-facto (unrecognized) state 1991 onwards. This is coded under the header of Moldova, however.

**Major territorial changes**

* Moldova attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Trans-Dniester Slavs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians; Ukrainians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000; 36502000 |

**Power access**

* The Trans-Dniester Slavs form a regional branch of the ‘Russians’ and the ‘Ukrainians’ in EPR, which are coded as ‘senior partner’ and ‘junior partner’, respectively, in 1989-1991. We found no evidence that the Trans-Dniester Slavs were represented in the Politburo, the Soviet Union’s most important executive organ, during the movement’s activity. We therefore code the group as powerless. [1989-1991: powerless]
  + This coding is ambiguous. European Russians (including Russians from the European part of the RSFSR, Russians from other western union republics, in particular Ukraine), as well as Ukrainians were well represented in the Politburo at the time. It is therefore possible to argue that the Trans-Dniester Slavs were implicitly represented, given especially their small size.

**Group size**

* The Trans-Dniester Slavs are Slavs in the Moldovan SSR located left of the Dniester river (and Bender, a right-bank town which was claimed by Transnistria and has been fully under its control since 1992). According to Minahan (2002: 532), the Trans-Dniester Slavs number around 550,000 (out of Transnistria’s total population of 732,000). Minahan seems to refer to the Soviet Union’s 1989 census and this figure appears to include Bender. Other sources say that Transnistria had a population of about 600,000 in the 1989 census, with 40% ethnic Moldovans. This figure likely does not include Bender, but it still is lower than Minahan’s 732,000. We follow Minahan and use his figure including Bender. According to the 1989 census the USSR had about 287 million inhabitants. [0.0019]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 532), whose figures appear to relate to the situation in 1989 (see above), the vast majority of the Trans-Dniester Slavs resides in Trasndniestria (approx. 90%), where they make up 68% of the local population. [concentrated]
  + Note: While the Transdniester Slavs can be considered concentrated throughout, the Slavs in Moldova as a whole cannot (the Slavs in Transdniestria make up only approx. 45% of all Slavs in Moldova)

**Kin**

* We do not code ethnic Russians outside of the USSR (Russian Jews in Israel) as kin because this is a movement by ethnic Russians that was directed, at least to some extent, against a Russian-dominated government (i.e. the government of the USSR). [no kin]

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## Turkmen

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In September 1989, Agzybirlik was formed, the ‘Society for the Protection of the Turkmen Language’. In addition to language claims, Agzybirlik advocated sovereignty (Suyarkulova 2011: 134). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1989. Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement (Banks et al. 1997). [start date: 1989; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* Turkmen nationalist organizations sprang up in the last days of the Soviet Union. According to Suyarkulova (2011: 134), the common themes included sovereignty, but not outright independence, even in 1991. Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1989-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Turkmen in Russia corresponds to present-day Turkmenistan (previously the Turkmen SSR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Turkmen SSR declared its sovereignty on August 22, 1990 (Kahn 2000: 60; Nissman 1997: 638). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* October 26, 1991, a referendum on independence is held in Turkmenistan, with 94% voting for independent statehood. October 27, 1991, the Turkmen SSR declared independence. This is not coded since by then, the Union had been effectively defunct and the declaration thus was not unilateral as defined in the codebook.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the 1920s, the Soviet territories in Central Asia were sub-divided into several nationally defined republics, as part of a policy of ‘national delimitation’. Turkmenistan was awarded with full Union Republic status in 1924 (Nissman 1997: 635).
* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). In particular, Nissman (1997: 636) notes that Turkmen officials were able to demand more powers in budget and planning matters. Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).
* The Gorbachev era saw further decentralization, with the introduction of contested, multi-party elections throughout the Union in 1988 (Suny 1993: 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Turkmenistan) and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. Note: it is not clear when exactly the concession was made; however, given that the movement emerged only in September 1989, it is more likely than not that the concession was made before the movement’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. In May 1990, the Turkmen SSR adopted a language law which made Turkmen an official language and gave it equal status with Russian (Nissman 1997: 650). [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, and Turkmenistan’s independence officially recognized. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Under Gorbachev, there was further decentralization. Hence, we code the Turkmens as regionally autonomous throughout. [1989-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Turkmenistan became independent. [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Turkmen |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Turkmens |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36525000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.005]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were 2.7 million Turkmen in the Soviet Union. 93% of the Turkmen resided in the Turkmen SSR, where they made up 72% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Turkmen in Afghanistan (approx. 1.5 million according to Ethnologue) and Iran (approx. 2 million) (EPR, MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Tuvans

Activity: 1989-2010

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Tuvan Popular Front was set up in 1989, with some demanding increased autonomy, and others outright secession (Fondahl 1997: 227). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1989.
* In 1992 the Tuvan Popular Front and another nationalist party, the People’s Party of Sovereign Tuva, lobbied for a referendum on secession from the Russian Federation. Tuva’s Supreme Soviet overwhelmingly rejected the holding of such a referendum, given the strong economic dependence on Russia (Fondahl 1997: 218).
* In 1993, Tuva adopted a constitution that was in direct conflict with the Russian constitution and conferred significant autonomy, including precedence of Tuvan law over Russian law and the right to secede from Russia. Also, the republic’s name was changed to Tyva. In a referendum that was held simultaneously with the referendum on the Russian constitution in December 1993, the Tuvan constitution was adopted with 62.2 per cent of the vote, while the Russian constitution was rejected with only 29.7 per cent of voters approving (Orttung et al. 2000: 582).
* Under federal pressure, in 1996 (MAR; 1997 according to Orttung et al. 2000: 582) Tuva removed those parts from its constitution which directly violated the Russian constitution, including powers in the realms of the military.
* Minorities at Risk reports that agitation towards self-determination became more limited in subsequent years, and that levels of protest decreased. However, Goble (2008) suggests that there continued to be separatist mobilization.
* In the 2010s, nationalist and anti-Russian sentiment remained intact (Roth 2015: 172). However, there is no longer evidence of a politically organized movement. Major SD organizations such as Tuvan Popular Front and Hostug Tuva were disbanded in the second half of the 1990s. During that time, the most active nationalists were either co-opted or found dead (Kommersant 2006; Nikonorov 2016). The last clear evidence for separatist mobilization is in 2008 (see Goble 2008). Subsequently, a wave of repression occurred between 2008 and 2010, when several Tuvan self-determination organizations had to disband due to state pressure (Nikonorov 2016). This appears to have ended the movement. Notably, Roth (2015: 170) describes the movement as “dormant” at the time of his writing. [start date: 1989; end date: 2010]

**Dominant claim**

* Information on the exact nature of the claims made is scarce, but what is clear is that there were claims for outright secession, an upgrade to union republic status (during the Soviet period), as well as for increased autonomy (Fondahl 1997: 227; MAR; Minahan 2002: 1939; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 303). In 1992 the Tuvan Popular Front and the People’s Party of Sovereign Tuva collected signatures for a referendum on independence, but Tuva’s Supreme Soviet overwhelmingly rejected the holding of such a referendum. On the other hand, the 1990 declaration demanded increased sovereignty, but (contrary to many other ASSRs at the time, including Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, and Chuvashia) did not unilaterally upgrade the republic’s status to union level. And in 1993 Tuva adopted a constitution that unilaterally gave Tuva increased powers and the right to secede, but without declaring independence. Minorities at Risk notes varying claims being put forth, but appears to suggest that demands have generally focused on increased autonomy. Goble (2008) also suggests an autonomy claim. Based on this, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1989-2010: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* The Tuvan Popular Front was set up in 1989, with some demanding increased autonomy, and others outright secession (Fondahl 1997: 227). In 1992, the Front and another organization called People’s Party of Sovereign Tuva lobbied for a referendum on secession from the Russian Federation (Fondahl 1997: 218). Major SD organizations such as Tuvan Popular Front were disbanded in the second half of the 1990s, but the movement retained a smaller presence until 2010 (see above). To what extent independence claims continued to be made is not fully clear. The best source we could find, Nikonorov (2016), does at least not rule this out. We maintain the independence claim until 2010 but note that this is ambiguous. [start date: 1989; end date: 2010]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Tuvans is the current Tuvan Republic, which borders Mongolia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Tuvan ASSR declared sovereignty on November 1, 1990 (Kahn 2000: 60), apparently without upgrading the republic’s status to union level. [1990: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In May 1990, the Tuvan ASSR witnessed civil strife between the Russian and Tuvinian populations. Charging that Russia had failed to provide them with employment opportunities or suitable housing and had sought to eradicate their indigenous culture, the Tuvinians attacked Russian neighborhoods, setting fire to homes and forcing about 3,000 Russians to flee. According to Fondahl (1997: 218), the Soviet press attributed as many as 88 deaths to interethnic strife in 1990 in Tuva. We do not code the 1990 riots as LVIOLSD since it is an incident of inter-ethnic strife. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Tuva fell under Russian control only in 1914, when it attempted to secede from a China weakened by revolution, civil war, and foreign intervention. After the October Revolution, Tuva’s sovereignty status was in flux for some years, before it became a nominally independent Russian protectorate in 1921. In 1944 Tuva ‘petitioned’ to accede to the Soviet Union, and was incorporated into the RSFSR as an Autonomous Oblast. In 1961 Tuva was upgraded to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic status (MAR; Fondahl 1997: 215-217; Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 303). In contrast to many other Siberian peoples, the Tuvans form a majority within their own titular unit. Still there has been significant Slavic in-migration after Tuva’s annexation. Due to Russian out-migration, in recent years the relative share of Tuvans has increased significantly (from 64 per cent in 1989 to 82 per cent in 2010). In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the anti-Buddhist policies of the Soviet authorities were relaxed (Minahan 2002: 1938).
* In 1988 travel restrictions were lifted, opening up Tuva for travelers (Minahan 2002: 1939) – but this does not constitute a concession as defined in the codebook). In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics and autonomous republics (ASSRs) like Tuva. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. Note: it is not clear whether this concession was made before or after the SDM’s start date. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Subsequently Tuvan attained official language status in the Tuvan Republic. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Sherig-Ool D. Oorzhak was elected as Tuva’s president in 1992 (re-elected in 1997; Orttung et al. 2000: 581). The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center's control of a region. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). Tuva did not sign such a treaty, however (see e.g. Söderlund 2006: 94).
* According to MAR, in May 1994 Yeltsin ordered that certain territories in Tuva be placed under central administration because of their dire economic condition. We found no corroborating evidence, and thus we do not code a restriction.
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. This is not coded since Tuva never had a bilateral treaty.
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which would be coded as a concession were the movement still active.
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). However, direct elections of governors were scrapped only in North Caucasus. In the rest of Russia, including Siberia, regional elections were not affected (Regnum 2022).
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). Yet, the movement was no longer active by then.

**Regional autonomy**

* Tuva had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Tuva has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. [1989-2010: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tuvans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tuvinians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36539000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1989-1991: 0.0005; 1992-2010: 0.002]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 74% of the Tuvans reside in the Tuva republic, where they form 67% of the population according to Minahan (2002: 1965). If anything, census figures suggest that the Tuvans are more dominant in their homeland (64%, 77%, and 82% in 1989, 2002, and 2010 censuses), while agreeing that most Tuvans reside in Tuva. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* MAR and Minahan (2002: 1935) note that there are Tuvinians also in adjacent Mongolia, but they number only approx. 35,000. No other kin found. [no kin]

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## Udmurts

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the more relaxed atmosphere during Perestroika, Udmurt cultural organizations began to be formed in the late 1980s. Their initial agenda was focused on the preservation and fostering of Udmurt culture and language, and not on self-determination as we define it. One of the first such organizations was the Udmurt Cultural Club, which was formed in January 1988; another was the Society for Udmurt Culture, formed in 1989 (Frank & Wixman 1997: 173-174).
* The first evidence of organized separatist claims we found is when the Udmurt ASSR declared sovereignty in September 1990 (hence the start of the movement). After the fall of the Soviet regime, a small independence developed in Udmurtia, of which the Society for Udmurt Culture was an important vehicle (Frank & Wixman 1997: 174). The main drive, however, was for increased autonomy.
* According to Minahan (2002: 1957), the movement was active at the time of his writing. According to Minahan (2016: 439), demands for cultural and linguistic autonomy gained support between 2000 and 2015. Similarly, Nikonorov (2017) points increased support for existing separatist organizations, such as Udmurt Kenesh, and the creation of new organisations, such as the Congress of the Peoples of Udmurtia. The latter lobbies for the creation of Udmurt Special economic zone, which would allow the regional administration to regulate tax rates (Kommersant 2021; Nikonorov 2017). [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Udmurt ASSR declared sovereignty on September 20, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 184). After the fall of the Soviet regime, a small independence movement developed in Udmurtia, of which the Society for Udmurt Culture was an important vehicle (Frank & Wixman 1997: 174). The dominant claim, however, was for increased autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 305; Minahan 2002: 1957). In the 2010s, Udmurt movements continued their demanded for greater autonomy (Minahan 2016: 439; Nikonorov 2017). [1990-1991: sub-state secession claim; 1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* According to Frank & Wixman (1997: 174f), a small but “energetic” independence movement emerged “soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991”, with the Society of Udmurt Culture being the most active organization associated with this claim. We somewhat arbitrarily peg the start date to 1992 based on this. Frank & Wixman (1997: 175) suggest the movement remained active at the time of writing. Nikonorov (2017) suggests that secessionist claims continued to be made in subsequent years, though the account is not fully clear about the nature of claims. [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Udmurt is the Udmurt Republic in eastern Russia (Minahan 2002: 1952). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Udmurt ASSR declared sovereignty on September 20, 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 184; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]

**Historical context**

* Following the conquest of the Vyatka Republic, northern Udmurtia was incorporated into Russia in 1489. The Udmurts were reunited under Russian rule with the conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 by Ivan IV (the Terrible). The Udmurts are a Finnic people. The language of Udmurts is Udmurt Kyl. The majority of Udmurts is Christian Orthodox, with a substantial minority clinging to animist beliefs (Minahan 2002: 1953-1954).
* The Udmurts were awarded with autonomous oblast status (in 1920). The status of the Udmurt homeland was upgraded to that of an autonomous soviet socialist republic (the second-highest status within the Soviet matrioshka federal system) in 1934 (Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 305).
* Despite the promise of autonomy, in the context of forced collectivization subsequent years saw significant centralization and brutal repression. The post-World War II period saw significant industrialization. Slavic in-migration reduced the Udmurts to a minority within their own ethnic homeland. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted increased autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). At the same time, however, Russification continued in the smaller entities of the Volga region: “by the 1960s the Komi, Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts, Mordvinians, and Mari saw the virtual end of support by the state for their cultures” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 155). “By the 1960s, the use of Komi, Komi-Permyak, Mari, Mordvinian, Udmurt, and Chuvash was eliminated as a medium of instruction in the schools even within the respective ethnic homelands” (Frank & Wixman 1997: 160).
* There were, however, significant concessions in the late 1980s, when Gorbachev initiated perestroika. In December 1988 Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow's control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, including increased taxing autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224; Gorbachev 1999: 99; Suny 1993: 144). [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics, including ASSRs, to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205-207; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Udmurt subsequently became an official language at the state level. We treat this as a prior concession since the law was adopted in April and the movement emerged only in September 1990. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* April 26, 1990, the Soviet Supreme Soviet adopted the law ‘On the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation’. In this law, both union republics and autonomous republics were described as subjects of the federation. Previously, only autonomous republics had been described as subjects of the federation, while union republics used to be described as ‘founders of the Union’ (Ross 2002: 20; Dunlop 1997: 35). The exact meaning of this measure is disputed. According to Teague (1994: 29), “[t]he apparent intention of the April 1990 legislation was to downgrade the union republics and hamper the efforts of the independence-minded among them to free themselves from the USSR.” On the other hand, Dunlop (1997: 35) notes that the policy was perceived as anti-Russian, as it threatened the RSFSR’s sovereignty over autonomous republics. Finally, Ross (2002: 20) suggests that Gorbachev’s move was aimed to weaken Russia’s (and thereby Yeltsin’s) position in the negotiations over the new Union Treaty (Ross 2002: 20). Since the exact meaning of the policy remains disputed and ambiguous, and because it was pure rhetoric, we do not code this as a concession (for ASSRs) or restriction (for SSRs).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The concessions/restrictions coding refers to the Udmurt ASSR/Republic, despite the fact that Udmurts make up only about 30 per cent of Udmurtia's population, and that Russians tend to occupy important positions in the regional administration (Frank & Wixman 1997: 174). But the Udmurts are the titular nationality, and titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Roeder (2007: 134) suggests that the Udmurts’ influence over the regional government was most substantial in the movement’s initial years.
* In December 1990 the Russian Socialist Federation Soviet Republic (RSFSR) changed the constitution of the RSFSR to raise the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian Federation (Ross 2002: 21). We do not code this since this action hardly implied tangible consequences, given that Russia’s ASSRs had the highest status within the RSFSR’s federal set-up anyway.
* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. Due to inter-ethnic competition between Russians and Udmurts, the first presidential elections were held only in 2000 (Roeder 2007: 134). Still, the introduction of directly elected governors is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a significant autonomy offer, and also because the centrally-appointed regional party secretary was abolished anyway, implying increased local autonomy. [1991: autonomy concession]
* At the same time Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution adopted shortly thereafter curtailed republican autonomy. Strengthened by the April 1993 referendum that showed an unexpected level of support for his administration, Yeltsin moved to reassert the competencies he had earlier granted to the republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). Note that the constitution was contradictory; some sections clearly favored some sub-units (the republics, in particular) over others (Orttung et al. 2000: xx); that is, republics continued to have more extensive powers compared to other subjects. Still, the 1993 constitution constitutes an autonomy downgrade and is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1993: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). The Udmurt Republic signed a bilateral power-sharing agreement with Moscow in October 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 589; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1995: autonomy concession]
* In 1996 the Udmurt Republic adopted a new law that strengthened education in the Udmurt language, hence accommodating a core demand of the movement (Minahan 2002: 1957; Frank & Wixman 1997: 173-174). This is not coded as a concession because it is the regional government which enacted the change (in which the Udmurts participate), even if it has to be noted that the Udmurts do not have full control of the republican government (Russians, the majority group in Udmurtia, play an important role in the regional government too, if not the more important role).
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The ethnic republics lost prestige – not only were they grouped into the same federal okrug with other republics, but also with non-ethnic oblasts. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). However, direct elections of governors were scrapped only in North Caucasus. In the rest of Russia, including Udmurt Republic, regional elections were not affected (Regnum 2022).
* In 2017, a new Russian-wide language law made Russian the only compulsory language, while before republics were allowed to teach minority languages as a compulsory subject in schools (EPR Atlas 2021: 1595). [2017: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Udmurt Republic had the status of an ASSR until 1990, when it became a constituent republic of Russia. The status of an ASSR was the second highest status after Union Republic status. Even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities (in particular: ASSRs) and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). The Udmurt Republic has retained a certain (yet varying, see above) extent of regional autonomy after Russia became independent in late 1991. Note, however, that the Udmurts make up only about 30 per cent of Udmurtia's population, and that Russians tend to occupy important positions in the regional administration (Frank & Wixman 1997: 174). But the Udmurts are the titular nationality, and titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Roeder (2007: 134) suggests that the Udmurts’ influence over the regional government was more substantial in the initial years. Nonetheless, we code regional autonomy throughout. EPR (2021) does the same. [1990-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Udmurts |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Udmurt |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36530000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.003; 1992-2020: 0.004]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 70% of the 1.02 million Udmurts resides in their homeland, the Udmurt republic in the Volga region, where they make up 43% according to Minhahan (2002: 1952).
* Census figures are different, but lead to the same conclusion:
  + First, census figures suggest a lower number of Udmurts: 747,000 in the Soviet 1989 census, 637,000 in the Russian 2002 census, and 553,000 in the 2010 census.
  + Census figures agree with Minahan in that the majority of the Udmurts lives in Udmurtia (66%/72%/74% in the 1989/2002/2010 censuses, respectively), but suggest that the share of Udmurts in Udmurtia is lower than the figure by Minahan: 31%/29%/28%.
* Nevertheless, the Udmurts can be concentrated in line with our definition. We accessed district level census data (2002 census), and found that the threshold is met if a number of predominantly rural districts in Udmurtia are combined. The Udmurts make up an absolute majority in 14 rural districts, and a relative majority in another two districts. Approx. 41% of all Udmurts reside in those 16 districts, and taken together they make up 64% of the local population. If another 7 districts and the city of Mozgha are added where the Udmurts make up a significant minority (for details see below), we get a spatially contiguous area that consists of almost all rural parts of Udmurtia (plus Mozgha) where slightly more than 50% of all Udmurts reside, and where the Udmurts make up 53% of the local population. [concentrated]
* Census figures:
  + Absolute majority
    - Alnashsky district: 82% out of 23,000
    - Balezinsky district: 58% out of 38,000
    - Vavozhsky district: 58% out of 17,000
    - Glazov district: 79% out of 19,000
    - Debyossky district: 79% out of 14,000
    - Zavyalovsky district: 51% out of 59,000
    - Igrinsky district: 61% out of 43,000
    - Kezsky district: 68% out of 26,000
    - Malopurginsky district: 78% out of 32,000
    - Mozhginsky district: 64% out of 30,000
    - Seltinsky district: 58% out of 13,000
    - Sharkansky district: 83% out of 21,000
    - Yakshur-Bodyinsky district: 59% out of 23,000
    - Yarsky district: 62% out of 19,000
  + Plurality
    - Kiznersky district: 46% out of 24,000
    - Yukamensky district: 48% out of 12,000
  + Significant minority
    - Grakhovsky district: 37% out of 11,000
    - Kiyasovsky district: 38% out of 12,000
    - Krasnogorsk district: 38% out of 12,000
    - Syumsinsky district: 37% out of 16,000
    - Uvinsky district: 45% out of 41,000
    - Votkinsk district: 22% out of 24,000
    - Mozgha city: 26% out of 47,000
    - Sarap district: 10% out of 24,000

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]

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## Ukrainians

Activity: 1945-1950; 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Ukraine enjoyed a short period of independence at the end of the First World War. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, Ukrainian nationalists seized the opportunity and took control of Western Ukraine (Galicia) and proclaimed the independent Republic of Western Ukraine in 1918. In Eastern Ukraine, nationalists proclaimed the independent Russian Ukraine, also in 1918. In 1919 the two Ukrainian states were merged, but in late 1919 the Bolsheviks gained control of Ukraine, and in 1920 the Ukrainian SSR was proclaimed (note that a significant part of Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union only later; Transcarpathia, then part of Czechoslovakia, was annexed into Ukraine after the Second World War, and mainly catholic Western Ukraine, then part of Poland, as well).
* A period of harsh repression followed. In 1930, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was banned. Western Ukraine (then part of Poland) and Transcarpathia (then part of Czechoslovakia) were denied autonomy, despite earlier post-World War I agreements.
* In 1938, Transcarpathia was made an autonomous entity within a federal Czechoslovakia. Transcarpathia declared independence in 1939, but it was quickly occupied by Hungarian forces.
* As a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets occupied Polish Western Ukraine in 1939, followed by harsh repression and deportations. Nazi Germany then invaded Ukraine, but was forced out by the Red Army in 1944 (Minahan 1998: 282-283; Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 240-242; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 306).
* Polish Western Ukraine, Czechoslovak Transcarpathia, and Romanian Bessarabia were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in 1944. This gave rise to a Ukrainian resistance campaign, starting in 1944, that fought against the incorporation of Ukraine into the USSR (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Accordingly, 1944 is coded as start date, though we only code the movement from 1945, the earliest possible date in our data set. We note prior violent activity. We code an end to the movement in 1950 since the movement was defeated and we find no subsequent movement. [start date 1: 1944; end date 2: 1950]
* A period of dormancy followed until 1989, when the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) was formed to advocate for Ukrainian sovereignty (and later independence) (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 250; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 306). We therefore peg the start date of the second phase of the movement at 1989. Ukraine became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement (Banks et al. 1997). [start date 2: 1989; end date 2: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* 1945-1950: the Ukrainian movement should be associated with the ‘Forest Borthers’, partisans resisting Soviet rule and the annexation of the Baltic Republics and Ukraine (Minahan 1998: 168). Hence, we code an independence claim. [1945-1950: independence claim]
* 1989-1991: Initially the main vehicle of the Ukrainian movement, Rukh, did not explicitly advocate independence but only increased sovereignty. This changed with its second congress in October 1990, when Rukh came out for independence (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 250). Hence, we code an autonomy claim in 1989-1990 and an independence claim in 1991. [1989-1990: autonomy claim; 1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date 1: 1944; end date 2: 1950] [start date 2: 1990; end date 2: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ukrainians consisted of the Ukrainian SSR, which initially did not include Crimea, which was transferred to Ukraine only in 1954 (Roth 2015: 155ff). Therefore, we code the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR without Crimea for the period between 1945-1950, and the former Ukrainian SSR including Crimea from 1989-1991, drawing on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Ukrainian SSR issued a sovereignty declaration on July 16, 1990 (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 248; Kahn 2000: 60). [1990: autonomy declaration]
  + The declaration was issued in 1989 according to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 306). The above sources tend to be more reliable.
* The Ukrainian SSR, declared independence after the August Coup, on August 24, 1991. This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and the declaration thus not unilateral in the sense employed here.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* HVIOLSD started in 1944 and continued to 1950 (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). [Pre-1945-1950: HVIOLSD; 1989-1991: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + Ukraine enjoyed a short period of independence at the end of the First World War. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, Ukrainian nationalists seized the opportunity and took control of Western Ukraine (Galicia) and proclaimed the independent Republic of Western Ukraine in 1918. In Eastern Ukraine, nationalists proclaimed the independent Russian Ukraine, also in 1918. In 1919 the two Ukrainian states were merged, but in late 1919 the Bolsheviks gained control of Ukraine, and in 1920 the Ukrainian SSR was proclaimed (note that a significant part of Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union only later; Transcarpathia, then part of Czechoslovakia, was annexed into Ukraine after the Second World War, and mainly catholic Western Ukraine, then part of Poland, as well). A period of harsh repression followed. In 1930, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was banned. Western Ukraine (then part of Poland) and Transcarpathia (then part of Czechoslovakia) were denied autonomy, despite earlier post-World War I agreements. In 1938, Transcarpathia was made an autonomous entity within a federal Czechoslovakia. [1938: autonomy concession]
  + Transcarpathia declared independence in 1939, but it was quickly occupied by Hungarian forces. As a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets occupied Polish Western Ukraine in 1939, followed by harsh repression and deportations. Nazi Germany then invaded Ukraine, but was forced out by the Red Army in 1944. The Polish Western Ukraine, Czechoslovak Transcarpathia, and Romanian Bessarabia were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR (Minahan 1998: 282-283). [1939, 1944: independence restriction]
* 2nd phase:
  + Crimea was transferred to Ukraine in 1954 (Roth 2015: 155ff).
  + Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150). The Gorbachev era saw further decentralization, with the introduction of contested, multi-party elections throughout the Union in 1988 (Suny 1993: 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992). Finally, political liberalization in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s allowed the Uniate church to function openly again after 1987, and received official sanction in 1988 (Minahan 2002: 2075). [1987: cultural rights concession] [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
  + According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Ukraine) and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. Note: Rukh was formed only in September 1989; therefore, it is likely that this concession occurred before the movement onset. [1989: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The immediate post-Second World War period was a period of harsh repression, with mass deportations. In 1946 the Uniate Catholic Church of Western Ukraine was banned and absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church (Minahan 1998: 283; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 306). [1946: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1990 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was given autonomy from the Russian Orthodox Church (Minahan 1998: 283; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 306). [1990: cultural rights concession]
  + The 1990 language law provides further justification for a cultural rights concession in 1990: April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR had not had de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian had merely been defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics, including Ukraine, had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law (see Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages.
* In autumn 1990, in concert with measures taken against the Baltics, there were some attempts to roll back the challenge to Soviet authority, with demonstration bans, troop concentrations around Kyiv, arrestments, and the creation of administrative obstacles for regional leaders (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 249). It seems that none of the actions taken qualifies as a restriction as defined in the codebook.
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* Ukraine became independent with the dissolution of the Union in late 1991. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Hence, we code the Ukrainians as regionally autonomous throughout. [1945-1953, 1987-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ukrainians |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Ukrainians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36502000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code 1945. Ukrainians were represented in the Politburo in 1945, so we apply the 1946 code (junior partner) also to 1945. We draw on EPR for all other years. [junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.17]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1989 census, there were 44 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. 84% of the Ukrainians resided in the Ukrainian SSR, where they made up 73% of the local population. The share had been slightly higher in the 1940s/1950s. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes the Ukrainians in Poland as ethnic kin. The total number of Ukrainians in Poland (1990) was approximately 300,000 according to EPR. There were also approx. 10,000 Ukrainians in Slovakia (MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Uralians

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

* The term “Uralians”, as employed here, relates to ethnic Russians in four Uralian Oblasts, Perm (now Perm Krai), Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Kurgan Oblast (Minahan 2002: 1970).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In the context of the fall of the Soviet Union, Uralians began to demand increased political and economic autonomy, fueled by the asymmetric concessions give to the ethnic republics like Tatarstan or Bashkortostan (Minahan 2002: 1973). The 1992 Federal Treaty, though devolving powers to both ethnic and “normal”, non-ethnic regions, created an asymmetrical federation in which ethnic republics enjoyed several privileges, including control over their natural resources, the right of secession, and citizenship (Ross 2002: 23). The most active contenders came from Sverdlovsk Oblast, Yeltsin’s home region (Orttung et al. 2000: 519). According to Easter (1997: 617, 622), Sverdlovsk Oblast’s political elite began to advocate increased economic autonomy in 1991, hence the start date of the movement.
* In July 1993 the government of Sverdlovsk Oblast unilaterally declared the region a member republic of the Russian Federation, a move that would increase the region’s political and economic autonomy (Easter 1997: 622; Roeder 2007: 192).
* By October 1993 the other Uralian Oblasts had joined the revolt. To pressure Moscow, the Uralian Oblasts began to withhold tax money and blocked Muscovite directives (Minahan 2002: 1974).
* In November 1993 Yeltsin signed a decree to dissolve Sverdlovsk’s regional Soviet and declared all of its actions regarding the creation of the Ural Republic null and void (Easter 1997: 624). Rossel, Sverdlovsk’s governor that had pushed for increased autonomy, was also sacked. Rossel subsequently formed a party dedicated to the autonomy issue, winning significant support in the 1993 regional parliamentary elections (Easter 1997: 625; also see Orttung 2000: 520).
* After negotiations, a watered down version of the unilaterally proclaimed Ural Republic constitution was passed by the Duma in 1994. The most significant concession was that Sverdlovsk was allowed to hold gubernatorial elections (following the adoption of another law in 1995) – thus becoming the first non-ethnic region to hold gubernatorial elections, which had repeatedly been postponed by Yeltsin (Easter 1997: 617, 625). Rossel became Sverdlovsk’s first popularly elected governor (Easter 1997: 627; Orttung et al. 2000: 520), and continued to negotiate increased sovereignty.
* In January 1996, Sverdlovsk signed a bilateral treaty with Moscow, conferring additional sovereignty on Sverdlovsk (Easter 1997: 627-628; Orttung et al. 2000: 522-523). Sverdlovsk was the first non-ethnic region to sign a bilateral treaty (Orttung et al. 2000: 523).
* News reports indicate that the movement remained active in in the 2010s and 2020s (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, Lexis Nexis). In 2003, the "Ural Republican Movement" (URD) was registered, which proclaimed as its main goal "the creation of the Ural Republic on the territory of the present Sverdlovsk and (in the future) adjacent regions of the Ural region." (Kirillova 2017). In 2010, in Yekaterinburg, in addition to the democratically elected mayor, the post of an appointed city manager was introduced, and the powers of the mayor were significantly curtailed. The reforms sparked substantial discontent. The flag of the Ural Republic, adopted in 1993, re-emerged at protest rallies "For Fair Elections" in 2011-2012. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ideas of independence sounded again at the Peace March in Yekaterinburg. The same year, the movement activists were subjected to severe repressions. In the spring of 2016, Eduard Rossel, the former governor who had pushed for the creation of Ural Republic in 1993, returned to politics with cautious statements about the “Ural Republic”. Rossel claimed this idea does not imply the separation of the region from Russia but reminds that de jure, the republic still exists (Kirillova 2017; Pivovarov and Spirin 2017). [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1973), the Uralian movement’s demands focused on increased economic and political autonomy (also see Easter 1997: 631). The unilateral proclamation of the Ural Republic in 1993 was a move to gain increased sovereignty within Russia. The movement continues to make claims for increased autonomy (Lexis Nexis; Kirillova 2017; Pivovarov and Spirin 2017). Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1991-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Sverdlovsk Oblast’s political elite began to demand increased economic autonomy from the USSR in 1991, and unilaterally declared the region to be a member republic of the Russian Federation in 1993. By October 1993, the remaining Uralian Oblasts (Perm, Kurgan and Chelyabinsk) had joined the revolt. For the period from 1991 to 1993, we code the Sverdlovsk Oblast as the claimed territory. From 1994 onwards, we code all Uralian Oblasts as the claimed territory, relying on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In July 1993 the government of Sverdlovsk Oblast unilaterally declared the region a member republic of the Russian Federation, a move that would increase the region’s political and economic autonomy (Easter 1997: 622; Roeder 2007: 192). Moreover, a Southern Urals republic was formed in Chelyabinsk (Ross 2002: 24-25). [1993: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Ural region came under Russian influence in the 16th century (Minahan 2002: 1971). Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk Oblast were established in 1934 and Kurgan Oblast in 1943. In 2005, Perm Oblast was merged with Komi-Permyak (formerly an Autonomous Okrug) to form Perm Krai. Perestroika led to a couple of important autonomy concessions. Gorbachev initiated contested elections throughout the Union in December 1988, a measure tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* In 1989, Sverdlovsk Oblast was granted far-reaching economic autonomy (Solnick 1996: 224). [1989: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In August 1991 Yeltsin created the institution of the regional governor (Ross 2002: 137). Supposed to be directly elected through contested, multi-candidate elections, the governors were to replace the chairmen of the regional Supreme Soviets (regional parliaments), which had been chosen by the regional parliaments (regional parliaments had been elected in contested elections since 1988), and the not democratically legitimized, usually centrally appointed regional Communist party secretaries, which de-facto exercised most authority. Republican presidents (i.e., the heads of the executives of the highest-ranking ethnic entities within Russia) were elected since 1991. The introduction of directly elected governors and abolishment of the centrally-appointed party secretary (which de-facto yielded most of the power) is coded as an autonomy concession since it implies a reduction in the center’s control of the regions. [1991: autonomy concession]
* Through successive moratoriums in November 1991, October 1994, and September 1995, Yeltsin repeatedly postponed gubernatorial elections in the non-ethnic regions and ethnic entities without republican status. With a few exceptions, the governors of these entities were appointed until 1996 (in particular, 45 out of 49 of the governors of non-ethnic entities were appointed). The postponement aimed mainly to hinder anti-Yeltsin forces from assuming power (Zlotnik 1997). Since Yeltsin had originally promised direct popular elections when introducing the institution of the governor in August 1991, and since chairmen of the Supreme Soviet which the regional governors replaced used to be (at least to a certain extent) locally chosen, the moratorium on regional elections in favor of an appointment system is coded as a restriction on autonomy. [1991: autonomy restriction]
  + After the unilateral proclamation of the Ural Republic which was immediately abolished by Yeltsin, Moscow and Sverdlovsk began to negotiate the delimitation of powers. A watered down version of the unilaterally proclaimed Ural Republic constitution was passed by the Duma in 1994. The most significant concession was that Sverdlovsk by the revised charter was allowed to hold gubernatorial elections. Like most other non-ethnic regions, the gubernatorial elections in Sverdlovsk had repeatedly been postponed by Yeltsin (Easter 1997: 617, 625). Rossel became Sverdlovsk’s first popularly elected governor (Easter 1997: 627; Orttung et al. 2000: 520). Given the temporary nature of a moratorium, we do not code this as a concession.
  + In 1995, Yeltsin reluctantly lifted the moratorium on regional gubernatorial elections in the remaining non-ethnic entities and ethnic entities below republic status (Orttung et al. 2000: xiii; Ross 2002: 33). In 1996, the first official gubernatorial elections were held in Chelybinsk Oblast (inofficial gubernatorial elections in 1993 had been declared illegal by the constitutional court), with Petr Sumin winning office (Orttung et al. 2000: 82). Also in Kurgan Oblast, the first gubernatorial elections were held in 1996, from which Oleg Bogomolov turned victorious (Orttung et al. 291). Finally, in Perm Oblast the first gubernatorial elections were also held in 1996, with Gennadii Igumnov winning the election (Orttung et al. 2000: 425). Given the temporary nature of a moratorium, we do not code this as a concession.
* Also in 1991, Yeltsin created the institution of the presidential representative, an institution designed to keep the regions in check (Ross 2002: 137). The representatives, at least on paper, had extensive powers. They were supposed to serve as Yeltsin’s eyes and ears in the regions and champion his reforms. Their role was to ensure compliance of local laws with federal legislation. They had the authority to directly impose presidential decrees, and even propose the dismissal of regional officials. Initially, representatives were deployed solely (or at least mostly) to the non-ethnic entities only. By December 1991, Yeltsin had established personal representatives in 62 oblasts and krais, thus in 62 of Russia’s 88 regions (with Ingushetia splitting from Chechnya, this number soon became 89; George 2009: 56). By 1998, there were representatives in all but four of Russia’s 89 regions, including ethnic republics – exceptional cases (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) never had a representative assigned to them. In practice, the curtailment of regional power was limited – the representatives were soon co-opted by regional elites, and operated more as regional advocates at the federal level rather than vice versa. Moreover, their power was limited due to the limited budgetary and staff resources at their hand (Orttung et al. 2000: xx; Danks 2009: 187). The introduction of presidential representatives is not coded as a restriction since their mandate involved the ensuring of compliance with federal law, which as such is not a restriction.
* The March 1992 Federal Treaty created an asymmetrical federation. It granted the ethnic republics far-reaching autonomy, and they were even recognized as sovereign states with rights of national self-determination including (though that was more theoretical) the right to secede. They were awarded citizenship rights and ownership of their land and natural resources. Republics also were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign countries and engage in economic relations at their own discretion (Ross 2002: 23). Entities other than republics were not granted that far-reaching concessions; still, the treaty implied some devolution of powers also to national-territorial entities (autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts) and non-ethnic regions (Ross 2002: 23-24). [1992: autonomy concession]
* In October 1993 Yeltsin moved to abolish regional and local Soviets (parliaments), replacing them with smaller and weaker assemblies. The decrees were mandatory for regions, but only recommended for republics (Ross 2002: 93). We do not code this as a restriction since the regional Soviets were replaced with an equivalent institution.
* The 1993 constitution curtailed the autonomy of the ethnic republics. With the 1993 constitution, ratified in December, the Federal Treaty (which had granted the republics far-reaching autonomy) was relegated to sub-constitutional status (and thus effectively abolished), all subjects of the federation were declared equal, and therewith all special concessions that had been granted to the republics in 1992 removed (Ross 2002: 26; Dunlop 1997: 53). However, the constitution appears to have left untouched the autonomy of non-ethnic regions.
* The 1993 constitution opened up the possibility for bilateral treaties between Moscow and its regions, a move undertaken by Yeltsin to foster his position and create allies to his cause. The bilateral treaties rapidly undermined the authority of the federal constitution, and often gave the regions significant powers, including control of natural resources, tax concessions, increased economic sovereignty, and increased autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. Attached to the bilateral treaties, there were often also special, usually secret agreements which granted even more far-reaching competencies to the regions (Ross 2002: 41; Orttung et al. 2000: xiii-xiv). Hence, the bilateral treaties established a highly asymmetrical federal system, leading to varying degrees of autonomy. As a general rule, the earlier a Treaty was signed, the more extensive the powers conferred to the region. Tatarstan was the first to sign a bilateral treaty in February 1994, Bashkortostan followed suit five months later (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; George 2009: 70). In January 1996, Sverdlovsk signed a bilateral treaty with Moscow, conferring additional sovereignty on Sverdlovsk (Easter 1997: 627-628; Orttung et al. 2000: 522-523; Söderlund 2006: 94). Sverdlovsk was the first non-ethnic region to sign a bilateral treaty (Orttung et al. 2000: 523; Söderlund 2006: 94). Perm Oblast, along with Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (which was sub-ordinated to Perm), signed a power-sharing treaty with Moscow in May 1996 (Orttung et al. 2000: 427; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1996: autonomy concession]
* Chelyabinsk Oblast signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty with Moscow in July 1997. The bilateral treaty was further specified in subsequent agreements, which are not coded (Orttung et al. 2000: 84; Söderlund 2006: 94). [1997: autonomy concession]
* The center begun to crack down on the separatist tendencies at the close of Yeltsin's presidency (George 2009: 147-148; Ross 2002: 137). By 1999, when Yeltsin resigned on New Year’s Eve, 40 bilateral treaties had been signed, and the situation was quite chaotic: regions regularly passed legislation that contradicted federal government legislation. By way of a July 1997 decree, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen the powers of the presidential representatives in the regions, giving them increased competencies to monitor the implementation of federal programs. The reform ended in failure (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The 1997 reform is not coded since monitoring competencies do not as such infringe upon regional autonomy: the reform aimed to check the unilateral power grabs by many regions.
* In June 1999, a law was signed to regulate bilateral treaties. The law reinforced the supremacy of the Russian constitution and gave regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal law. The law was only moderately successful in this (Ross 2002: 44-45). Still the reform aimed to re-centralize some of the competencies that had earlier been granted via bilateral treaties, and thus constitutes an autonomy restriction. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The campaign against the separatist tendencies intensified with Putin assuming the presidency. In 2000, Putin began an assault on federalism in order to strengthen the ‘power vertical’, thus radically reforming the federal system and curtailing the regions’ competencies. In Yeltsin’s years, the question had been how much power the regions could grab; in Putin’s Russia, the question became how much power the regions could keep. Putin undertook a series of reforms, all designed to decrease the ‘anarchic’ powers of the regions (Ross 2002: 138-150; Gel’man 2008: 10; George 2009: 150-152). First, in May 2000 Putin divided the country into seven new federal districts (federal okrugs), each including a dozen or more federal subjects. Each district was headed by a representative, to be appointed by the president. The representative was tasked, among other things, with overseeing the regions’ compliance with Moscow’s legislation and the Russian constitution. Meanwhile, the institution of the presidential representative in the regions, introduced by Yeltsin in 1991, was effectively abolished (Orttung et al. 2000: xx). The new districts were drawn up as such that they closely resembled Russia’s military districts – in order to give the presidential representatives direct access to the military. The reform aimed to increase Moscow’s control over the regions. It was not fully successful in this, but certainly had a containing effect. Second, Putin granted himself the power to dismiss (under certain circumstances, including the violation of federal law) regional governors and dissolve regional parliaments. According to Gel’man (2008: 10), “[a]lthough this power was never used in practice, the very threat of its use had a serious deterrent effect and reinforced the subordination of regional elites to the Centre”. Third, Putin, in March 2000, began a major campaign to bring regional charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution. In March Putin issued decrees which demanded that legislation in the republics of Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, and Ingushetia be brought into line with the Russian constitution and federal legislation; similar decrees were issued against Amur, Smolensk, and Tver Oblasts. In June the highest court ruled that the republics’ sovereignty declarations violated the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In August, there was a call for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January 1, 2001. Not all entities fully implemented Putin’s call; for instance, Tatarstan and Sakha protested and demanded that the Russian constitution be brought into line with the Republican ones, rather than vice versa. They did not fully comply with Putin’s order (Ross 2002: 149-150). Also, Bashkortostan’s constitution continued to have many violations of federal laws. In the following years, there was a significant recentralization of budgetary flows (Gel’man 2008: 10-11). In sum, the 2000 reform clearly constitutes an autonomy restriction. The introduction of federal okrugs may have primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with federal laws, which as argued above does not necessarily constitute an autonomy restriction. But overall Putin’s assault on federalism clearly decreased regional autonomy. [2000: autonomy restriction]
  + Note that Putin’s verticalization of power strategy entailed other elements, which, however, are more difficult to reconcile with our notion of a restriction. In particular, Putin stripped the regional governors’ right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament, and replaced them with delegates elected by the regional parliaments. This meant a sharp decrease in the influence of regional elites on policy-making in Moscow. Also, the reform implied that immunity from prosecution (which federal legislators enjoy) was taken away from regional executives; hence, Putin could use the threat of prosecution to keep the regional leaders in line. To sweeten the pill to the regions’ governors, Putin at the same time (in September 2000) introduced a presidential advisory board – the State Council – made up of regional governors; however, this body has an advisory role only, and met at the whim of the presidential administration.
* Following a 2003 referendum, Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug was merged with Perm Oblast to form the Perm Krai (Minority Rights Group International; Goble 2009, 2012). Previously Komi-Permyak (an ethnic region) had been sub-ordinated to Perm Oblast, but retained certain powers. During a transitional period lasting until 2008, Komi-Permyak retained its autonomous status. This could be coded as a concession for the Uralian Russians; however, we judged this as too ambiguous.
* Shortly after the Beslan incident in September 2004, Putin announced several reforms in the name of combatting terrorism. Directly relevant to us, in September 2004 Putin moved to abolish the direct elections of regional governors in favor of a presidential appointee system. The regions continued to play a role in the appointment of executives, but their role became much more limited: while regional parliaments enjoyed the right to disapprove a presidential nominee, if the legislature disapproved of the same nominee twice, Moscow would have the right to dissolve the regional parliament (Gel’man 2008: 1; George 2009: 152). [2004: autonomy restriction]
* In 2012 direct gubernatorial elections were reintroduced (Radio Free Europe 2012), which is coded as a concession. However, note that the Kremlin made extensive use of its appointment competence prior to the reintroduction. [2012: autonomy concession]
* Putin rowed back in April 2013, 'allowing' the regions to scrap direct gubernatorial elections and return to an appointment system – a move widely seen as reinstating stronger control of the regions (RIA Novosti 2013; Carbonnel 2013). However, direct elections of governors were scrapped only in North Caucasus. In the rest of Russia, including Ural, regional elections were not affected (Regnum 2022).
* In 2020, changes to Russian constitution enshrined the concept of the Russian language being that of "state forming people". Experts noted that the amendment effectively divided Russia’s population into two classes of citizens and negates the federal structure of Russia (Aleksandrov 2020; Aleksanyan 2020; Krastnov 2020). We do not code a restriction because the change does not appear to have led to a concrete loss of autonomy.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Uralians’ homeland comprises four Oblasts (three Oblasts and one Krai as of 2005, respectively). As federal subjects, the Uralian Oblasts (and Perm Krai) have invariably enjoyed regional autonomy, though the extent of autonomy varied over the years. [1991-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Uralians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36501000 |

**Power access**

* In 1991, the last year the Soviet Union existed, EPR codes the Russians as senior partner and the Ukrainians as junior partner. In all remaining years, the Russians are coded as dominant. The Uralians have access to central state power, though overall less than Russians in the two centers, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Executive power in Russia is strongly concentrated in the presidency, and all Russian presidents were European Russians (both Putin and Medvedev are from Saint Petersburg, and Yeltsin was from Sverdlovsk (which can be seen as part of extended European Russia, even though we code it as part of SE Asia)). Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last secretary general, was also from the European part (Stavropol Krai). Moreover, key posts in the executive are given mostly to European Russians. This is true in particular since Putin took over, who tends to give key posts to close associates of himself, in most cases stemming from St. Petersburg, like himself (Monaghan 2012: 5-6). Based on this, we code the Uralians as junior partner, though noting that at least during Yeltsin’s years a senior partner code could also be defended. [1991-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1970; 2016: 441) the Uralians numbered approximately 12.05 million in 2002 and 2015. We combine this figure with the Soviet Union’s 1989 census (total population of 287 millions) for 1991 and with Russia’s 2002 population (145.2 million according to 2002 census) for the remaining years. [1991: 0.042; 1992-2020: 0.083]

**Regional concentration**

* The majority of the Uralians (Ural Russians) lives in the Ural region (>90%), where they make up 92% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 1970). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* For 1992 onwards, Uralian Russians in Kazakhstan can be considered ethnic kin according to Minahan (2002: 1970). Minahan does not give exact figures regarding the number of Uralians in Kazakhstan, but given the size of the Russian community in Kazakhstan (4-6 million), the numeric threshold is likely met.
* For 1991, we do not code kin. We do not code ethnic Russians outside of the USSR (Russian Jews in Israel) as kin because this is a movement by ethnic Russians that was directed against a Russian-dominated government (i.e. the government of the USSR). [1991: no kin; 1992-2010: kin in adjacent country]

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## Uzbek Tajiks

Activity: 1988-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first report of separatist activity by Tajiks in Uzbekistan we found is in 1988, when in demonstrations in Samarakand and Bukhara (two mainly Tajik cities in Uzbekistan) demands were raised that majority Tajik regions be united with Tajikistan (Melvin 2000: 50).
* In November 1989, a meeting was organized by citizens of the Tajik region of Samarkand, where claims were raised for the autonomy of Tajiks in Uzbekistan, for the removal of borders between Bukhara and Samarkand, and for the establishment of an autonomous republic by the name of Sogdiana.
* The Tajik movement in Uzbekistan remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 311; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Melvin 2000; MAR; also see Tajiks in Uzbekistan). [start date: 1988; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* It is not fully clear what the dominant claim of the Tajik movement in Uzbekistan was. According to MAR: “At a meeting organized on 15 September by citizens of Samarkand, claims were raised for the autonomy of Tajiks in Uzbekistan, for the removal of borders between Bukhara and Samarkand [two regions in Uzbekistan with significant numbers of Tajiks], and for the establishment of an autonomous republic by the name of Sogdiana.” MAR thus sees the Tajik movement as autonomist. In contrast, Minorities International speaks of a movement for outright separation from Uzbekistan. Melvin (2000: 50) concurs with Minorities International, arguing that the Samarakand movement demanded that territories with a Tajik majority should be reunited with Tajikistan. We code the more radical claim throughout. [1988-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* A claim for re-unification with Tajikistan does not amount to irredentism as defined here because both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan at the time were part of the USSR. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Uzbek Tajiks consists of Samarkand and Bukhara, where, apart from Surxondaryo, the most Persian-speakers, i.e., Tajiks, are concentrated (Rezvani 2013: 371). More specifically, the Tajik movement starting in 1989 called for the removal of borders between Bukhara and Samarkand, and for the establishment of an autonomous republic by the name of Sogdiana (MAR). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the 1920s, the Soviet territories in Central Asia were sub-divided into several nationally defined republics, as part of a policy of ‘national delimitation’. Uzbekistan was awarded with full Union Republic status in 1924 (Gleason 1997: 573). Tajikistan became an ASSR in 1924, under the administration of the Uzbek SSR. In 1929, Tajikistan was separated from Uzbekistan and was awarded full Union Republic status (Atkin 1997: 605). However, a significant number of Tajiks lived outside the territory of the Tajik (A)SSR, and thus remained under Uzbek administration when Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were separated.
* Members of an ethnic group with an ethnically defined homeland generally enjoyed relatively little self-determination rights if they lived outside their homeland because they already had titular status in a different entity (Fumagalli 2007: 571). Thus, Tajiks outside the Tajik SSR were not granted territorial autonomy, and were not endowed with any form of special protection (e.g., no language protection).
* Indeed, during Soviet rule, there was a policy of Uzbekization. For the Tajiks in Uzbekistan, the policy of national delimitation thus led to restrictions, particularly on language. Moreover, according to Melvin (2000: 50), from the 1960s education in Tajik was scaled down.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Uzbeks as the Republic’s titular nation dominated the Uzbek SSR, and it is not clear whether (yet unlikely that) the Tajiks constituted a majority in any of the regions. According to Minority Rights Group International, most Tajiks are concentrated in the regions around the cities of Bukhara, closer to the border with Turkmenistan, and Samarkand, adjacent to Tajikistan. But the ethnic make-up of the respective regions (Oblasts) remains unclear. Note that reliable ethno-demographics of Uzbekistan are difficult to get by, especially because many Tajiks indicate Uzbek identity to avoid discrimination. But it seems unlikely that the Tajiks would control any of the existing regions. Hence, we do not code changes in the status of any of the existing regions as concessions or restrictions.
* In 1988 multi-candidate, contested elections were introduced throughout the Union, at all levels. This can be read as a measure of decentralization given that it reduced the degree to which local leaders are de-facto appointed by the center (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). However, this had little effect on the Uzbek Tajiks as they do not control an autonomous region; hence we do not code a concession.
* Following the example of the Baltic Republics, in October 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR adopted a language law that made Uzbek the official government language (Gleason 1997: 583-597). The requirement to speak Uzbek can be seen as a decrease in the protection of the Tajik language, at least relative to the Uzbek language, which was elevated to a pre-eminent status in Uzbekistan. According to MAR, Tajik leaders pointed out that the new language law disregards the linguistic and cultural interests of the Tajiks (though it has to be noted that most Tajiks are bilingual, see Melvin 2000: 50). Thus, we code the 1989 language law as a cultural rights restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Uzbek Tajiks |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Tajiks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36519000 |

**Power access**

* The Tajiks, including those in the Uzbek SSR, were powerless. [1988-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 1989 census, there were around 930,000 Tajiks in Uzbekistan (Gleason 1997: 575). The 1989 census put the Soviet Union’s total population at approximately 287 millions. [0.0032]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, most Tajiks are concentrated in the regions around the cities of Bukhara, closer to the border with Turkmenistan, and Samarkand, adjacent to Tajikistan. The ethnic make-up of the respective regions (Oblasts) remains unclear, however. Reliable ethno-demographics of Uzbekistan are difficult to get by because many Tajiks indicate Uzbek identity to avoid discrimination. According to official figures, the Tajiks make up 5% of the population, but inofficial estimates run much higher. According to official figures, Tajiks tend to live in Uzbekistan’s eastern parts, in particular in Samarkhand and Kashkadarya oblast. Even if the actual number of Tajiks is higher, it appears unlikely that the threshold for territorial concentration is met, given the Uzbek Tajiks’ scattered settlement pattern (see GeoEPR). This is not more than an educated guess, however, for the named reasons. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Tajiks in a number of other countries, in particular Afghanistan (approx. 5 million) (EPR, MAR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Uzbeks

Activity: 1988-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Birlik, the first organization making claims for sovereignty, was formed in 1988 (Suyarkulova 2011: 134). This movement ended with the independence of Uzbekistan in 1991 (Banks et al. 1997). [start date: 1988; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* Uzbek nationalist organizations sprang up in the last days of the Soviet Union. According to Suyarkulova (2011: 134) and Gleason (1997: 579, the common themes included sovereignty, but not outright independence, even in 1991. Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1988-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Uzbeks matches the current boundaries of Uzbekistan. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Uzbek SSR declared its sovereignty on June 20, 1990 (Kahn 2000: 60; Gleason 1997: 580, 597). [1990: autonomy declaration]
* Shortly after the August Coup, on September 1, 1991, the Uzbek SSR declared independence (Gleason 1997: 598). This is not coded since by then, the Union was effectively defunct and thus this declaration cannot be considered unilateral.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is 3 in 1985-1989; it could be that this was due to the sovereignty declaration (though it was issued only in 1990). We found no corroborating reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the 1920s, the Soviet territories in Central Asia were sub-divided into several nationally defined republics, as part of a policy of ‘national delimitation’. Uzbekistan was awarded with full Union Republic status in 1924 (Gleason 1997: 573; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 311). In 1929, Tajikistan was separated from Uzbekistan and was awarded full Union Republic status (Atkin 1997: 605, Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 311).
* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s saw a revival of the ‘nativization’ policy of the 1920s, implying the recruitment of an ever larger number of locals in power in the regions, and less and less Russians ‘parachuted’ in from Moscow (Remington 1989: 150).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1987, Gorbachev stressed the need to democratize the Soviet Union and proposed contested elections at all levels (Brown 1996: 166). At the CPSU’s Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev renewed his commitment to radical reform. He again called for multicandidate elections for regional and local legislatures and first party secretaries. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet enacted respective changes to the 1977 constitution to allow for contested elections at all levels of the Soviet Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites were effectively hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism was more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). Thus, we code an autonomy concession in 1988. Note though that party secretaries, which de-facto had the most powerful position, continued to be appointed. Also note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a separate concession. In 1989 the Uzbek electoral law was adjusted to conform to the new guidelines (Gleason 1997: 578). [1988: autonomy concession]
  + Note that in 1988, multi-candidate but not multi-party elections were introduced. The formation of non-Communist parties remained banned. This changed October 9, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies enacted a law that allowed for the formation of non-Communist parties (Gerner & Hedlund 1993: 126). This is not coded as a (separate) concession.
* According to Solnick (1996: 224): “In 1989 the Soviet government began a restricted initiative to devolve certain functions from Moscow to regional levels, reducing direct transfers from the center while giving regional governments new taxing authority over local enterprises. In line with Solnick, Gorbachev (1999: 99; also see Suny 1993: 144) notes that 1989 saw the adoption of a law which strengthened the autonomy of union republics (like Uzbekistan) and autonomous republics. Notably, other Union Republics (Baltic Republics and Belarus) and Sverdlovsk were granted more far-reaching concessions in the form of special economic status; still this constitutes a concession given that there was some movement in the direction of a more decentralized union. [1989: autonomy concession]
* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law. In particular, following the example of the Baltic Republics, in October 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR adopted a language law that made Uzbek the official government language (Gleason 1997: 583-597). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990, a new secession law was enacted which made it more difficult for union republics to secede. If at all, the new secession law had limited consequences in terms of autonomy, and is hence not coded. Moreover, the same year a law was adopted that, according to one interpretation, downgraded union republics and upgraded autonomous republics. The law was ambiguous in its meaning and, equally important, pure rhetoric, hence we do not code this as a restriction (for union republics) or a concession (for autonomous republics). See the ‘Tajiks’ entry for a more detailed account.
* In December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, and Uzbekistan’s independence officially recognized. [1991: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Soviet federalism had always been highly centralized, especially under Stalin’s reign (-1953; see Tishkov 1989; Towster 1952). However, even under Stalin (the period with the highest degree of centralization) the ethnic entities and especially the union republics had a certain measure of powers as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language. The center’s control loosened after Stalin’s death, and the regions were permitted considerable autonomy from Moscow under Krushchev and Brezhnev (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Under Gorbachev, there was further decentralization. Hence, we code the Uzbeks as regionally autonomous throughout. [1988-1991: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Uzbekistan became independent. [1991: independence]
* Furthermore, some Uzbeks became part of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Uzbeks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Uzbeks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36505000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.02]

**Regional concentration**

* Most Uzbeks are located in the former Uzbek SSR (14/16..5 million in the 1989 census), though there are also significant populations elsewhere in the former USSR, in particular Kyrgyzstan. According to the Soviet 1989 census the Uzbeks formed a majority within the Uzbek SSR: approx. 70% of the local population. This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR and MAR both note numerically significant kin in Afghanistan. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Veps

Activity: 1989-2001

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Under Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies, a Veps ethnic revival took place. In 1989 the Veps Cultural Society was formed, “the first openly Vep association since 1937” (Minahan 2002: 1997). The movement was primarily focused on language rights (in 1990 the Republic of Karelia in its sovereignty declaration recognized the Vep language as one of its official languages according to Minahan 2002: 1997 and Kurs 2001: 79 reports that the Vepsian language has been taught in two schools (Sheltozero and Rybreka, both in Karelia) since the early 1990s), but there were also some claims for autonomy. According to Minahan (2002: 1997-1998) Vep activists “demanded a separate Veps homeland, an autonomous region that would allow the Veps the same rights as other national groups in the Russian Federation.” The earliest evidence for activity we came across is in 1989, when “Vepsian scholars submitted proposals to the authorities in Karelia as well as in Leningrad and Vologda provinces about re-establishing 15 rural councils” (Kurs 2001: 78). Thus 1989 is coded as start date.
* Vepsian intelligentsia furthermore advocated “an all-Vepsian autonomous district” that “was to include Vepsian-inhabited territories in Karelia, Leningrad, and Vologda provinces” (Kurs 2001: 78).
* The Vepsian autonomy movement is noted by Mastyugina & Perepelkin (1996: 73) as well.
* The movement appears to have petered out relatively quickly, however. Minahan (2002: 1997) reports that several nationalist groups emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but we did not find much evidence for separatist activity beyond 1991 and in particular not after the mid-1990s. Thus, we code an end to the movement in 2001, following the ten-years rule. [start date: 1989; end date: 2001]

**Dominant claim**

* The Veps movement focused primarily on language and cultural rights. However, there were some limited claims to autonomy too. According to Minahan (2002: 1997-1998) Vep activists “demanded a separate Veps homeland, an autonomous region that would allow the Veps the same rights as other national groups in the Russian Federation.” Kurs (2001: 78) also suggests an autonomy claim: “[in 1989, ] Vespian scholars submitted proposals to the authorities in Karelia as well as in Leningrad and Vologda provinces about re-establishing 15 rural councils.” According to Kurs, the Vespian intelligentsia furthermore advocated “an all-Vepsian autonomous district” that “was to include Vepsian-inhabited territories in Karelia, Leningrad, and Vologda provinces” (Kurs 2001: 78). Mastyugina & Perepelkin (1996: 73) suggest an autonomy claim too. We code a claim to autonomy throughout. Note: it does not appear that the Vepsian autonomy proposals would have implied the break-up of any existing federal unit, thus “sub-state secession” does not apply. [1989-2001: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* It is not clear to what territory the Veps’ claims were tied as this short-lived movement seems to never have clearly articulated an explicit territorial claim. Therefore, we flag this claim as ambiguous and code it based on the Veps’ settlement areas within the two regions, based on the GREG dataset (Weidmann et al. 2010), which serves as an approximation.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD code. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Veps are a Finnic people located mainly in the Karelian Republic and the Saint Petersburg and Vologda Oblasts (Minahan 2002: 1993). The Veps never had a single autonomous district, neither in tsarist nor in Soviet Russia (Kurs 2001: 70). However, in the Soviet Union’s early phase, the authorities appeared relatively favorable to the Veps. Kurs (2001: 80) reports that among other things, the Soviet authorities supported the development of a standard literary language. However, in later phases, particularly under Stalin, the Veps were subjected to severe assimilation pressure (Minahan 2002: 1996; Kurs 2001: 73). In particular, the autonomous national districts they used to have were all dissolved in 1939 (Minahan 2002: 1996). Note though that repression was stronger in some places (Vologda and Leningrad) than in others (Karelia) (Kurs 2001: 80).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1990 the Republic of Karelia declared its sovereignty. According to Minahan (2002: 1997), the Karelian declaration recognized the Vep language as one of Karelia’s official languages. Minahan may only be partly correct on this as it appears that Vepsian was recognized only as a minority language. In any case, the status of Vepsian was increased. Further evidence to code a cultural rights concession in 1990 comes from Kurs (2001: 79), who reports that the Vepsian language has been taught in two schools (Sheltozero and Rybreka, both in Karelia) since the early 1990s. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1994 the republic of Karelia granted a village inhabited mainly by Veps a very limited extent of autonomy (Kurs 2001: 78). In 1996 Karelia granted the municipal government some budgetary autonomy, but its budgetary competencies remained very limited (Kurs 2001: 79). We do not code this i) because we do not generally code devolution to municipalities and ii) because the extent of autonomy conferred appears very limited. Note: in 2006 the limited extent of autonomy was abolished again.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Veps |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Veps are not represented in EPR. We found no evidence of representation in the national executive. [1989-2001: powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 1993) claims that there are 40,000 Veps, but the Soviet/Russian censuses counted much fewer Veps. Minahan (2002: 1997) argues that Soviet census figures are suspect and that the Veps misrepresented their nationality to avert discrimination. Whether or not this is due to the threat of discrimination, many indeed appear to have stopped indicating their Veps nationality: the number of Veps fell from 33,000 in the 1926 census to 8,100 in the 1979 census. The ethnic revival led to more citizens indicating a Vep identity: in the 1989 census a total of 12,000 individuals declared themselves Veps (Kurs 2001: 76). We draw on Minahan’s figure, in part because we do this also in other cases and in part because it simply does not matter much, given that the Veps remain a small minority anwyway. We combine Minahan’s figure with the Soviet Union’s 1989 census (total population of 287 millions) for 1991 and with Russia’s 2002 population (145.2 million according to 2002 census) for the remaining years. [1989-1991: 0.0001; 1992-2001: 0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* The Veps homeland lies in northwestern Russia in the area near St. Petersburg, where the republic of Karelia, Leningrad oblast, and Vologda oblast meet. We found no exact data, but the narrative in Minahan (2002: 1993) suggests that the threshold for territorial concentration is not met. Note their very small size: 40,000, and the scattered nature of Vespian settlements, see Kurs 2001: 79). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Veps are a Finnic people related to the Finns in Finland (Minahan 2002: 1993). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Volga Germans

Activity: 1964-2013

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, created in 1924, was abolished during the Second World War, in 1941, and the Volga Germans were deported to Siberia. In 1964 the Volga Germans were partially rehabilitated but not allowed to resettle in the region. The Volga Germans began to organize for the right to return to their homeland and the restoration of autonomy. The first evidence of organized activity we found is in 1964, when Russian Germans sent a delegation to Moscow to present a petition for the re-establishment of the Volga Republic (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 342-343). Thus 1964 is coded as start date.
* Some low-level organized activity continued in subsequent years, though the movement faced harsh repression (Minahan 2002: 2010; Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 343-345; Roth 2015: 153f).
* In 1972, Moscow removed travel and residency restrictions on ethnic Germans, though the right to return to their homeland remained largely theoretical and was poorly enforced (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 334-335).
* A number of German organizations emerged in the more relaxed atmosphere of the late 1980s. The Vozrozhdeniye (Rebirth) society was organized in 1988 to return the autonomy of the Volga Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within its former borders. Other German organizations were established at the same time, including Svoboda (Freedom) and the Interstate Organization of Russian Germans (Zwischenstaatlicher Verein der Russlanddeutschen).
* In 1991, ethnic Germans regained the right to settle in their ancient homeland. Most, however, chose to emigrate to Germany or stay where they were (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 346).
* News reports indicate that the movement has continued to be active until 2003: In 2003 the Association of Volga Germans organized a congress in Saratov; the congress called for the restoration of the autonomous status (Lexis Nexis).
* The calls remained unanswered though there were plans to re-establish autonomy. The idea was first raised by Brezhnev in 1972, but each time when the idea was brought on the table it was met by fierce resistance from the Russian population now located in the area that used to be the Volga German ASSR. In July 1991, the Soviet government promised the formation of a German autonomy in the Altai Krai, which was to be the first of a number of autonomous territories for the Russian German population that is scattered throughout the country due to the earlier deportation. However, the plan was abandoned following the collapse of the union (Minahan 2002: 2010). In negotiations with Germany, Russian officials agreed to the reestablishment of the autonomous homeland in the 1990s, but failed to implement the agreement (Minahan 2002: 2010).
* We found no evidence for self-determination activity beyond 2003. Minahan (2016: 453) notes that the Volga Germans, supported by the large diaspora, continue to seek autonomy, including a 2012 plan for the re-creation of Volga Germany. However, we found no corroborating evidence. Therefore, we code the movement as ended in 2013, following the ten-year rule. [start date: 1964; end date: 2013]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1964 the Volga Germans were partially rehabilitated but not allowed to resettle in the region. The Volga Germans began to organize for the right to return to their homeland and the restoration of autonomy. The first evidence of organized activity we have found is in 1964, when Russian Germans sent a delegation to Moscow to present a petition for the re-establishment of the Volga Republic (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 342-343). Some activity in this direction continued in subsequent years, including a 1967 petition signed by more than 8,000 (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 343-345).
* Under the more relaxed atmosphere of the late 1980s, mobilization increased. A number of German organizations emerged in the more relaxed atmosphere of the late 1980s. The Vozrozhdeniye (Rebirth) society was organized in 1988 to return the autonomy of the Volga Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within its former borders. Other German organizations were established at the same time, including Svoboda (Freedom) and the Interstate Organization of Russian Germans (Zwischenstaatlicher Verein der Russlanddeutschen) (Minahan 2002: 2010-2011; Schmaltz 1998; Schmaltz & Sinner 2002). News reports indicate that the movement has continued to be active until 2003. In 2003 the Association of Volga Germans organized a congress in Saratov; the congress called for the restoration of the autonomous status. In sum, the relevant claims has been for the restoration of the Volga German Republic. As the republic would have to be be carved out of existing territories, this constitutes a claim for sub-state secession. [1964-2013: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Volga Germans is the former Volga German ASSR, which currently lies in the Saratov and Volgograd Oblasts (Roth 2015: 153). We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 153).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, and thus we classify the movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Tsarina Catherine the Great issued an invitation to German settlers in 1763, guaranteeing German settlers and their descendants free land, exemption from military service, freedom of religion, and autonomy. A modestly large number followed her invitation, the origin of the German population in Russia (Minahan 2002: 2007). Germans settled mainly in the Volga region, but later also in other regions, in particular the Altai region in Siberia.
* Catherine's successors subsequently abolished all privileges that had been granted to the Germans (Minahan 2002: 2008). Suspecting pro-German sentiment, the Tsarist government ordered the deportation of Russian Germans in 1916; however, the law was suspended in 1917 and rescinded after the October Revolution.
* In late 1917, pro-Bolshevik formed an autonomous government in the Volga region, the first autonomous homeland that was created by the Bolsheviks. The Volga German unit was upgraded to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. Outside the Volga Republic, the Soviets created as many as 17 autonomous units for the scattered German population.
* After the German invasion, all German autonomies, including the Volga Republic, were abolished in 1941, and the Volga Germans were deported to Siberia. The Volga Germans were not rehabilitated along with the other deported peoples in 1956/1957.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1964, there was a partial rehabilitation but the Volga Germans were not allowed to resettle in the Volga region, and the Volga German's autonomous status was not re-established (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002).
* In 1972, Moscow removed travel and residency restrictions on ethnic Germans, though the right to return to their homeland remained largely theoretical and was poorly enforced (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 334-335). We do not code a concession.
* In 1991, ethnic Germans regained the right to settle in their homeland (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 346). In line with the codebook, we code the right to return as an autonomy concession. Note though that few Volga Germans took this opportunity. Most emigrated to Germany or stayed where they were. [1991: autonomy concession]
* There have been plans to re-establish autonomy. The idea was first raised by Brezhnev in 1972, but each time when the idea was brought on the table it was met by fierce resistance from the Russian population now located in the area that used to be the Volga German ASSR prior to 1941. In July 1991, the Soviet government formed a German Autonomous Raion in the Altai Krai, which was to be the first of a number of autonomous territories for the Russian German population that is scattered throughout the country due to the earlier deportation. The plan was abandoned following the collapse of the union (Minahan 2002: 2010). The Autonomous Raion in Altai Krai has very limited competencies. In negotiations with Germany, Russian officials agreed to the reestablishment of the autonomous homeland in the 1990s, but failed to implement the agreement (Minahan 2002: 2010). In the end, the promise to re-establish autonomy was never acted upon (also see Minority Rights Group International). Thus, we do not code a concession.
* Under Stalin a total of 13 ethnic groups were deported – the Soviet Koreans, Finns, Volga Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meshketian Turks, Georgian Kurds, Khemshils (Muslim Armenians), and Pontic Greeks (Pohl 2000: 267). In 1956/1957 most deported peoples were rehabilitated, and the autonomous status of at least part of the deported peoples was restored. Under Gorbachev, the rehabilitation process was revived. November 14, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a declaration (On Recognizing the Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Ensuring their Rights). The resolution recognized 11 of the 13 deported peoples as ‘repressed peoples’ (all except for Finns and Khemshils; Pohl 2000: 268). In April 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Federation under Boris Yeltsin issued another rehabilitation law: On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. The law aimed to lay the groundwork for the political, territorial, social, and cultural rehabilitation of the deported peoples (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). More than a hundred further rehabilitation acts followed in the 1990s (Stoliarov 2003: 92). Richmond (2008: 134) suggests that the 1991 rehabilitation law was, all in all, slowly implemented, if at all. This does not mean that it did not have effects at all. From Stoliarov (2003: 92), for instance, we know that historic names have been returned to villages, cities, and administrative units, and that there was affirmative action in education programs. Territorial reforms were much trickier, partly because the 1991 law was contradictory: it promised the restoration of territorial autonomy as it had existed prior to deportation, but at the same time prohibited the infringement of the rights and interests of non-repressed peoples who currently live in the affected territories (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75). No territorial reforms followed directly from the law. Overall, the deported peoples profited little from the rehabilitation laws (apart from the right to return, which is coded as a concession, see above). Thus, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Volga Germans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Germans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36517000 |

* Historically, there were three major German populations in the Soviet Union: in the Volga region, in the Baltic republics, and in Kaliningrad (Olson et al. 1994: 253-254). Due to migration and the deportation of Volga Germans during the Second World War, the Germans became scattered across the Union. Since most Volga Germans no longer live in the Volga region, the term refers to Germans who historically lived in the Volga region. Not all Germans in the Soviet Union/Russia are descendants from Volga Germans, thus ethnic Germans are in principle not congruent with Volga Germans. Still this is best seen as a 1:1 case. The distinction between Volga Germans and other Germans in the Soviet Union/Russia is largely an artificial one since ethnic Germans no longer live in the Volga region. Volga Germans are sometimes also called Russian Germans.

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1964-1991: discriminated; 1992-2013: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1964-1991: 0.008; 1992-2013: 0.004]
  + The decrease in relative group size after 1991 is due to emigration.

**Regional concentration**

* Only a small share of the Volga Germans (5% according to Minahan 2002: 2006) lives in their former homeland in the Volga region (the former Volga republic), and they make up a very small share of the local population (3% according to Minahan). In line with Minahan, GeoEPR codes the Germans as dispersed. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Germans in various countries can be considered kin: Germany, Switzerland (Swiss Germans), Austria (Austrians), Romania, Italy (South Tyroleans), etc. (see EPR). We code kin in an adjacent country from 1964-1991 due to the Germans in Poland: Poland (approx. 200,000 according to EPR) and from 1992 onwards due to the Germans in Kazakhstan (approx. 200,000-300,000 according to EPR). [1964-1991: kin in adjacent country; 1992-2013: kin in non-adjacent country]

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## Western Ukrainians

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

* The Western Ukrainian movement relates to Ukrainians living in 7 Western Ukrainian Oblasts (Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, and Zakarpattya) demanding increased autonomy and cultural rights.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Western Ukraine, also known as Galicia, was annexed from Poland in 1939. In June 1941 nationalists declared Western Ukrainia an independent state, but it was retaken by the Red Army in 1944.
* In 1989, the inhabitants of Western Ukraine, who are ethnic Ukrainians, began to make claims for cultural and political autonomy (EastBook.eu 2013; Keesing’s; Kyiv Post 2002; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996: 620ff 2002: 2071ff; also see Western Ukrainians under Ukraine). The movement ended with Ukraine’s independence in late 1991/early 1992. According to Kuzio, who wrote for the Kyiv Post (2002), “with the sudden arrival of independence in January 1992, Rukh dropped its backing for federalism and the Galician Assembly was discarded”. Wolczuk (2002: 72) argues that Western Ukrainians increasingly started to oppose the idea of autonomy since they felt that the idea of federalism was manipulated by political elites in South and East Ukraine to undermine Ukrainian independence. [start date: 1989; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* The Western Ukrainian movement demanded decentralization of the Soviet Union and Galician autonomy (within Ukraine, it appears). While vehemently supporting independence of Ukraine as a whole, the movement did not seek the independence of Galicia (Wolczuk 2002; Minahan 2002: 2076) [1989-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Western Ukrainians is the unofficial territory Western Ukraine, sometimes referred to as Galicia. This territory is composed of the Ukrainian Oblasts Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, and Transcarpathia (Minahan 2002: 2071). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Ukraine enjoyed a short period of independence at the end of the First World War. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, Ukrainian nationalists seized the opportunity and took control of Western Ukraine (Galicia) and proclaimed the independent Republic of Western Ukraine in 1918. In Eastern Ukraine, nationalists proclaimed the independent Russian Ukraine, also in 1918. In 1919 the two Ukrainian states were merged, but in late 1919 the Bolsheviks gained control of Ukraine, and in 1920 the Ukrainian SSR was proclaimed.
* Note that a significant part of Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union only later; Transcarpathia, then part of Czechoslovakia, was annexed into Ukraine after the Second World War, and mainly catholic Western Ukraine, then part of Poland, as well.
* A period of harsh repression followed. In 1930, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was banned. Western Ukraine (under Poland) and Transcarpathia (under Czechoslovakia) were denied autonomy, despite earlier post-World War I agreements. In 1938, Transcarpathia was made an autonomous entity within a federal Czechoslovakia. Transcarpathia declared independence in 1939, but it was quickly occupied by Hungarian forces.
* As a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets occupied Polish Western Ukraine in 1939, followed by harsh repression and deportations. Nazi Germany then invaded Ukraine, but was forced out by the Red Army in 1944. Polish Western Ukraine, Czechoslovak Transcarpathia, and Romanian Bessarabia were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR (Minahan 1998: 282-283).
* Ukraine as a whole can be considered autonomous during the Soviet period. However, the Ukrainian regions (oblasts) had very limited powers – Ukraine under Soviet rule was highly centralized (Wolczuk 2002: 68-69).
* Political liberalization in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s allowed the Uniate church to function openly again after 1987 and received official sanction in 1988 (Minahan 2002: 2075). The Uniate Catholic church, to which many Western Ukrainians belonged, was absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church during Stalin’s reign. Subsequently, the church operated underground, and became a major vehicle for Western Ukrainian nationalism. [1987: cultural rights concession]
* In 1988 Moscow introduced contested elections throughout the Union (see Suny 1993: 118, 141, 461; Linz & Stepan 1992; Brown 1996: 179).. However, regions without autonomous status (such as the Western Ukrainian oblasts) profited relatively little from local leader choice because their regions’ decision rights were very limited (Ukraine inherited a heavily centralized set-up from the Soviet period, see Wolczuk 2002: 68-69). Hence, we do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* April 24, 1990, the Soviet government passed the All-Union Language Law which made Russian the official language of the USSR, but at the same time allowed the Republics to establish their languages as state languages (Grenoble 2003: 205; Gorbachev 1999: 99). Until 1990, the USSR did not have de jure an official language (the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian SSR were the only three Union Republics where the language of the titular nation had enjoyed official status already prior to this). Russian was merely defined as the language of interethnic communication. However, de-facto Russian had the role of the official language. Note that many Republics, including Ukraine, had adopted their own language laws prior to the all-union law (see Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). The sub-state level language laws are not coded as concessions since they constitute unilateral actions aimed at raising the status of the titular nations’ languages. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was given autonomy from the Russian Orthodox Church (Minahan 1998: 283). This is not coded as a concession since in Western Ukraine, the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church was dominant (Batt 2002: 160) and the Uniate church had been legalized already in the late 1980s (Minahan 2002: 2075). Moreover, there was a series of autonomy concessions to Union Republics, but these are not coded for the Western Ukrainians since they aim for autonomy for themselves. In late 1991, Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union. However, this is not coded as a concession since the movement is not about independence for Ukraine. The independence movement is coded separately.

**Regional autonomy**

* We do not code regional autonomy While Ukraine as a whole can be considered regionally autonomous, Ukraine itself was heavily centralized, Western Ukrainians presumably participated in Ukraine’s regional government, but they make up only about 10% of Ukraine’s population. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Western Ukrainians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Ukrainians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36502000 |

**Power access**

* The Western Ukrainian movement relates to Ukrainians living in 7 Western Ukrainian Oblasts (Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, and Zakarpattya) demanding increased autonomy and cultural rights. Hence, the movement relates to a regional branch of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. EPR codes the Ukrainians as junior partners, and indeed, ethnic Ukrainians had considerable influence in the Politburo, even if clearly less than ethnic Russians. However, Ukrainians in the Politburo originate mostly from the traditionally more pro-Russian central or Eastern Ukraine, and not from the Western part. Moreover, members of the Politburo had to be loyal to Moscow and to grand Russia; thus, Ukrainians in the national executive can hardly be considered as representatives of the most nationalist of all Ukrainians, the Western Ukrainians. Minahan (2002: 2075) suggests that Ukraine’s Western part was treated differently from the central and Eastern parts, too. For all these reasons, we code the Western Ukrainians as powerless in 1989-1991. [1989-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 2071), the Western Ukrainians make up about 14 per cent of Ukrainians living in Ukraine in 2002. If we use the relative 2002 figure and combine it with the share of Ukrainians (living in Ukraine) in the Soviet Union (roughly 13%, according to the 1989 census), we get a group size estimate of .14\*.13= .0182. [0.0182]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 2071), approx. 79% of the Western Ukrainians resides in Western Ukraine (Galicia), where they comprise 54% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2002: 2071) reports “smaller groups” of Western Ukrainians in Romania and Poland. The total number of Ukrainians in Poland at the time (1990) was approximately 300,000 according to EPR (EPR does not include the Ukrainians in Romania; they number approx. 50,000 according to censuses, but nationalists claim substantially higher figures). It is unclear how many would see themselves as Western Ukrainians, but given the close spatial proximity it appears likely that the threshold is met. [kin in neighboring country]

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1. According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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3. According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. According to Gorbachev (1999: 99), there were two other laws that may qualify as concessions, one on languages which set forth guarantees for their development and utilization and another one demarcating the respective powers of the USSR and federal entities. However, the exact implications are not clear, thus they are not coded. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)